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The Eternal Present of Utopianism

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An Idealistic Approach to Utopianism: Utopia as a State of Mind

Within the large and ever-expanding field of utopian studies and among its ingenious and useful glossaries, the term ‘utopianism’ emphasises a trend of thought that is at the origin of, and permeates, several forms of social-political activity, cultural expression and literary creation with its profuse variations on the textual pattern established by Thomas More. In Joyce Oramel Hertzler’s *The History of Utopian Thought*, published in 1922, utopianism is defined as ‘the rôle of the conscious human will in suggesting a trend of development for society, or the unconscious alignment of society in conformity with some definite ideal’ (1922, p.268). Hertzler was probably the first historian of ideas in the twentieth century to study utopia by making use of a radical or a priori universal principle proceeding from anthropological grounds, a principle that has been expressed in several ways by later scholars and essayists: ‘utopian spirit’, ‘utopian mode’, ‘utopian propensity’, ‘utopian function’ and so on. Hertzler, at the end of a narrative (which includes both an historical review and an analysis and critique of social utopias) epitomising the broad and heterogeneous description of what the author regards as illustrating different stages and different concretions of utopian thought, simply declares that ‘after all Utopia is not a social state, it is a state of mind’ (1922, p.314). This almost axiomatic sentence, reinterpreting the concept of utopia on ontological grounds, is not without philosophical resonances and theoretical implications, some of which we would like to scrutinise in this paper. By emphasising the role of the mind as the determining factor for the general and ultimate principle of explanation of utopian phenomenology, Hertzler is, after all, revisiting a philosophical view
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with a long and prestigious tradition in the western world, which currently goes under the name of idealism.

This same idealist approach to the phenomenology of utopia can also be detected, although less explicitly, in Martin Buber’s *Paths in Utopia*. In this philosophical work, originally published in Hebrew in 1946 and translated into English three years later, Buber, in reflecting on the two main perspectives or ‘paths’ leading the human will toward an ultimate moment of justice (the religious eschatological drive for the expectation of the ‘perfect time’ and the social utopian drive for the construction of the ‘perfect space’) provides the following idealism-tinged judgement: ‘for Utopia everything is subordinated to conscious human will, indeed we can characterize it outright as a picture of society designed as though there were no other factors at work than conscious human will’ (1949, p.8).

But it is not only the scholar and the philosopher that, by different theoretical means and notwithstanding the disparity in the alignment of their own arguments, come to coincide on this idealist standpoint. In 1929, the sociologist Karl Mannheim published his first German edition of *Ideology and Utopia*, translated into English in 1936. In this book, whose main objective is to provide a theoretical framework for the foundation of a sociology of knowledge, Mannheim also relates utopia to different states of mind. He then proceeds to establish a typology of utopias, articulating their different forms with a fourfold classification of the utopian mentality (chiliastic, liberal-humanist, conservative, and socialist-communist). Before doing so, Mannheim discusses, from a historical and philosophical perspective, the formation of the ‘global concept of ideology’ in order to contrast it with the concept of utopia. He states that although ideologies and utopias fulfil different social functions (the former operating as class devices (a set of ideas, thoughts and beliefs) to perpetuate a given social order, and the latter operating as devices of other classes to transform that order), they both have an ideal origin. They are ‘incongruous with’ prevailing life situations and, furthermore, both have an ideal content, since they overlap with the structure of empirical reality by carrying within them discrete and opposing sets of representations of society and the world in general. In Mannheim’s view, the idealist philosophical conception of the world, whose theoretical grounds were established by Kant and later by a constellation of German thinkers, including Hegel, was crucial for the formation of the concept of ideology and, by extension, for the formation of the concept of utopia.
We would like to stress the importance of the idealist theory of knowledge as a key to the comprehension of utopianism as ‘a state of mind’. In fact, this theory regards the phenomenal world as being without self-existence, since its ‘appearance’ depends on the continuous participation of the perceiving mind, the so-called ‘knowing subject’, which, according to one of the principal German idealists, Arthur Schopenhauer, is a general term defining the prerequisite condition for being able to know the world. This means that, for idealist philosophy, the world is a mental phenomenon ruled by spatial-temporal determinations and logical categories, the so-called a priori forms of knowledge, that are inherent to mental processes. Mannheim regards the emergence of this school of philosophy as the first historical and doctrinal step toward the formation of the concept of ideology: ‘After the objective ontological unity of the world had been demolished, the attempt was made to substitute for it a unity imposed by the perceiving subject. ...Henceforth the world as “world” exists only with reference to the knowing mind, and the mental activity of the subject determines the form in which the world appears.’ (1960, p.58.) This means that, for the so-called idealist philosophers, the given reality is always conditioned by the activity of the knowing mind; therefore, for them (and we are mainly referring to the post-Kantian philosophers whose doctrines vary in the extent of the importance they attach to mental activity in its interaction with the material world) to idealise does not mean to beautify or to perfect, but to make present (to re-present) the world through the mediation of the ideas and images of the knowing subject. In this sense, according to this theory, one could say that utopia is but another idea or image of a world already made of, and known by, ideas and images (mental representations) with the difference that utopian ideas have no empirical correspondence whatsoever to the perceived reality. Using Mannheim’s expression, utopia is not only ‘incongruous with’, but ‘transcends’ reality.

This interdependence between subject and object, postulated by the idealist philosophers (although prefigured in Berkeley’s idealism and Descartes’ rationalism), this interplay between the conscious will or mind and the material or objective world may be regarded as having a narrative illustration or fictional correspondence in the name given to the ideal society visited by Raphael Hythlodaeus, the Portuguese navigator to whom Thomas More ascribes the role of discover and describer of the island of Utopia. According to Hythlodaeus, the word ‘Utopia’ derived from Utopus, that is, from the name of the philosopher-king responsible
for the constitutional foundation of social harmony and justice among the Utopians. In this sense, Utopia, the ideal social object, is simply the construction or mental conception of its inventor Utopus, who, according to our interpretation, is a fictional personification of the indetermined subject of knowing. This contiguity of, and interdependence between, subject and object, between the two halves of the process of knowing or idealising, is also to be found in Plato’s theory of knowledge, particularly in *The Republic*.

One of the main sources of inspiration for More’s ‘fruteful, pleasant and Wittie work’, *The Republic*, is also regarded, both in the history of political ideas and in the history of utopian thought, as the very first example of a utopian blueprint. In Plato’s view, the ideal society is the one in which justice prevails, a goal that can only be reached by a perfect correspondence between subject (the human soul) and object (the city). Since, for Plato, justice is the main issue of politics and its principle determinant, he sees it as the achievement of harmony, necessarily both in terms of the individual and city-state. In this sense, the ideal society would be the one in which the dominant characteristic of the threefold nature of the individual soul (wisdom, courage, and temperance) would be at the service of the city, by means of its appropriate integration into one of the three classes of the collective order (magistrates, warriors, and artisans). The same harmony or justice prevailing in the hierarchical distribution of functions between *nous, thumas* and *epithumia*, the three aggregates of the soul, should also prevail in the hierarchical distribution of the governing, defending and working functions ascribed to the three classes integrating the social body. By establishing an analogy between soul and city, Plato was then able to infer that the outside world was an extension of man’s inner nature, that the ideal city depended on the ideal orientation and integration of the quality of the soul of its citizens, and that the Republic was a collective mental emanation governed by the wisdom of its philosophers. ‘So there will be no difference between a just man and a just city, so far as the characteristic of justice goes.’ (Plato, 1955, p.185.)

**A Hopeful Approach to Utopianism: Utopia as a State of Time**

Originally a mental device, utopia is then paradoxically omnipresent with its large and multifarious range of formal and functional possibilities, which operate as alternatives to the situations that are historically represented as necessities. The wide spectrum of these
possibilities (social, technical-scientific, architectural, medical, geographical, artistic and so on) have been studied as 'outlines of a better world' by the German philosopher Ernst Bloch in the second volume of his Principle of Hope, published in its final version in 1959, and translated into English in 1986.

According to Bloch, the primordial and rudimentary, sometimes even frivolous, content of that principle, which in itself is the guiding principle of the transforming utopian consciousness, is the daydream, which 'posits all the figures of venturing beyond, from the noble robber to Faust, all the wishful situations and wishful landscapes, from the aurora in oil to the symbolic circles of the Paradiso' (1986, p.94). Together with his doctrinal, although unorthodox, Marxist view of the world, the idealist dimension of Bloch’s philosophy can be traced back to a theory of knowledge that recognises mental activity as a determining condition for the representation of the empirical world. In fact, when Bloch contrasts the nature of the nocturnal dream with that of the daydream, characterising the latter as the cornerstone of the hopeful or utopian urge to world improvement, he seems to subscribe to Schopenhauer’s judgement that ‘the same brain-function that conjures up during sleep a perfectly objective, perceptible, and indeed palpable world must have just as large a share in the presentation of the objective world of wakefulness’ (Schopenhauer, 1966, Vol.II, p.4). This world of wakefulness, partly conjured up by the brain-function, is the same historical phenomenal world which, in Bloch’s words, can be daydreamed with other presuppositions and other possibilities; it is the material world upon which the idealising function of the brain may supersede other alternative mental worlds. The configuration of these ideal, geographically unlocated places requires, nevertheless, a location in time, and they may take three different forms: (i) they may be synchronous with the historical time of a given social formation (for example, More’s Utopia as a counterpoint to Tudor society); (ii) they may be nostalgically located in a past locus amoenus (in this case, idealisation is prone to dreaming about the restoration of the primordial unity of man with nature, an ideal construction that cannot be accurately defined as utopian but eutopian, to recall a useful and productive distinction provided in More’s book); (iii) they may be projected into some undetermined future (for example, William Morris’s News from Nowhere as an illustration of a twelfth-century pastoral-communist society symmetrically opposed to nineteenth-century industrial-capitalist British society).
Of course, the social function and feasibility of utopian thought is not to be confused with literary works, even if these express the content of a political programme or the will of a social group, much less with personal wishful thinking (as Mannheim remarks, there is no singular thinking, but only participation in group thinking). But our intention here is not to examine the different forms, definitions and conceptualisations of the utopian representation of the world, we simply wish to stress its basic anthropological mechanisms and to recognise that utopia, being a ‘state of mind’, is also a state of time, because it may deploy coeval, past or futurist idealisations. Since it results from the will to perfect and to live a better life, utopia is, therefore, a state of consciousness with different temporal ramifications, somehow coexisting with other states of consciousness directed toward the representation of the actual state of the world. Its temporal dimension thus guarantees its ubiquity, but not its eternity, since eternity is, by definition, a transcendence of the concept of time. This takes us on to the question contained in the title of this paper: whence the eternal present of utopianism?

An Idealist and Hopeful Approach to Utopianism: Utopia as the Face of our Will

I shall attempt to answer the above question within the framework of the idealist school of philosophy and its connections with Bloch’s thought and Mannheim’s classification of utopia. In order to do so, we need to go back to Schopenhauer (a very anti-utopian type of thinker, but very useful for my argument) to remind us that his entire system is based on the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and the thing-in-itself, that is, between the world as it appears to mind activity (the phenomenal world of representation) and the world in itself, beyond the reach of mental perception. Not determined by any form of mental activity, the thing-in-itself is, according to this doctrine, the unknown, undivided and sole essence of the world. Schopenhauer, nevertheless, claimed that he contributed to the unveiling of this enigma when he discovered, within the premises of his philosophical system, that the thing-in-itself is the will, an unintelligible and indivisible will-in-itself that becomes manifested in the world through the mediation of our mental perception.

In Schopenhauer’s monism, the one essential will, when submitted to the time-space conditions inherent in the mind’s activity, becomes perceived in an infinitely phenomenal way; it permeates all phenomena
that constitute the different layers of the empirical world – inorganic, vegetable, animal, intelligent. Furthermore, the empirical world, determined by the mind’s activity, is a non-ending temporal world that, nevertheless, must be coexistent with an inapprehensible present, whose nature is to be identical in all directions of time, a non-chronological, eternal present, named by the scholastics as Nunc Stans. ‘There is only one present, and this always exists: for it is the sole form of the actual existence,’ says Schopenhauer (1966, Vol.II, p.480), adding that the ‘impossibility of directly recognizing this identity is just time, a form and limitation of our intellect’ (p.479). This is so because intellect is unable to grasp the indestructible inner nature of things, the will-in-itself; it can only perceive the individual phenomenal and perishable manifestations of the essential will.

In contrast to Schopenhauer, Bloch’s philosophy does not disregard the possibility of man’s coming to know, by means of some sort of teleological revelation, the thing-in-itself ‘as the face of our own will’ (Bloch, 1977, p.333), that is, as the ultimate human will, leading to the yet-unknown utopia of the final Summum Bonum. On the other hand, what Schopenhauer refers to as the eternal present (a correlative of the willing essence of the world that remains outside the consciousness of time) Bloch designates as the eternal now, an indeterminate and empty now, that seems to pulse in the interstices of time. He calls it ‘the darkness of the lived moment’ (Dunkel des gelebten Augenblick) (Bloch, 1986, Vol.I, p.290–300). In Bloch’s complex ontology, this dark, empty, lived moment seems to be not only the pure source of cosmic and historical time, permanently renewing its beginning, but also a not yet accomplished time, permanently flowing toward its full realisation in a final cosmic state. In other words, the ‘darkness of the lived moment’ is a grain of eternity within time. ‘The Now of the existere, which drives everything and in which everything drives, is the most inexperienced thing that there is; it still drives continually under the world. It constitutes the realizing aspect which has least realized itself – an active moment-darkness of itself.’ (Bloch, 1986, Vol.1, p.293.) This obscure and enigmatic Now is given at the subjective level, but has a connection to the indeterminate or inapprehensible core of objective reality. This most proximate now that sustains life experience, simply because it is the most immediate of all perceptions, is, paradoxically, also the least perceptible. It is veiled by the obscurity of the moment. Bloch uses several metaphors to explain this obscurity. For instance, he recalls the saying that ‘there is no light at the foot of the lighthouse’ (Bloch, 1986, Vol.I, p.295), and
uses the analogy of the landscape painting to relate the indeterminate nature of time (the *Now foreground*) with the indefiniteness of space (the *Here foreground*). Indeed, he asks where the landscape portrayed in a picture begins. The painter does not paint himself, ‘although he is also immediately located in the landscape, as the innermost ring of the Immediate. . . . The portrayed landscape therefore does not only begin, as is obvious, outside the painter who is painting it, but also beyond the still diffuse objects of his nearer environment.’ (Bloch, 1986, Vol.I, p.296.)

Thus one could conclude that, according to Bloch’s thinking, in every lived moment, in the closest and most immediate kernel of time, in the nearest nearness of place, there is no time, there is no place, there is an emptiness, a no-time (a uchronia), a no-place (a utopia), allowing and sustaining the formal and concrete determinations of time and place respectively. Just as in every particle of matter there is a germ of infinity, so in every moment there is a remnant of eternity and an eternal beginning: in every *Now* there is an original emptiness and a potential final totality.

Within the framework of his philosophy of hope oriented toward the redeeming function of the temporal dimension of future (as if the future necessarily accomplishes the final liberation of humanity) it is somehow logical that Bloch would reflect upon the categories of ‘Front’, ‘Novum’, ‘Ultimum’, and ‘Possible’, but it is quite surprising that he would elect the *Here* and *Now* as central categories of utopia. This he does by relocating the prospective quality of utopian consciousness in the mindful revelation of the *Now* of the lived moment. ‘In other words,’ he states, ‘we need the most powerful telescope, in order to penetrate precisely the nearest nearness. Namely, the most immediate immediacy, in which the core of self-location and being here still lies, in which at the same time the whole knot of the world-secret is to be found.’ (Bloch, 1986, Vol.I, p.12.)

In fact, Bloch seems to admit that it is through an exceptional apprehension of this most immediate *Now*, which cannot be experienced within the common flow of time (the apprehension of what he designates the *Unum necessarium* or the sense of the needful unity of everything), that ‘the ultimate utopian state’ can actually be experienced. Bloch defines it as ‘a meeting place of highly ramified mediations between past and future in the midst of the unsighted *Now*. A sudden, not historically horizontal, but vertically striking light [that] falls on immediacy so that it almost appears to be mediated, though without ceasing to be immediate or overclose nearness.’ (1986, Vol.I, p.294).
But what is the real quality of these moments? According to Bloch, these are moments whose absolute presence and whose revelation of the enigma of being (of the thing-in-itself) is characterised by no-mind mediation, prefiguring the consummation of time and history, transcending the self, mind, time and space. In Bloch’s view, the penetration of the darkness of the lived moment involves, therefore, some kind of ontological transformation; it is a sort of epiphanic experience, purely immanent within the structure of the world, in which everything is seen as it truly is. In this sense, to be truly here and now is paradoxically the most utopian and uchronian experience, since this *hic* and this *nunc* are without spatial-temporal boundaries. In its most immediate immediacy, the utopian-uchronic present, in our interpretation of Bloch’s thinking, is (i) a sort of reverberation in the given present both of the creational alpha and the redemptive final day, (ii) the no-place that sustains all places, (iii) a no-time, the now that sustains all time, (iv) the empty place where everything takes its place, and fully is (v) the realisation of an integral *carpe diem* that results from grasping the sense of oneness.

A Chiliastic, Fictional and Real Approach to Utopianism: Utopia as Mindful Awareness of the Now

These difficult, but fascinating, considerations of Bloch on the final utopian condition, along with the imperceptibility of the eternal now have less to do with a sociology and more to do with an ontology of utopia. Nevertheless, they do have a correspondence with Mannheim’s characterisation of chiliasm, ‘the most extreme form of the utopian mentality’ (Mannheim, 1960, p.191). Chiliasm derives its meaning from *chiliad* (*khiliás* is the Latinised Greek word for thousand) and it designates the rising of the prosperous kingdom of 1000 years ruled by Jesus Christ as it has been prophesised in St John’s Gospel. According to Mannheim, this utopian mentality had its first historical appearance after the collapse of Mediaeval ideological structures, in the sixteenth century, when the Christian sect of the Anabaptists and their leading figure, Thomas Münzer, took over the German revolutionary peasant movement. It became the general designation for the state of mind associated with revolutionary euphoria in which time is perceived as having been invaded by a sense of eternity. ‘For the real Chiliast,’ says Mannheim, ‘the present becomes the breach through which what was previously inward bursts out suddenly, takes hold of the outer world and
transforms it,’ and ‘what is important for him [the real Chiliast] is that it
happened here and now, and that it arose from mundane existence, as a
sudden swing over into another kind of experience’ (1960, p.193–5).

Perhaps the best fictional illustration of the eternal present of
utopianism associated with the *aporia* of the here and now is Aldous
Huxley’s last novel, *Island*, published in 1962. Written within the
tradition of the utopian genre, its action is set in the eastern, but
unmapped, island of Pala. Having achieved a high level of social
consciousness based on a deep respect toward life in general, the citizens
of Pala are invited to participate freely in a continuous and wide-ranging
educational programme with the ultimate purpose of enlarging their
field of consciousness and transcending their egotistical perception of the
world. Some of the techniques that are used in this programme are
conducted by the so-called ‘reality revealers’, expert pedagogues whose
function is to awaken the minds of their fellow countrymen to the
immediate reality of their present state. The narrative begins with the
warning ‘Attention!’ sounded by the harsh voice of a bird, some sort of
parrot or jackdaw, one of the many that abound in the island and that
have been trained (not without a sense of humour) to produce that
exhortation. The aim of these birds’ sound was to bring the inattentive
human minds out of their state of unawareness and thought congestion
back to the multiform richness of their present situation. That simple
appeal for attention acquires, nevertheless, a strategic meaning with the
unfolding of the story, since it is at the centre of one of its main themes:
the demonstration of the practical effects of the above-mentioned mind-
training programme. This leads to a personal and collective mind
awakening of Pala’s citizens, to a cleansing of their illusory and cloudy
states of consciousness and of their egocentric motivation. Once
liberated from their temporally conditioned way of being (and seeing),
they are eventually able to perceive the world within and around
themselves as it appeared in the clearness (not in the darkness) of their
lived moment, to paraphrase Bloch’s philosophical expression. In the last
chapter, there is a long narrative on the awakening into the present
surrounding reality of the main character, the sceptical western visitor
and journalist, Will Farnaby. In the course of his stay in Pala, and in spite
of his tenacious resistance, Will has been learning, by means of empirical
demonstrations and not by ideological inculcation or religious
conversion, the transcendental meaning of the given reality in every
moment. Only when he is able to accept present circumstances as a gift
beyond reasoning and conceptual judgement is he ready to submit
himself to a sort of awakening rite. This will then take place with the help of a female initiator, Susila Macphail (embodying the wisdom of the female principle) and, at a given moment, a musical device, Johann Sebastian Bach’s Fourth Brandenburg Concert (embodying the original harmonious state of reality). The result is as follows:

To begin with, it was no longer he, William Asquith Farnaby, who was hearing it. The Allegro was revealing itself as an element in the great present Event, a manifestation at one remove of the luminous bliss. ...The Fourth Brandenburg had an intensity of beauty, a depth of intrinsic meaning, incomparably greater than anything he had ever found in the same music when it was his private property. ...And tonight’s Fourth Brandenburg was not merely an unowned Thing in Itself; it was also, in some impossible way, a Present Event with an infinite duration. Or rather (and still more impossibly seeing that it had three movements and was being played at its usual speed) it was without duration. (Huxley, 1976, p.311-2.)

Something essential seems to be hidden in this most present present, in this most inapprehensible now, as can be seen from the symbolical representation of literary discourse or from the conceptualisation of philosophic reasoning; something that, out of an ultimate will or aspiration to sound the depths of our human condition, ensures the eternal human propensity toward the utopian category of the present. This is not the temporal present of history, but the eternal present of utopia, a present in which what Bloch calls the ‘symbol-intentions of the Absolute’ (1986, Vol.I, p.289) or a ‘flash of utopian final state’ (1986, Vol.I, p.289) may be perceived, which is nothing more than our will to desire the ‘highest good’ (1986, Vol.I, p.305). Part Five of Bloch’s magisterial compendium on the philosophy of utopianism, The Principle of Hope, makes a guideline of those wishful images of the fulfilled moment, that is, of those human experiences that operate as symbols of the realisation of this eternal and imperceptible timeless now.

Within the broad spectrum of utopianism, one may roughly discern two main trends: the narrative (political and sociological) project of improving historical inadequacies on the basis of a rational principle of justice, and the poetic (spiritual and ethical) aspiration to perfect the self, driven by an unfathomable urge fully to realise life. The multiplicity of patterns of the narrative project and the variety of forms of the poetic aspiration coincide in showing the inescapable mental determination of utopianism, as well as its perennial quality. Man’s drive to pursue some
definitive socio-ontological ideal is without limit, and, in its overt indeterminacy, the object of his ideal may be projected neither in the yet-to-be future, nor in the already over, nostalgic past: paradoxically, it may coincide with the drive to inhabit in full awareness the veiled eternity of the nearest present, the now where lies the ‘utopissimum’, ‘the riddle of existence’ (Bloch, 1986, Vol.I, p.293), a ‘zone of silence in the very place where the music is being played’ (Bloch, 1986, Vol.I, p.295).

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NOTES

1. These adjectives constitute the title of the first English version of Utopia, translated by Ralph Robinson in 1551.

2. The first edition of Utopia includes, as an appendix, four parodic poems written in the ‘Utopian tongue’. One of them is by Anemolius, the supposed poet laureate of ‘the best state of a publique weale’. The last two lines run as follows: ‘Wherefore not Utopie, but rather rightly/My name is Eutopie: A place of felicite.’ (More, 1927, p.167.)

REFERENCES


Isaiah Berlin, William Morris, and the Politics of Utopia

LAURENCE DAVIS

To believe the modern-day critic of utopian political thought is to believe that it is responsible for some of the worst horrors of the twentieth century, among them the gulag and the concentration camp. Karl Popper declares that the utopian’s need for a ‘clean canvas’ dictates that he should ‘purge, expel, banish, kill’. Leszek Kolakowski warns in his Tanner Lectures on Human Values that ‘the victory of the utopian dreams would lead us to a totalitarian nightmare and the utter downfall of civilization’. Isaiah Berlin contends that while utopias have great value in expanding the imaginative horizons of human potentialities, as guides to human conduct they are literally fatal. Widely respected by fellow liberals for their lifelong commitments to the values of toleration, non-violence, and the gradual renewal of society via the free debate of ideas and modification of attitudes and ways of life, these champions of the open society are apparently rather immoderate in their unqualified equation of utopianism and totalitarianism.

In this essay, I will endeavour to look beyond the vitriol in order to assess the validity of one of the main liberal arguments against utopianism as a form of political thought. My chief aim is to consider the logic of what might be termed the ‘pluralistic school’ of anti-utopian liberal argument by addressing the following question: is utopian political theorising necessarily totalitarian? The discussion proceeds in three stages. In part one, I carefully outline Berlin’s pluralist critique of utopianism in order to identify the precise characteristics of utopian thought that he perceives to be a threat to individual liberty. I focus, in particular, on the claim that utopias are necessarily anti-political and hence authoritarian in character because they are all premised on the assumption that lasting public disagreement about fundamental matters
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