

POVERTY IN EMPLOYMENT:  
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION  
IN DAKAR, SENEGAL.

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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for  
the degree of Ph.D.

NOTE: Since the original bound copies of my PhD thesis are lodged in the libraries of Leeds University (United Kingdom) and the Universidade de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro (Portugal) and not readily accessible for copying, I have used digitisation and OCR software to "reconstruct" the text from a rather poor photocopy of the 1979 typescript. The text is essentially the same, but the pagination is slightly different and, as and when I found typographical errors and stylistic inconsistencies, these have been corrected. Also, the tables and figures have been reformatted and the maps "refreshed". For any remaining defects of this sort that I may have missed, please accept my apologies. [Chris Gerry 2018]

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## S U M M A R Y

This study of petty commodity production in Senegal's capital city, Dakar, begins with a critique of conventional social scientific analyses of the "non-industrially-employed" segments of the labour-force in underdeveloped capitalist economies. In doing so, it also examines the contributions already made by radical theorists in this field, and offers an initial framework of problematics and concepts on which a more detailed materialist analysis might be based.

Following this introduction, the concept of petty commodity production is analysed in some detail, with reference to both the classical and contemporary Marxist literature. Subsequently, the historical evolution and dynamic of petty commodity production is traced in general terms for Europe, and then with specific reference to the Senegambian region of West Africa.

The composition and organisation of the labour-force in petty commodity production is then closely examined on the basis of data collected in a questionnaire survey of 285 workshop-based small producers. The labour-force and the labour process are then disaggregated in order to identify the various forms and degrees of proletarianisation experienced by petty producers and their labourers. Finally, the conventional policies for the "promotion" of small scale industry and services in under-developed capitalist countries are critically evaluated in both their national and international contexts.

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
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Swansea, January 1979.

MAP I. CONTEMPORARY SENEGAL



Railroads - - - - - Principal Roads = = = = =

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## CHAPTER 1

### THE LABOUR FORCE IN UNDER-DEVELOPED CAPITALIST ECONOMIES. A CRITIQUE OF DUALISM

#### 1.1. INTRODUCTION: ORTHODOX SOCIAL SCIENCE & THE "PROBLEM" OF POVERTY.

It was only towards the end of the nineteenth century, after the Reform Bill, and at the height of British imperial hegemony, that conventional British social science started even to pay lip-service to a study of the lives of that "crowd of dwarfs and cripples" whom Charles Kingsley had considered such an inadequate measure of Man's historical evolution and achievement (1). But even as the social historians, the philanthropists, and others discovered that labourers and laundry-women, too, were part of history, and a significant factor in the economy and society of the day, they necessarily restricted their interest to their own national boundaries. Despite the vastness of the imperial spheres of domination of that time, the great debate centred upon how best the problems of the metropolis should be solved; the poor and the needy, as well as the rising industrial proletariat, were increasingly becoming a crucial variable in those deliberations.

In Britain, many theorists (such as the Fabians) were suggesting that the inefficiencies of capitalism could be solved by disinterested State intervention (on a scale unthinkable at the time) in conjunction with an expanded and intensified colonial exploitation. Concern was growing over the conditions in which

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(1) The full quote, from Kingsley's 1861 inaugural lecture as Professor of History at Cambridge, is as follows: "(T)he new science of little men can be no science at all; because the average man is not the normal man, and never yet has been; because the great man is rather the normal man, as approaching more nearly than his fellows to the true 'norma' and standard of a complete human character. (...) (T)o turn to the mob for your theory of humanity is (...) about as wise as to ignore the Apollo and the Theseus, and to determine the proportions of the human figure from a crowd of dwarfs and cripples." Quoted in Blackburn (1972:98).

workers lived and laboured, and over the effects that these conditions might have on the political status, activities and consciousness of such workers. However, it was not until the forties and fifties of the present century that this interest was exported in the "peripheral" areas of the world, many of which were on the very threshold of nominal political independence. In many respects this world-wide "enfranchisement" had similar effects to those that followed the reform bills of Europe. It was at about this time (though such areas as Latin America had gained independence at an earlier date) that Western social scientific analysis focused on "the poor", "urban unrest", "the employment problem", etc., in these countries - countries over which the developed capitalist economies no longer had direct political power, but over whom it was in capitalism's interests to continue exerting as much economic and cultural domination as possible.

This period of heightened interest in the socio-economic problems that were emerging in under-developed capitalist economies coincided with the period of relatively rapid industrialisation (albeit of a distorted nature) in many of these countries. The "problem" cited above, once conceptualised, gave rise to "solutions" (either in terms of theory or policy) that in the main were predicated upon the functionalist approach: anthropology, sociology and economics were permeated to the core with functionalism of one sort or another.

Functionalist anthropologists such as Malinowski, Evans-Prichard and Gluckman, postulated that all actions were value-oriented and value-originating; all values were held to be balanced, and thus society itself was in harmony, with no fundamental disequilibria existing. In sociology, the situation was very similar, though later on, the so-called structural-functionalists did allow for a small degree of disharmony or "dysfunction". Nevertheless, such occurrences were held to be aberrations from the harmonious norm, since dysfunction originated

in the societal superstructure and not in its basic fabric (2). In the field of economics, harmony and equilibrium reigned equally supreme; external pressures on the fundamentally static environment were seen as the mechanism whereby change occurred, but this transition was understood to be between different equilibria. Disequilibrium was an aberration and was remediable, and thus bourgeois economics was the exact counterpart of functional anthropology and structural/structural-functional sociology (3).

Consequently, conventional social scientific analysis in general, and economic analysis of labour and employment problems in particular, had an essentially dualistic vision and a partial, residual conception of the under-developed capitalist economy. This paradigm is still heavily in evidence today. Bourgeois economics is predicated on stasis, and necessarily takes a reformist stance in the context of both analysis and policy-formulation. These characteristics of the conventional approach apply equally as well to its general consideration of the economic system as a whole, as to its more specific treatment of labour and employment problems in under-developed capitalist economies. Conventional economics exemplifies much of what is mystifying and unscientific in social science in general. The contemporary form of bourgeois economics can be generally defined as neo-classical. Kay (1975:4-5) characterises this economics as follows:

- (1) it defines its object of study as the allocation of scarce means to un-limited ends, and is thus ahistorical, since it regards scarcity to be universal;

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(2) However, what the functionalists and their "permissive" heirs saw as society's fabric, Marxists would take to be merely the superstructure.

(3) This paragraph draws heavily on the seminar paper "Methodology: the dialectic", given by Prof. V.L. Allen to his graduate seminar in the School of Economic Studies, Leeds University, 2nd October, 1972.

- (2) it assumes social harmony, and thus all conflicts are but transitory aberrations from the norm;
- (3) it assumes three factors of production (land, labour and capital) are materially indispensable to the process of production, and socially are each other's equivalent; and
- (4) it assumes capitalist property relations to be not only universal, but also desirable.

In more detailed terms, Gordon (1972:26-52) identifies six clusters of common assumptions and hypotheses that form the core of the conventional theory of income-determination and income-distribution. This theory cannot be considered to be unified or coherent, and tends to concentrate on specific areas of socio-economic phenomena at the expense of other very significant areas.

- (1) Conventional theory assumes that, in the short-run and under conditions of perfect competition, (circumstances that, ironically, are more relevant to petty commodity than capitalist production), incomes are equal to the marginal productivities of the corresponding labour inputs. One must assume that conventional theory sees the real world as departing from this model only in terms of the most insignificant details, irrespective of the fact that no acceptable empirical evidence can be advanced to support the contention that incomes do reflect marginal productivities.
- (2) Orthodox supply theory has been extensively used to study poverty and its associated employment problems: the poor are assumed to have a limited or even zero supply of the types of productivity normally assumed to form the basis for the demand for labour (namely, inherent skills, formal education, vocational education, on-the-job training and experience acquired through employment). Thus the clear policy-conclusion of such an analysis is the extended provision of access to such sources of labour productivity to those who currently have least to offer the formal labour market.
- (3) As noted above by Kay, orthodox theory assumes a basic harmony of interest between all parties to the production process and labour market. Thus the status quo ensures all participants the optimum stake in the purchase and sale of labour and the consequent production of commodities. Low incomes and sub-optimal productivity are considered to be aberrations from this "Pareto" optimum. Policy-intervention at the margin constitutes the means whereby current disequilibria can be minimised or even eradicated.

- (4) Conventional theory's search for relevant models of exchange societies, both implicitly and explicitly demands simplicity, universality and fruitfulness (Gordon 1972: 17-21). Even though the fundamental assumptions of these models of income determination and employment are normally relaxed in order to emphasise a desire for universal applicability and real-world relevance, the focus on simplicity, universality and the "importance" of the hypothesis almost inevitably militates against the relaxation of assumptions to the extent that embarrassing questions concerning the inability of capitalism to ensure socially-productive full employment and the equitable distribution of income are comprehensively avoided.
- (5) As an extension of orthodox theory's adherence to assumptions of societal harmony, consensus and the "Pareto" optimum, conventional analysts leave out of account any possibility of social or institutional change: as long as this fixed-institutions framework is maintained, and the aggregation of individual preferences can never lead to structural change in the environment to which individuals are deemed to respond.
- (6) Though this facet of conventional theory normally remains buried under pseudo-sophisticated technical formulations, the assumption that the worker is equally "sovereign" as the consumer (in this instance, with respect to hours worked, contracts entered into, skill-acquisition and level of training), remains in force. Thus in whatever situation the worker finds him or herself, this can be considered to be a freely-chosen optimum. The extent to which institutions, relations of production and differential ownership of the means of production restrict such choice, is largely excluded from the analysis.

In conclusion, conventional theory remains fundamentally apologetic, assumes capitalism to be both desirable and universal, and cannot explain persistent poverty and institutionalised income inequality both between and within social groups and different modes of productive activity. Such questions go to the heart of political structures and political change, class relations and the distribution of ownership of the means of production, a subject that orthodox economists are still loath to incorporate into their models. Yet by the very operation and continued hegemony of orthodox economic theory, the political change it refuses to countenance remains an important object of study and action for

only a relative minority of writers, theoreticians and political activists.

In the following sections of this chapter, various models of income determination, and of the distribution of economic functions within the urban economy of under-developed capitalist economies, are outlined and critically evaluated.

## 1.2. EMPLOYMENT IN UNDER-DEVELOPED CAPITALIST ECONOMIES: THE DUALISTIC APPROACH

### 1.2.1. Introduction

Bourgeois economics and its specific analysis of labour-power and the labour force tends to be based upon a simplistic and dualistic notion of how a socio-economic system operates. The term "dualism" as used here is not meant to merely describe a theoretical process of isolating characteristics and the formation of a dichotomous model intended to represent the fundamental elements in a system. More than just a technical term, "dualism" refers to a pseudo-scientific approach that treats the elements in the dichotomy as if they were separate and autonomous entities, rather than components. While the dualistic approach will support the thesis that black and white are in some way opposites, it barely ever pays more than lip-service to the proposition that certain fundamental laws may link those opposites together both theoretically and in reality, thereby enabling the analyst to both see black in terms of white (as well as vice versa) and to see both in terms of a common mechanism that brings them both into existence. Consequently, specific differences tend to be ignored, while superficial superstructural dissimilarities are fetishised.

The characteristics of a particular form of economic organisation (such as petty commodity production, for example), upon which dualistic analysis lays such stress, are however nothing

more than the manifestations of a complex set of relations between the various components of a socio-economic formation. The nature of this overall set of relations will be largely determined by the nature of the mode of production that is dominant at that time. It is probably the preoccupation with characterisation and the refinement of definitions and typologies on the part of dualistic analysts that has been at the root of their failure: to an important extent they have neglected the fact that it is the relations between the different components in a socio-economic formation that determine which phenomena will appear to characterise each separate element. These relations, and not the characteristics to which they give birth lay the foundation for the functioning of the whole system.

Thus the dualistic approach has sentenced to death by bourgeois analysis those parts of social reality that appear to correspond most closely to capitalism; any form or system that does not appear close to this model is relegated to an analytical residuum, where it is at the mercy of the most superficial, barren and often tautological analysis that conventional social science can offer. However, there is no reason why a model cannot be constructed in which "dualities" are recognised and utilised, without the above problems destroying the validity of the model (see e.g. Quijano 1974). Nevertheless, this is only the case when the identification of "opposites" (or dualities) is used to emphasise and give content to an essential unity (e.g. that existing between low levels of labour-remuneration and high levels of capital accumulation). This is precisely where a focus on relations rather than characteristics is crucial. The more prevalent forms of dualism are based on an ahistorical analytical framework, in which the universal applicability of predictions derived from static (or, at best, comparative static) analysis is taken for granted. This allegation can readily be substantiated by an examination of conventional analyses of the involvement (both potential and actual) of the labour force in capitalist

production. For example, in Western capitalist economies, it is normal that a large section of the economically active labour-force be involved in industrial, commercial and services wage-employment. More than this, it was essential that such a predominantly wage-earning labour force be created for the successful transition of these economies to fully-fledged capitalism.

When analysing the labour force of a contemporary under-developed capitalist economy, conventional economists have tended to make uncritical use of what might be termed an employment - underemployment - unemployment continuum, so much so that they not only assume that it accurately reflects the reality in developed capitalist economies, but also take it to be universally applicable. Thus in the hope of determining the role and status of various sections of such a labour force, they disregard the different conditions under which industrialisation proceeded and a wage-labour force emerged in economies characterised respectively by relatively more and less developed capitalist social relations. The relations that exist between a dominant mode of production (viz. capitalism on an international scale) and various coexisting modes or forms of production, are equally neglected.

In reality, what is posited as a universal typology of labour force participation - the conventional employment continuum - is in fact nothing more than a typology that relates specifically to what appears to take place within the core economies of the capitalist mode of production. Employment is analysed in the context of the relative and differential availabilities of "complementary factors of production", e.g. capital (conventionally defined in terms of material means of production), wage-labour, land, and entrepreneurial skills. The lack of some factors of production, or their disproportionality with respect to the needs of highly productive, high profit capitalist production, has long been considered among conventional economists to be a major constraint to development. But such problems represent a constraint to what sort of development? Such apparent scarcities

only make sense when considered as part and parcel of those constraints that impede capitalist development, the development of a mode of production predicated upon man-made scarcity (rather than that ordained by natural conditions and/or the level of development of society's productive forces).

The policy-prescriptions derived from the conventional analysis of labour utilisation provide relatively simple answers that, understandably, have positive value only for the process of capitalist development. The need for rapid inflows of capital is normally stressed, as is the large scale expansion of "modernising" production processes predominantly oriented towards the transformation and/or exportation of primary products, along with small sectors based on import-substitution (either for domestic consumption, or, increasingly, for export). The cynicism of these policy-prescriptions is clear in this instance. Modernisation in the recent past has meant that under-developed countries (and especially their capital cities) now have their own prestige buildings, and such essential industries as Coca-Cola bottling plants, cigarette factories, etc. Elsewhere, massive capital inflows have created cheap-labour light-industrial sectors that have little direct and positive effect on authentic development.

The conventional approach to the study of employment therefore locates the main "problem" in (a) the scarcity of capital (4); (b) the high incidence of low-productivity employment; and (c) the very existence of the underemployment. Not only does this approach have the crucial drawback of assuming the universality and desirability of the capitalist mode of production and the capitalist road to "development", but capital itself is deemed to be the source of all employment. In reality, the phenomenon somewhat mystifyingly labelled "underemployment" is a direct result of a mode of production based on class divisions and

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(4) For an interesting discussion of the capital-scarcity versus capital-abundance debate, see Emmanuel (1974: 61-82).

grossly inequitable distribution of the product of social production. As Quijano (1974:426) has commented:

"It is not the class of productive resources, the technology employed, but the class of interests in whose benefit those resources are used which is the basis of the 'employment problem' now worsening for the bulk of the population of our societies. This does not constitute a technical problem for the present system of production, that is, for its dominant groups. It begins to constitute a 'problem' for them in the socio-political field, to the extent that there are emerging everywhere the first indications that the sharpening of conflicts and contradictions of the society as a whole derive mainly from the growth of this sector of the labour force excluded from the significant levels of employment in the system."

The phenomenon described as "underemployment" is far more the employment problem often described as "Marxian" (where capitalist production has an inherent inability and lack of motivation - even at full capacity - to make use of all available labour-power), than that normally termed "Keynesian" (where the major causal factor is deemed to be deficient effective demand) (Robinson & Eatwell 1974: 116-117; Kay 1975:153-155).

The Keynesian prediction, when applied to an under-developed capitalist economy, seems facile in the face of available evidence: it tells us that quite probably the value of consumption, the extent of investment and the size of government expenditure will generate an insufficient level of national output and national income relative to what the nation's full potential for output and income-generation could be. If this prediction seems facile, the proposals for eradicating the problem seem wholly improbable: through whatever orthodox means possible, create more demand! But these means are unlikely to prove successful not, as Todaro (1977:177-179) suggests, because of highly imperfect factor markets with institutionalised bottlenecks on the supply side, or even because of what he calls "induced" rural-urban migration, though, of course these factors

are not without importance. What type of demand is to be generated and by whom? The failure of the market to ensure a full-employment equilibrium demands that the government intervene to some extent. But the combination of Keynesian demand-creation and neo-colonial class-structure only ensure that the demand that is ultimately stimulated is primarily one for privileged consumption items, often requiring an excessive level of imports. Does this matter if employment is created and money-incomes generated? It does, since it is not the fact of employment, nor just the monetary outcome for the worker that is important: precisely what is produced and for which purpose, under what circumstances, with what technology and for whom are all crucial questions that Keynesian analysis fails to address, let alone answer.

The extension of the Keynesian approach, as elaborated in the period immediately after the Second World War, focused on the problem of accelerating the rate of economic growth. The manner in which this acceleration could be achieved, it was maintained, was through the encouragement of the savings and the capital accumulation that this was thought to engender. If growth were maximised, then problems of labour-absorption would become less onerous (Todaro 1977:179). The reason for the "disappointing" results (namely that "in spite of relatively impressive rates of industrial output growth in many less developed countries, the rate of employment growth has lagged significantly behind") is to be found in the very nature of capitalism: the capitalist mode of production is characterised by the pursuit of increased rates of capital accumulation predicated upon the increases in the productivity of labour to which progressively higher capital-labour ratios give rise. A higher level of labour productivity has a contradictory nature, as Todaro (1977:180) rightly points out:

"In general, increases in labor productivity are desirable. But what is really desirable are increases in 'total' factor productivity: output per unit of all resources. The productivity of labor can increase for a variety of reasons; some good and some not so good. Improved

education, better training and better management are all desirable forms of human resource growth. But increases in labor productivity as a result of the substitution of capital for labor in production processes or as a result of the importation of sophisticated and expensive labour-saving machinery and equipment (...) may be less satisfactory in heavily populated nations. Not only can such capital accumulation waste valuable domestic financial resources and foreign exchange, it can also curtail the growth of new employment opportunities. Moreover, the importation of inappropriate and expensive labor-saving capital equipment may, in fact, reduce total factor productivity and thereby increase average costs of production even though it increases labor productivity."

In fact, employment-growth has not lagged behind at all. Todaro's comments exemplify the strategic assumption made by numerous observers: when they talk of "employment", they automatically assume this to be capitalist wage-employment, just as "development" is so often assumed without argument to be "capitalist" in nature. What has happened in this world of increasing labour-productivity is that the mass of the urban population and increasingly large sections of the rural labour force have been induced to find means of generating incomes that fall "outside" the familiar dichotomy of subsistence and/or cash crop agriculture (on the one hand) and industrial wage-labour (on the other). These activities - variously termed "refuge occupations", "marginal" or "informal" - have provided an additional focus for conventional economists, namely the study of "unemployment" and "underemployment".

### 1.2.2. Unemployment

It can be safely assumed that "unemployment" (in the conventional Western sense of the term) barely exists in under-developed capitalist economies (5). Of course, the term "unemployed" can be

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(5) For a detailed discussion of the relevance of the term "unemployed" in the context of under-developed economies, see Weeks (1971:11-21).

used idiosyncratically in order to describe a particular type of sub-optimal labour-utilisation: its utility in this context remains dubious, as the following quote from Viner (1957) indicates:

"Let me (...) suggest the possibility of a special kind of unemployment which is not 'disguised' or 'hidden', but is open and voluntary. This is the kind of unemployment which would arise from a rise in productivity, or in income per time-unit of labour, when the supply curve of labour was (...) 'rising-backward' (...) When income per time-unit of labour and aggregate income per labourer both rise, the labourer's relative valuation of marginal units of leisure and wages per unit of labour may so change as to make a shorter working-day, week or year attractive even at the cost of a smaller increase in the size of the pay envelope."

No mention is made of the conditions under which such changes in productivity or income-levels would occur, or to what extent it would affect cultivators, or urban wage-workers or the self-employed. The homogeneity of the economic group is assumed - it is seen in isolation - and yet its access to the means of technological advance and capital accumulation is taken for granted.

It appears that even the most enlightened definition of unemployment with respect to West Africa would virtually define the category out of existence: if one states quite seriously that the unemployed comprise

- (1) those who have received some degree of secondary education, but do not exercise their skills due to the lack of employment commensurate with their aspirations, and who are thus largely inactive and/or parasitic;
- (2) those who have lost employment they formerly held and are consciously seeking new employment; and
- (3) those who have no habitual (even if precarious) income generating possibilities (other than eliciting transfers) yet who actively search for work,

then a multitude of differentiated groups are admitted into the category of the "unemployed", thereby removing any definitional clarity and analytical relevance that might otherwise have emerged. One is left with a largely residual category that tells

us little except the obvious - namely that the labour force in under-developed capitalist economies is a complex phenomenon that we barely understand. The whole process of identifying labour-utilisation in terms of what it is not (i.e. not enough, not in a sector with which we are familiar, not sufficiently productive, etc.), diverts attention away from the fundamental issue of production. From capitalist exploitation at the "top" down to begging at the "bottom" of the economically active population, virtually all people have access to income generating possibilities, even if the distribution of these possibilities is highly asymmetrical and inequitable. People generate incomes in many ways - direct production, distribution, various service occupations, various positions of authority, supervision, etc., and through the ownership of means of production and concomitant process of appropriation of surplus-labour. Thus it is production that provides us with the most appropriate starting point for an analysis of the utilisation of labour power.

### 1.2.3. The concept of underemployment

Possibly one of the most comprehensive reviews of the deficiency of conventional social scientific (and particularly economic) analysis of labour force participation in under-developed capitalist economies is that provided by Myrdal (1968: III, 2041-2061). There are many criticisms that can be levelled at Myrdal's own analysis, particularly with respect to the fact that his "immanent critique" provides no real alternative analytical framework. In fact, the writer concludes by saying that the major fault lies in the abstraction of conventional theory from the imperatives of policy-making, and appears to imply that were the theoretical and the practical aspects to be unified in an enlightened manner, most of the problems of "underemployment" would be resolved. The lack of an alternative methodology relegates Myrdal's analysis to a somewhat abstract and pious

level. Nevertheless, it would be useful at this point to briefly summarise the major points of his argument; thereafter, some additional comments can be made.

- (1) Quoting Rosenstein-Rodan, Myrdal states that the theory of underemployment has provided one of the cornerstones of development theory ever since the 1940's. Underemployment is seen as the gap between the actual level of work performed and some normatively established standard (measured in terms of hours, days or weeks of labour). The fact that the standard is normative is problematical: the efficiency of labour can be assumed constant, since it is the quantitative aspect of labour utilisation that is deemed of primary importance. Underemployment is assumed to be involuntary, and the willingness of people to engage in low productivity or unproductive activities is explained by a lack of resources complementary to labour-power (6).
- (2) In contradistinction to its use in the West (where underemployment is assumed to be a temporary phenomenon arising out of a cyclical downturn in economic activity, and hence in employment opportunities), it is clear that the phenomenon is of chronic and massive proportions in under-developed economies. (In other terms, Myrdal is suggesting that underemployment in a developed capitalist economy is "frictional", while in under-developed economies it tends to be of a "structural" nature). Since the concept is used uncritically in a largely inappropriate context following its transfer to an under-developed economy, the basic assumption of Western economic theory (and particularly that of Keynesian formulations) is that the problem would be resolved if the level of total effective demand for labour (derived from the total effective demand for commodities) were increased through increased government intervention in markets that have palpably "failed".
- (3) The conventional wisdom on underemployment is an essentially static approach, even though dynamic elements are assumed to be important (though they are almost inevitably neglected in the analysis, e.g. population growth). Myrdal correctly states that much underemployment theory is also ahistorical (or "timeless", as he prefers to call it).

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(6) It is interesting to note that the assumptions commonly made about the 'underemployed' assume that they are a homogeneous group with typically non-wage relations of production. Data presented in the present study will indicate that this oversimplification ensures that much of the theory and predictions of the underemployment approach are invalid.

- (4) In the conventional analysis of labour force participation, the marginal productivity of many workers outside wage-employment is assumed to be negative, zero or only slightly positive. Logically one would suppose that productivity should be closely linked to the quality of the labour input, and not merely to numbers of workers, or numbers of days worked; and yet, the latter tends to be the predominant formulation. Marginal productivity cannot reasonably be zero, since where family or other dependent labour is insufficient for the work to be performed, wage-labour may be employed - a contingency that is in no way compatible with zero marginal productivity. The assumption that large numbers of workers could be "with-drawn" from various low-productivity sectors without dimin-ishing the total product of that sector (e.g. Hagen 1975: 220) has no corresponding assumption about the circumstances (econ-omic or otherwise) that would permit such a withdrawal to take place. Equally so, little information is given by conventional theorists as to the consequences of such a withdrawal on those withdrawn; what opportunities are likely to be open to them in other sectors, once we take account of low levels of nutrit-ion, skill and education?
- (5) Myrdal concludes that considerable vested interests, administrative bottlenecks and institutional and attitudinal biases prevent the underemployment problem from being solved. A programme for enhancing the labour-utilisation levels of a specific economy need to focus also on the complex of land tenure, class and employment relations that maintain large sections of the population in low-productivity employment and hence in poverty. Many advocate rapid and comprehensive industrialisation: but to Myrdal this appears to offer little hope in the present circumstances of under-developed capitalist countries, since (for example) South-East Asian industrialisation has been rapid, but demand for labour has risen much less than proportionately, regardless of rising population. Output in all "underemployed" sectors must be raised relative to increased labour inputs (7).

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(7) Quite how this will be undertaken, and upon what theoretical basis an alternative strategy might be mounted, remains very unclear in Myrdal's analysis. The reservoir of 'underemployed' labour is seen (both by conventional writers and perhaps surpris-ingly also by Myrdal) as something entirely negative. What is required is an analysis that seeks to identify the functionality of this reservoir with respect to the dominant capitalist mode of production. We should not only be asking "what will they do in the future?" but also "what advantages of their very existence accrue to dominant sections of the society and economy at present?".

This, then, is the basis of Myrdal's critique of the concept and theory of underemployment. There are, however, other points to be made. The terms "underemployment" and "disguised unemployment" are quite regularly used by conventional theorists in an interchangeable manner. Sylos-Labini (1964: 270) suggests that, even within this framework, the terms are only partially synonymous:

"more properly the term 'underemployment (...) refers to persons who, for economic reasons, work only part of the 'normal' working time. In fact such part-time workers can be divided into three categories: those who work part-time (1) voluntarily, (2) for non-economic reasons (sickness, bad weather, etc.), (3) for economic reasons (conditions of the labour market)."

He goes on (1964:269) to warn would-be theorists that:

"the structure of employment in a backward economy is not less but more complex than that of an advanced country (...) The clear-cut distinction between employed and unemployed people - though valid, in a first approximation, for advanced economies - is of little use in the case of a backward economy (...) Even the concepts of hidden unemployment and of underemployment worked out with reference to backward economies, are inadequate and express only certain aspects of a more complex situation".

The argument presented above suggests that the majority of analysts of the labour force in under-developed capitalist economies ought to concur with the conclusion drawn: unfortunately, the term "unemployment" is still used with regularity, as if it were a directly operational and valid concept. Equally, this terminology has often been used by theorists and policy-makers alike as a stick with which to beat the urban "residuum", that mass of insecure and seemingly self-employed individuals who make their living at the margins of the distribution and production systems as conventionally delineated. Few theorists have attempted to explain in concrete terms this hypertrophic growth of (especially urban) petty production and trade, except perhaps in terms of neo-classical migration theory, which is closely related

to the theory of underemployment (8). Amin (1973:213-214) explains the background to so-called "disguised unemployment" in the following terms:

"[T]he integration of pre-capitalist societies into the international capitalist market has 3 fundamental effects one of which is (...) the hypertrophy of certain tertiary activities with low productivity (petty retailing, especially of an itinerant variety, and multiple services, for instance) which (...) is a manifestation of disguised unemployment, itself the result of the marginalisation process characteristic of the development of peripheral capitalism. (...) The hypertrophy of the tertiary sector is consequently nothing more than the manifestation of a specific law of peripheral surplus-population, this latter resulting from extraversion [9] and the mechanisms which exclude a growing proportion of the labour force from production".

Though Amin uses the term "disguised unemployment" (a common synonym for which is underemployment), he relates it to a process he calls "marginalisation" that he considers characteristic of peripheral capitalism. Whether this term (which clearly relates to a process rather than a state) provides us with a more appropriate framework for the study of labour in under-developed capitalist economies is a question that will be addressed in a subsequent section of this chapter. Amin relates low productivity activities to a process; the general usage of the term "underemployment" relates more directly to a state. However, as Myrdal has indicated, the identification of this state of unemployment is commonly based on a normatively formulated judgement, i.e. a level of labour-input considered to be "sufficient". But is that

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(8) See e.g. Lewis (1954); Fei & Ranis (1961).

(9) "Extraversion", as used by Amin, is a term describing the orientation of many under-developed capitalist economies towards primary exports for the world capitalist market, and/or their orientation towards providing cheap-labour light-industrial assembly sectors within the capitalist international division of labour.

normatively formulated state objectively attainable in the context of underdevelopment? Clearly it is absurd on the one hand to label individuals, economic groups or labour processes as underemployed without reference to levels of resource utilisation and allocation that are attainable in the given circumstances, while on the other hand providing neither theoretical explanations nor policy formulations capable of transforming the ideological and material conditions in which labour-utilisation is "sub-optimal" into those in which it would be (more) optimal. If access to relatively greater opportunities for individually and socially productive employment are absent and/or blocked as far as the so-called "underemployed" are concerned, the term should be dismissed as singularly inappropriate, for it can only act as a mystifying concept. Indeed, it perhaps deserves the same ridicule that Hodgskin (1825:17) applied to the 19th century use of the term "capital": "[It is] a sort of cabalistic term which, like the words 'State' and 'Church' (...) was invented by those who fleece the rest of humanity in order to hide the hand which does the fleecing".

At a more global level, we can see a similarity between the sectoral use of "underemployment" terminology and the macro-use of the concept of "surplus labour". Reference is rarely made in the latter case to the manner in which that "surplus" arose. The commonest formulations also make only very vague references to the factors in relation to which labour can be considered to be "excessive": for example, Nurkse (1957:3-5) speaks of rapid population growth as naturally leading to excess population on the land, and of this excess population being so great in relation to land and capital that marginal productivity may fall to zero. He also comments that "while population has doubled in Asia, other things such as techniques, capital supplies and cultivable land have remained too much the same" [emphasis in the original].

It is a common failing of the conventional analysts that little or no attention is paid to uncovering the mechanisms that

generate such disjuncture between the strategic variables in an under-developed capitalist economy. The explanation of low levels of productivity, subsistence level incomes and blocked access to strategic production processes must be undertaken in a more rigorous and realistic framework, appropriate to the material conditions in such economies, rather than through a few well-chosen (and largely unsubstantiated) words about underemployment and the lack of complementary resources. Then perhaps it will be possible to respond in practical terms to Haberler's (1957:3-5) jeremiad on the prerequisites for the efficient use of human resources:

"If it were possible to improve methods of production in agriculture; if the skill of farm labourers is increased; if social habits could be changed; (...) if technology in industry could be changed so as to employ unskilled rural workers; if capital and other (...) factors of production (...) could be provided in larger quantities and better quality; if (...) agriculture can release a lot of labour without loss of output and industrial output be stepped up at the same time."

#### 1.2.4. The new dualism: the "informal sector" approach

Several excellent reviews and critiques of the informal sector approach have recently appeared (10), and no attempt will be made to duplicate their achievements here. Nevertheless, reference will be made to a number of their conclusions, and additional elements of a critique will be provided when this helps to clarify the picture. It has become almost a matter of form to apply the axiom "when speaking of dualism, begin with Boeke (1953) and when talking of the informal sector, start with Hart (1971)". As Keith Hart would now almost certainly admit that it is not the terminology he coined that is of so much interest, but rather the rapidity with which it became the common currency of such agencies as the International Labour Office: indeed, by 1972 the ILO had

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(10) For example, Moser (1978:1041-1064) and Breman (1976: II, pp. 1870-1876, pp. 1905-1908, and pp. 1939-1944).

already integrated Hart's terminology into its World Employment Programme country survey of Kenya (ILO, 1972). Over the succeeding five years, dozens of studies of the informal sector were commissioned and published. Few noticed that, in the interim, the researcher who had taken the first step in elaborating the concept of the informal sector had reformulated his approach in a decisive manner: an unpublished paper by Hart that circulated in 1975 was entitled "Urbanisation, the post-colonial state and petty commodity production in Ghana" (11).

How have the protagonists of the informal sector approach defined their object of study? Sethuraman (1976:69) explicitly makes the connection between the use of this term and the "target group approach" elaborated in the "Redistribution with Growth" thesis (Chenery et al 1974) when he says:

"The basic reason for the introduction of this term informal sector in the Kenya employment mission report followed from the now widely recognised fact that it takes a very long time for the benefit of general development policies to trickle down to the poorest sections of the population. Effective development needs to be focused directly on a specific "target" population, and the employment mission considered that perhaps the most important such target group in urban areas was what it described as the informal sector".

Leys (1973:420), by no means an enthusiastic proponent of neoclassical economic theory, characterises the sector as follows:

"[T]he 'informal sector' means economic activities which largely escape recognition, enumeration, regulation and protection by the government. (...) Labour-intensive, competitive, using locally produced inputs, developing its own skills and technology, locally owned and controlled, the informal sector is in the ILO "Kenya Report" mission's view the model of the kind of economy Kenya needs; but, instead of being encouraged to the maximum, it is restricted and

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(11) Keith Hart, "Urbanization, the post-colonial state and petty commodity production in Ghana," unpublished paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Past & Present Society, devoted in its 1975 edition to a discussion of "Towns & Economic Growth", and held at University College, London.

harassed so that it too fails to furnish adequate incomes to those who are engaged in it".

The informal sector is thus conventionally seen as a target group, namely "a group of people who are (...) relatively homogeneous with respect to the effect that a given set of policy instruments might have upon them" (Chenery et al 1974:91). Such groups have been identified in the past as targets for government policy and for academic research: Hugon et al (1977:16-17) summarises the dichotomous models presented by various researchers as follows:

Figure 1.A. Dichotomous models of the urban economy in poor countries (12)

AUTHOR	DICHOTOMY
Geertz (1967)	bazaar economy: firm-centred economy
Marsden (1969)	backward: advanced
OECD (1971)	underprivileged: privileged
Sabalo (1971)	unproductive employment: productive employment
Hart (1973)	informal: formal
McGee (1973)	peasant production: capitalist production
Bugnicourt (1973)	marginal/transitional/infra-urban
Gerry (1974)	petty production: capitalist production
Mazumdar (1974)	unprotected: protected
Emmerij (1974)	unstructured: structured
Santos (1975)	lower circuit: upper circuit
Sen (1975)	unorganised/non-wage: organised/wage

In reality, the analysis based upon a dichotomy between the "informal" and the "formal" sector is neither new (since it corresponds in essence to the formerly popular traditional sector - modern sector dichotomy) nor fruitful - since it has brought

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(12) Indeed, trichotomous and even more complex typologies of the urban economy have been proposed: casual/petty/factory labour (Papola 1974), stagnant/unstructured/structured sectors (Standing 1974), traditional/semi-traditional/modern sectors (Pazos 1975), casual/unstable/stable income-earners (Kritz & Ramos 1976), and unemployed/informal/intermediate/modern sectors (Steel 1976).

forth policy prescriptions that have no real possibility of success other than at the very margin of business activities, is based on a tissue of tautology and flimsy a priori assumptions, and has in no way added to our basically quite limited understanding of non-capitalist production and labour-utilisation in under-developed capitalist economies.

Sethuraman (1976:70) distinguishes this plethora of dichotomies from the original traditional-modern model of under-developed society by reference to the technological nature of the latter distinction: the traditional sector was assumed to be technologically backward, compared to the advanced nature of production techniques in the modern sector, while the dichotomous models above, claims Sethuraman, almost exclusively refer to organisational distinctions between various segments of the urban economy.

Few writers have dogmatically asserted that the various "sectors" or "circuits" they have identified are somehow fixed and immutable: Santos (1975a) is a prime example of a writer whose model may at first glance appear to be dualistic, whereas in fact he divides his "lower and upper circuits" into distinct economic and spatial sub-components and traces the connections between sub-components both intra-sectorally and inter-sectorally over time. There are others who have employed "dualities" in a way untypical of the majority of dualistic models, specifically because they have made an attempt to analyse relations within and between the dualities identified, rather than applying the components of a typology to mutually-exclusive sectors. As implied above, the use of dualities does not preclude the use of a materialist methodology.

However, in the majority of cases, much of the analysis of employment among the urban poor in under-developed capitalist economies focuses more on characteristics than on relations. Orthodox analysts regard the employment - underemployment -

unemployment continuum as an adequate and universally applicable framework for the study of labour utilisation and efficiency. Much of the activity of the so-called "informal-sector" is thus characterised as under-employment: since informal occupations are deemed to have levels of efficiency and productivity lower than those to be found in capitalist industry (13), it seems quite natural to orthodox analysts to consider production "outside" the confines of capitalist economic organisation synonymous with the underutilisation of human and material resources. Not only is this inaccurate, as empirical evidence on large scale industry in under-developed countries clearly indicates (Mouly & Costa 1974: 46-57), but it is an argument that purports to be scientific and logical, when in fact it is neither.

Some quite ingenious conclusions have nevertheless been drawn from the analytical approach based on the concepts of "under-employment" when it has been applied to the non-industrial "informal sector". These conclusions give weight to the contention that orthodox theory is simplistic, dualist and capable of little more than residual analysis: Sethuraman (1974:7-13), working on the assumption that marginal productivity will be reflected in the wage-rates paid to particular sections of the labour force, concludes that the urban economy of an under-developed country neatly divides into an "informal" and a "formal" sector, the dividing line being drawn such that those receiving wages in excess of the national minimum wage find themselves in the labour force of the "formal" sector, while those receiving less are allotted places in the "informal" labour force.

"If we agree that labour productivity offers us a better criterion to define the enterprises in the informal sector then the collection of data pertinent to this sector might proceed as follows. Since the informal sector, by definition, is characterised by 'ease of entry' and operates in 'unregulated competitive markets' as the ILO's 'Kenya

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(13) Mouly & Costa (1974:46-57) give details of the low level of productive capacity utilised in Third World industrial enterprises.

Report' proposed, labour productivity can be approximated by the wage-rate per worker in these enterprises. Thus we come up with a simple definition of the informal sector: all enterprises which employ labour at a relatively low wage."

The assumptions concerning the characteristics of the "informal" sector, made prior to the establishment of this dividing line, included the contention that it would have zero- or low productivity of labour. Such analyses present a grossly over-simplified picture of a dual economy in which the dividing line between various sectors is based upon an arbitrarily chosen legislated wage-rate; the non-payment of such rates in the informal sector can be more lucidly explained in terms of variables other than marginal productivities of either labour or capital. Wages lower than the national minimum level will exist because petty producers will tend to pay only subsistence remuneration to many if not all of their workers, since in such operations relations of production are neither equitable nor non-exploitative. The surplus appropriated will be distributed among relatives and/or will be appropriated in part by "upstream" or "downstream" enterprises (capitalist or otherwise).

By establishing and justifying the use of a "formal/informal" dichotomy, the conventional dualistic approach paves the way for a residual analysis of all production processes other than that of capitalism, and all workers other than those employed therein. Consequently, the implicit background to such studies will be that (1) capitalist production is of prime importance and is the yardstick by which everything else is quantitatively and qualitatively assessed; and (2) those sections of the labour force, and production processes not directly involved in capitalist production, can be legitimately seen as a substantially homogeneous residuum. As Webb (1977:4) concludes, "the usual dualist definitions (...) have the misleading effect of downplaying the multiplicity of types of differentiation and labour market segmentation". However, under normal circumstances, the only exception to the neat bipolar division of society and economy will be the group

of small enterprises that has shown itself to be sufficiently oriented towards capitalist production to benefit from government assistance and preference (see Chapter 7).

In more concrete terms, the informal sector has been variously defined in the following ways:

(1) "As a first approximation, it could be defined as being intermediate between the rural and modern sectors, being generally concerned with predominantly monetarised but non-capitalist activities organised on a small scale, particularly in urban areas". (Hugon et al 1977:8) [emphasis in the original].

(2) Figure 1.B. Distinctions between the informal and formal sectors

INFORMAL SECTOR	FORMAL SECTOR
• ease of entry	• difficult entry
• indigenous inputs predominate	• overseas inputs predominate
• family property dominant	• corporate property dominant
• small scale of activity	• large scale of activity
• labour intensive	• capital intensive
• adapted technology	• imported technology
• skills from outside school system	• formally acquired (often expatriate) skills
• unregulated/competitive market	• protected markets (e.g. tariffs, quotas, licences)

(See e.g. ILO 1972:6)

(3) According to Sethuraman (1976:81), in order for a particular enterprise to be identified as an informal sector manufacturing concern, it should fulfil at least one of the following conditions:

- " (a) It employs 10 persons or less (including part-time and casual workers).
- (b) It operates on an illegal basis, [in defiance of ...] government regulations.
- (c) Members of the household of the head of the enterprise work in it.
- (d) It does not observe fixed hours/days of operation.
- (e) It operates in semi-permanent or temporary premises, or in a shifting location.

- (f) It does not use any electricity in the manufacturing process.
- (g) It does not depend on formal financial institutions for its credit needs.
- (h) Its output is (...) distributed direct to the final consumer.
- (i) Almost all those working in it have fewer than 6 years of formal schooling."

- (4) However, according to the "Kenya Report" (ILO 1972:5) the "informal sector" is:

"far from (...) marginally productive, and is in fact economically efficient and profit-making, though small in scale and limited by simple technologies. [It englobes (...)] a variety of carpenters, masons, tailors and other trades-men, as well as cooks and taxi-drivers, offering virtually the full range of basic skills needed to provide goods and services for a large though often poor section of the population (...)".

Clearly, this departs from the assumption that members of the non-wage section of the labour force are of minimal significance to the rest of the economy, and can be thought of as comprising either lumpen-proletarian pariahs or romantic traditional craftsmen.

- (5) Kilby (1969:310) is not as confident of the potential dynamism of such economic activities as perhaps the ILO has been; while the "Kenya Report" sees this sector as being a new growth pole in under-developed economies, Kilby has certain reservations.

"Backward in technology and managerial performance, small scale industries rarely constitute islands of development or an effective training school for larger industry. Much of the small industry toward the lower end of the scale is characterised by atomistic competition, product dilution and zero profits; other characteristics combine to produce something akin to a low-level equilibrium trap. However, as a quasi-sponge for urban unemployment and a provider of inexpensive consumer goods with little or no import content, this sector serves important pressure-releasing, welfare-augmenting functions. Its more positive role is to produce an increasing number of firms that grow up and out of the small scale sector."

- (6) "The distinction between formal and informal income opportunities is based essentially on that between wage-earning and self-employment". (Hart 1973:68) (14)

- (7) "[The] informal-formal dichotomy, unlike the traditional-modern [one], will not prejudge the unenumerated small scale

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(14) For a thorough critique of the concept of self-employment as used in this context, see McEwen Scott (1979:105-129).

urban sector as non-dynamic (...) The distinction between a formal and an informal sector is based on the organizational characteristics of exchange relationships and the position of economic activity vis-à-vis the State. The nature of exchange relationships is primarily a consequence of the economic insecurity of operations in the informal sector, which, in turn, is a direct consequence of the latter's limited access to economic resources of all types." (Weeks 1975:2)

Many more definitional statements could be listed here, but the conclusion is already clear: as Breman (1976:1871) points out, "discussion of the informal sector seems to have given rise to more questions than it has solved. This is due primarily to the lack of a precise definition". However, the problem is not just one of definitional imprecision, or semantic distinctions among different researchers. The problem can be clearly situated within the fundamental problematic of the dualistic methodology. But before pursuing this point in greater detail, it is possible to make a concrete connection between the implications of the terms "formal" and "informal" and the ideology implicit in dualism.

When asked to discuss concepts of any sort, the student is often directed to dictionary definitions. Though scorn is often poured upon such an apparently juvenile starting-point, in this particular case, the exercise is both informative and useful. Conventionally, the word "informal" can variously imply a lack of conformity to established conventions, customs, methods or rules, or an irregularity of behaviour. Santos (1975b:7-8) makes the point clearly:

"Dualists, when referring to under-developed countries, note an opposition between a developed (...) and a non-developed sector. This is seen as a contrast between (...) coherent (...) rational, efficient actions, and an inarticulate set of irrational, inefficient and archaic actions".

He goes on to note (1975b:16) that the distinction made by Etzioni (1964: 40) between formal and informal organisational patterns in industrial society characterises the former as being

the rational scientific norms laid down by management, and the latter as the interpersonal relations that evolve

"above and beyond [that which is ...] determined by the organization (...) as a consequence of the interaction between the organizational design and the pressures of the inter-personal relations among the participants."

We have moved rather a long way from the world of artisans, shoeshine boys and petty traders of Third World cities, it seems. Perhaps not. Dualism isolates and contrasts two sectors of the urban economy, labelling one "formal" (i.e. conventional, regular and rational) and the other "informal" (i.e. abnormal, irregular and irrational). Just as in our discussion over the applicability of the term "underemployment", we are confronted by "the ideological and ethnocentric character of the distinction (...), [t]he notion of rationality (...) applied as a yardstick to pre-industrial societies" in what Santos (1975b: 137-8) denounced as "a clear case of cultural arrogance.

Why cannot the much-discussed characteristics of workers in the "informal sector" be interpreted as reflecting entirely rational responses to their objective economic and social environment? Must the proponents of such an interpretation be accused of falling prey to vulgar economic determinism? Increasingly, the more sophisticated models of urban employment in under-developed capitalist economies are taking account of what must be seen as rational responses to the extremely demanding and difficult set of circumstances under which the mass of the labour force must eke out its subsistence. This recognition has laid the foundations for a much more profound analysis of the relations between different "sectors" of the under-developed economy, and the concomitant shift in emphasis from static features to dynamic relationships.

This point is most forcefully made with reference to our earlier discussion of the connection between the concept of the informal sector and that of the target group (Sethuraman 1976:69). Since the latter implies a large degree of homogeneity at least

with respect to the impact of government policy, the failure of such policy is often attributed to so-called "leakages".

In other words, a target group is correctly identified as the object of ameliorative policy, but the resources directed at it are somehow redirected to or hijacked by a non-target group. This is surely ample evidence either of a complete failure to identify what one might call "target relations", or a completely cynical attitude towards redistributive and/or poverty-relieving strategies. Since the concept of the target group emerged out of the discussion of income-redistributive strategies, it is perhaps surprising that while there was an apparently clear identification of target-groups to whom government intervention would cause proportionately more resources to flow, no attempt was made either to identify the corresponding target groups that would under the given conditions benefit proportionately less from economic growth, or to discover which target relations needed to be encouraged (in order to augment and support redistribution), and/or inhibited (in order to reduce or minimise leakages to and hijackings by non-target groups).

Workers in the "informal sector" cannot reasonably be viewed as vestiges of an age long past, an archaic, irrational residuum, unwilling and often unable to respond to the exigencies of modern urban life. As Lenin (1972b: 536) so incisively remarked:

"the development of forms of industry, like that of social relations in general, cannot but proceed very gradually among a mass of interlocking, transitional forms and seeming reversions to the past." [emphasis added].

Were this not the case, we can be sure that the more dynamic merchants of the European middle ages would have viewed the increasingly impoverished rural craftsmen as an impediment to capital accumulation, and not as an increasingly significant source of surplus-labour to be exploited through, for example, the so-called "putting-out system".

In his comprehensive critique of the "informal sector" approach, Breman (1976:1873-1906) examines some of the most prominent a priori assumptions concerning such occupations, namely:

- a) its relative insulation from the rest of the national economy;
- b) its nature as a variegated collection of low-productivity or even apparently wholly unproductive trades and services;
- c) its dependence upon self-employment; and
- d) its essential heterogeneity.

These various assumptions are all prominent in the sample of definitions of the informal sector presented above.

- (1) Insulation and segmentation: Breman argues that what many authors identify as the "informal sector" is not as wholly urban as they might suppose. Much of the agriculture has been subordinated to capitalist relations in the same way as the urban labour force finds its own environment increasingly monetised, compartmentalised and commoditised. Nor is urban production itself (whether formal or informal) the insulated, wholly externally-oriented enclave so many claim it to be. Because so many studies have presented the reader with an apparently urban sector that is neatly divided into two parts, while the flows of labour, commodities and surplus between town and country (and back again) and between subordinate economic forms and the dominant mode of production have been largely ignored.
- (2) The parasitic, unproductive nature of the "informal sector": Breman recalls that many writers give the most negative impression of productivity, effort and rationality in the "informal sector", namely that though it "provide(s) a meagre existence for poverty-stricken people, (it is) (...) of doubtful economic benefit in terms of actual production". Latterly, more studies have been undertaken of production (rather than services or distribution) in the "informal sector", since no

dichotomy such as the one under scrutiny here could be rationally assumed to apply only within specific branches of production.

- (3) "Informality" as self-employment: Hart (1973) originally characterised "informal" income opportunities as being characteristic of the self-employed. Little care is exercised by dualists in general when employing this latter term. Little attention is paid to the precise composition of the "informal" labour force (15), and no work is undertaken on the concrete analysis of relations of production within the "informal sector" except to superficially label them as being based on the use of family-labour. Breman (1976:1873-1874) concludes that corresponding to the fiction of the "self-employed" peasant cultivator, we now also have a well-established myth of "an urban informal sector consisting of the self-employed who at the most utilise their household members as a labour force".
- (4) Heterogeneity of the "informal sector": Breman (1976:1873) asserts that the "preoccupation with the refinement of this dichotomy (between the informal and formal sectors) has distracted attention from the great variety of activities which make up the informal sector". This has led some writers, as noted above (e.g. Standing 1974, Friedman & Sullivan 1974, Steel 1976) to further disaggregate the urban labour market. But as Breman correctly warns, such a disaggregation will only prove "effective if the dualism concept is abandoned". What does the abandonment of dualism imply?

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(15) A detailed breakdown of the labour employed in the occupations studied in Dakar is given in Chapter 5. A distinction is made between family and non-family, wage and non-wage labour. In more theoretical terms, some examination is also made of the corresponding relations of production.

### 1.3. RADICAL DUALISM? THE FORMULATIONS OF PORTES, DAVIES & SANTOS.

A number of writers have taken simple dichotomies as a starting point and have subsequently attempted to inject a dynamic or dialectical element into the analysis of Third World labour markets (e.g. Davies 1979, Portes 1978, Quijano 1974, Santos 1975). Both Davies and Portes retain the "informal sector" terminology for various reasons, and will therefore be examined first.

Davies (1979:87-104) feels comfortable with the term "informal sector": quoting Wittgenstein, he maintains that the concept can be used as a "ladder" that can be discarded once a point of greater theoretical clarity has been attained. Portes does not have this apparently casual and utilitarian approach to terminology and expansively asserts that:

"the concept of the 'informal economy' is fundamental to understanding the operations of capitalism as a world phenomenon and constitutes a missing element in contemporary 'world-system' formulations of relations between core and periphery".

In fact, Portes (1978:65) considers his thesis to be in part "a defence of the concept" of the informal sector or informal economy "against accusations of irrelevance or academic vogueism". The major elements in Portes' thesis are that, while many have remarked upon the extreme dependence of "informal" activities upon resources provided, decisions made and events brought about by the "formal" capitalist sector (Mangin 1967, Peattie 1968, Leeds & Leeds 1970, Gerry 1974, Uzzell 1975, Roberts 1976, Lomnitz 1977), has much less often been demonstrated that to a considerable extent the reverse form of dependency is more significant. Portes further

claims that the effects of what happens in the "informal" economy "reach (...) to the very centres of capitalist accumulation" (16).

Portes (1978:36) identifies the roots of the dependency relationship that makes the "informal economy" so important to capitalism) in the distinction between the process of "organic integration of profits and wages" in core economies and in "peripheral capitalism", respectively. While much in this argument is acceptable, he seems to forget that not only is the "periphery" dependent on maintaining competitive export markets for their raw materials and manufactures (thereby generating a constant downward pressure on real wages), but the so-called "core" economies are also highly sensitive to fluctuations in their own export performance and competitiveness. This implies an intensification of the process that Portes is describing. As the world capitalist division of labour becomes more advanced and more complex, so the import content of exported manufactures increases. For example, the maintenance of Japan's competitive (re-)export of electronics also depends partly upon its ability to keep wages in Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, etc., as low as possible. So the claim by Portes that "the market for core capitalist production is also, by and large, a 'core' market" is only accurate if he admits that the "core" market also embraces, among others, the bureaucratic and capitalist classes of peripheral areas.

Inevitably, in a society in which wage-labour is the rule rather than the exception, the process of capitalist production will need to provide more comprehensively for the subsistence needs of its own national labour force than in a situation where only between less than 20% of the active labour force has contractual wage-employment. Consequently, what Portes takes to be a distinction between "core" and "periphery" is in fact one of the

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(16) For an earlier (and, unfortunately, only recently published) formulation of these dependency relations, see the excellent note by Williams and Mutebile (1978:1103-1104).

very mechanisms he has sought to identify. "Core" economic sectors, wherever they are situated, can benefit more or less easily, more or less directly from the existence of such a phenomenon as the "informal" economy. Paper-mills, for example, can tap local, alternative, "informal" sources of inputs if the price of pulp on the international market becomes unacceptably high (Birkbeck 1977, 1979). Since workers are provided with many wage-goods from the "informal" economy at prices lower than their "formal" substitutes, the wages paid, for example, by Volkswagen of Brazil or Dodge of Colombia can be kept proportionately lower and profits commensurately higher. While Portes (1978: 36) says "under these conditions (of peripheral capitalism) downward pressure on wages is not counteracted by pressures to expand the internal market", it would be more accurate to conclude that pressure on wages is counteracted in part by pressure to expand the internal market. But such an expansion will increasingly be based upon the privileged consumption of mainly imported commodities, or products made locally under licencing agreements or similar arrangements, whereby the limited effective demand that is generated in the internal market among the ruling class and the "labour aristocracy" will be realised as surplus in the "core" economies and thus will not accrue as higher real income to the mass of the population.

However, Portes (1978:37) has some controversial comments to make about the "informal" economy itself: he sees it almost as constituting a class apart from other sections of society, though this is asserted without recourse to any theoretical validation. At the top of the "peripheral" society, we find "owners, managers and top-level state administrators", followed by "clerks, technicians and salaried professionals"; on a third rank we find "manual workers in the public and private sector" and, finally, at the bottom of the hierarchy, "informal sector workers". This latter "class" can be characterised as being labour-intensive in its economic activities and operating normally outside the scope of

government regulation and supervision. But this is precisely why the "informal" economy can establish itself within the overall structure of production and markets. Portes (1978:37) asserts that:

"the 'competitive edge' of the informal sector in relation to the formal (...) parallels (...) that of the peripheral country as a whole (...) in relation to core capitalist nations in the international economy. In both cases, it is based on access to cheaper sources of labour."

But the "competitive edge" permits only survival and stagnation in the majority of cases, and not prosperity. The "competitive edge" is maintained, as Portes also points out, by exploitation of one sort or another. The owners use "informal sector workers" as an "industrial reserve army" against the interests of the intermediate "classes", or allow the latter to exploit the informal sector's cheaper labour, thereby reducing, via a subsidy, the cost of reproducing "formal" labour power. But this cheap-labour thesis becomes almost tautological unless there is also some explanation of why the labour is cheaper. The conventional answer is that, since labour in this sector has low productivity, it receives small returns. Though Portes (1978:37) makes the same point in a perhaps more sophisticated way, the end result is much the same: labour intensivity and lack of state regulation combine

"to reduce the 'input' costs of whatever goods or services are produced, thereby cheapening the price of the outputs. Long and strenuous hours are contributed by the individual himself, by unpaid kin, and by others (...) Absence of state supervision means (...) greater ease in avoiding taxation (...) [and] the rigidities of labour legislation. Informal sector workers are seldom paid the official minimum wage, nor do they have access to health insurance, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions and other indirect benefits. Hiring and laying off is done on a much more casual basis, according to need."

But still we do not know why labour is cheaper. To try to explain this, Birkbeck (1979) makes an interesting point with

respect to the transactions between garbage-pickers and paper-mills.

"Why is the income of the garbage-picker so low? (...) The factory sets its price for recycled paper, and this is done with direct reference to alternative raw materials supplies (...) Any attempt to raise the price of waste paper to anywhere near the price of pulp would end the market for recuperated materials (...) If garbage-pickers were (...) to become employees of the factory] (...) the cost of waste paper would rise by at least three times, and it would be pointless for the company to buy that material (...) [This system] (...) is designed not only to keep the price of waste paper low, but to ensure the continued existence of waste paper collection. Unless pulp rockets in price or becomes unavailable (...) the garbage-picker can only be a low income worker" [emphasis added].

We can thus conclude that at the other end of the spectrum of capitalist development (namely, that of the advanced, industrialised economies), where a far-reaching process of proletarianisation has been completed, such activities as those described above, relatively speaking, are barely present. Only at the very lowest levels of "social deprivation" do these activities constitute a permanent form of income generation.

By way of a parenthesis, I am reminded of a recent stay in Glasgow, Scotland, including an outing to "Paddy's Market" under the city's main railway arches. The crowd of second-hand clothes and paperback book sellers gave the market a familiar Third World appearance, but what was most surprising (and one wonders whether such surprise is justified) was a lone man selling a pair of old shoes, a battered thermos flask and a single volume from an old set of encyclopaedias, these meagre articles arranged on the floor on a flattened cardboard carton. Nevertheless, the incidence of such apparently absolute levels of poverty is much higher in the urban centres of under-developed capitalist countries: indeed, what appears to Western eyes as absolute impoverishment may well be a moderately profitable concern. Such value judgements con-

cerning the identification of poverty-based economic activities are yet another example of eurocentrism and Western methodological rigidity. Just as the capitalist is little concerned with what is produced in and sold from his factory, many (though not all) urban petty producers and traders are motivated primarily by the need to survive and are thus only interested in the nature of the activity to a more limited degree; and, the greater the need, the greater the indifference is likely to be to the means by which that need is satisfied.

It would now be appropriate to look at the conclusions Portes draws from his radical reconceptualisation of the "informal sector" concept. Portes (1978:39) affirms that most writers

"while (...) denying the interstitial character of the informal economy (...), still insist that its existence and dynamism are dependent on the formal sector. This argument stands the situation on its head: though there exists a symbiotic relationship between the two, from the standpoint of basic structural arrangements, the opposite is the case."

He also complains that current radical theory has proved incapable of explaining "how disparities between core and peripheral wages can be indefinitely maintained", dismissing (by implication) the suggestion that this can be achieved by using "semi-proletarianised labour (...) whose reproduction is partially subsidised by subsistence enclaves", in any but the least-developed and least-industrialised peripheral economies. But Portes perhaps focuses too closely on trying to identify the successive spheres of "subsidy" within the international capitalist system: clearly, whether or not "formal sector" wages are indirectly kept low by the existence of a rural subsidy to urban "informal" wage-goods production, or whether it is merely the unsubsidised "informal" production of wage-goods combined with its role as an industrial reserve army that brings about downward pressure on industrial wage-rates, will vary from country to country and from one conjuncture to another. What is important,

however, is the extent to which various sections of the labour force (both urban and rural, and irrespective of their "formality" or otherwise), come to be proletarianised, and by what method we identify their objective conditions of labour. This necessitates at least some elements of a class analysis, an endeavour that Portes studiously avoids. The "semi-proletarianisation" that he mentions (and yet fails to define), will be looked at again in detail in Chapter 6.

Now let us turn to Davies (1979), who also employs the "informal sector" terminology purposefully and in an attempt to make a concrete analysis of urban non-industrial employment in Rhodesia. Davies' model of the "informal sector" (which he considers to be a subordinate mode of production within the Rhodesian social formation) is very much the sort of thing about which Portes felt so unhappy: Davies (1979:90) says that its function "is to 'service' the formal sector through its impact on wage-structures and labour-supplies". He views the characteristics of the informal sector in the light of his own empirical evidence (ease of entry, ownership of means of production, degree of monopoly, price-determination, technology and legal status) and finds that there is support both for the contention that it acts as a reserve army and that it constitutes a springboard for limited capital accumulation (Davies 1979: 87-104). He suggests that:

"it is likely that a combination of these two views in part explains the formation of the urban informal sector. It can be a buffer against unemployment; it can also provide a decent living and a means of raising capital".

Davies adds that, in order to explain its existence, there has to be effective demand for the commodities it is capable of producing, a demand the existence of which he then proceeds to demonstrate (1979:95-97). Such demand derives from a combination of a low level of industrial wages and the fact that the "formal sector", as a result of its high level of technology and its

extraverted character, is both unwilling and lacks any incentive to produce such commodities. In conclusion, Davies (1979:102) argues that although "formal" and "informal" economies constitute a dialectical unity - or, in Ley's words (1973:427) "between the mass of very low incomes in general and the very high profit levels of the larger, mostly foreign firms" - it is a mistake to imply that the "informal sector" has no separate identity, precisely because this masks the very real degree of differentiation existing among and between the various exploited elements of society. The conflict of interests between various fractions of the labour force constitutes, in Davies' eyes, a major element in our understanding of the political economy of under-developed capitalist economies. With this particular conclusion we are in total agreement: the objective of much of the rest of the present study (and, initially, the latter part of this chapter) will be to outline the principal theoretical elements necessary to construct such a political economy, with particular reference to the so-called "informal sector".

Before moving on from Davies' contribution, which is clearly a valuable one, it is worth questioning yet again the continued use of the term "informal". Davies (1979:102) reminds us that in essence his model "is simply that of a relationship between a dominant, central mode of production and a subordinate, peripheral one". If this is the case, we may feel that the use of the formal-informal dichotomy is somewhat confusing: terminology is important and, though we may have objections to the characterising of the "informal sector" as a mode of production (see Chapter 2, Sections 4 and 5), subordinate or otherwise, we feel that it is through the use of Marxist terminology and, far more importantly, the Marxist analytical method, that the elaboration of a more rigorous and comprehensive political economy of labour in under-developed capitalist economies can be achieved.

To summarise the points so far made in this brief critique of the dualistic approach in general, and that of the "informal

sector" in particular, we can say that dualism has clearly failed to provide an appropriate methodology for the analysis of under-developed capitalist economies precisely because it has employed an ahistorical and simplistic analysis that focuses on characteristics, thereby apportioning responsibility (or even "blame") for urban poverty on an entirely pseudo-scientific basis. These factors are strongly rooted in dualism's dependence upon neo-classical economic theory, which in this particular context still tends to apply stylised models of progress through perfect competition among small scale producers (17), while in no way diminishing its own ideological commitment to the maintenance and justification of the increasingly monopolistic capitalist system.

One of the most prominent radical writers in the study of the urban non-industrial labour force is Santos (1975, 1979), who has attempted to introduce a rigorous, dialectical analysis of the relations between the "upper" and "lower" circuits of the urban economy in under-developed capitalist societies. This objective has been pursued on the basis of comparative data drawn from every continent, as well as a continuous critique of the dualistic approach as it has manifested itself in urban geography and related fields. Santos attempts to depart from the dualistic approach by extensively disaggregating the under-developed economy into its component parts, seen in their wider economic, social, political and spatial contexts. His basic model may appear to be essentially dualist: after all, he subtitled his study "the two circuits of the urban economy and their spatial implications" and viewed the urban economy as consisting of two circuits (hence implying motion through time and space) - the upper (capitalist,

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(17) Orthodox analysts commonly see the principal problems facing the "informal sector" as being those of the market imperfections sponsored by big business and/or governments. Remove these, and the sector could become dynamic and contribute significantly to the development process. For details of the policy implications of the "informal sector" approach, see Chapter 7.

dominant) circuit and the lower circuit (less well-defined, but clearly subordinate).

In a study of considerable proportions, compared with those so far reviewed, Santos provides a wealth of detail concerning the evolution and structuring of the "lower circuit" in terms of its predominant characteristics, drawing on diverse and comprehensive sources to examine such aspects of the urban economy as "lower circuit" sources of credit, and the fragmented that characterises the evolution of the division of labour. Figure 1.C. (overleaf) summarises Santos' view of the characteristics of the "lower circuit" compared to those of the "upper" in a detailed and comprehensive manner that will be very familiar to those with a working knowledge of the literature.

Clearly, there are points of issue in this, as in any, list of characteristics: one complaint is the degree to which "lower circuit" activities are dependent (directly or otherwise - and Santos does not clearly define his use of this term) on foreign sources of inputs (18). Nevertheless, Santos goes on to present a much more acceptably differentiated and disaggregated picture of urban production in under-developed capitalist economies - especially given Davies' well-taken comments about the need to emphasise stratification and differentiation in both "sectors" of the economy. Santos talks of the "marginal upper circuit" that he sees acting as both a link between and, in part, an offshoot of the "lower circuit". It exists alongside yet "above" the craft sector, and comprises two distinct elements - one consisting of activities that are "mature" from their very inception, and another in which competition still exists between enterprises that

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(18) Evidence presented in Chapter 6 Section 1, and elsewhere (Gerry 1974, 1979) suggests that this dependence may be considerable in many branches of production and commerce.

have differing degrees of capitalisation, levels of technology, scales of production and quantities/qualities of labour.

"These inequalities are significant because, while homogeneity is possible within several branches, it is impossible in others where the burden of a growing population and a low standard of living allow less modern forms to subsist" (Santos 1975:97).

Figure 1.C. Characteristics of the two-circuit urban economy.

VARIABLES:	UPPER-CIRCUIT	LOWER-CIRCUIT
TECHNOLOGY	• capital-intensive	• labour-intensive
ORGANISATION	• bureaucratic	• generally family-based
CAPITAL	• abundant	• scarce
HOURS OF WORK	• regular	• irregular
WAGE PAYMENTS	• normally regular	• normally irregular
INVENTORIES	• large quantities &/or high quality	• small quantities: poor quality
PRICES	• generally fixed	• negotiable between buyer and seller
CREDIT	• banks and other institutions	• personal, non-institutional
PROFITS & PROFIT MARGINS	• large relative to turnover (except for luxury items)	• small in relation to turnover
CLIENT RELATIONS	• impersonal and/or document-based	• direct: personal
FIXED COSTS	• large	• negligible
PUBLICITY	• necessary	• none
RE-USE OF GOODS	• none/waste	• frequent
OVERHEAD CAPITAL	• indispensable	• dispensable
GOVERNMENT AID	• large	• none/almost none
DIRECT FOREIGN DEPENDENCE	• great: externally-oriented activity	• small or none

Source: Adapted from Santos (1975:33) [my translation].

However, Santos does not spend much time examining the differentiation that exists within the "lower circuit", but concentrates rather on what he sees as a form of transition for the privileged few, out of the "lower" and into the "upper"

circuit. Clearly the issue of the transition from small scale, family-based or individual production to capitalist commodity production is an important one (to be examined in more detail in Chapter 6 section 5). But before this analysis can be undertaken, a clearer statement of the process of differentiation within the "lower circuit" needs to be made.

The implications of Santos' work (and, indeed, the contributions of Davies, Portes and others) are of course much wider than has been indicated here. The point that has been made for the specific purposes of this study is nevertheless valid: we must be at pains to elaborate an analytical framework by which the complexity, dynamics and composition of what Santos calls the "lower circuit" can be clearly articulated, not only in terms of structural but, more centrally, in terms of class analysis.

#### 1.4. THE "MARGINALIDAD" APPROACH: QUIJANO

The contribution made by Quijano (1974) to the study of the urban labour force in under-developed capitalist economies is also noteworthy. Quijano has been selected for particular comment here because his analysis is perhaps the best-articulated of those associated with the concepts of "marginality" and "marginalisation". The connections between the marginalidad school and the writers referred to in the previous section are close. Both have attempted to analyse the workings of the urban labour market and production process from an explicitly Marxist - or as Foster-Carter (1974:67-105) would perhaps designate it, a "neo-marxist" standpoint. The terminology again tends to be relatively unfamiliar to European Marxists at least, and for this reason, and due to the fact that the marginalidad approach raises serious and interesting questions, the analytical framework of the preponderantly Latin American school will be evaluated in some detail here.

In many ways, the marginalidad approach lacks a consistent theoretical basis, terminology both from Marxist and dependency theory being used, often interchangeably. It has been widely employed to examine the relations between dominant "integrated" and/or "internationalised" sectors of production or sections of the population on the one hand, and apparently "marginal" sectors and strata, on the other. Sunkel (1970:29-37) for example, proposes an analytical framework (which he openly admits is simplified and highly abstract) in which he identifies the following dichotomies: the developed and under-developed countries, the "integrated" and "marginal" sectors of production, and the "internationalised" and "marginalised" social groups, reflecting a process of underdevelopment that has international, spatial, socio-economic and class coordinates.

Kowarick (1979:83), for example, characterises the forms of production commonly identified as "marginal" as follows:

"It is a question of activities which are not organised in a typically capitalist form. 'Marginal' groups constitute a basic element in the process of capitalist accumulation because they form part of the industrial reserve army (...) Since capitalist accumulation involves unequal productive forms articulated around a single structural logic which favours the realisation of surplus-value at the hegemonic centres, the 'marginal' sectors are seen to be an important element in a system that unites capitalist and not-typically-capitalist productive forms(...)"

Thus "marginal" groups or activities appear to be very much those we have already seen discussed in the context of the "informal" sector: but if the term "informal" is deemed unsatisfactory or inappropriate, is "marginal" (i.e. pertaining to the edge, limit, or extreme) any better? Land has long been referred to as "marginal" when it provides for subsistence with only the most gruelling preparation and continuous inputs of human labour and/or equipment and/or added nutrients. Just as land, as a factor of production, becomes more "marginal" as one moves further and

further away from the most fertile agricultural heartlands, so one can envisage a "topography" of economic activities in which the most "marginal" appear so far removed (spatially, politically, ecologically, and in terms of access to various facilities) from the "commanding heights" of industry, commerce and decision-making that, in spite of permitting a living to be made, provide a livelihood that borders on subsistence.

In fact, the terms "marginality" and "marginalisation" were coined before the introduction of the "formal-informal" dichotomy, in response to the dissatisfaction felt by Latin American radical social and economic theorists over the application of Marxist concepts such as "industrial reserve army" and "relative surplus population" to the prevailing conditions of Latin American under-development. Though Kowarick (above) used the term "industrial reserve army" and suggested that "marginal" groups constituted part of that reservoir of labour, and though their role in the urban economy could take one of several alternative forms, the marginalidad approach sought to apply a Marxian method of analysis while moving beyond the limits of what it considered restrictive and dogmatised terms.

The static concept of "marginality", descriptive, so it seems, of a state or status rather than analysing an historical process or mechanism, appears incapable of providing the basis for a class analysis of under-developed capitalist economies. It offers little that would facilitate an examination of the process of differentiation into more clearly-defined classes, or the differentiation taking place within and between constituent fractions of contemporary classes-in-formation. Cordova (1972:6) describes as "marginal" those who are unable "to enjoy the possibilities of self-fulfilment and participation that organised society offers, albeit on unequal terms, to its other members".

This is problematical, since urban labour not directly involved in capitalist production is never automatically unorganised or non-participatory because of this. Nun, Murmis and Marin (1968) divide social groups characterised by "marginality" into three categories:

- (1) those who remain within the pre-capitalist sector;
- (2) those who migrate to urban areas to work on a casual basis, and who are free to sell their labour-power; and
- (3) labour once employed but now redundant or retired, and perhaps working casually or intermittently (19).

"Marginality" implies (potential) exclusion: that the mass of the population in under-developed capitalist economies is progressively excluded from adequate income-generating opportunities, adequate housing, etc., is no new discovery. If the concept of marginality has only this to offer, it offers very little, and that in a totally static framework, too. If it claims to isolate and analyse the mechanisms of exclusion (i.e. how surplus is transferred from class to class, from one mode or form of production to another, both within and outside the national boundaries of the country under scrutiny), then its analytical potential cannot be dismissed so lightly.

Quijano (1974) claims that the concept of the classical industrial reserve army (see Figs. 1.D. and 1.E.) has much less significance in contemporary under-developed capitalist economies for several reasons. First, it does not allow for the effects of the scientific and technical revolutions upon the productivity of labour; second, the limits within which the capital-intensivity (organic composition of capital) may currently vary are also believed to be substantially different from those identified by classical Marxists. Changes in the nature and functioning of the

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(19) A similar formulation is provided by Quijano (1972).

international capitalist system to which marginalidad theorists such as Quijano have pointed in justification of their approach, are clearly important. But these changes diminish the importance of neither the concept nor the reality of the industrial reserve army or relative surplus population; the impact of contemporary capitalist production on the working populations of under-developed economies is of crucial importance. Compared to the European labour force of the Industrial Revolution, that of contemporary urban Senegal, for instance, may have rather different potential for changing individual living and working conditions; indeed, these possibilities may be viewed quite differently by members of the labour force. The principal reason for this is that most urban Senegalese workers are confronted by a developed capitalist mode of production under which relative surplus value prevails, while European workers and petty producers faced an emergent capitalist mode of production, wherein absolute surplus value was the rule (20). In the case of the early capitalism, the principal means of increasing the rate of surplus value was the lengthening of the working day, the limits to which was the strength and competence of working class organisation, solidarity and resistance. Under conditions of advanced capitalism, the production process "rationally" incorporates progressively more labour-saving technology, thereby considerably expanding the possibilities for increasing the productivity of labour. Wage-earners, peasants, petty producers, casual workers and many others confront these advanced methods of production either directly or indirectly, in the sphere of production or in that of circulation, as part of their daily struggle for survival and material advancement. Such is the basis for the obstacles that are systematically created to impede the autonomous evolution of indigenous capitalism, and the growth of workers' political power and consciousness.

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(20) I am grateful to Ruth First for her extremely helpful suggestions on this point.

As such, they form the cornerstones of continued underdevelopment and subordination.

Indeed, the more dynamic concept of "marginalisation" (21) clearly consists of a combination of mechanisms, each concretely linked to and operating as a manifestation of the global relationship between the dominant capitalist mode of production (seen on an international scale) and the mass of the population in the under-developed capitalist economies in which it holds sway. Amin (1973: 319-320) suggests that the component mechanisms that make up the overall phenomenon of "marginalisation" include exploitation, partial proletarianisation, rural-urban migration, and the evolution of the international division of labour, all of which relate directly to the process of capitalist accumulation.

Thus the forms and trajectory of class differentiation possible within an under-developed capitalist socio-economic formation themselves become transformed through the process of capitalist penetration. The scope of class differentiation may at first appear to be more limited, and its evolution sluggish, but this is again a product of many Marxists' eurocentrism and dogmatism: the process is different from that which took place in Industrial Revolution Europe; this does not, however, mean that we should discard powerful analytical tools and categories, and replace them with vaguer, more generalised categories that, on closer examination, refer to nothing more than the laws of motion of capitalist development, a focus that is essential if they are to have meaning and utility.

Consequently, it appears that writers of the marginalidad school have reacted against vulgar Marxism by rejecting the Marxist method itself. Admittedly, in the past, the concept of

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(21) Writers using the "marginalisation" concept most adroitly include Nun, Murmis & Marin (1968), Quijano (1974), Nun (1969), Cordova (1972) and Sunkel (1970).

"industrial reserve army" has been used in an overly rigid and dogmatic way, thereby excluding large sections of the labour force in under-developed capitalist countries from its analytical scope and, perhaps more significantly, from participation in the praxis of Marxism. The wide acceptance gained by the marginalidad approach should not obscure the fact that, in attempting to construct a more relevant and inclusive model, the "new" terminology has been rendered impotent on account of its over-generality. For example, what is the class-composition of Quijano's "marginal masses"? What relations of production characterise and/or dominate its various spheres of economic activity? The static, exclusive and vulgar Marxist "magnifying glass" (incapable of seeing much more than proletariat and bourgeoisie defined in the most restrictive terms) has been replaced by the "telescope" of dependency theory, with a fixed focal length, enabling us to distinguish no more than an almost undifferentiated and homogeneous "mass" of marginal individuals and activities at an over-aggregated level. The Marxian method, to continue the metaphor, should have the facility to "zoom" from the micro-level to the macro-level (and back again), linking concepts of socio-economic formation, mode and form of production, class and class struggle, relations of production, etc., with their own and each other's concrete realities.

Writers such as Quijano do not advance sufficiently convincing arguments in support of their alternative terminology and conceptual framework ("marginal" pole, "marginal masses", etc.). Possibly the most serious implication of the marginalidad approach is that its conceptual imprecision has the inherent and imminent danger of dragging its protagonists into sterile and counter-productive dualism (e.g. "marginalised" versus "integrated" sectors), without permitting them to discover the crucial dialectical relations that link the twin poles of urban production together and drive the system onwards. Just as importantly, if the analytical focus is restricted to the heterogeneous so-called

"marginalised masses", class analysis may well fall prey to residual analysis, the staple fare of dualists and other apologists of the capitalist road to "development".

#### 1.5. EMPLOYMENT IN UNDER-DEVELOPED CAPITALIST ECONOMIES: THE PARAMETERS OF A MARXIST APPROACH

In juxtaposition to the dualistic, radical and marginalidad approaches (discussed in some detail above), the initial elements of a materialist analysis of the urban labour process can now be presented. This introduction of alternative concepts and formulations will be a fairly brief one, as the bulk of the analysis will be presented and explained in more detail in the central parts of this study (in particular, chapters 5, 6 and 7). In order to "pick up the threads" of the foregoing analysis, it will be necessary to return to the comments made earlier regarding the classical Marxist concepts of relative surplus population and industrial reserve army. In some respects, these concepts form the basis for the materialist theory of labour supply, but have the added advantage of not only explaining the impact of surplus labour on the real and money wages of those in registered wage-employment, but, in the context of under-developed capitalist economies, enables an explanation to be provided of the impact of employment in the "non-wage" or "quasi-wage" sector on the production of commodities in general and of wage-goods (means of subsistence) in particular.

##### 1.5.1. Relative surplus population and industrial reserve army.

The concepts of relative surplus population and industrial reserve army are often used interchangeably: this is imprecise and confusing. The concept of relative surplus population has general historical significance while that of the industrial reserve army

is specific to the capitalist mode of production (22). The general historical significance of the relative surplus population can be examined with respect to the functional relationship between various sections of the labour force and the dominant mode of production. Beggars and vagrants in the Middle Ages in Europe were certainly part of a relative surplus population that was "non-functional", i.e. it offered no contribution to the surplus-appropriation potential of the dominant mode, nor did it cause much disruption to the efficient policing of the community.

However, the more flexible labour force employed within the contemporary capitalist mode of production contains elements of a relative surplus population, characteristic only of that particular mode of production. This surplus population has a concrete function vis-à-vis capitalism; it represents the slack that allows capitalist production itself to be flexible, and to ride out its periodic crises of accumulation, allowing wages to be kept in check and accumulation to proceed.

Consequently, even though the concept of underemployment is undeniably a neoclassical one, as has been mentioned already, Marxist analytical categories can be fruitfully brought to bear on the same object of study - namely the suboptimal utilisation of labour-power. On the one hand, conventional analyses have assumed that perfectly-functioning capitalism, or a system reformed by

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(22) Major references by Marx and Lenin to these concepts include:

MARX.

Relative Surplus Population:

1961 I: Ch.25, Sections 3 & 4,  
esp. p. 612.

Industrial Reserve Army:

1961 I: Ch. 25, sections 3 & 4;  
1961 III: pp. 214, 217-19, 231-  
61 & 614; 1974: pp. 400 & 604-  
610; 1961 II: pp. 316, 410, 501  
& 513-514.

LENIN.

Industrial Reserve Army:


1972b: pp. 451, 534, 549-550

marginal policies to counteract the more stubborn market imperfections, would minimise underemployment. On the other hand, Marxists argue that the capitalist system, by virtue of its inherent tendency towards destabilisation (in the accumulation process, and hence throughout all markets, whether for labour, capital or whatever), systematically and increasingly generates the underutilisation of labour power as technical progress takes place. The various manifestations of this underutilisation are, according to Maletta's (1978:7-8) reading of Marx, as follows:

"a 'floating' surplus population - a mass of workers temporarily unoccupied which exists continuously, cyclically drawn in and expelled by the structure of occupational demand; an 'intermittent' surplus population of the formerly-employed who nevertheless depended on the most precarious forms of existence, with maximum working-time and minimum pay (...); a 'latent' surplus population, the section of the rural labour force, displaced by the increased organic composition of agricultural capital".

Sweezy (1970:87-92) employed the schema (overleaf, Figure 1.D.) to illustrate the function and composition of the industrial reserve army. The sector delineated by the broken line represents the location of many activities commonly included under the headings of petty production and petty trading. Some of these undertakings will be more closely connected to the capitalist production process than others. This point is further elaborated in Figure 1.E. by adapting Sweezy's schema to the specific situation of under-developed capitalist economies. Firstly however, the general principles outlined in Figure 1.D. can be presented.

Figure 1.D. General schema of the industrial reserve army



Source: Adapted from Sweezy (1970:87-92)

Industrial and allied commercial employment swells or declines as capitalism proceeds from boom to slump, with the industrial reserve army acting as a sump that holds those cyclically, or more permanently, surplus to capital's requirements. The central area of the diagram, delimited by the discontinuous rectangle, could be seen as representing those sections of the labour force that are predominantly subject to the cyclical vagaries of capitalism's demand for labour-power; workers in this segment of the labour force would constitute "latent" members of the reserve army, passing intermittently from capitalist wage-employment to activities ostensibly outside or marginal to the needs of capitalist production, being hired, fired and often circulating repeatedly in and out of capitalist wage-employment. Clearly, in under-developed capitalist economies, wage-employment is relatively small compared


to that found in developed capitalist economies, while those located permanently or intermittently in the reserve army will probably constitute a larger proportion of that maximum labour force potentially employable by capitalist firms.

Moreover, co-existing modes and forms of production (such as petty commodity production) that are integrated into and subordinated to the capitalist mode of production to a greater or lesser degree, will contain a much larger proportion of the total working population than is the case in developed capitalist economies. In under-developed economies, industrial employment is a much smaller proportion of aggregate economic activity, and entry tends to be more restricted. Alternative forms of economic activity exist that are no longer to be found to as significant an extent in developed countries: (1) peasant cultivation typically consisting of a combination of cash-crop production, subsistence farming and circular migration for wages; (2) self-employment in petty production and commerce; and (3) non-wage employment in petty commodity production and commerce, etc.).

#### 1.5.2. Petty producers and capitalism: the dialectic of dissolution – conservation.

Among petty producers, orders tend to be infrequent, and labour often only intermittently remunerated, due to the intense competition that their relatively recent proliferation has engendered. Casual workers (see Chapter 6, Section 4) employed in capitalist enterprises, also cannot expect regular or continuous earnings and thus can be classified, as suggested above, as having "latent" membership of the industrial reserve army (Marx 1970: I, 642).

Figure 1.E. Industrial reserve army and subordinate forms of production



- \* The level of economic activity in this "sector" will largely determine the size and relative proportions of labour inflows and outflows a - f. Economic activity is subject to booms and slumps (discontinuities in the accumulation process) and therefore will determine the approximate size of the industrial reserve army.
- \*\* The frontier between industrial reserve army and subordinate forms of production shifts in response to changes capital's direct and derived demand for various types of labour.
- \*\*\* Subsistence agriculture, petty production and trading, either continuously or intermittently, will supply both capitalist production and the reserve army with labour (either for immediate or future use) as and when the situation permits. At the same time, these subordinate forms will generate quantities of surplus-labour that will be appropriated (albeit asymmetrically) by various national class fractions and by the capitalist class at an international level.

This analysis is supported by the role played by petty producers: in their daily efforts to generate incomes, they serve as a back-up battalion to the industrial reserve army, even though they are involved in production apparently outside (though not unconnected with) the dominant mode of production. The characteristic advantage of these producers over the more obviously full or latent members of the industrial reserve army, in terms of their usefulness or "functionality" with respect to capitalism, is that they themselves produce commodities that enter into the consumption (and thus the reproduction of labour-power) of workers, peasants, the urban relative surplus population, other small producers, etc., thereby helping to minimise the costs incurred by capitalism in reproducing the direct labour-power it may require at any given time. Williams and Mutebile (1978:1103-1104) summarise the "usefulness" of petty commodity production vis-à-vis capitalist commodity production as follows:

"Petty-commodity producers provide inputs which the capitalist firms are unable to produce profitably. These include cheap food and consumer goods for the employees of capitalist firms (and the State which services them), thus reducing wage-costs and inflating the salaries of managerial staff. They maintain the reserve army of labour, which limits the bargaining strength of organised labour, thus reducing wage-costs and ensuring a flexible supply of labour to capitalist employment. They provide opportunities for additional earnings, and the possibility of establishing themselves as independent men to employees, thus both subsidising and encouraging wage employment. They provide the (protected) market for the products of capitalist firms. Far from being displaced by capitalism, petty-commodity production (including peasant agriculture) is essential to (the neo-colonial form of) capitalist production".

Until quite recently, the details of the mechanisms by which subordinate and dominant economic systems interact and evolve have remained poorly understood. Early Marxist writers such as Rosa Luxemburg (1951:1416) certainly perceived that were nuances in this dialectical interaction that Marxist analysis at that time was only beginning to confront. Luxemburg says

"The general result of the struggle between capitalism and simple commodity production is this: after substituting commodity economy for natural economy, capital takes the place of simple commodity economy. Non-capitalist organizations provide a fertile soil for capitalism; more strictly, capital feeds on the ruins of such organizations, and although this non-capitalist milieu is indispensable for accumulation, the latter proceeds at the cost of this medium by eating it up. Historically, the accumulation of capital is a kind of metabolism between capitalist economy and those pre-capitalist methods of production without which it cannot go on and which, in this light, it corrodes and assimilates. Thus capital cannot accumulate without the aid of non-capitalist organizations nor (...) can it tolerate their continued existence side by side with itself. Only the continuous and progressive disintegration of non-capitalist organizations makes accumulation of capital possible."  
[emphasis added]

Thus the above-mentioned subordinate elements are simultaneously "indispensable" and "intolerable" to a dynamic capitalism.

Kay (1975:104-5) implies that in the interests of analytical rigour, we should be seeking an explanation of the balance between "corrosion" and "assimilation" not just in terms of sweeping generalisations such as "capitalism finally establishes its hegemony", but in terms of concrete analyses of concrete conjunctures. In other words, in Geoffrey Kay's words (Kay 1975: 105), we should expend more effort on attempting to explain why "capital, despite its corrosive effects, has bolstered up archaic political and economic forms through a series of alliances with powerful elements in the pre-capitalist order".

Kay himself provides some of the elements of an answer. He believes the answer to lie in the fact that "in the under-developed world, independent merchant capital was the form of existence of industrial capital" and thus capitalism penetrated in a manner characterised by what Kay terms behaviour that is alternately revolutionary and reactionary, through which commodity production is accelerated, and either simultaneously or subsequently, the existing pre-capitalist order is given compre-

hensive support. Alternatively, this dialectic has been described as one of "dissolution-conservation" (Bettelheim 1972: 297-298); it almost seems as if we have the makings of a Marxist proliferation of "dialectics" to match the dichotomies presented in the dualist analyses: "corrosion-assimilation" (Luxemburg), "revolutionary-reactionary" (Kay) and "dissolution-conservation" (Bettelheim)!

Of course, there is some element of truth and precision in each of these formulations: Kay's corresponds to the general process through which capitalist relations and commodity production gradually achieves overall control of a socio-economic formation; but to do so requires "mid-course" changes, revisions of strategy, and a healthy dose of pragmatism. In specific situations the old feudal order, for example, must be supported or even strengthened; but equally so, under new conditions, capitalism will show no mercy in sweeping away feudalism at a stroke. Clearly, this is not merely a case of volition: the gap between aspiration and realisation can be closed or widened by historical forces operating at many levels.

Whether one prefers Luxemburg's "corrosion-assimilation" or Bettelheim's "dissolution-conservation" formula is largely immaterial. Differences in emphasis exist between these two conceptualisations: for the purpose of this study, the former is preferred. Nevertheless, it is not so much the nuances achieved by one and disregarded by the other that are important; rather it is the additional advances we can make in generating a dialectical mode of analysis that corresponds as closely as possible to the reality of under-developed capitalist economies. Both formulations allow for a non- or pre-capitalist form to be encouraged, only later to be severely constrained or even destroyed. Though one may not accept Alavi's thesis (1972) of the "colonial mode of production", there is certainly considerable validity in his assertion that the very penetration of capitalism and its

increasing hegemony suffices to substantially alter the nature of the various forms of production that experience its impact.

It is only with a perhaps somewhat misguided historical hindsight that we can talk at all of pre-capitalist forms: sometimes it may be helpful to have no historical precedence with which to make comparisons. Of course, the prefix "pre-" does not mean that pre-capitalist forms are merely chronologically anterior - to suggest so is to reduce the Marxist method to a banality. "Pre-" actually means "less-developed than" with respect to a complex historical periodisation of social development. We should not make the error of viewing today's pre-capitalist forms of activity as merely an historical residue or atavistic "throwback". Once capitalist penetration has begun to generate the conditions for its own reproduction and expansion (namely the conversion of an economy based on use-values to one based on exchange-values) no prominent pre-capitalist form of economy is ever really the same again.

We will argue in Chapter 3 that, even before extensive European contact was established, an unevenly developed and "imperfect" form of commodity production existed in parts of West Africa that was based upon the circulation of imperfect or undeveloped monies. Once European commodities entered the African markets (namely those of a privileged aristocracy), a process of "corrosion" took place, and all forms of productive activity, whether artisanal or agricultural, experienced a gradual or, at times, a more rapid transformation. Some internal autonomy may have been retained by these pre-capitalist forms in the initial stages, but very soon (at the risk of introducing a new qualifying prefix) they became "synchro"-capitalist, and marked less by their origins than by the unequal terms of their new partnership. The co-existence of an increasingly dominant mode of production and a complex of pre-capitalist forms causes the latter to mutate under the influence of successive waves of commoditisation. Thus what was previously a single and apparently unified and unambiguous form dissolves, only to later re-emerge elsewhere or in another

branch of production; rural labour becomes proletarianised and/or their landlords enter into a class alliance with the colonial bourgeoisie; wage-labour is expelled from capitalist production and is activated "independently" as petty commodity production, and yet cannot but operate dependently in a comprehensively monetised and commodity-producing environment.

Thus we are not dealing with a crude dialectic of the creation and destruction of capitalist and non-capitalist relations and forms, respectively. A given process of "dissolution" may well involve the further proletarianisation of labour at the level of the labour force in aggregate terms, but this may be achieved (at the level of the individual small enterprise) either through the intensification or extension of relations of circulation between itself and its capitalist milieu and/or by intensifying/extending pre-capitalist relations of production within the workshop. Since this process appears so contradictory - which is indeed the case - it may be useful to employ an apparently incongruous analogy to clarify this suggestion.

Until recently, the housewife has been almost wholly excluded from the analysis of the capitalist production process. On the one hand, orthodox writers felt that this category had nothing to do with the economy or the labour force: statistically, housewives were excluded and in developed economies constituted a veritable "unenumerated" sector. Recent studies at both the theoretical and the empirical level have partially rectified the situation: the work of the housewife has been linked concretely to the process of production and accumulation in capitalism (see e.g. Adamson, Brown, Harrison & Price 1976:2-48; Secombe 1974:3-24; Gardiner, Himmelweit & Mackintosh 1975: IV.II.2; Gough & Harrison 1975: IV.1.). Figure 1.F. (overleaf) illustrates this analogy.

The important distinction to be made between petty commodity production and women's domestic labour is that while both activities create part of the means of subsistence for large

sections of the labour force, this appears in commodity-form in the former case and as a use-value in the latter case. Articles provided by petty commodity production can exert a downward pressure on the value of the industrial wage precisely because this form of production can create such commodities under conditions that capitalism finds unacceptable, even though it is quick to accept the benefits bestowed on it in the form of lower real wages.

Figure 1.F. Comparison between the functions of petty commodity production and women's domestic labour.

PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION

Creates skills, generates income and reproduces individualistic ideology.

Acts as "functionally" productive (23) industrial reserve army that can be tapped when labour is in short supply, or when downward pressure on wages needs to be exerted.

Surplus-labour generated because labour is partly socialised

WOMEN'S DOMESTIC LABOUR

Assists in reproduction of capital and subsidises reproduction costs of means of subsistence via cooking, cleaning, child-rearing and socialisation, etc.

Acts as a "functionally" unproductive (24) industrial reserve army that can be tapped when labour is in short supply, or when downward pressure on wages needs to be exerted.

No surplus-labour generated because labour is generally privatised.

Though the domestic work of women is a necessary prerequisite of the reproduction of capital, its status as "privatised toil in the home" (Adamson et al 1976: 9) excludes it from social production. Since Adamson et al further claim that women's

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
(23) "Productive" because exchange-values are produced for consumption by various (mainly poor) sections of the population.

(24) "Unproductive" because use-values are created for consumption by households as part of the means of subsistence. Domestic labour is largely privatised (rather than socialised).

domestic work cannot be socialised under capitalism, can we also - by analogy - propose that petty commodity production cannot be comprehensively transformed into capitalist production (in the context of a world capitalist mode of production) because its very existence also constitutes a basic precondition for the continuous accumulation of capital? This brings us neatly back to Luxemburg's comments (cited above) concerning the indispensability to capital accumulation of "non-capitalist organisations". But whether capitalism can tolerate the continued existence of privatised domestic labour in its very midst is an interesting question that would, unfortunately, lead this discussion even farther astray.

To return to the problem posed by the dialectic of dissolution-conservation: if we look at the relations between wife and husband within the home, husband/worker and employer in the factory, they simultaneously complement, reflect and yet contradict each other. This is what makes the analysis of the role of housework in capitalism and its functionality vis-à-vis the accumulation process such a difficult task. This example parallels the situation (for example) of the apprentice in the urban artisanal workshop individually vis-à-vis his master, and more globally within the framework of the capitalist mode of production. While the relations between worker and capitalist may be relatively well understood (as are those between apprentice and master, and husband and wife, to a lesser extent), in the case of a small artisanal enterprise, it is extremely difficult to locate either the craftsman's wife or his worker within the system as a whole. What contribution does domestic labour make to the viability of capitalism? What part does the craftsman's young apprentice play in the process of capital accumulation? Some would answer "none", others "very little", as Figure 1.G. (overleaf) illustrates:

Figure 1.G. A comparison of the position of wives and apprentices in the capitalist system



Relation 1 is conventionally considered to be "extra-economic" and culturally-defined, just as Relation I is deemed to be "traditional" and either non- or pre-capitalist. On the other hand, Relations 2 and II will normally be conceived of as economic, "rational", capitalist and "modern". Thus the wife is analytically excluded in a similar way to the "informal" sector and its labour force. What is required is a methodology whereby the wife and the apprentice can both be meaningfully situated within the framework of Relation 3 and Relation III, respectively. How does the concept of the dialectic help us with this problem?

If we assume a simplistic dissolution-conservation formula, we are almost bound to predict that the effect of a conjunctural capitalist strategy of conservation vis-à-vis petty producers

would be to conserve the relations of production within the small workshop until such time as the conjuncture permitted/demanded a change of strategy. This may not be the case: the greatest care must be exercised in identifying what constitutes "conservation" and what may be described as "dissolution". Though these facets of the process of capitalist development are posited as polar opposites, they in fact have the capacity to "reverse their polarity": an example will clarify this.

Capitalism may in general terms support feudal or quasi-feudal forms of production in an under-developed capitalist society as Kay has suggested; this can be identified as conjunctural conservation i.e. the dominance of the "conserving" aspect over the "dissolving" one. However, if the objective of this strategy is the relative intensification of the rate of exploitation in agriculture while simultaneously giving material support to a part of the dominant class alliance (namely, the feudal landlords), capital accumulation may well be improved, enhanced or encouraged. The marketing of agricultural products from these feudal lands (either as urban foodstuffs or for export) inextricably links the feudal form of production with the process of capitalist development. Have then the agricultural workers in the landowners' fields nothing to do with capitalism? The assimilation of the feudal form of production into the general ambit of capitalism not only begins to transform feudalism as a mode of production but also the relations of production experienced by its labour force. If subsequently the pressures exerted on agricultural production by capitalism require changes to be made in the form and content of agricultural workers' conditions of labour, could it not be argued that the impact of apparent conservation itself embodies elements of dissolution?

A similar argument could be applied to the situation of apprentice- and family-labour in petty commodity production, when the latter is brought into close contact with fully capitalist production: if capitalism seeks to offload some of its social

responsibilities to its workers by "externalising" certain aspects of the production process (through the mechanism of sub-contracting, for example), this would constitute a stimulus to the proliferation of petty commodity activities, i.e. the conservation of a particular segment of the socio-economic formation. However, in order for the petty producer to satisfy his aspirations for the maintenance or improvement of his income and status in an environment dominated by monopolistic and/or oligopolistic capitalist market conditions, it may be necessary to intensify the conditions of exploitation of his labour force (conservation, again). However, the construction of concrete relations of subordination between capitalist suppliers, distributors and buyers (on the one hand) and the petty producer (on the other) inevitably brings the latter's labour force into a situation of indirect (and in this sense, double) subordination to capital. Are these workers then subject to a process of partial and/or indirect proletarianisation?

Thus a simplistic utilisation of a dialectical concept of dissolution - conservation may not advance our analysis too far, unless we are prepared to examine in far greater detail and more rigorously both the relations of production existing within specific forms of production, and those implicit in the relations (either in the sphere of production, or that of circulation) between subordinate forms and the dominant mode of production. The manner in which the dialectical formulation is often employed may not emphasise or even recognise the possibility that modes and/or forms of production other than capitalism may survive (albeit in a modified form) the onslaught implicit in the concept of dissolution for, even though the possibility of conservation is recognised, it is always assumed that

"economic development distributes functions among different persons; and the handicraftsman or peasant who produces with his own means of production will either gradually be transformed into a small capitalist who also exploits the labour of others, or he will suffer the loss of his means of production

(...) and be transformed into a wage-labourer. This is the tendency in the form of society in which the capitalist mode of production predominates." (Marx 1969: I, 409)

While this may well be fully acceptable as a long-term tendency (and, indeed, some of the data to be presented in this study will suggest that the pace and extent of proletarianisation is often far greater than commonly assumed), it is incumbent upon those who adhere to a materialist conception of the historical development of capitalism to trace in much more detail the short- and medium term (i.e. conjunctural) complexities of this dialectical process. We are therefore in agreement with LeBrun (1972:16) when he suggests that:

"if there exist numerous arguments in favour of the maintenance and even the development of the artisanry in the urban zones of Africa, there are, on the other hand, many arguments that can be advanced in favour of its dissolution. This is, of course, a contradictory process." [my translation, CG].

Not only is it a contradictory process, but it is also an extremely complex one. A more detailed analysis of some of the contradictory aspects of the process of capitalist development as experienced in its periphery will be given in Chapter 6. With regard to complexity, and to conclude the present chapter, we will return to some of the simplistic propositions advanced by orthodox economic theory.

### 1.5.3. Labour productivity and productive labour

At this point, (and in more detail in Chapter 5) an attempt will be made to criticise the prevailing conceptualisation of labour-productivity in under-developed capitalist economies - namely that it can be represented by some point on a continuum that encompasses employment, underemployment and unemployment, and that the scale of this continuum can be measured in terms of the wage-employment that characterises a developed capitalist economy. Any

discussion of this concept must address itself to the nature of labour-productivity i.e. in terms of what is the productivity of human labour to be measured, and in what sense can labour be deemed underproductive (underemployed) or unproductive (unemployed)?

It might be suggested that any use to which labour-power is put, and for which use remuneration is freely offered, must be productive, since it commands a price on the market. It seems clear that the commodities that partially or wholly arise from the utilisation of a given quantity and type of labour-power must command a price, since otherwise money would not have been advanced for the purchase either of that labour-power, or the raw materials upon which it acted in order to create those commodities. When the argument is presented in this way, however, a tautology is involved, since it proposes that labour is productive because it commands a wage (i.e. its price), and commands that price because the commodities it produces themselves command a market price. In simple terms, labour is productive because someone is prepared to remunerate it, and it is remunerated because it is productive.

Other writers have implied that unproductive labour characterises certain activities typical of capitalism but hypothetically superfluous under socialism. Allen 1969:135-48) for example, refers to the "inflationary" nature of much of the employment demanded by the capitalist mode of production. However, to measure an activity's "superfluity" with respect to an abstract form of rational labour utilisation may be to commit a similar error as the neo-classical economists have committed in judging particular levels of labour utilisation to be "suboptimal" relative to some rational ideal. What is required is the examination of labour productivity in the context of the specific mode of production in which it is generated: in the case under examination, the mode of production in question is that of capitalism. This presents few

problems when we are focusing upon the highly developed, highly proletarianised central (i.e. metropolitan) economies from which this mode of production was originally spread and internationalised. But in the much less-developed economies of the "periphery", where only limited proletarianisation appears to have occurred (25), the analysis becomes more difficult.

In Marxist theory, a productive activity is one that, in the context of the capitalist mode of production, increases capital either directly by generating surplus-labour, or indirectly by assisting in its realisation as surplus-value (Hodges 1960:281-2). The corollary of this definition, therefore, would be that an unproductive activity neither generates surplus-labour nor helps in its "valorisation". In this vein, Paul Baran (1973:144) defines unproductive labour as "all labour resulting in the output of goods and services the demand for which is attributable to the specific conditions and relationships of the capitalist system, and which would be absent in a rationally ordered society". This definition appears to cover both labour that is necessary but unproductive, as well as that which is simultaneously unnecessary and unproductive. In the discussion that follows, directly productive labour will be referred to as "productive", that which assists in the realisation of surplus-value as "unproductive", and that which neither produces nor helps to produce surplus-value for capitalism "non-productive".

Baran considered that these three forms of labour should be treated separately, while Hodges (1960) further refers to productive and unproductive labour that can be either directly and/or indirectly exploited and, indeed, be directly or indirectly exploitative of other sections of the labour force. Since the degree of involvement of particular sections of the aggregate labour force in the production and/or realisation of surplus-value

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(25) The thesis that "under-development" is wholly synonymous with "under-proletarianisation" is challenged in Chapter 6, Section 2.

(either manifestly, or in some "veiled" or "disguised" manner), and the quantity and direction of the flow of surplus-value are central to the distribution of the surplus generated by capitalism, clearly the concepts of productive, unproductive and non-productive labour are of great significance to the discussion.

Much of what has been variously described as the "informal sector", the "bazaar economy" or simply "traditional economic activities" appears to have little either directly or indirectly to do with the capitalist production process. However, Marxists now recognise that a strong and positive "functional" relationship exists between capitalism and such forms of employment. The symbiosis is complex: while Portes (1978) asserts that "peripheral capitalism" would be lost without the "informal sector", Williams & Mutebile (1978: 1103-1104) among others, affirm that capitalist penetration has rendered petty (commodity) production more highly dependent on capitalism than before. In this chapter it has been argued that major elements of both these formulations have validity, and that this apparent contradiction is due to the existence of a dialectical relationship of dissolution-conservation between dominant and subordinate components. This dialectic represents one of the major motive forces behind the development of capitalist relations in the "periphery". As Amin (1973: 212-214) explains, three of the major characteristics of this relationship (which itself characterises capitalism's current phase of development in the "periphery") are as follows:

- (1) The hegemony of capitalist industry established in contemporary under-developed countries on the basis of either pre-Independence colonial foreign capital, or post-colonial private foreign and/or State investment, has left only limited avenues open to indigenous owners of accumulated wealth, consisting in the main of commercial activities.
- (2) In contrast to the developed capitalist economies, where landed property has tended to decline in importance as profit-on-capital has progressively become the driving force of the socio-economic system, the under-developed world's orientation towards agricultural production for export has induced the maintenance of monopoly incomes from land ownership as the

driving force behind the development of the domestic ruling classes. These monopoly incomes need not necessarily be saved (since limited competition demands only limited modernisation and investment), but can alternatively be spent both in the consumption of luxury commodities (with a very high import content) and on local commodities, particularly services.

- (3) This factor is more complex since it concerns not only unproductive employment as described in (1) and (2), but also what might be termed non-productive employment (Marx 1969: Part I, 407) lying outside the capitalist mode of production itself or, at most, situated at its very margins.

A cursory examination of the structure and orientation of a typical under-developed capitalist economy (such as Senegal) would seem to indicate that much employment exists that is neither directly productive of surplus-labour nor involved in the realisation of surplus-value. This initial impression can only be denied or proven by closely examining the relationships between these various forms of employment and the capitalist mode of production. Much petty production, micro-trading and personal services appears to be either excluded from the production of surplus value, or (in the case of petty commerce) involved in its realisation under conditions imposed on it by the requirements of capital accumulation in "peripheral economies" (26). Such activities are commonly cited as a manifestation of a process of "marginalisation", but to what extent can they be accurately described as unproductive (or even non-productive)?

For the mass of the urban population of an under-developed country much of the working-life is spent in individual endeavour, i.e. in self-employment or, indeed, working collectively in a group headed by such a self-employed individual. Admittedly, there are workshops that use appreciable amounts of productive equipment, have predominantly wage-employees, even though the

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(26) For example, petty stallholders or shopkeepers who sell individual sachets of coffee, sugar by the lump, single cigarettes, etc., are ensuring that even when the poorest consumer has a need that capitalism can satisfy, someone is there to ensure the realisation of even the minutest quantity of surplus-value.

latter may appear from the outside to be just petty shanty-town manufactories. To the more typical urban petty producer, this type of workshop, and its scale of operations, would seem as far removed from his own reality, as the major industrial complex would appear if viewed from the premises of a small factory-owner.

Much petty production is based on family- and/or apprentice-labour, remunerated at or around subsistence level. A large number of the urban self-employed use no other labour than their own; over 21% of the Dakar sample of petty producers were one-person-operations. Marx (1969:1,407) describes in the following terms the position of such operators who, employing no labourers, are not deemed to be capitalist producers:

"[T]hey are producers of commodities [and (...)] confront me as sellers of commodities, not as sellers of labour, and this relation therefore has nothing to do with the exchange of capital for labour (...), nothing to do with the distinction between productive and unproductive labour, which depends entirely on whether the labour is exchanged for money (...) as capital. They therefore belong neither to the category of productive nor of unproductive labourers, although they are producers of commodities (...) [T]heir production does not fall under the capitalist mode of production" [emphasis in original].

Implicit in Marx's statement here is the assumption that the decision as to whether labour is productive or not has to be seen in the context of a given mode of production. However, if "non-productive" labour does not fall under the capitalist mode of production, it must consequently not be party to any form of relationship with that mode that would enable surplus-labour to be generated and subsequently be appropriated as surplus-value by the dominant mode. If such were the case, and this employment could be termed non-productive, this would be because it is neither directly nor indirectly productive of surplus-labour that is "functionally destined for accumulation, i.e. for the widening and deepening of capitalism's sphere of activity" (Amin 1973: 212). If this is not the case, and large proportions of urban non-wage-

employment can be structurally and relationally identified directly or indirectly with the process of capitalist accumulation, their "non-productivity" vis-à-vis capitalism would need to be seriously reassessed.

Nevertheless, the characterisation of petty production (in general) as non-productive vis-à-vis the capitalist mode of production may well refer to a general trend. Just as Lenin (1972b: 536) posited the existence of numerous "transitional forms" between pre-capitalist and capitalist production, it may be possible to suggest that numerous transitional forms (or various degrees of "transitionality") exist in the direct or indirect functionality that specific economic activities have vis-à-vis capitalism. This is of particular importance when attempting to establish the nature of the production processes that are based entirely upon family- and/or apprentice-labour, where the petty producer could be cast in the role of one who exploits the labour of others. However, there is every reason to suspect that, in general, he will redistribute the surplus he appropriates from those who work with him to members of his family (including those who work with him) "after hours", such that the entire labour force operates like the disembodied parts of a single autonomous producer. Alternatively, in the case of apprentices (27), their remuneration takes the form of food, possibly shelter, some small money payments, skill acquisition (unless they have a totally unscrupulous master) and occasional off-peak access to the means of production and scrap materials for the production of commodities for their own profit.

However, it is essential to remember the dynamic and dialectical elements that should form the basis of an analysis of the nature of these apparently marginal activities: if these are neglected, the result would be an impression as simplistic as that given by the dualists. Clearly, industrial wage-workers, artisans, petty commodity producers, domestic capitalists,

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(27) See chapter 5, and Chapter 6, Section 1.

landowners, etc., in the context of a given socio-economic formation, are in a constant state of flux. There is a constant flow back and forth between classes and within classes, as the margins of such groups and the constituent fractions dissolve and are reconstituted. But even when examined in a much more static framework, the world of the petty producer is intimately related to, and interpenetrates on numerous levels with that of trans-national corporations, the domestic bourgeoisie and with various subordinate forms of production.

In order to understand the nature of the interaction between the dominant capitalist mode of production and subordinate forms of production, and in order to concretely analyse the contemporary role of petty (commodity) production with respect to capitalism in an under-developed economy such as Senegal, the orthodox continuum ranging from employment to underemployment to unemployment must be discarded. It has been argued in this chapter that the orthodox framework of analysis, so dependent upon the marginal productivity theory of income-determination and income-distribution and by extension on the concept of underemployment, offers little hope of making significant progress in the analysis of the labour process in under-developed capitalist economies.

Additionally, it has been suggested that the use of the Marxist method and a rigorous yet flexible use of its basic analytical tools - such as the concepts of the industrial reserve army, dissolution-conservation, productive and un- (or non-) productive labour - will enable this analysis to be successfully undertaken. Such an approach, when used to determine under what conditions and through which mechanisms surplus-labour is appropriated (if at all) from a given activity, must initially clarify what is the nature of the activity under scrutiny. Is the labour process productive, unproductive, or non-productive? Once such an approach is elaborated, it could be eventually operationalised for planning purposes by placing it firmly within the context of transitional policies aimed at achieving the effective and full utilisation of the labour

force, with the implication that this be effective utilisation of the labour force for the labour force. This would be in stark contrast to the current formulation - which identifies how more jobs might be generated within the existing institutional framework - so beloved by the governments of many under-developed capitalist countries. If the study of the socially inefficient utilisation of labour power is focussed on the vectors that obstruct the effective and full utilisation of the labour force in the interests of the labour force, then the vectors most conducive to the optimal and socially efficient utilisation should emerge.

The bulk of this proposed analysis of the labour process in Dakar, Senegal appears below in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. After an additional theoretical chapter and an historical introduction, chapter 4 attempts to give a general overview of petty production in Dakar, in order for the more detailed analysis of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 to be read in context. In summary then, the objective of the rest of this study is to examine petty production (in general) and petty commodity production (in particular) in their theoretical, historical and contemporary contexts, to ascertain their contemporary role vis-à-vis the dominant capitalist mode of production, and to point to policy-orientations that would be consistent with the analysis presented above. Thus the main thrust of the study consists in the thesis that this form of production - in Senegal certainly, and with every likelihood in other under-developed capitalist countries both similar and dissimilar to Senegal - is inextricably bound and subordinate to the capitalist mode of production, and that it is precisely this relationship that blocks the emergence of more indigenously controlled production, prevents the evolution of a more viable national economic structure and dynamic, and perpetuates the structural distortions of the national economy to the benefit of domestic and foreign ruling classes and to the detriment of the mass of the working population.

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## CHAPTER 2

### PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION: AN INTRODUCTION

Before any detailed examination of empirical evidence can be undertaken, it is essential to make some basic statements concerning the theoretical framework proposed for this study. In examining the current situation of various branches of small scale production in Dakar, the terms petty production, petty commodity production, petty producers and petty commodity producers will be frequently used. Part of the object of this chapter is to clarify where the boundaries of petty commodity production (PCP) actually lie. The way in which small scale non-agricultural activities have evolved through history with respect to various dominant systems of social organisation will be dealt with in subsequent chapters.

#### 2.1. THE CONCEPT OF MODE OF PRODUCTION IN HISTORICAL PERIODISATIONS

Marx's analysis was mainly concerned with the capitalist mode of production. He also focused his attention variously upon the ancient and slave modes, the feudal mode, and, perhaps rather more tentatively, upon what he called the Asiatic mode of production. It is generally considered that the most primitive and the most advanced forms of Human organisation, namely primitive communities and socialism/communism can also be termed modes of production. In most Marxist schemas of historical development (and several variants of Marx's original are currently used the primitive community and the advanced communist society are exceptional inasmuch as neither are characterised by class divisions or exploitative relations.

Melotti (1977) has examined some of the more influential schemas of historical development elaborated by Marxists, and, in critically appraising their deficiencies, proposes a multilinear model of his own that he feels more closely reflects the totality


of Marx's own views on the subject. The diagram presented overleaf simplifies and summarises these various schemas; in addition to those mentioned by Melotti (1977:8-27), the schema proposed by Amin (1973:9-17) has also been included.

At its most vulgar level, much of the periodisation analysis has asked questions such as "what followed what?" and "what led to what?" Amin's rejection (1973:9) of history as an orderly succession of modes of production is correct, and rightly exposes many periodisation schemas for the hopeless dogma and mechanistic nonsense that they are. There is as little analytical correspondence between "mode of production" and "discrete historical stage", as between "mode of production" and "economic structure". If a mode of production is seen only as an episode in history during which time a specific form of social organisation predominates, then history is reduced to a mechanistic process whereby social fact and reality are violently forced into a mystificatory and dogmatic corset. If a "mode of production" is seen as nothing more than an "economic system" or "structure", then it is simply an empty box into which virtually any sort of descriptive and/ or quantitative material can be thrown irrespective of logic, order or relevance.

## 2.2. CO-EXISTING MODES OF PRODUCTION

"Modes of production" have been seen (albeit incorrectly) as analytical categories that represent discrete historical epochs. The concept was only to be used at the abstract level, or in terms of the grand schemas (or even "iron laws") of historical development, or so it appeared. More recently, the concept has been used in attempts to analyse the various interlocking parts of a complexity - for example, a specific society or geographical region.

Figure 2.A. Six Marxist schema of historical development.



(1) Amin states explicitly (1973:9) that the concept of mode of production implies m, order of historical succession. The particular order will be a product of specific circumstances which may differ from one civilisation or historical period to another.

(2) including oriental society as a variant.

(3) historically common, rarely dominant.

Thus analyses of "co-existing modes of production" and "the articulation of modes of production" have become relatively numerous, replacing the common historical usage of the term "mode of production" with one displaying both contemporary-structural and historical-dialectical features.

Some writers have examined particular societies and concluded that they had such broadly similar levels and processes of material production that they could be considered part of the same mode of production. For example, Alavi (1975) and Banaji (1972) talk of a "colonial mode of production" that is not capitalist but in fact exhibits the characteristic relationships of several modes. Alavi (1975:191) suggests that such a complex unity warrants the term "mode of production" since the autonomy, evolution and character of several of its (subordinate) components have been so altered by the penetration of (colonial) capitalism, that they along with the foreign and indigenous capitalist modes that dominate them, can only really constitute an "authentic" mode of production when taken together as a unity. The question of what constitutes either theoretical and/or empirical "authenticity" is crucial here, and will be dealt with below.

Other Marxist writers, struck by the apparent inapplicability of specifically characterised modes of production to the situation they are studying, have either sought to rekindle interest in the "Asiatic mode of production" that Soviet writers rejected during the Stalin era, with a view to examining the possibility of the existence of an "African mode of production" (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1971) or have used the concept of mode of production as something applicable to highly specific, almost micro-social realities (Terry 1972:97-105). Thus Rey (1975) proposed the existence of a "lineage mode of production" and, one is tempted to add, Terry (1972) was barely able to resist the temptation of postulating a "hunting an elephant with a net mode of production"! The problem that arises in Terry's formulation is that virtually any difference between two ways of achieving the same end debars them from

membership of the same mode of production. He suggests this on the basis that, in so-called primitive societies, several different labour processes can act as channels for the same raw material to become the same product. Thus fish can be transformed into a non-perishable condiment via a number of catching techniques (the net, the hook, the spear) and various methods of preservation (salting, drying, smoking, etc.). Terray (1972) therefore suggests that such labour processes be referred to as "concurrent modes of production". This raises another definitional question: can the terms "mode of production" and "labour process" be used interchangeably? Just as the term "mode of production", "economic structure" or any similar designation, is emptied of any meaning if it is taken to be synonymous with "historical epoch", a parallel between the term labour process and mode of production will not lead us to an acceptable formulation of the latter concept.

Yet other Marxist writers (e.g. Rey 1971, 1973) have devoted their attention to the way in which transition from one historical epoch (or "mode of production", as it is incorrectly called) to another takes place. Of particular importance has been the debate over precisely how different modes of production respond and relate to one another over time, and how this "articulation" as it has come to be known, is reflected in the emergence of new or the concretisation of old patterns of exploitation, class alliances, class struggles and, indeed, the emergence/supersession of modes of production themselves (see e.g. Foster-Carter 1978: 47-77).

Before moving on to a rather more detailed examination of specific definitions proposed by different authors, the clarifications advanced by Rodinson (1974: 4-11) and by Amin (1973:12-17) should be considered. Both of these authors in their different (and not necessarily compatible) ways have articulated a similar concern over the confusion that appears to plague the so-called "modes of production debate" - namely that between the mode of production seen first as an abstract theoretical construct, and second as something empirically-based and identifiable, a con-

fusion that finally provides us with nothing more precise than a description of the manner (i.e. mode) in which an act of material appropriation is performed.

Both Rodinson (1974: 58-9) and Shaw (1978: 32) emphasise that Marx himself may be inadvertently the source of this confusion, since he tended to use the term "mode" in all three ways. Rodinson's claim is that Marx never unambiguously defines the term, while Shaw (1978: 32) argues that Marx never intended the term to be used in anything more than a general systematising sense. Normally it is the context in which Marx writing that provides the key to determining the precise level of analytical exactitude or generality with which he is using the term.

Rodinson (1974: 6) makes the following distinctions in his use of the term "capitalism", and in doing so clarifies some of the confusion over the above-mentioned levels of analysis:

"On the one hand, capitalism is a 'mode of production' in the strict sense of the word, that is, an economic model in accordance with which production can be carried on in an 'enterprise' (in the widest sense of this term). An owner of the means of production pays a wage to free workers in order that the latter may (...) produce commodities which the owner will sell for his own profit."

Many would dispute the validity and relevance of this definition of a mode of production as nothing more than a "model". However, Rodinson (1974: 6) continues:

"[I]t is possible to talk of a capitalist 'sector' in the economic system of a given society, in order to indicate all the enterprises in which (...) the capitalist mode of production is operative."

Here, it is clear that "sector" is seen as a collective noun embracing all units of production that, in the loosest sense, have a capitalist modus operandi, which he characterises equally loosely as an enterprise-based method of production and productive organisation. In broader, but rather more perceptive terms, Rodinson (1974: 6) concludes:

"Finally, there is a capitalist 'socio-economic formation'. This is what one usually has in mind when speaking of capitalism; it is the formation in which we are living. It is marked by a particular 'economic system' in which the capitalist sector occupies a predominant place, and by an ideological and institutional superstructure corresponding to this" [emphasis added].

Again one could criticise the specific terms in which Rodinson's formulation is set. Many Marxists would argue that "sector" is primarily a bourgeois concept devoid of any serious analytical content, and would wish to see the term "capitalist mode of production" used here in its place. Nevertheless, Rodinson is correct in juxtaposing an empirical reality ("the formation in which we are living" [emphasis added]) with something that has a more abstract flavour, namely the idea that an economic "system" may be characterised by the (pre-)dominance of a specific "way of doing things", in this case capitalist in nature, that can only really be analysed rigorously if its abstract "pure" form and its empirical "impure" manifestations are both separated and fused within the analysis.

Amin (1973: 12) makes a similar point rather more clearly and traces the repercussions further than Rodinson. No mode of production (of which he enumerates five) has existed in a "pure" state in the real world, he claims. Societies today, yesterday and tomorrow can best be described as "formations" (here Amin uses the same term as Rodinson), i.e. concrete structures organised on the basis of a dominant mode of production. Around this hegemonic "hub", a complex composite structure is to be found comprising a number of subordinate modes. As Amin (1973: 12) concludes:

"[W]e can envisage the petty commodity mode of production articulated either with (28) a dominant tributary mode of production (... embryonic or feudal), or with a slave-based or even a capitalist mode of production".

Amin goes on to discuss specific modes of articulation between "social formations", giving the example of long-distance trade in what Coquery-Vidrovitch has called the African mode of production. A social formation according to Amin, (and much in the way Rodinson suggests) can be defined as a complex of several modes of production; once one has identified the dominant mode and its corresponding predominant form of surplus, the complexity of the heterogeneous surplus (the admixture of rent, tribute, profit, etc.) and its roots in the complex of modes can be analysed. Thus, concludes Amin (1973:14) in order to rigorously analyse a social formation, we need to examine the way in which the dominant mode exercises its hegemony, and how, upon that basis, each of the component modes of production fits into the whole. The thesis is phrased in quite explicit Althusserian terms, i.e. those of dominance and subordination, dissolution and conservation, mediated by specific forms of articulation.

In conclusion, we can return to Rodinson (1974:65), who provides an extremely useful summary of his own position both with respect to modes of production in the context of a historical periodisation, and with respect to their empirical existence.

"Before the age of capitalism (...) it is possible at most to distinguish a primitive communal mode of production which (...) was the only one in existence (...). Then came an infinite variety of modes of production with a (corresponding) structure of exploitation (...). It seems that, in general, these systems imply juxtaposition or articulation of various modes of production, combined in different ways and (...) proportions (...)  
If we want to speak of socio-economic formations

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(28) Or should it be "articulated by"? Foster-Carter (1978: 53) quotes a forthcoming publication by Ken Post on the Jamaican Labour Rebellion of 1938 in which he identified two levels of meaning for the term "mode of production": (a) a "joining together" and (b) a "giving expression to".

corresponding to the various systems (...) only the striking predominance of a mode of production in a particular system, as happened with slavery in classical Greece (...) or with serfdom in mediaeval Western Europe, would confer on this system and the corresponding socio-economic formation a highly characterised specificity" [emphasis added].

In order to emphasise this point, Rodinson (1974:66-67) gives the following example from Muslim society of the Middle Ages:

"The economic system on which [this society] (...) was based varied between periods and regions (...). [I]t consisted in a co-ordination of different modes of production. In the countryside we find village communities exploited from outside by individuals or by the state (...). On the one hand, far from being in every case survivals of primitive communities (...) many of them (...) are of relatively recent formation. On the other hand, they have coexisted in proportions varying by period and region, with the ownership or usufruct of a small plot of land allowed to the individual peasant (...). Some lands at some periods were also worked by slaves (...). Agricultural wage labour also existed (...). The fact that sometimes the state and at other times a 'feudalist' received the dues paid by the peasant (...) does not seem to have (...) any major significance."

However, even if Rodinson and Amin agree about the practicality of identifying socio-economic (or social) formations at the empirical level, and believe these to be juxtapositions, combinations or articulations of different modes of production, others are as dissatisfied with the concept of "social formation" as they are with "mode of production". Roxborough (1976: 126-127), for example, (quoted in Foster-Carter 1978:73) claims that the term "social formation" cannot be the empirical expression of the more abstract concept of "mode of production", since it may contain or comprise more than one mode of production. Clearly, it is this composite constitution that Amin and Rodinson variously refer to as "social formation" or "socio-economic formation". Foster-Carter, in attempting to clarify Roxborough's objections, seems to imply that equally the term "social formation" cannot denote the empirical (albeit "impure") realisation of a complex structure in

which several modes of production articulate or combine (1978:73). The term "social formation", he concludes, is a conceptual abstraction that is admittedly closer to the complexity and concreteness of reality, presumably because it is itself a complex concept, rather than just one of several ostensibly simpler components of a complex concept.

At this point, it is tempting to assert that the "mode of production" debate reaches an impasse. However, virtually every term used in social science can be criticised on the grounds that it is an abstraction and does not clearly and plainly confront us in the real world. Trite as it may seem, one must ask whether we are to refrain from using the collective conceptual term "bird", since no such thing exists, the real world being full of differentiated yet identifiable "versions", examples or concrete manifestations of that general and generic concept?

However, now that some of the principal contextual points and issues have been raised with respect to the concepts "mode of production", and, to a lesser extent, "social formation", some additional definitional clarification can be made by referring to the work undertaken by several theoreticians on the articulation between the various co-existing modes of production, which we will assume for the purposes of this study can be identified with sufficient accuracy at a given point in time within a specific socio-economic formation.

### 2.3. MODES OF PRODUCTION & ARTICULATION: AN ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONAL CLARIFICATION.

The moderately simple definition provided by Rodinson and the qualifying comments of Amin have already been introduced. Since much of the recent debate concerning modes of production was set in motion by Althusser and Balibar (1970) (and more extensively by the latter), it is appropriate to begin with their definition. A mode of production is "a complex structure, doubly articulated by

the productive forces (...) and the relations of production"  
(Althusser and Balibar 1970:311,317; [emphasis added].)

To be more precise, Althusser in fact refers to an articulated "connection" between forces and relations of production. Thus when other authors of the Althusserian school speak of the "articulation of modes of production", they are normally referring to the relations, linkages or connections between the principal aspects of various modes. Foster-Carter (1978:54) explains that Althusser is referring to two different dimensions of these "linkages": first, between the consequences of the individual dynamics of particular, separate and unequally developed modes; and second, between vertically juxtaposed and co-existing modes (co-existing within a particular social formation, one assumes).

However, as Foster-Carter suggests, it is probably in the work of Pierre-Philippe Rey (1971, 1973) that the concept of the articulation of modes of production finds its authentic and original expression. For Rey, articulation takes place in stages over time and is conceived of as a disaggregated conceptualisation both of the transition from one mode to another, and the evolving relations between a dominant mode and various pre-existing modes. In brief, Rey concludes that the process of articulation comprises three stages: (1) the initial linkage between one mode of production and another (or others) within the sphere of circulation, reinforcing the other mode(s) of production, (2) the taking root of the intruding mode of production, during which time the pre-existing modes are simultaneously subordinated and made use of, and (3) the total disappearance of the pre-existing mode(s). Rey is specifically referring to the transition to the capitalist mode of production, but one suspects that his model could also be applied to other transitions (for example, from that of the primitive community to the feudal mode of production).

Hindess & Hirst (1977:9-10), working quite explicitly in an Althusserian theoretical framework, define a mode of production in an even more detailed and, arguably, rigorous way:

"A mode of production is an articulated combination of relations and forces of production, structured by the dominance of the relations of production which (...) define a specific mode of appropriation of surplus labour and the specific and corresponding form of social distribution of the means of production."

The principle advance in this formulation is the assertion made by Hindess & Hirst that the concept of mode of production cannot be constructed on the assumption that the forces of production are the determining feature of the "articulated combination" (1977:11-12). Additionally, they argue that a determinate labour process (such as, for example, those discussed by Terray 1972:107-116), cannot be usefully examined outside the context of the corresponding relations of production.

If we accept the primacy of relations of production within the concept of a mode of production, logically we should recognise that this also refers, at least in abstract terms, to the primacy of the economic over the political and ideological aspects of a particular social formation (LeBrun 1972:70). Such a primacy will be of special significance when examining the corresponding process(es) of material appropriation (not to be confused with what Hindess & Hirst refer to as "determinate labour processes"), for it is precisely the dominant mode of appropriation of surplus-labour that will define a specific articulated combination of relations and forces of production (Hindess & Hirst 1977:304-5).

The critics of the "articulation" thesis argue for the acceptance of a contemporary and generalised capitalist mode of production or, in Wallerstein's terms (1974) a "capitalist world system", to which all else is subordinated. Such a critique has often arisen out of an unwillingness on the part of some Marxists to accept the notion of a capitalist mode of production having even relatively limited national characteristics: thus Kitching

(1977:58) asserts that there is no evidence to suggest that Kenya, for example, is capitalist, even though it is clearly subordinate to capitalism - i.e. that of the internationalised capitalist system. However, national capitalist classes may exist, as may national "capitals" or fractions of capital. To use a perhaps rather curious analogy, it can be said that there is air in a particular house, but such a statement does not go far in defining the nature of air in general, until it is accepted that a particular pocket of air is just a single minute part of a much more generalised phenomenon. Atmospheric conditions, humidity and chemical composition may vary from location to location, but this does not deny the fundamental unity of the generalised phenomenon.

In the remaining pages of these more theoretical introductory chapters, a crucial conceptual problem is posed. First of all, it is important that some attempt be made to clearly define the characteristics and internal dynamic of a specific phenomenon that some (e.g. Amin 1972: 9) have termed a "mode of production", namely petty commodity production. Nevertheless, this cannot be done without reference to the complex articulation of co-existing modes (or whatever we eventually decide to call them) of which petty commodity production forms just one part. Equally so, it must be recognised, I would argue, that if we accept Amin's formulation of the relationship between "mode of production" as an abstraction and "social formation" as a concrete historical complex of "impure" modes dominated by one among them, and for the moment leaving Roxborough's and Foster-Carter's none-too-clear objections aside, then at least one of the distinct components of a specific social formation has to be seen as something operating in a much wider arena than merely that of national geographical space occupied by a specific social formation.

Perhaps this is expressing the conditions for the study of petty commodity production in reverse, for, rather than the contemporary capitalist enterprises operating in an under-developed economy having external consequences and repercussions,

it is an internationalised (albeit far from internally harmonious) capitalist mode of production whose world-wide strategy of capital accumulation has internal consequences for and repercussions on the contemporary under-developed social formation. It is all too easy to pay lip service to this fact when conducting research in an under-developed country. Capitalism is certainly present "there", we must admit, but is "there" capitalist? One of the principal aims of the present study is to assess the way in which the capitalism in (but, generally speaking, not of) Senegal has diverted, deformed and reformulated a pre-existing order of indigenous non-agricultural production. Another aim is to assess how capitalist Senegalese petty commodity production currently is, how capitalist it may become in the future and/or what else it might conceivably become.

#### 2.4. THE CONCEPT OF PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION

Before taking a detailed look at the contemporary situation of petty in the Dakar economy, it is essential to examine the concept of petty commodity production (PCP). In much of the conventional literature, many small scale, apparently marginal, traditional or "refuge" occupations in the cities of under-developed countries are seen as activities lying outside the principal spheres of capitalist (or "modern") production. In using the PCP formulation, and by examining the empirical evidence, this "outsideness" will be challenged. PCP can be thought of as a distinct economic form, to be found historically in close proximity to, and with a high degree of integration with a number of dominant modes of production. Since it is commodity production that is of interest here, it would be difficult to sustain an argument suggesting that PCP was to be found flourishing in the interstices of primitive communal social formations. In such communities where trade is virtually non-existent (barter being the predominant complement to subsistence production), and production for the market unheard of,

production is essentially oriented towards the creation of use-values that may potentially (for example in the context of the more advanced market conditions of a neighbouring society) have exchange-value.

In Harrison (1978:29) there is a useful discussion of the confusion that has often arisen over the nature and significance of PCP: Harrison says:

"Simple commodity production [here used as a synonym for PCP] (...) is a simpler form of commodity production than capitalism. As such, it provides a convenient way of examining features common to both systems, without immediately encountering all the complexities of capitalism (...) A confusion between simple commodity production and capitalism underlay many of the bourgeois socialists' errors. An understanding of both systems clarifies these mistakes."

Thus PCP appears both as a theoretical model or construct, and as something that, albeit in an "impure" empirical form, can have material and historical existence. Of course, not only did the concept of PCP underlay many formulations of bourgeois socialist thinking but, in its guise of "perfect competition", also provided a fundamental building block of neo-classical economic theory.

In volume 1 of Capital, Marx's exposition relates most crucially to a model of abstract, simple commodity production, in order for the more complex and controversial task of analysing the capitalist mode of production to be undertaken with more rigour and clarity. So how does Harrison define PCP (or simple commodity production as he prefers to call it)? He advances the following characteristics of petty commodity production (1978:30-35):

- i. individual producers (usually known as artisans) own all the requirements for production;
- ii. a developed division of labour exists; and
- iii. production is undertaken for exchange purposes (i.e. in order to realise the market value of what is produced) rather than for its intrinsic usefulness.

Now we can pursue this definitional clarification further by introducing the characteristics of PCP advanced by Alison MacEwen

Scott (1977:1-2) who suggests that three elements are crucial to the definition of petty commodity production:

- "(a) the production of commodities for the market (...);
- (b) small scale production, (...) factors commonly associated with which (...) include volume of output, size of work-force, size of capital and level of technology (...). PCP is referred to by Marx as the "pygmy property of the many";
- (c) ownership of the means of production by the direct producer. For Marx the foundation of PCP is the fact that [for Marx, 'the labourer is the private owner of his own means of labour set in action by himself'."

Thus MacEwen Scott and Harrison agree on ownership of the means of production by the direct producer and the production of commodities as being crucial to the definition of PCP. Harrison emphasises also the relatively advanced degree of specialisation, while MacEwen Scott underlines the need for smallness of scale (in its various forms). Additionally, Emmanuel (1974:73-74) has the following suggestions to make towards a definition of the concept:

"If the 'individual, private' property owner has the capacity to bring means of production into operation by him/herself, and if he/she does so, then we are faced with the fusion of possession and property under the form of non-capitalist individual property (...) which presupposes not only a certain amount of power (a particular relation of production) but also a 'structure of the labour processes' such that each property owner can effectively bring the means of production into operation by him/herself. Consequently, this property implies 'a parcelling out of the social process of production' among the centres for the appropriation of nature, these being owned by different (...) proprietors. Such a structure, which is that of simple commodity production, involves the transformation of products into 'commodities' and [their] (...) circulation under the form of commodity exchange."

In brief, this amounts to a definition of PCP according to three fundamental characteristics, namely that:

- i) the individual property owner is able to bring the means of production into operation by him/herself (an act involving relations of property, control and production);

- ii) production is for exchange (i.e. transformation of products into commodities and their circulation as such); and
- iii) the social process of production is "parcelled out" among a number of different proprietor/producers.

Characteristic (c) can perhaps be taken as the fusion of Scott's criterion of smallness of scale and Harrison's emphasis on the extent of specialisation. The "parcelling out" of the social process of production implies both a multiplicity of relatively small producers able to set in action the means of production of which he/she is the owner, as well as a developed division of labour, such that social production in all its facets is relatively specialised between occupations and individuals.

If we define capitalist commodity production as that which is undertaken to an overwhelming extent upon the basis of free wage labour, then we may say as a corollary that PCP is commodity production principally undertaken on the basis of free labour that is tied to the owner of the means of production through relations of personal dependence (e.g. family, kin, age, apprenticeship) rather than by wage-contract (at the individual level) or by dint of the fact that labour has been almost universally dissociated from alternative sources of subsistence income generation. The following diagram, based on the arguments of the authors cited above (Bettelheim, 1972; MacEwen Scott, 1977; and Harrison 1978) illustrates the way in which PCP represents a form of economy in which commodity production has emerged but, even though it is itself characterised by the use of labour power that has been "freed" from anterior forms of surplus-generation and appropriation, this process is neither generalised, nor are the forces of production as yet sufficiently developed to enable that process of generalisation to be accelerated. The abstract model of PCP can therefore be summed up as commodity production (and circulation) undertaken by individual, small and occupationally specialised proprietor/ producers, on a free and equal basis. However, as Harrison (1978:48) explains:

"No society organised along the lines of PCP (...) has ever existed. (...). Production by artisans did take place on a significant scale during the period of transition from natural economy to fully fledged commodity production. But it never became the dominant form of economic activity. At first it existed under the wings of feudalism. By the time production for sale became general, artisanal activity had been eclipsed by the rise of capitalism. Moreover, even in its heyday, artisanal production involved unequal, hierarchical and coercive social relations."

Figure 2.B. Characteristics of modes/forms of production

1. Primitive Community	Labour "free"; no commodity production; "primitive" artisan producing use-values.
2. Tributary/Feudal Mode	Labour "tied" (personal relations of dependence); commodity production and exchange in evidence; commodity form not yet extended to labour.
3. Petty commodity production	Labour "freed" in relatively small quantities, but "retied" to property owners, through <u>relations of personal dependence</u> ; commodity production and circulation characteristic of this form of economic organisation.
4. Capitalist commodity production	Labour freed in massive quantities but "retied" systematically to property owners through relations arising out of <u>sale of labour-power as a commodity</u> .

Harrison then goes on to examine briefly the impact of the sexual division of labour within artisans' families, the inheritance of means of production, the long process of apprenticeship by which skills were obtained, and the attendant limitations placed on the mobility of labour and the rapid acquisition of working capital.

Probably most important of all is the fact that several forms of economic organisation will normally co-exist within one society

at any one moment. Additionally, unequal relationships will exist in PCP both in the processes of production and circulation.

The examination of such factors constitutes the confrontation between PCP as a model and as an empirically observable phenomenon. Such factors make up the real-world situation in which petty producers live and work - not to mention certain groups whose stage of development is anterior or even subsequent, such as true artisans (29) and petty capitalists. Evidently, the model of PCP presented by Marx in volume 1 of "Capital" abstracts, to a large extent from the difficulties and complications of the real world. However, if the materialist analysis of contemporary PCP is to advance at all, these concrete phenomena of unequal and hierarchical relations within PCP and between it and other forms of economic organisation must be examined. A bourgeois formulation would tend to treat such phenomena in a highly cynical and contradictory manner, simultaneously viewing them as inherent, and thus fundamental characteristics of socioeconomic life, and yet as inessential objects of study.

## 2.5. IS PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION A MODE OF PRODUCTION?

Hindess & Hirst (1977), in their much-debated work on pre-capitalist modes of production, discuss the various forms taken by the separation of direct producers from their means of production, and the differing ways in which they become subsumed under particular relations of exploitation. These questions, with particular

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(29) Harrison (1978:36) says, with respect to the model of PCP, that "(a)rtisans are interested only in the exchange value (...) of goods they produce"; I prefer to restrict the term artisan to the situation Bücher (and subsequently Lenin) envisaged when they described an artisan as one who has contact with the market only as a purchaser of the means of production, and who produces articles on the basis of orders received from clients who will consume the articles themselves. For a fuller discussion of the distinction between artisans and petty commodity producers (strictly defined) see below (Chap. 5) and LeBrun & Gerry (1975:21-23).

respect to petty commodity production, is a major objective of the present study. However rigorous Hindess & Hirst are in their analysis at the abstract level, it is difficult to see the way in which what they define as a mode of production could conceivably be identified for more than a relative split-second of historical time, so demanding are the conditions and criteria for its existence. Since an "impure" mode of production as found in the context of a contemporary or historical social formation would necessarily be significantly discrepant in terms of Hindess & Hirst's criteria, would it be advisable to abandon the term unless it is being used in an explicitly abstract sense? This would not be a denial of the relevance of the term - more a recipe for the avoidance of either generalised confusion and/or interminable semantic debates. Another question to be posed, if not fully answered at this juncture, concerns the degree of refinement currently employed by writers on the subject of co-existing "modes" of production. Could it be that, by attempting to ensure that central criteria for confirming the existence of (and clearly identifying) a particular mode of production are satisfied in an indisputable and concrete fashion, they are ignoring the possibility that, at a more detailed level of analysis of the real world (perhaps as yet undisclosed) such criteria are, in fact, met to a much greater extent than currently realised? This may sound ominously like an open invitation to manipulate theory to fit one's assessment of reality or, indeed, the discovery of "realities" that "fortuitously" fill the lacuna in our theoretical constructs. However, I do not believe this to be the case. Some empirical evidence and the accompanying theoretical framework is presented in Chapter 6.

Nevertheless, we have already looked at the concepts that have been generally employed in the Marxist analysis of petty commodity production to date. The task of outlining the principal parameters of a more empirically-based, detailed and disaggregated analysis of co-existing "modes" of production forms the subject-matter of

Chapter 6. For the moment, in the final section of this chapter dealing with the conceptual framework we will be concerned with addressing the question "mode of production, form of production or what?" This almost inevitably brings us back to the definition of a mode of production.

In a recent journal article (LeBrun & Gerry 1975:20), in which a brief attempt was made to examine the nature of petty production, the following assertion was made:

"[the use of] the term form of production to describe PCP is deliberate. Mode of production seems (...) inappropriate, since it refers essentially to a totality which is self-sufficient at both the superstructural level and at the economic base. Forms of production exist at the margins of the capitalist mode of production, but are nevertheless integrated into it and subordinate to it".

Individual production for personal domestic consumption, individual production of articles ordered by individuals for their own consumption, individual and/or collective production of commodities for the market, individual and/or collective production for factories, warehouses and retail establishments enjoying high degrees of monopsony - these were just some of the forms of production identified in the context of Dakar's small scale activities. Such "variants" and "transitional" or "intermediate" forms were singled out quite deliberately, since many of the labour processes encountered neither met the criteria necessary for their identification as classical artisans (namely that production was for individual client's orders rather than for the market) nor could be unambiguously classified as commodity producers (inasmuch as production was undertaken solely with a view to realising exchange-value rather than creating use-value). Indeed, in many cases, individuals could almost have said "today I am by definition an artisan, but yesterday, I was a surely a commodity producer, and the day before ..."

In the above-mentioned article (LeBrun & Gerry 1975:22) the blanket term "petty producers" was used: this subsumed both artisans

and petty commodity producers of various levels and scales. Indeed, as the present study will indicate, there are also "petty producers" who are almost indistinguishable from wage-workers, at least in terms of the relations of production into which their labour processes are inserted. But the major distinction is between the artisan, whose production is principally oriented towards the production of use values, and the petty producer of commodities, whose is primarily concerned with production for the exchange-value that will be realised thereby. This fundamental distinction between production for use and production for exchange reflects a whole family of other differences, summarised in Figure 2.C. (overleaf).

The terminology "form of production" and the distinction made above between it and the mode of production has been criticised by Davies (1979: 103) and in many respects this critique is valid. Davies complains that "what LeBrun & Gerry refer to as a mode is more properly called a social formation". The implication that a mode of production needs to be "self-sufficient at both the superstructural level and at the economic base" is indeed inaccurate: this supposed self-sufficiency, at least in terms of the economic base, must be predicated upon the subordination of other co-existing forms of economic organisation. This inaccuracy does not, however, affect the argument over "form" versus "mode".

Indeed, Davies gives a hint of how this problem might be resolved by quoting Oskar Lange (1963: 19-20 in Davies 1979: 103): "there is (...) another mode (30) of production which, although never dominant in any period, continually appears as a subsidiary mode of production - and one which is frequently very important. This is simple commodity production" [emphasis added].

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(30) Again, it needs to be pointed out that it is precisely the use of the term "mode" that is at issue here.

Figure 2.C. Production for use-value versus production for exchange value

PRODUCTION PRINCIPALLY ORIENTED TOWARDS:

- | (I) USE-VALUE   | (II) EXCHANGE-VALUE   |
|---|---|
| 1. production is for both use-value and exchange-value; mainly due to (I.4) and (I.5) below, the ideology of use-value production predominates. | 1. production almost exclusively of exchange-value; direct producers' involvement with the intrinsic nature of the product severely limited (31). |
| 2. client-oriented (i.e. artisan).  | 2. market-oriented (i.e. PCP).  |
| 3. relations of personal dependence predominate.  | 3. capitalist relations of production predominate.  |
| 4. reproduction of means of subsistence generalised.  | 4. ability to accumulate (differentially) generalised.  |
| 5. limited commodity alienation (32).   | 5. substantial commodity alienation.  |

Lange apparently deliberately qualifies the term "mode of production" with the adjective "subsidiary"; in many ways this is precisely the qualification made by Amin when he distinguishes petty commodity production and slavery from the three major modes

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(31) Neither petty commodity producers who are unable to accumulate, and artisans who rely on small clienteles for survival, although they produce articles that exchange for money (whether in the market or "over the counter") have entirely submitted to commodity alienation. They often relate personally to the nature of their product, both in terms of client satisfaction and intrinsic quality. Involvement with the market, however intermittent and slight, tends to initiate the dissolution of use-values (indeed all values) into exchange-values.

(32) For the owner of the means of production, a process of commodity alienation takes place: as soon as profit is possible, the actual nature of the articles produced becomes of progressively less importance, within the confines dictated by the market. For his workers, a progressive development of the social and technical relations of production along capitalist lines alienate them both from the owner of the means of production, (as he occupied himself more with the organisation of rather than direct involvement in the process of production), and from the product itself (as workers are progressively assigned detailed functions in the division of labour, and progressively alienated from the product as a unified commodity).

of production (namely the primitive community, the tributary and capitalist modes of production). He considers the former to be only exceptionally and fleetingly capable of providing the foundation for a socio-economic formation; the latter "could itself be non-dominant (...) or dominant, as was more exceptionally the case (e.g. in classical Ancient societies)" (Amin 1972: 12).

Thus at the very least we are faced with a subsidiary, exceptional and more often than not non-dominant mode of production. This conclusion invites, of course, the rejoinder that both capitalism and feudalism (and, one supposes, socialism) in the respective periods of transition from one historical epoch to another, were themselves non-dominant (i.e. immature, and only beginning to assert themselves) and therefore performing a subsidiary role in the socio-economic formation as a whole. Why should PCP be any different?

No-one would deny that during an historical epoch dominated by a particular mode of production (capitalism, for example), both "remnants" and "reincarnations" (33) of historically anterior modes of production continue to co-exist with, depend upon, and contribute to the development of the dominant mode. Thus an abstract mode of production can emerge in reality either as a dominant central element in a socio-economic formation, or as a subsidiary and subordinate partner, depending upon the historical conjuncture. This is clearly the case with feudalism and the primitive community; we can assume that it is also the case with the capitalism that continues to subsist during the transition to

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(33) "Remnants" would consist of the most resilient (or least strategic) elements of the old order; "reincarnations" are those pre-existing aspects of anterior modes that can be usefully moulded to fit the new reality in which a different mode of production holds sway (e.g. the eventual conversion of African "use-value" slavery into a more developed commodity form; and the maintenance, modification and refinement of feudalism in contemporary Latin America).

socialism. Whether such an argument can be sustained with respect to slavery and PCP seems to be more doubtful.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter and certainly far too tangential to the study as a whole, to enter into a discussion of the so-called slave-based mode of production. However, the essence of the position taken here is that, just as slavery can be seen as a harsh, inhuman, less developed and yet highly resilient form of and precursor to labour as a commodity as Hindess & Hirst (1977: 142-144) argue (34), PCP can be viewed as a highly adaptable, anterior and simplified version of the very commodity production that characterises capitalism. It is the fact that PCP is a variant form rather than a distinct analytical and empirical category that makes it so inappropriate to term it a mode of production, thereby placing it analytically at the same level (or, according to Lange and Amin, below), feudalism or capitalism.

In order to undertake his analysis of commodity production in the abstract, Marx clearly had to make simplifying and/or generalising assumptions. In applying that analysis to the specific case of capitalism, Marx assumed that capitalism had penetrated every branch of industry. But clearly not every productive system (and PCP is equally clearly one such system) is capable of becoming dominant, i.e. carrying its own characteristic modus operandi into every sphere of social and economic life. We can be sure that only in the most exceptional circumstances and for the briefest periods can PCP exercise such power. Probably the same can be said of slavery, though, in the context of this study, this is a matter of intuition and speculation.

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(34) Hindess & Hirst do not, however, identify slavery as being equivalent to wage-labour: the major distinction they make is that the slave can be considered both a form of capital and a part of capital, whereas the wage-worker him/herself confronts as capital the surplus-labour that has been appropriated from him/her within previous cycles of the production process. See Hindess & Hirst (1977: 125-148).

Considerable historical study will need to be undertaken on the political, juridical and ideological superstructure that corresponded to empirically identifiable examples of petty commodity production as a dominant system of production (for example, of the 18th and 19th century New England and Boer socio-economic formations cited by Amin) before we can conclusively say that PCP is inherently incapable of sustaining its extensive domination without itself being entirely or substantially transformed and transcended. If, as may be suspected, no such capacity for long-term domination exists, then the hypothesis advanced here will be considerably strengthened: PCP is an undeveloped and/or partial form of capitalist commodity production that can act alternatively and dialectically as precursor, catalyst and initiator vis-à-vis capitalism, as well as providing the raw materials for further capitalist exploitation (both as a source of directly or indirectly appropriated surplus-labour and as a source of future capitalists and wageworkers).

Additional evidence will be suggested in the concluding section of this chapter to support the use of both the term and concept of form of production. This evidence is more pertinent to an examination of the historical dynamic of PCP, a topic that constitutes a logical "bridge" between this more theoretically and conceptually-based discussion, and that of the specific historical evolution and reality of PCP which forms the subject-matter of the next chapter.

## 2.6. THE HISTORICAL DYNAMIC OF PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION.

From the preceding analysis, it will be assumed that the terminology "form of production" is more appropriate for the analysis of petty commodity production than its characterisation as an empirically-identifiable mode of production. For the purposes of this sketch of the historical dynamic of PCP, it can

be seen as a distinct economic form (characterised by commodity production and/or circulation on the part of small scale and occupationally specialised proprietors and/or direct producers) found in virtually all historical epochs (with the exception of those in which no relations of class or exploitation are present, i.e. the primitive community and advanced communism). Petty commodity production thus operates and responds vis-à-vis several dominant modes such as feudalism, capitalism and socialism (35).

Normally attention is focused upon the principal actors in a drama: in discussing the role played by PCP in the various transitions from the hegemony of one mode of production to that of another, we will of necessity concentrate less on the former box-office favourite, and equally as little on the star who is on the ascendant. In order to see the development of PCP, the major elements in the schema are of course essential, but their role will be seen in terms of their implications for and repercussions on the evolution of PCP. But in focusing attention on PCP, it should be remembered that we are talking about an economic form that is normally subordinate (though not necessarily lacking in the ability or power to take initiatives), usually dependent (i.e. in most socio-economic formations, for the major part of its existence it plays a subordinate role) and yet often acts in a way not unlike a historically recurring catalyst, based upon some of the most simple and unfettered principals of commodity production, such that during the establishment of the overall control of a particular mode of production, PCP may well play a decisive role in providing some or many of the elements necessary (but not sufficient) to provide the dynamic of transition. Once that

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(35) No attempt will be made here to enter into the debate over how to categorise the contemporary so-called socialist societies (such as the Soviet Union or China). Nowadays, it is increasingly argued that these are no less class societies than those of the capitalist West and, as such, are just another variant of the capitalist system. See e.g. Wallerstein (1974) and specifically Foster-Carter (1978:74).

hegemony has been acquired, and a specific and largely generalised mode of appropriation has been established, the subordinate aspect of PCP predominates. Every element in the system is involved in a complex dialectical development, and thus can emerge as a powerful influence, only later to come into conflict with, and eventually succumb to, the very forces it helped to engender. As Engels (1976: 344) says:

"(J)ust as manufacture and the handicraft industries, which had experienced a further growth under the (...) influence of the feudal system and the guilds, had come into conflict with the feudal trammels of the guilds in their time, so large scale industry, in its more complete development, (...) comes into conflict with the barriers within which the capitalistic mode of production holds it confined".

The historical process whereby the scattered "puny, dwarfish, circumscribed" means of production (Engels 1976:346), belonging to individual direct producers, are transformed into highly productive and modern means of production required the emergence of a capitalist class, willing and able to direct this process, in progressive stages (simple co-operation leading to manufacture and eventually to large scale industry), and the transformation of the individual means of production into social means of production worked by a collectivity of labourers. Thus the development of large scale industry is based upon the formation of that collectivity of free labourers, who themselves have been "released" from the ties of individual property. Such a release emerges as the corollary of the acquisition by a minority hegemonic class of capitalists of that individual proprietorship - i.e. the progressive concentration in the hands of a privileged class of the majority of the society's strategic means of production. It is much later that this concentrated individual property (which enables social acts of production to be undertaken in series and thus in a highly productive manner) becomes institutionalised and legitimated in juridical terms as class property. Just as the means of production were progressively socialised for the benefit

of a small class of capitalist proprietors, the socialisation process (being devoid of socialised ownership of the means and benefits of production) reduced the labour-power of the mass of the population to a commodity-form, leaving individual small-scale property and production as a residual element in the socio-economic formation.

Engels (1976:346) describes this process taking place in the feudal era of the European Middle Ages as follows:

"But where the spontaneous division of labour within society (...) which arose gradually and planlessly, is the fundamental form of production, it imprints on the products the form of commodities, the mutual exchange, purchase and sale of which enable the individual producers to satisfy their manifold wants. (...) The peasant, for example, sold the artisan agricultural products and bought from him the products of his craft. The new mode of production (...) set up the planned division of labour, as it was organised in the individual factory, in the midst of the spontaneous planless division of labour which (...) then prevailed throughout society; side by side with individual production, social production made its appearance. The products of both were sold in the same market and (...) at the same prices, at least approximately. But planned organisation was stronger than the spontaneous division of labour; the factories working socially produced their commodities more cheaply than the isolated small producers (...). In its origin (...) social production was directly tied up with certain already existing levers of commodity production and exchange: merchant's capital, handicrafts, wage-labour. Since social production itself appeared as a new form of commodity production, the old forms of appropriation characteristic of commodity production remained in full force for it too" [emphasis added].

This extensive quote provides us with many of the central analytical elements necessary for an examination of the historical dynamic of PCP. But before looking more closely at the feudal era, it is important to focus our attention on the preceding transition (at least in terms of the classical historical periodisation) from classical society to that based upon the exaction of tribute (whether feudal or otherwise). In order to look at this 'first' transition, some substantiation must be provided for the assertion

that PCP cannot be regarded as anything but a subordinate (albeit important, perhaps catalytic) component in any given socio-economic formation.

It appears that PCP co-exists and interpenetrates with a succession of dominant partners (feudalism, incipient capitalism, mature capitalism, state socialism); MacEwen Scott (1977:4-5) suggests that PCP uses these dominant partners as its sole means of self-reproduction. Why is PCP incapable of reproducing itself either 'from within', or by the absorption of outside resources, as a dominant form? If we try to find historical evidence of societies based predominantly upon PCP, the evidence is both limited and at the same time illuminating. As Amin (1973:320-325) points out, certain societies such as Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Eastern seaboard of North America have relied substantially on PCP in the initial stages of their development. Very quickly, however, the rudimentary economic form both superseded itself and was superseded within the dialectical process whereby early capitalism emerged. It is worth quoting Amin (1973:322-323) at length, with reference to South Africa.

"The patriarchal economy of the Boers was originally one of simple commodity production, grafted onto the system of maritime transport of the 17th and the 19th century. The Boers supplied dried meat to the boats in a manner similar to the conditions under which the nascent capitalism operated in the European agriculture of the time. At this stage, white and black society remained separated (...) and there was no exploitation. The Boers repulsed the Africans, just as the Indians had been kept at bay in North America. The English arrived at the end of the 19th century in order to exploit the gold and diamond deposits which had been recently discovered, rather than through any attraction to the Boer economy. The English needed a proletariat, and this was to be found in the black population. The English colonial administration created the reserves, and were the initiators of apartheid. The Boers (...) lived in a self-sufficient economy which made their exploitation by the English impossible (...).

Gradually, however, the simple commodity economy of the Boers gave birth to a localised, self-sufficient capitalism, which was nevertheless partially dependent on the

extraverted colonial economy. Taking advantage both in economic and political terms of English capital, the Boers supported and were supported by the (colonial) State and exploited for their own profit the internal colony which the African reserves represented (...) The patriarchal agrarian Boer economy ought to have felt threatened by modernisation and monopoly, yet has been able to subsist, despite its backward technology, thanks to cheap (black) labour."

And with respect to New England, Amin (1973:321) says:

"New England (...) was not established as part of the mercantilist periphery as were the Indies and the Southern States of North America: it was autonomous from the beginning and was not created as a dependency by the metropolis. New England was a by-product of the process of proletarianisation in England. The impoverished emigrants who left for New England were of no interest to metropolitan mercantilism, which left them alone to organise themselves for survival. The simple commodity economy of farmers and artisans which ensued was poor but self-sustaining. This (...) society, founded on the simple commodity mode of production (36) as the dominant mode (something which occurs rarely in history) nevertheless has the ability to generate capitalism. Gradually, New England took on the functions of the metropolis within the North American system. It substituted the English slave colonies for England itself as its (...) dominant pole. This substitution was partial until the War of Independence, and thereafter total. Freed from the tutelage of metropolitan mercantile monopolies (...) New England became a developed centre before acquiring the status of a metropolis on a world scale."

Here, we are drawn back to MacEwen Scott's assertion that PCP can only reproduce itself through its relations with a dominant mode of production. There is certainly evidence of such conditions

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(36) The reader is reminded that Amin considers simple commodity production to be one of five major modes identifiable in history. It is rarely dominant, and exists in conjunction with numerous other (albeit dominant) modes. While agreeing with much of Amin's formulation, I feel the term "mode" is inappropriate. The problem of the so-called slave mode of production (see e.g. Hindess & Hirst 1977: 109-148) is equally difficult: it has been argued that slave-based Viking society of the 9th and 10th centuries escaped much of the generalised European slide towards feudalism for the very reason that surplus-labour was appropriated from a constantly replenished mass of slaves, rather than the impoverished kinsmen of a clan-group (Anderson 1974: 176-7).

being necessary, as Hindess & Hirst (1977:98-108) are quick to point out with respect to the Ancient World: the ravages of continual warfare, and the demands this placed both upon the state apparatus and upon the populace in general, led to a systematic decline in commodity production, which throughout the classical era had been extremely limited in terms of the potential for long-lasting and comprehensive development of the productive forces. Economic relations based upon personal dependence between patriarchs and direct producers developed in a manner analogous to those characterising the tributary/feudal mode of production (Hindess & Hirst 1977:106-7). Out of this process developed a rudimentary form of feudalism based on tenancy, rent-in-kind, labour-service and the concentration of commodity production on estates and latifundia. The embryonic feudal class, and the nascent constituent elements of a feudal mode were the means by which commodity production (albeit in a circumscribed manner controlled by and for the benefit of the feudal lords) was able to survive. Thus the reproduction/survival of PCP, and its ability to retain its viability at a low level of development until the rise of the urban economy, was largely based upon its dependent self-reproduction within the terms of reference established for it by embryonic feudalism.

Thus the principal conditions for the reproduction of PCP appear to be supplied by the dominant mode of production in any given historical conjuncture, or, in more realistic terms, the reproduction of PCP is predicated upon the ability of some other mode of production (and very rarely itself) to establish substantial hegemony, first at the economic, and later at the political-ideological level.

"Whatever this dominant mode happens to be (...) its preferential provision of markets, either in PCP's favour or to its detriment, its characteristic form of surplus appropriation and its specific social and spatial division of labour, ensure that its transition from simple reproduction to accumulation is predicated upon the transformation of its paternalist relations of production into those of the dominant mode of

production. In short, this implies that if it is to break out of its cycle of simple reproduction, and engender a spiral of accumulation, PCP must transform itself into something else. What PCP transformed itself into in the past, and what the future may hold for it, largely depends on the nature of its dominant 'partner'." (Gerry & Birkbeck 1979).

It should be remembered, however, that the dissolution of the relations of production and the attendant political institutions characteristic of the Ancient World, did not take place evenly or equally either in time or space. The level of development attained in Greece or in the Roman Empire, though it had its parallels in the Middle East and Asia, was not necessarily duplicated elsewhere. Equally, several socio-economic formations (notably those of Northern Europe and Scandinavia) retained considerable elements of their pre-feudal social and political structure until well after feudalism had reached its zenith in Western Europe (Anderson 1974:173-181).

The emergence of a dominant feudal order was nevertheless predated by urban commodity production: as Anderson (1974:150) points out, "in Western Europe (...) the genesis of urban commodity production is not to be located within feudalism as such (...). But the feudal mode of production nevertheless was the first to permit it an autonomous development within a natural-agrarian economy." He goes on to illustrate this point with reference to the Roman Empire (in which urban centres were ruled by noble landowners who, despite the fact that they lived there, drew their wealth from the land) and to China (where towns and cities were controlled by Mandarin bureaucrats "segregated from all commercial activity"). As Marx notes, "modern history is the urbanisation of the countryside and not, as among the ancients, the ruralisation of the city". It is only with the emergence and increasing hegemony of the feudal mode of production that a dynamic articulation emerges between the predominantly and increasingly commodity-producing urban centres, and the rural economy, the latter based on feudal

control of the demesne along with small relatively autonomous pockets of communal and individual property.

Of course, rural commodity production existed on a restricted scale, even though it tended to benefit the upper echelons of a differentiating peasantry rather than the peasantry as a whole. As Anderson says (1974:146):

"More (...) villages came to possess forges for the local production of iron tools, a scattered rural artisanate developed. The improvements of technical equipment (...) tended to lower the demand for labour services on noble demesnes, allowing a corresponding rise in inputs on peasant plots themselves (...) (There was an increasing social differentiation in the villages due to fragmentation of plots); (...) an incipient kulak stratum usually confiscated most of the benefits of rural progress within the village (...)".

Urban areas in mediaeval Europe normally sprang up around regional markets or sources of raw materials for embryonic manufacturing. Anderson (1974:191) suggests that rising cereal prices from 1100-1300 encouraged commodity production and exchange in the towns. Many of the urban centres were dominated at an early stage by feudal lords (prominent or petty) or by the agents of the Crown, but rapidly came under the control of an indigenous 'patrician' stratum comprising former agents and intermediaries of the feudal social structure, successful merchants whose transactions were of strategic importance (Bienefeld 1979:30) and incipient manufacturers. Beneath the patrician oligarchy was the mass of small master craftsmen and occasionally (as in Flanders and Italy) a wage-earning stratum.

Though some significant manufacturing sectors developed, long distance trade and localised usury were the most lucrative activities, therefore confining much economic and political power in the hands of the urban mercantile oligarchy. As Marx (1970: Vol.I, 750-751) points out:

"Doubtless many small guild-masters, and yet more independent artisans, or even wage-labourers, transformed them-

selves into small capitalists and (by gradually extending exploitation of wage-labour and corresponding accumulation) into full-blown capitalists. (...) But the middle ages had handed down two distinct forms of capital (...) usurer's (...) and merchant's capital (...) The money capital formed by means of usury and commerce was prevented from forming into industrial capital, in the country by the feudal constitution, in the towns by the guild organisation (37) (...) These fetters vanished with the dissolution of feudal society, with the expropriation and partial eviction of the country population."

In this way, PCP co-existed with feudalism and later formed the technological and "managerial" (if not the financial) basis for the development of capitalist manufacture. Nevertheless, just as not all apprentices became successful master-craftsmen in the previous epoch, not all master-craftsmen were transformed into embryonic captains of industry. The workshops and small manufactories or pre-Industrial Revolution Europe were nests from which hatched not only capitalists, but also members of the embryonic modern proletariat.

In the context of contemporary under-developed capitalist economies, PCP co-exists with a mature and largely externally-controlled capitalism. PCP comprises not only elements from the peasantry (former artisan-peasants now working in town but with substantially the same techniques and often relations of production (38), but also those who have taken up self-employment in occupations introduced by the colonial and post-colonial penetration of capitalism. Both these components have undergone considerable changes in the past and appear to be still in control of their respective production - processes. However, in reality, their labour is often firmly subordinated to capital via mechanisms of "unequal

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(37) Marx adds in a footnote "Even as late as 1794, the small cloth-makers of Leeds sent a deputation to Parliament, with a petition for a law to forbid any merchant from becoming a manufacturer".

(38) This may be the case only at the level of appearances: in reality, many may be dominated by large scale and medium industrial or merchant capital, thus retaining only formal independence.

exchange", discriminatory and exploitative sub-contractual relations and by monopoly protectionism, mechanisms that will be examined in more detail subsequently in this study.

Nevertheless, the origins of petty commodity production can be traced back to the small scale subsistence agriculture of pre-feudal society. Even if, in this era, little or no surplus is marketed by the direct producers (but is appropriated by community-based patriarchs for eventual exchange), many of the elements of PCP are in force. Direct producers in many cases were in individual control of the means of production, though these latter were normally distributed communally. Relations of production tended to be patriarchal (or, on occasions, matriarchal) and largely personalised. Small scale production of an agricultural type thus provided the basis for social differentiation, the conversion of a communal division of labour into a structure of hereditary privilege, and laid the foundations for the evolution of a tributary/feudal system.

As this system evolved, part of the incipient village craft sector, already producing on the basis of barter for social "equals" within the village, or on the basis of exchange or customary rent-in-kind for an emergent kulak stratum as well as the feudal nobles, relocates itself in the emerging urban areas, is constituted into guilds by the urban oligarchs of trade and embryonic manufacturing, and begins to grasp the possibilities of capital accumulation. Gradually at first, then with ever greater confidence, the already evolving urban PCP becomes stronger and begins to constitute a threat to the dominant feudal order.

Eventually, it forms part of a complex of variables that together constitute the vehicle by which the feudal order (at least in Western Europe) is dissolved and overturned. As capitalism, based partially on the more dynamic elements of PCP (the more backward elements of which have already succumbed to proto-capitalist relations of production and have lost much of their initial autonomy) gains progressively more control over the more strategic

means of production, and as the principal means of accumulation become concentrated in manufacture and commerce (rather than in the ownership/control of agricultural land) the remaining elements of PCP fall under the domination of capital and the increasingly influential capitalist relations of production. Thus the most dynamic elements of PCP become part of the emerging capitalist order, while the more backward components find themselves opposed to new and potentially overwhelming forces. Whereas before, it had been the exactions of the village patriarchs and feudal nobles that had structured the conditions under which PCP flourished or foundered, now it was the urban oligarchy of merchants, manufacturers, usurers and guild-masters who largely determined the rules of the game.

Following its industrial and technological revolutions, the capitalist mode of production can be characterised as "mature": this maturity is amply evidenced by the fact that the appropriation of relative surplus labour (rather than that of absolute surplus labour) is the predominant factor in the accumulation process. Capitalism moves from its competitive mercantilist phase to one in which transnationally active capital (and progressively finance capital rather than any other variant) systematically attempts to establish and maintain a flow of surplus (on an increasing scale) from the colonies and semi-colonies to the advanced capitalist "centres", following the contours of the uneven capitalist development previously engendered and nurtured through direct colonial political domination. The position of PCP in the developed capitalist economies in this period constantly changes, but is nevertheless characterised for the majority of participants by chronic crisis.

PCP can certainly survive in the era of mature capitalism, and is sometimes able to benefit from periods of crisis which, due to its inbuilt resilience, individualistic (rather than corporatist) ideology and flexibility of production, may not affect it as profoundly as it does large scale production. Needless to say, such crises of capitalism take their toll on PCP, but its participants

may be offered greater opportunities for work and for capital accumulation following the structural changes that crises almost inevitably force on capitalism. Work previously performed in large factories may be contracted out to outside specialists, some of whom may be newly-established, highly specialised capitalist enterprises, others of whom will be small individual, family and/or petty capitalist concerns. Equally so, the exigencies of increased redundancies, and the swelling of the industrial reserve army not only stimulate the supply of small competitive entrepreneurs, but also shift the demand of the relatively poor consumer away from the commodities produced by large capitalist firms to those of much smaller units.

Consequently, even though a progressively modified PCP survives an environment dominated by large scale capitalism, it is only able to make absolute rather than relative headway in the process of accumulation. Capitalism now exhibits an unprecedented degree of monopoly, thereby creating an environment in which only relatively few niches are available for the propagation of petty commodity producing activities, indeed, for the lower echelons of true capitalism itself.

Advanced industrial capitalism also exhibits a progressive and proportionate diminution its demand for labour within the process of direct production. Its periodic crises force some workers and inevitably many of the so-called self-employed into unstable employment situations. Former wage-workers become self-employed: the construction worker becomes a small contractor or jobbing builder; the worker formerly in direct production becomes self-employed in an ancillary service activity. Some small businesses are able to take up labour thus expelled from the large scale capitalist sector. However, the growth of sub-contracting, franchising and outwork represents a proliferation of self-employment only at the level of appearances: in reality, much of this supposed self-employment is but thinly disguised wage-employment. Instead of the mass of workers being continually clutched to the very heart of industrial and

finance capital, increasingly large sections of the labour force (especially in the readjustment phase of a crisis) are held at arm's length. Nevertheless, the grip of capital is not slackened, and we should not assume that the proletarianisation process cannot proceed hand-in-hand with wide-ranging redundancies and the introduction of more productive production techniques. The capitalist relations of production may find their purest expression within a factory's walls: this is not to say that capitalist relations cannot transcend those walls and bring under the sway of capital segments of the labour force whom we are accustomed to consider self-employed. Interestingly, this phenomenon of disguised proletarianisation (a term that overcomes the dualistic and often simplistic implications of the integration - marginalisation dichotomy commonly used to analyse the nature of the urban labour force in under-developed capitalist regions) applies with equal force to the dynamic of capitalism in both its heartlands and in its peripheral spheres of influence, giving ample evidence of the international nature of the capitalist mode of production, and emphasising the folly of employing categories such as "peripheral capitalism" as if they had theoretical rigour and analytical potential.

The transformation of elements of both the industrial-commercial wage-labour force and of small scale production into disguised wage-labour enables large scale capitalism to shift both the responsibility (and as a consequence the production costs also) more emphatically onto the shoulders of ostensibly independent direct producers. It is in this context that we can view the past development of PCP as part of the global development and progressive penetration of capitalist relations of production. Equally, it makes clearer the apparent ambiguities that bedevil the interpretation of trends in the contemporary development of PCP, whether in the capitalist heartlands, or in the economies of their peripheries. Parallel to the strengthening of PCP's ideological commitment to independent economic endeavour, we encounter a process in which the objective independence of PCP (circumscribed as it always has been)

is progressively weakened as it moulds itself to the reproductive cycle of capitalist accumulation. By modifying its strategic responses, PCP partially transcends itself: less and less of what we might identify as PCP corresponds in reality to its abstract theoretical form. This, in very limited detail, is the nature of the articulation between the capitalist mode of production and the petty commodity form: many of the issues raised above will be taken up again in more detail in the remaining (more empirically-based) parts of this study.

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### CHAPTER 3

#### THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION IN SENEGAL

##### 3.1. COMMODITY PRODUCTION AND FORMS OF MONEY

In this more historically-focused chapter, a more detailed and specific level of analysis can be used in order to facilitate our real-world picturing of PCP as material production. Clearly, the abstract model of PCP will envisage a natural, "closed" economy; as Vilar (1976:24) explains, all known economies have engaged in some form of exchange, even though this does not necessarily imply the existence of money. Thus to posit the existence of money (as we know it today) as a prerequisite for the circulation of commodities would be to over-formalise and artificially limit the scope and depth of our analysis. Consequently, it would be appropriate at this point to examine forms of money and its circulation in relatively simple societies, in order to see the role it plays in commodity production.

Vilar (1976:24-26) explains that though the Incas had gold and precious stones in abundance, they did not use money. Inca society was not characterised, however, by backwardness in the measurement and monitoring of transactions: highly sophisticated forms of non-monetary accounting were fully institutionalised. Just as the pig is still a commonly-used standard of value in many so-called primitive Pacific cultures, so the head of cattle was used in tribal Germanic society as this was the reference point by which the value of other goods was measured. In the 12th century, linen cloth was used as currency in the Baltic; as late as 1760, villagers in the isolated villages of the Catalan Pyrenees used grain to purchase goods at local markets (Vilar 1976:25).

It is commonly held that in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, personalised relations of dependency within the production process progressively give way to commodity relations.

However, to automatically extend this formula to make the existence of commodity relations contingent upon that of money in its modern sense would be wrong on at least two counts. First, such an analysis would seriously underestimate both the pervasiveness and significance of less developed forms of money, or "imperfect monies", as Braudel (1973:329-335) has called them. Second, and more fundamentally, such an approach would involve an incorrect identification of widespread commodity production with extensive monetarisation of the economy. The terms "widespread" and "extensive" have a rather special meaning, since commodity and monetary relations may well be spatially selective and concentrated; as Braudel (1973: 325, 355) tells us:

"The monetary economy (...) only made its way into certain regions and (...) sectors. It continued to disturb the others (...) In Naples the peasants, who form [ed in 1751] three quarters of [the] people, [did] not settle a tenth of their consumption in hard cash (...) The bonds of money and market did not encompass all human life. The poor evaded them. It was possible to say [of Burgundy in circa 1713] that 'variations in [the value of] money hardly interested the greater part of the peasants (...) who do not possess currency'. This was true almost always for peasants everywhere."

Thus in many instances relatively advanced monetary circuits co-existed with less developed, "imperfect" ones, Braudel (1973:332) concludes that outside Europe:

"the fate of this (...) money after the European impact (...) proves identical in every case (...) monstrous and catastrophic inflation caused by an increase in reserves, and accelerated (...) circulation, and a concomitant devaluation in relation to the dominant European money".

Consequently, to attempt to identify when money and monetary relations began to impinge in a given society requires a more detailed analysis of the parallel processes of dissolution – conservation to which "imperfect monies" were subjected during the progressive transformation of personalised into commodity relations. For example, in the early European colonies, metal

money was often in short supply (Braudel 1973:334) and this meant that "imperfect money naturally played its part". Though simple and more sophisticated forms of barter continued to predominate (Braudel 1973:335), "every time it was needed, an early improvement brought the circulation of (...) "imperfect monies" (...) to its aid" (Braudel 1973:326).

What we can probably say quite safely, however, is that as commodity relations advance, intensify and eventually come to predominate within a particular economy, so the forms of money that were formerly relatively secondary and subordinate (compared to other transactional calculi) are superseded and "modern money" begins to play the major role in social relations. In brief, as personal relations of production give way to commodity relations, monetary forms develop and take up an increasingly dominant role in the economy.

If relatively widespread monetary circulation and acceptability is necessary for the existence and progress of commodity production, is it not surprising that at least the relatively sophisticated banking systems of Ancient Greece and Rome could not provide the environment for a rapid transition from simple to capitalist commodity production? Since in the Ancient World, both wage-labour, fairly advanced forms of land tenure, and quite modern banking institutions had all evolved, one might have expected to see the development of capitalism in the "modern" sense of the word. Rostovtzeff (quoted in Hindess & Hirst 1975: 99-100) suggests that the commercial development of the Ancient World was very close to the stage of economic development reached by European capitalist economies in the nineteenth and present century: there were large internal markets, considerable mass production for the market, and massive employment (of slaves, particularly) in both industry and agriculture. Hindess & Hirst (1977:102-103) themselves point out the distinction between the commercialism of the Ancient World and the capitalism of the modern era of world history in the following way:

"In capitalism the mechanism of appropriation of surplus-labour works through commodity relations and involves the dominance of the economic level. In the ancient mode of production it is constituted by the intervention of political and legal relations which determine, for example, certain rights of possession of land, the position of the tax-farmer, etc. (...) The conditions of a general increase in the level of capitalist exploitation require an increase in the productive power of labour and in the general level of commodity production (...) In the ancient mode of production, commodity relations are articulated on the conditions of exploitation in an entirely different fashion. The revenues of members of the ruling class are devoted to the reproduction of the political and legal conditions of their continued appropriation of surplus-labour. Only to a limited extent do these conditions generate investment in production (...) Far from transforming their surplus product into capital, the ancients invest it in unproductive expenditures (...) This accounts for the very limited (...) development of productive forces [and] (...) the often catastrophic effects of temporary devastations of war. The rapid replacement of the means and conditions of production is often beyond the productive capacities of ancient communities".

Hindess & Hirst (1977:104) further clarify the situation by noting that capitalist relations of production (i.e. commodity production on the basis of free wage-labour) can appear within pre-capitalist economic systems, but at the level of the individual unit of production, and not at a level capable of underpinning the reproduction of the economy as a whole.

Thus, even if the ancient mode of production cannot give rise to widespread and dynamic commodity production (and from this to capitalism), it is clear that petty commodity production itself plays an important role. What of the relatively unmonetarised (so-called primitive) societies of the ancient world? Can petty commodity production exist if money (as specie) is not used? This is a difficult point: precious metals or other valuable materials are not necessarily used as money (viz. the Incas), nor does money need to be precious in this sense to be used as such (viz. barley in Mesopotamia). It must be understood, as Vilar is quick to point out (1976:20-21) that the term "money" has several distinct

dimensions, namely its commodity form, its fiduciary (or token) form, and its form as a unit of account.

Commodity money is normally considered to be scarce and precious, and needs to be unperishable and divisible. Gold, silver and other precious materials have served as commodity money in many societies, but such substances as pepper have also been used. Fiduciary money has little or no intrinsic value, but people are confident that it represents a given value, institutionally guaranteed. Accounting money is merely an acceptable, abstract measure of value.

In precolonial West Africa, a relatively large number of monetary systems existed, which in the course of time interpenetrated each other, gained ascendancy and/or disappeared. Such monies - rarely made of metal in fact - conformed to a large extent to the classical requirements of money: they often had intrinsic value (though this is a matter of regional variation and of the values thrown up by the social and environmental conditions of life); for the most part, they were able to instil confidence that their value would remain fairly constant; and they were continuously used as a method of valuation and accounting (Curtin 1975: 233-40).

The actual materials used ranged from cloth (39) to millet, cowrie shells, gold dust, ceremonial tokens and iron bars, for example. Some of these monies were very close to the classical concept, others corresponding more selectively or partially to specific aspects of money's functions. Exchange rates existed and were recognised, such that individual strips of cloth could be converted not only into other goods, but also into other commodity-monies.

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(39) Cloth was valuable in exchange, and divisible in a reverse manner, inasmuch as it was normally woven locally in strips that could subsequently be used additively; cloth was therefore quite well suited for use as a unit of account.

Even though all transactions might be undertaken in terms of cloth (acting as the commodity-money), low values and high values might be expressed in terms of other forms of money. Thus a highly valued product might be counted in terms of slaves (for which recognised prices were paid), while a product of insignificant value would warrant a mere woven strip of cloth two metres long.

Money represented not only these important functions, but also the labour that entered into the production of a specific product (Curtin 1975:239). A standard piece of broadloom cloth would be worth enough millet for ten days supplies, ten days being the time it takes to weave it; two hundred days of millet supplies (or its equivalent in broadloom cloth) would buy a prime girl slave, two male slaves, or would pay the bride-wealth of a freeman.

However, as Braudel has pointed out, a monetary system - and in this case an imperfect one - does not extend its influence to all sections of the population to the same degree, at least not until commodity relations have considerably established themselves. In Senegambia, the various monetary systems and subsystems fulfilled various functions, but most of these related to the ruling aristocracy's way of life rather than that of the populace in general. The functions these monies performed - as a store and measure of value, and as a unit of account - were functions largely demanded by the trading and consumption circuits of the political leadership and their dependents and allies.

Braudel (1973:330-3)4) lists a representative sample of primitive monies employed by various African, Asian and American societies: salt, bitter almonds, cloth, gold dust, tin and copper ornaments, horses, slaves, chickens, coral beads, cowrie and wampum shells, dried fish, furs and rice, paper, tobacco, cocoa and sugar. However, this list is somewhat indiscriminate and confusing, because he fails to show how some of these articles performed most of the functions normally attributed to money, while others were money in only a very partial manner. Many in the

above list were, in fact, commodity money while others (such as cowrie and wampum shells, coral beads, paper, for example) were predominantly fiduciary (or token) in nature. Others mainly performed the function of a unit of account only (i.e. slaves and horses) even though they had intrinsic value: for the majority of the population their only significance was their ability to measure a large number of articles that individually had only a low value. Nevertheless, taken together as constituting a complex system of monies, the Senegambian standard of exchange and value was indeed money, having, in general terms, both its appearance and its functions.

It is clear, then, that several of these monies could be characterised by the fact that, even though they operated at a secondary and subordinate level within social relations, they did fulfil the classical functions of money (albeit in an uneven and less fully-developed way). The measure of the imperfection or degree of underdevelopment of monetary form is to be found in the fact that monies such as cloth, iron bars and grain not only acted as commodity money (having intrinsic value over the relatively long term) and as a unit of account, but also - as use-values produced either by free or unfree labour for direct consumption - also circulated as commodities in their own right. However, we should note that commodities such as iron bars and cloth would circulate in relatively restricted markets - certainly not those to which the mass of the population would typically have access. Thus, while much more complex than the Ancient World's monetary system, that of pre-colonial West Africa is clearly identifiable as a system, and not as an anarchic collection of contradictory and irrational primitive means of exchange, account and valuation.

Consequently, there would appear to be no problem involved in describing certain aspects of small scale production in pre-colonial Senegambia as constituting petty commodity production, at least from the point of view that production for exchange, facilitated by the existence of monetary circulation (in forms which

were both relatively complex and undeveloped) did take place at something more than just a rudimentary level. The fact that the form in which money circulated as commodity-money had not been separated from its parallel form as a directly consumable use-value, is not sufficient to gainsay the existence of PCP in precolonial Senegambia.

The three principal criteria for the identification of PCP (production for exchange, a more than rudimentary division of labour, and the ownership of the means of production by the direct producer) will be discussed in the succeeding sections of this chapter.

We can now move on to a more detailed examination of the Senegambian reality of petty commodity and artisanal production in its historical context. We begin with the evolution of rural non-agricultural production and its organisational parameters, followed by the impact of domestic and later European-managed slavery, and the later development of a largely urban-based PCP in Senegalese colonial society.

### 3.2. CRAFTS, CASTES AND SLAVERY IN PRE-COLONIAL SENEGAMBIA

Until the colonial period, embryonic African commodity production (including purely artisanal activities) were a close counterpart of - indeed almost inseparable from - basic subsistence agriculture. Village craftsmen rarely (if ever) specialised in one occupation to the exclusion of all else (40), once something more than the most rudimentary techniques of cultivation had been established. This was probably as true for Africa as it

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(40) It is rare indeed to find rural craftsmen who do no farming, though often they will hold much less land than the pure cultivator (Karsten 1972).

was for feudal Europe (41) (Hindess & Hirst 1977:250-251; Anderson 1974:186). The Senegambian village smith or weaver also worked the land for a part of his family's subsistence needs: his craft activities fulfilled the remainder of those needs by providing objects that could be exchanged for food and other consumption goods in transactions with other agriculturalists or those who also combined craft and agricultural activities. However, handicraft activities were often highly specialised, and were undertaken by well-defined social groups - for instance, by members of a caste.

N'Diaye (1970) considers castes in the West African context to be groups of individuals able to concretely trace their descent from a common ancestor, and who exclusively exercise the same profession. The much-discussed "Indian" caste system, while similar in form, differs inasmuch as it continues to play a determining role in social differentiation in contemporary India. In Senegal, it is often said that two individuals of equal economic status know only too well the original status-differentials of their respective families; it is doubtful, however, that caste and/or slave background carries much weight in situations where economic rank is equal. In India, however, caste differentiates between individuals to an important extent both in social and economic terms. As Saïd Shah (1973: v) explains, contemporary Indian caste status is closer to being "a particular form of class" that has relevance to the contemporary Indian social formation and mode of production. Kosambi (1973:22) makes reference to the somewhat untypical situation found in the former Portuguese colony of Goa (an enclave on the Western coast of

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(41) Lenin (1972a:333) remarked that in the Perm handicraft census of 1894-95, it was found that over 89% of artisans (i.e. those who worked exclusively to order) also engaged in agriculture. Among the "handicraftsmen" or small manufacturers of rural Russia, the percentage was appreciably lower.

India) and, in doing so gives an example that is perhaps intermediate between the Indian and Senegalese caste system.

"There are Roman Catholics in Goa who regard themselves as brahmin (high caste) Christians, and remember their family before forced conversion some four centuries ago; they will prefer to take drinking water or food from a Hindu brahmin (...) [than] from a sudra (low caste) Christian."

It cannot be assumed, however, that all are agreed on the part played by caste institutions in the development of the division of labour and in the formation of classes in Senegal. Diop (1972:65) implores his readers not to underestimate its importance:

"[T]he caste system has the property of creating a mould into which it forces all future socio-economic systems. Having camouflaged slave society and feudal society, the caste system maintains itself unshakeably. Thus in a 1957-58 sample of Toucouleur (42) society, the following distribution of castes was discovered: torodo (priests, cultivators, herdsman) 49%; thiedo (farmers) 10%; thioubalo [fishermen] 16%; artisans 7%; descendants of slaves 21%" [my translation, CG].

While Bonnardel (1967: 100) warns that

"[I]n the period [preceding Independence], the colonial system had the effect of (...) levelling African society and reducing everyone to a common position in law. Independence has (...) harshly reinforced and hardened the hierarchisation between ethnic groups and, (...) the great mistrust which exists between castes" [my translation, CG; emphasis added].

However, whereas Indian castes have remained relatively potent as forces determining the level and form of social and economic differentiation, castes in Senegal have tended to degenerate much more - mainly due to the impact on class-formation of Islam rather than that of industrialisation or urbanisation - and today remain potent only at the level of individual perceptions of rank, and relatively weak at the level

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(42) An ethnic group from north-eastern Senegal.

of economic and class differentiation. The caste system in Senegal, while still evident at certain levels, today seems to function as no more than a marginal and subordinate determinant of social and economic rank.

Regarding the technical aspects of artisan production, Barry (1972: 81) cites the explorer Dapper who, in 1686, observed that

"on the banks of the Zenega, one only really finds two professions, that of weaver and smith, both of them rudimentary occupations having poor equipment, yet nevertheless managing to do reasonable business with such as they have. They make shields, scabbards, and (...) slippers from cowhide, and their saddles are as good as I have seen at home. Their iron stirrups are similar to ours, and they make their spurs pointed with a disc attached to them" [my translation, CG].

Chambonneau (43), also cited by Barry (1972: 81-82), observed that

"they do not know the thousands of trades and crafts which we have in Europe, but just have the robeseyr (who make woven strips), tegue (who fashion gold, silver and iron so clumsily), those who do all leather work (...) so attractively, the lobez (woodworkers who make canoes, dishes, mortars, pestles, etc.) and the cubalots (fishermen who work with harpoon, line and net)" [my translation, CG].

Diop (1971:49) considers that these castes were normally made up of conquered ethnic groups who acquired well-defined and specific occupations by being forced to undertake various tasks for their new masters. Integrated into the dominant society as war-captives, they were only allowed to marry among themselves, thereby reproducing their subordinate socio-economic status. Also, certain pre-existing inferior castes in the Senegambian region were diluted by the forced integration of war captives and later freed slaves into the established division of labour. In Wolof society (i.e. the areas under the political control of the Kingdoms of Jolof and Waalo), many of caste-based activities were

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(43) Barry is referring to a description by Louis Chambonneau, quoted in Ritchie (1968:289-353).

controlled through caste-chiefs responsible for a particular community; such caste-chiefs were normally nominated to these positions of responsibility by the monarch. Some of the main castes of the Senegambian region were as follows:

Figure 3.A. Senegambian Castes

<u>WOLOF</u>		<u>FOUTA TORO (44)</u>	
<u>tuegg</u>	(smiths, jewellers)	<u>khalmbané</u>	} (musicians)
<u>oudé</u>	(leatherworkers)	<u>tamakat</u>	
<u>laobé</u>	(woodworkers)	<u>boufta</u>	
<u>mabo</u>	(weavers)	<u>gueval</u>	
		<u>gnolé</u>	(gatekeepers)

The above is not a complete list; in more general terms, such non-agricultural workers were divided into free, low-status nyeenyo (craftsmen, musicians, clowns) ana (domestic slaves, the latter working under the control of craftsmen or other individuals in their various places of work (Barry 1972: 81-91; Diop 1972: 21-31; 50-52)).

For the period before and during the Atlantic slave-trade, it is also necessary to examine the beginnings of commodity production in the context of the indigenous and imported forms of slavery. Since much of society's non-agricultural production (as well as farming activities) were undertaken by members of castes many of which had their roots in various forms of slavery, this connection is clear. Additionally, the evaluation of the Atlantic trade in African slaves, managed by the Europeans, radically changed the nature, scope and significance of preceding forms of personal servitude.

Slavery was certainly well-established in Senegambia prior to contact with Europeans. Two authors who have written extensively on slavery in pre-colonial Senegambia are Curtin (1975) and Barry

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(44) i.e. the Fulani-ruled kingdom of Tekrur.

(1972). The former concentrates on what he terms the "internal dynamic" of Senegambian society in order to place the slave-trade in its proper historical context. Barry, in contrast, sets out to locate the roots of Senegambian economic and political subordination both internally and externally, focusing in particular on the era of the slave trade and significantly on the period preceding the establishment of contact with European merchants (45). Barry's interpretation appears to be the more rigorous, albeit based upon less comprehensive documentary evidence. It is worth quoting in some detail his comments on the social institutions of slavery in the Kingdom of Waalo (1972:89-91):

"The dyaam (or slaves) constituted the lowest social category (...). Despite their lowly social rank, the slave class was nevertheless internally hierarchised, slaves of the crown being superior to those of the freeman's household (...). At the bottom of the slave hierarchy were the domestic slaves, who (...) experienced varying degrees of misery. All the authors of the 16th to the 19th century are nevertheless unanimous as to the characteristic mildness and leniency of Senegambian domestic slavery. In general, male slaves were responsible for cultivation of their masters' fields, and females performed housework. While still a minor, a slave lived as part of the master's family. Marriage enabled them to set up a home elsewhere with their only obligation being to annually pay homage and give over twenty measures of millet to their master. Even though enslavement in Waalo was above all the punishment for crimes of various sorts, prisoners-of-war were nevertheless extremely important (...). Freedom was attainable and slaves could even rid themselves of masters who were too severe (...). As Suret Canale has pointed out (...), agriculture and artisanal activities based on servile labour were as yet unknown or were wholly exceptional. The conditions experienced by the captive were of an essentially juridical nature and did not imply that the subsistence economy was characterised by a severe exploitation of slave by master. Nevertheless, the existence of slavery as a social phenomenon greatly contributed to the development of the [Atlantic] slave-trade" [my translation, CG].

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(45) For a relatively detailed discussion of the comparative merits and demerits of these approaches, see Gerry (1977:140-145).

In many respects it appears that the relation of slave to master in the period preceding the Atlantic slave trade was largely that of a serf vis-à-vis his lord. Both labour and tribute were exacted by the social superior, honesty and loyalty was expected on both sides, and social rank was perpetuated both by custom and law. Slaves could, of course, be sold, but under what conditions might this take place, before the arrival of the Europeans? It is clear that the trade in slaves was almost exclusively conducted between noble houses of neighbouring states (Barry 1972: 83-84); owners of domestic (rather than war-) slaves were likely to sell them only under the strongest economic compulsion (46), the final result of which was often that the master himself became a slave. Thus, at least as far as domestic slavery is concerned (and this institution embraced a large part of the active direct labour force), the individual slave related to the master more as use-value (and therefore only as a primitive form of capital) than as exchange-value (which was the relationship of many war-captives to their noble captors). With the advent and stimulus of the triangular Atlantic trade, the predominance of the slave-as-use-value declined, and slave-labour became predominantly a commodity, something acquired for exchange with the Europeans (or, to a declining extent, with other African aristocracies) in order to acquire trade-goods with which to bolster the political power of the African ruling class.

This transformation of the essential form (as well as the scope and scale) of African slavery probably had a considerable impact on the presence and composition of craft skills in the indigenous labour force. War captives entered either the military corps of the ruling aristocracy or (to a much larger extent) the sphere of circulation (as commodities to be exchanged for European manufactures), while domestic slaves were almost exclusively

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(46) Of course, a master might rid himself of a dishonest, troublesome, lazy or otherwise unsatisfactory slave by selling him/her.

located within the sphere of production. Moreover, liberated slaves were integrated into society as members of inferior castes.

A society based simultaneously upon a form of slavery more akin to serfdom, and the exchange of captured slaves for European manufactures and money would appear to lack the necessary conditions for the emergence of extensive indigenous commodity production. It seems probable that the local reproduction of craft skills declined due to the increased exports of the very human resources upon which African aristocracies depended for the maintenance of local commodity production. Additionally, European manufactures penetrated the upper part of the indigenous consumption circuit, thereby pushing the remaining craftsmen out of elite-oriented activities into production predominantly for the (increasingly impoverished) masses. The concomitant monetarisation (albeit limited and slow to develop) of core parts of the indigenous economy also contributed to this process, as did the expansion of the Atlantic slave trade, by forging

"the very chains that bound the African aristocracies ever closer to the Atlantic trade and to the very source of the progressive exploitation and immiseration of their own subjects, (...) were to become the instrument by which both political and economic autonomy would be transferred from the aristocratic stratum to the foreign interlopers with whom they had so eagerly collaborated." (Gerry 1977: 144)

Production for a market (as opposed to the market in a more generalised sense) clearly existed in precolonial Senegambia. It was partly the production of certain specialised articles for mass consumption (such as agricultural implements and cloth) with only a minimal development of a significant division of labour at the point of production, even though an artisan or craftsman stratum could be clearly (albeit not exclusively) identified among the peasantry. Additionally, considerable effort went into the production of various commodities that also functioned as means of exchange (e.g. gold dust, iron bars and cloth).

At this point, it would be useful to detail the extent of this type of production within Senegambian society. Gold was extracted and refined in the south-east in the 1850's for use by the nobility as means of exchange; however, the remuneration of individuals in the gold-workings was very often less than that necessary for subsistence, and such work was thus undertaken as a seasonal subsidiary activity. The small amounts extracted tended to make the gold too expensive in Senegambia relative to the regions in West Africa better-endowed with minerals.

The production of iron and iron implements was probably at a quite high level and remained stable until European iron was able to compete, made relatively cheaper by the application of the Bessemer process and the economies of scale attributable to better road, rail and sea transport. It appears that in the western parts of what became French Soudan (now Mali), iron exports exceeded imports during the period 1650-1850 (Curtin 1975: 210-211).

Cotton textiles were produced both for direct consumption and exchange, as well as functioning in some areas as imperfect money. In the 11th century, al-Bekri reported that every home on the Senegal River had its own cotton bush (Curtin 1975:212). In the 16th century, cotton production was sufficient for considerable trading to take place with neighbouring states and with the Portuguese. Indeed, the latter used Senegambian slaves, transported to the Cape Verde Islands, to produce cotton cloth for the Portuguese market. They also bought quantities of cloth on the African mainland for use as money in other transactions. In general, production was undertaken for export as well as for mass consumption, and the Portuguese and other Europeans even attempted, unsuccessfully it appears, to encourage the production of raw cotton for export (Curtin 1975:214).

The production of meat and hides was mainly in the hands of specialists who produced for exchange in order to buy a wider range of foodstuffs and other articles. Due to the fall in

European consumption of beef in the period immediately before colonisation, European leather was in short supply; consequently, first West Africa, then more significantly South America became an important source of leather for Europe. In the 19th century, approximately half of the value of Senegambia's exports was made up of meat and hides (Curtin 1975:220-221).

Thus iron and textile manufactures and, to a lesser extent mats, fencing, pottery and metal utensils, were produced for regional and external markets. Hiring of labour (e.g. in the gold and iron workings), the borrowing of capital, and the renting out of land, all developed within this commodity-producing sphere. Curtin (1975: 232) considers that the Senegambian economy was far more market-oriented than the economy of the Tiv of Nigeria (studied by Paul and Laura Bohannan) or that of the Gouro of the Ivory Coast (analysed by Meillassoux).

In order to assess their situation and significance, it is important to see the different non-agricultural occupations discussed above in the context of the prevailing social system. In general the life-style was relatively simple, due to the low level of technology, and few if any urban centres existed. There existed the occasional fort and, more commonly, village communities that consisted of certainly no more than 400 constructions. Material possessions were simple (cotton clothes, essential tools and utensils, ornaments, etc.) and the predominant activities were agricultural (farming, fishing, hunting and stock rearing). Barry (1972: 79) suggests that this relative simplicity of life, and the almost permanent stagnation of the economy that characterised the Kingdom of Waalo if not territories further afield, were instrumental in accentuating the tensions between the different classes in society. He concludes that this was:

"a rural subsistence economy, always at the mercy of the river and the rain, particularly susceptible to invasion by locusts (...) so much so that many died of

hunger or were forced to sell themselves to the Portuguese as slaves" [my translation, CG].

In rather more concrete terms, Amin (in Barry 1972:11-12) characterises this sort of African society as being a

"tributary mode of production in which the continuing existence of the village community was juxtaposed with a social and political apparatus of exploitation based on the exacting of tribute. (...) We can distinguish (...) more evolved forms, such as feudalism, where the village community loses to its feudal masters the right to landed property, with each village continuing as an extended family community" [my translation, CG].

Both the early and evolved forms of the tributary mode of production characterised the Senegambian region until European colonial hegemony was achieved. Barry (1972), in analysing the political and social institutions of the Kingdom of Waalo, suggests that society was inegalitarian, with each person's status being determined by that of his family in society. Peasants and members of caste groupings had little to inherit as property, whereas the nobles developed hereditary political rights and inherited property. Society was divided into three hierarchised segments: noble freemen; caste-organised freemen engaged to a significant degree in artisanal production; and slaves, ranging from the relatively high-status warriors and servants of the King, to the low-status domestic slaves of the free-born population.

With the advent of Islam, even though traditional ancestor-worship withstood incursions for a considerable time (47) (Barry 1972: 92; Davidson et al 1970: 194-195; Diop 1972: 60-61), Islamic teachers (marabouts) became important in society, and were often protected by the Crown. Their importance was such that in the 1670's they succeeded in converting the feelings of insecurity

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(47) Diop considers that the rulers' major objection to embracing Islam was the fact that it might appear to the oppressed members of the pre-colonial society to be a force for emancipation.

felt by populations living under the persistent threat of the expanding slave trade into an appetite for holy war.

The King exacted tribute through his chosen local representatives, the lamanes, who collected animals, captives and millet from the village communities. The lamanes were village patriarchs and could concentrate and wield considerable power over the community's goods, chattels and production, which they effectively managed for the Crown. This power could be passed on, since primogeniture existed among these patriarchal families. Land could not be sold as such, but Diop (1972:56) suggests that it could be rented out for life. This type of community and social organisation produced particularly sharp differentiation in the fertile and hence densely populated areas, where the use of plots of land would be shared out generation after generation among members of families, whereas among the village patriarchs, control over that land and its usufruct passed undivided from father to son.

This, then, in very general terms, was the social system characterising many of the ethnic groups inhabiting the Senegambian region prior to colonisation; the effects of the mercantile trade in slaves undertaken by the Europeans and its consequences for African society will be briefly examined below.

### 3.3. THE SLAVE TRADE & RURAL CRAFT PRODUCTION

The development of the triangular Atlantic trade in manufactures, slaves and raw materials had a general effect upon West African communities, inasmuch as certain territories became severely depopulated (particularly with respect to their most healthy and able man- and woman-power), while societies in other geographical areas became geared to the pursuit and capture of slaves for sale to the Europeans.

This process obviously affected rural craftsmen as much as any other group. Those who were captured were unlikely to be able to exercise their specific skills once they found themselves on the

other side of the Atlantic, where a slave would only be given the opportunity to exercise his established skills or learn new ones if this would benefit his master directly (in the case of small jobs of craftsmanship and repair) or indirectly (as in the creation or maintenance of certain aspects of the subsistence of the slave labour force). Craftsmen who avoided capture, sale and transshipment would find their regular clientele of freemen diminished, the demand for craft goods on the part of noblemen curtailed, and the general climate for commodity or other production considerably worsened. Their consequent impoverishment might induce some to sell themselves into slavery, along with ruined cultivators and redundant petty officials from court, thereby negating the very fact that they had avoided capture. Ruined village craftsmen of this kind may have had some advantage over less-specialised individuals such as cultivators. The former might become domestic slaves in neighbouring societies (due to their specific skills), thereby further consolidating the caste-status of local craft production. The latter would almost certainly have been sold to the Europeans, since a predominantly slave-raiding society would have a relatively limited need to continually expand its servile agricultural labour force.

Thus the slave trade, by depleting local labour supplies, commoditising human beings as trade goods, and encouraging certain communities to orient their economic activities towards supplying part of the needs of the Atlantic trade, had a profound impact on local craft production. Though the depletion of labour supplies is clearly an important factor, it is possibly the impact of the institutionalisation of slave-raiding and localised warfare that has received least attention.

Labour was being systematically removed from the rural communities through the slave trade. Slave-raiding had become a more remunerative occupation for the local nobility than the appropriation agricultural surplus from dependent village communities. The triangular trade had increasingly introduced

European articles at least into the circuit of privileged consumption in the Senegambian kingdoms. The Europeans supplied not only articles of luxury consumption in return for slaves, but also local means of exchange (iron bars, for example) and fire-arms. It could be argued that the conjunction of these factors made it impossible for autonomous localised commodity production to develop out of village-based craft activities.

Hindess & Hirst (1977: 103-108) have argued that after its initial flowering in Ancient Greece and Rome a chronic decline in commodity production was brought about by an increase in the taxes and other demands on the part of the rulers of pre-feudal cities, these exactions in turn arising out of endemic warfare coupled with political changes in the basis upon which the surplus product was distributed. Can the major elements of Hindess & Hirst's argument be applied to pre-colonial Senegambia? It appears that though the dominant monetary system of the Ancient World may have been more unified and "perfected" than that of Senegambia, its impact was similarly partial and selective. Indeed, as Braudel tells us (1973:402), craft activities in Athens

"came up against the prejudices of an agricultural society that mistrusted [them] (...); [they were] therefore left to foreigners or slaves (...). Moreover, the villages had their [own] craftsmen (...). In short, industry was rudimentary, foreign and unobtrusive. Likewise [in Roman towns] there were no suburbs [i.e.] (...) no industry or well-organised crafts in their proper place."

If the village communities of Senegambia were largely self-sufficient (albeit at a dangerously low level) and the majority of their inhabitants for the most part bypassed by the monetary system, the seeds of widespread petty commodity production were hardly likely to germinate. For limited and embryonic commodity production (albeit predominantly linked to elite consumption) to become something more, the elite itself would have been required to invest a substantial proportion of its appropriated surplus in various forms of productive expenditure. In reality, this did not

take place: surplus, whether in the form of tribute-in-kind, slaves or trade-goods, was generally redistributed among the upper echelons of the freeman class in acts of ritual largesse that, importantly, also helped to secure political allegiance and the provision of military and logistical support (48).

Thus commodity production only really existed in Senegambia in its most embryonic form during the pre-colonial period. In the Atlantic slave-trade, in which strictly money transactions existed but were not necessarily the rule, we find a sector of the pre-colonial economy that could at least be designated a commoditised branch of the European mercantile economies, since slaves were normally exchanged for trade-goods (metal, cloth, alcohol, fire-arms), some of which took the form of elite commodity-money within African society, others enabling the process of commodity production and circulation to expand.

Trade goods entered the circulation and redistribution circuits and, in a curious way, also the elite-based production processes of the Senegambian economy. To some extent these goods may have displaced local production of use-values (such as cloth, more primitive types of weapons, etc.). The list presented in Table 3.1. below, compiled by Barry (1972: 126), shows the trade goods received from the French by the King of Waalo in exchange for 50 of his war-slaves. Note that the items of cloth at the head of the table make up a considerable proportion of the total value of the transaction. Barry (1972: 126) adds that this single transaction is a good example of how "the predominance of iron, fire-

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(48) The stability of the Sahelian Kingdoms of West Africa, and the reliability of the alliances that held them together, were often as ephemeral as the good environmental conditions necessary for the subsistence of the agricultural masses. Indeed, harsh climatic conditions not only could bring a village community to its knees (as indicated above) but even a whole Kingdom, making the latter easy prey for a better prepared, more powerful and/or less severely afflicted neighbouring state.

arms, cloth and spirits [in the so-called Atlantic trade], all assuring the permanency of the manhunt, perpetual warfare and the authority of the traditional aristocracy, the latter being the only [local] beneficiary" [my translation].

Table 3.1. Slaves and trade goods

CATEGORY	N°	UNIT	ITEM	PRICE
1. <u>Cloth</u>	201	<u>pataques</u>	[plain] cloth	@ 4 livres each
	1	piece	scarlet cloth	@ 32 livres
	225	pieces	blue/black cloth	@ 2 livres each
	69	pieces	<u>ronen</u> cloth	@ 2 livres each
	12	measures	red <u>galet</u> [cloth]	@ 4 livres each
2. <u>Metal</u>	1		silver <u>macaron</u> [bauble]& chain	?
	1		trumpet	?
	12	bars	iron	?
3. <u>Firearms</u>	5		light rifles	@ 50 livres each
	75	measures	gunpowder	?
	105	measures	lead shot	?
4. <u>Other</u>	24	pints	spirits	?
	8		ropes	?

We can conclude, therefore, that by 1724 the kings and nobles of the Senegambian region had already developed a taste for European cloth, either in preference (or in addition) to that which was locally produced. The extent to which local weavers' activities were diminished by the influx and distribution of European cloth among their principle clients, namely the nobility, can only be guessed. Suffice it to say that the impact of European goods on the activities of local non-agricultural producers, if it could be detected at the beginning of the eighteenth century, increased enormously in the succeeding years, and today is felt more than ever before.

Though the ruling elites of the Senegambian kingdoms profited politically rather than materially from the influx of European trade goods, the slave trade bound them ever more tightly to their

European commercial partners. However, that trade goods circulated should not be interpreted as implying that standards of living improved among the rural masses. The distribution favoured none lower in the traditional hierarchy than the numerous community and village patriarchs. For the mass of the population, a radical worsening of living conditions was to come. Indeed, few cultivators who avoided capture as slaves were materially better provided for than their brothers and sisters across the Atlantic. This was because the royal families' "addiction" to slaving as a source of goods and money almost inevitably entailed their imposing a harsh and tyrannical regime, in part as a result of the continual threat of famine, pestilence, war and slave-raiding military reprisals from neighbouring kingdoms.

In conclusion, since rural craftsmen catered both to the community's needs for basic use-values, and the nobility's demand for luxuries, and were barely involved in trading, either locally or over longer distances (49), one might suppose that an influx of trade goods received by the ruling aristocracy in return for slaves would tend to drive local producers out of production of luxuries and force them to concentrate more on the production of everyday use-values for village communities. It may well be that local craftsmen were to a large degree bypassed by the penetration of European manufactures, which remained largely within the relatively insulated consumption circuit of the royal family and nobility. However, the combination of an impoverished and depleted rural population, and a relatively well-catered-for elite and middle stratum, did not constitute a viable basis for a growing local commodity production. Rural non-agricultural production was to remain limited in scope, and tied to the subsistence needs of poor cultivators, until the colonial regime became fully established towards the end of the nineteenth century.

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(49) For a discussion of African long-distance trade, and those involved in it, see Coquery Vidrovitch (1971).

### 3.4. THE COLONIAL PERIOD & THE GROWTH OF PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION

It was only during the middle and late colonial period that imported articles of mass consumption began to reach the towns and villages and upset the relative tranquillity of the few village-based artisan micro-monopolists so characteristic of the earliest stages of commodity production. Thus, with the evolution of fairly widespread cash-crop farming (particularly groundnuts) and in central Senegal, the bringing under cultivation of marginal land, it seems likely that the satisfaction of rural communities' non-food subsistence needs could no longer remain the privileged domain of local craftsmen. The position of these small producers can be likened to that of the Russian handicraftsmen in the early days of capitalist industrialisation, as described by Lenin (1972b:335-36):

"In the rudimentary forms of commodity production, competition among the 'handicraftsmen' is still very slight, but as the market expands and embraces wider areas, this competition grows steadily stronger and disturbs the small industrialist's patriarchal prosperity, the basis of which is his virtually monopolist position. He exerts every effort, individually and with others, to check competition, 'not to let' rivals into his district, and to consolidate his assured position as a small master possessing a definite circle of customers."

In this way, the evolution of indigenous petty commodity production came to be simultaneously encouraged and obstructed: on the one hand, colonial hegemony and the increasing monetarisation of the economy encouraged the division of labour and the proliferation of petits metiers, while on the other hand, indigenous labour was seen as something to manipulate according to colonial imperatives, and not those of the indigenous population.

It was only when the slave-trade had declined, and the interest of the metropolitan European nations was turned towards the establishment of colonial empires, that the craft production of the Senegambian region (and all other regions similarly

colonised) began to be crucially affected. Apart from the trade in slaves, the Senegambian region became economically interesting to the expanding capitalist countries of Europe mainly because of its supplies of gum-arabic. Due to their powerful position as suppliers of gum to the Europeans, the Moors (largely located to the North of the Senegal River) were able to demand tribute from, and to a greater or lesser extent, dominate the kingdoms to the south and west.

In the region of Fouta Toro, to the west of Waalo and to the south-west of the Moorish settlements, an Islamic movement managed to throw off the yoke of Moorish domination, and was rapidly transformed into a movement passionately opposed to the slave trade. It claimed first of all that it was sacrilege for Muslims to be taken as slaves by infidels, and secondly that economic conditions were greatly worsened by the slave trade. Fouta Toro broke off all relations with Europeans and, for a time, became a haven for all those who sought sanctuary from slavers.

However, these Senegambian states were becoming progressively less cohesive; in Waalo, marauding bands of warriors were pillaging rural communities, the Moors periodically swept down from the North to occupy the land for a period, and the Europeans on the coast kept the disputes "at the right temperature", to ensure the destruction of the last vestiges of traditional political cohesion. France only relinquished its slave trade in 1817 and, since labour could no longer be taken to where the work was (i.e. the plantations of the French Caribbean islands), work had to be brought to where apparently "surplus" labour was available, namely the coastal bridgeheads France had established from St. Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River, as far down as the River Congo on the equator.

Out of this arose plans to agriculturally colonise the north of what is now Senegal, but the severely depleted Waalo population made this impracticable, since neither forced labour nor pecuniary

incentives had the desired effect. At one time, it was even considered that either convicts or Chinese should be imported to work in the agricultural projects! Furthermore, the policies of agricultural colonisation received scant support from the French State, and severe opposition from small traders (many of whom were of mixed blood) who believed that such developments would be detrimental to their own interests, and that money could be far more productively invested in encouraging the people of Waalo to cultivate cotton and indigo themselves. The Moors also were strongly opposed to any development that would affect their gum monopoly, hence agricultural colonisation never really left the drawing-board.

The end of the 19th and the first decade of the 20th century saw in French West Africa (as elsewhere) a revolution in the organisation of trade; indigenous trading minority groups lost much of their former significance, as French trading concerns expanded with the colonial penetration of the territory. Large coastal depots were established, and regional and local branches set up; in the early years of the 20th century, Levantines arrived in West and Central Africa, escaping the vicissitudes of life under Ottoman rule, and establishing themselves rapidly as an important link in the commercial chain. Cash crop marketing, originally in the hands of a small number of Lebanese, working en brousse in the hinterland, and an even smaller number of Africans (Suret-Canale 1971:11-16), moved progressively under the control of the former, until it was taken over by a government agency shortly after Independence. These new trading groups, and especially a number of relatively highly organised and well-financed French Mediterranean commercial companies (R. Cruise O'Brien 1973:79), provided the channels down which manufactured goods from Europe and elsewhere could pour into the newly opened-up territories.

Even now it is difficult to document the interaction between these imported manufactured goods of all sorts, and the lives of

the craftsmen who had formerly satisfied many of the non-agricultural wants of the mass of the population. Nevertheless, the availability of European cloth, implements, tools, household goods, etc., inevitably had a negative impact on the viability of indigenous production. The importing of metal-ware, for example, affected the demand for the production of various articles by African smiths. Relentlessly the range of articles made by such craftsmen was reduced by colonial competition; many artisans may have been forced back into full-time agricultural production. Others may have been prepared to look for work in the embryonic cities, migration towards which was becoming at least an identifiable trend by the beginning of the present century. Such developments in the labour market were not unconnected to the fact that many rural craft activities that had formerly flourished were by now suffering intense competition (causing many to relinquish their occupations) due to the progressive penetration of European manufactured goods. Though this drastic change in the environment in which local non-agricultural production took place had its roots in this early and middle colonial period, it was not until the establishment of a large non-African component in the labour force, that widespread structural changes took place within Senegalese petty commodity production. With the arrival of poor whites (petits blancs) from France (R. Cruise O'Brien 1973:66-79), and the Lebanese (responding to the pressures of the European depression and rural impoverishment respectively), and the subsequent wartime boom and post-World War Two industrialisation, small scale production became increasingly polarised. The more profitable (one might even say respectable) lines were in the hands of a small, non-African members of the urban petite bourgeoisie, while increasingly lower-technology, lower-return activities became concentrated among Africans.

Early in the 20th century, the coastal settlements of Senegal began to take on the appearance of European towns. Dakar's road and sanitation systems were developed. The railway network had

already reached the advanced level of development commensurate with the export-orientation of the colony; indeed, the railway had constituted a major means of crushing the final large scale anti-colonialist movement (50).

But the only real industrial development to take place at this time concerned the refining of groundnuts into oil, predominantly for export. This remained the case until after the Second World War when French industry, unable to satisfy the demand for manufactured goods in its African colonies, was in a process of reconstruction. Substantial French public funds were made available (R. Cruise O'Brien 1973: 79-80) for the development of industry. Private capital investment was also encouraged through favourable tax and credit terms. This heralded an economic boom for Dakar in particular, since it was now not only the capital of Senegal, but also the administrative and industrial-commercial centre for French West Africa. During this period there was also a considerable influx of unskilled and semi-skilled French immigrants (petits blancs), many of whom established small enterprises in the capital (R. Cruise O'Brien 1973: 66-79). Additionally the number of Lebanese immigrants was also very high, many of them having been attracted into the small and medium scale manufacturing and commercial sectors. French nationals and Indo-Chinese (after the fall of Dien Bien Phu) also found Dakar a relatively profitable location for their various activities.

What then was the effect of this relatively rapid urbanisation and industrialisation process on indigenous small scale producers? How did they react to the transformation of an essentially pre-capitalist society into one dominated by colonial capital? How were they subsequently affected by the commitment of an

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(50) In 1882 Governor Brière de l'Isle decided to depose Lat Dior, ruler of Cayor, due to the latter's adamant refusal to permit the construction of the railway line that would have ensured French colonial hegemony over much of the Senegalese interior. Lat Dior was defeated and slain at the battle of Dekhelé that same year.

independent Senegal to an essentially capitalist path to 'development'?

It is important here to distinguish between those activities that have what might be termed traditional origins in the pre-colonial order, and those that arose out of the penetration of commodity relations in colonial and postcolonial Senegal. Chronologically it was predominantly the relocation of formerly rural artisanal occupations to newly-urbanised or urbanising areas that preceded the development of new occupations connected to the establishment of colonial power. Alongside this process came the widespread introduction of commodity-exchange, or at least the systematic bartering of trade-goods for cash-crops, money being used as the unit of account (Suret-Canale 1971: 14-16) (51).

The competition between imported manufactures and indigenous, craft-produced goods may explain in some cases the drift towards areas of urban or urban growth or of infrastructural development. Individual craftsmen would find themselves unable to supplement their small subsistence production with receipts from articles they produced, and might seek either to use their skills in a wage-earning situation, or to set up as a small producer close to large concentrations of wage-earners, the latter having insufficient time to produce necessities for themselves. In such situations as the construction of railway infrastructure, the types of modifications experienced by rural peasant/artisan could have involved their transformation into migrant craftsmen on a

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(51) Suret-Canale describes the mechanism of exchange used in the rural trading posts that constituted the medium through which groundnuts were bought and exchanged for trade-goods. Small cash payments were required to cover taxes and debts, but most transactions used money only as the unit of account. A certain weight of groundnuts, valued at the going rate, was exchanged for its supposed "equivalent" in imported manufactured goods. Primary produce was bought at very low prices since, to keep profits high, the freight costs to Dakar had to be factored in. With exactly the same justification, imported manufactured goods taken by the peasants in exchange for their crops, were massively overpriced.

temporary or permanent basis, and with or without their apprentice "camp followers".

Since in general the data on such transformations in the rural environment is sparse - and with specific reference to the changing lives of craftsmen, virtually non-existent - only the broad lines of development have been drawn here. However, Seck (1968:36) is quite clear about the correlation between industrialisation (or at least the establishment of its basic infrastructure) and migration to urban areas:

"Obviously the several thousand local Lebou from Dakar's immediate surroundings could not satisfy the demand for labour [for the creation of infrastructure]; immigration had been the essential factor in Dakar's development: more than 80% of its African population, and all of its non-African population are directly or indirectly the result of immigration predominantly consequent upon the great building activities being undertaken in Dakar. There is no doubt that the growth of the urban population between 1891 and 1909 (at a rate of 5% per annum) correlates with the extensive military and civil undertakings of the period (the naval and commercial ports, administrative and military buildings, etc.) and with the importance of fitting and repairing ships at the harbour". [my translation, CG].

Seck explains that migration slumped to 1.7% between 1910 and 1921, thereafter reaching a peak after 1918 and proceeding at a rate of 6.2% between 1926 and 1931. Migration also accelerated again after the Second World War, when it was largely in response to the greater labour-absorptive capacity of the Dakar industrial sector and the still-precarious conditions in the rural areas.

West Africa was, and remains the cash-crop region par excellence. Though it has experienced industrialisation to a greater or lesser extent, the relative dearth of mineral deposits has meant that one of the principal facets of the proletarianisation process has been the integration of large sections of the rural labour force into the national and international market through the production of cash-crops. In Southern, Central and

East Africa, though cash-crop production is often an important source of income for the peasantry, it does not play the central role in the generation of rural incomes that it does in West Africa. Instead, mines and plantations have provided the major demand for labour, and in both these cases wage-employment was the rule. Thus, while both geographical-ecological regions (West and East) have experienced a substantial proletarianisation of the rural labour force, in the former case this has been achieved in a concealed manner, with independent peasant farmers becoming the "disguised wage-workers" of State Marketing Boards for example and, in the latter case, proletarianisation has been more direct and unambiguous, with peasant farmers becoming mine employees or plantation workers.

In Senegal, the high priority placed by the colonial authorities on the peasant cultivation of groundnuts was founded upon the establishment of a free market at the 'national' level - a market dominated by rurally-based French and Lebanese merchants. This in itself was enough to stimulate some small amounts of non-agricultural employment. When, just after Independence, groundnut marketing was brought under the wing of a State Board, these commercial intermediaries returned to Dakar or to the nearest provincial centres. More importantly, world prices for groundnuts rose by more than 50% between 1954 and 1968, while in the same period peasant remuneration on average remained more or less the same. The price paid per kilo of shelled groundnuts (around 25 CFA francs) remained constant for much of this period though, in 1974, a small upward movement was experienced. The price per kilo paid by the European oil-milling companies to the Marketing Board, remains a closely guarded secret; nevertheless, it was reputed to be close (if not in excess of) 100 CFA francs. The appropriation of surplus from peasant cash-crop production has financed far more than just the maintenance of the Marketing Board's viability. The investments made with this surplus have had a marked urban bias: it is cruelly ironic that the migration engendered by the impover-

ishment of much of the groundnut-cultivating peasantry leads many such rural residents to experience poverty in the very city that has to a large extent benefitted from their impoverishment.

Urban "pull" and rural "push", the opposite poles of the same migration process, provide the backdrop to the recent development of Dakar's petty producers. The "push" factors were substantially strengthened during the period of the Sahel drought (1968-1974), and in 1978, when la sécheresse again reached crisis proportions.

Traditional rural crafts have been transformed by their relocation to Dakar: much of that process relates to the fact that they now operate in a context totally dominated by the exchange economy, while this is still far from being the day-to-day reality of the peasant cultivator. Immigrants from the countryside and their offspring have also acquired skills formerly unknown in rural society: many of the "modern" self-employed craftsmen active today in Dakar learnt their skills in expatriate companies before establishing their own micro-enterprises (52) (LeBrun & Gerry 1975: 22). For example, among 130 self-employed furniture makers and vehicle mechanics interviewed in 1974 in the Dakar purposive survey on which the present thesis is empirically based, 70% of the former and 55% of the latter had spent on average more than half their working lives in wage-employment. In a larger sample undertaken in the same research, a distinction was made between self-employed petty producers who had always been so (27%), those who had set up small businesses after having been made redundant from large or medium-size capitalist enterprises (61%) and those who had themselves taken the initiative to become self-employed

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(52) Data obtained in interviews with groundnut farmers visiting Dakar to borrow money from relatives. Interviewees indicated that more intensive cultivation of groundnuts has severely reduced the fertility of the soil, requiring greater areas to be cultivated in order to achieve constant returns, with fertilisers, fungicides and special seeds having to be used in ever larger amounts. The growing demands on farming expenditure have apparently worsened the rate of indebtedness (See Chapter 4, Interview XXI).

(12%). Clearly, individuals with previous experience of other forms of employment arrive at the same point (i.e. acquire the status of self-employed petty producer) from several directions and under varying circumstance - some from the countryside, having found cultivation of cash-crops unviable, and others from the city, having lost stable wage-employment during an economic recession, or due to changes in technology.

Much of the rest of the present thesis will consist of an attempt to examine the various paths that lead to petty production, to evaluate the current role of small scale production in the material environment of the city, and to ask questions relating to the paths that petty commodity production may take (or be forced to take) in the future.

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## CHAPTER 4

### PETTY PRODUCTION IN DAKAR: A GENERAL OVERVIEW.

#### 4.1. INTRODUCTION.

In this chapter, a general overview of petty production in Dakar will be presented by means of a series of interviews (53) and corresponding commentaries. Five main themes characterise the open-ended interviews that were undertaken as a preliminary exercise intended to identify the fundamental issues to be studied via structured data collection. These themes comprise:

- (1) Recycling i.e. the use of recycled or "recuperated" raw materials in a wide spectrum of small scale activities, for want of the necessary financial conditions to acquire the new raw materials and tools that would secure more remunerative production;
- (2) Competition i.e. the difficulties encountered by small producers in their respective markets, especially vis-à-vis middlemen, suppliers and more powerful competitors;
- (3) Success i.e. the means by which certain small producers are able to accumulate capital, albeit to a restricted extent and within clearly-defined niches of activity;
- (4) "Informality" i.e. the administratively and/or criminally illegitimate means by which a not insignificant proportion of the urban economically-active labour force gain their livelihoods, either through force of circumstance and/or by choice; and
- (5) Failure i.e. the inevitably large number of casualties that occur as the poor earn, or attempt to earn, a living.

By presenting and discussing a number of interviews - typically in the form of occupational biographies of variable

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(53) Mainly undertaken in the shanty-town suburb of Nimzat-Angleouss; see Appendix III.

length and/or detail (54), and introducing some of the more general statistical data collected during the more formal interviews, a general picture of petty production in Dakar can be built up. In the majority of cases, the interviews speak for themselves, though some clarification and contextualisation may be required. Since the pure presentation of abstract arguments and aggregated data could lead to a feeling of alienation from the material environment of petty producers themselves, such a generalised introductory presentation is doubly valuable.

The 12-month period of fieldwork in Dakar consisted of 3 major phases: the second and third comprised a limited survey of employment conducted in the shanty-town of Nimzat-Anglemouss, and a systematic questionnaire survey of 285 petty producers from four occupations, respectively. In contrast, the first stage of the pilot survey consisted of many days spent walking the back-streets, main roads and peripheral suburbs of the city, observing, listing, photographing and taking notes on a host of different activities from the hawking of roasted peanuts, through market portorage, tin-trunk manufacture and newspaper vending, to sandal-repairing and the fabrication of charms and amulets. Across the board, one phenomenon that was both immediately evident and difficult to ignore, was the recuperation and recycling of waste materials.

## 4.2. RECUPERATION AND RECYCLING IN DAKAR

### 4.2.1. Theoretical & conceptual preface.

It is not so common to see a young African or Latin American child kicking a discarded tin can along a street as one might expect. Why? It would be more rational in the majority of cases to

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(54) The cases presented in the first person are based on field notes taken during interviews (more often than not through the "filter" of my research assistant's very able interpretation, since only a minority of interviewees spoke French). Those presented in the third person, tend to reflect less voluble interviewees and more discontinuous accounts that subsequently required greater "processing" i.e. compilation and chronological sequencing.

kick the tin can towards the horse and cart of the nearest rubbish scavenger. The reason for this is that the majority of the working poor in under-developed capitalist countries (and especially in the urban areas) are structurally excluded from access to the means of generating adequate incomes: such a situation is based on the more fundamental lack of popular access to even the most basic means of production. Very small proportions of the total populations of such economies are employed as wage-workers in industry and commerce (at least in the Western senses of the word). Consequently, aside from peasant agriculture, the major means of subsistence available to the urban working poor are those left to them by the dominant capitalist system that controls the commanding heights of the economy; this situation benefits capitalist industry in as much as the industrial labour force and their dependents have access to selected cheap mass consumption goods, a factor that exerts downward pressure on industrial wages and cheapens the cost of capitalist production (See Chapter 1, particularly Figures 1.D. and 1.E.).

Many Senegalese urban petty producers may be dependent upon large scale producers for their raw materials, equipment and, as signalled above, even their individual skills, for many used to work in the large factories during the colonial period. However, for the not-so-lucky, ownership of even the most basic means of production is not a prerequisite for earning an adequate income: merely access will suffice. Apart from the products made by some sections of the industrially-employed labour force, there exists considerable production of articles demanded by the mass of the population for their own essential consumption, depending not on inputs fresh off the factories' conveyor belts, but on equipment and materials that have been discarded either by capitalist production processes and/or by privileged bourgeois consumption. Thus not only "retrieved", "recuperated" and "recycled" raw materials and equipment find their way into small scale production, but there also exist many activities that depend upon discarded commodities or the residue of privileged consumption for

their raw materials. The flotsam and jetsam of capitalist production and elite consumption can be transformed (or used to transform) other materials into marketable articles, from which a meagre income may be earned. Such activities are not restricted to under-developed countries, but their existence elsewhere (for instance, in Western Europe and America) tends to be residual, rather than relatively central to the subsistence of the mass of the population.

Much of this style of subsistence production is so alien to the analysts who attempt to explain it, that very superficial explanations ensue. The common tendency is to look only at the level of appearances, i.e. to examine the manifestations rather than the underlying causes, of the phenomenon. The form of recuperative and recycling activities is described, while the analysis of its content and objective situation is ignored. What are the social and economic relations that give rise to the progressive distancing of large sections of the urban labour force from adequate means of subsistence? The answer lies in the fundamental relationship between capitalist development and under-development: the African labour force is inevitably a victim of the latter, and the more disadvantaged the group, the more profound is its degree of underdevelopment and consequent estrangement from the means of assuring an adequate standard of living. Mercantilism may have brought many of the people of Senegal a one-way ticket to the West Indies, but colonialism and neo-colonialism brought them into a world market and an economic environment dominated by costly and labour-saving technology.

There is undoubtedly some importance to be attached to the recycling that characterises some elements of Third World non-industrial production, the very manifestation of which is the urban shanty-town. However, a shanty-town is only wooden planks, corrugated metal and sheets of oil-paper at the level of appearances; to leave the analysis there would be as banal as to describe a factory as a particular combination of factor inputs (land, labour and

capital). To deny the existence of the fundamental social relations that produce this world of appearances denies social reality and reduces scientific investigation to paltry empiricism. Nevertheless, it would be informative to examine some of the different aspects of this type of production, since, when seen in the context of a complex urban situation, it will prove easier to understand how subsistence is ensured (but only just) and through what mechanisms this takes place.

The most basic of mass-consumption products are the stock-in-trade of urban recuperative production: mattresses, stoves, lighting equipment, housing, clothes and tools fall into this category, and to some extent compete for clients among the urban poor with their factory-made equivalents. Overall, a large proportion of Dakar's consumer-goods (particularly those available in city-centre shops) are imported. Imported goods are invariably accompanied by packaging of all sorts, all of which can be used in petty production. Much of the city's industry also provides by-products and waste that can be re-utilised by those who do not share the bourgeois system of values that denies such materials their use-value (though only exceptionally their exchange-value). Re-cycling is too expensive for many capitalist firms (though in contemporary developed capitalist economies it is becoming more common and cost-effective). However, petty producers, supposedly with ample "time on their hands" and access to the cheapest labour, but who are excluded from other raw materials markets by monopolistic pricing, have to make use of these inputs to ensure their subsistence.

Though many of the different occupations that can be included in the general framework of "recuperative" production are striking in their ingenuity, there is another and far more miserable pole to the spectrum of activities. Nevertheless, these may be characterised by commercial relations equally as well-developed and complex

(55) as those indicated in the examples of the second-hand clothes dealers (frippiers) cited below; many articles are salvaged by impoverished children and the aged from what bourgeois European and Senegalese families throw away; this is hardly surprising, since old shoes can be sold to shoe-repairers, plastic bags to women peanut-vendors to wrap their snacks in, and plastic mineral-water bottles can be cut in half to make a funnel for decanting cooking oil and a handy container for condiments. Old newspapers can be sold to the Mauritanian corner-shops as wrapping paper, and, in turn, such shops may sell their empty flour- and rice-sacks to mattress-makers (56) and repairers. Metallic waste, from tin cans to steel drums, collected from various sources, are an important input into artisanal metal-founding, an occupation that provides the urban poor with many of its cooking utensils and market-gardening tools (57).

While much of the paraphernalia of privileged consumption can be recycled and transformed from what appears useless within the framework of bourgeois values into something that has either a value in use and/or in exchange from the perspective of the working poor, comparable industrial sources of materials also exist. In some instances, large capitalist firms sell materials that have ceased to be of value to them as inputs into the production process; however, it is perhaps indicative of the nature of relations between capitalism and petty production that the buying and selling of discarded materials and used industrial packaging often link the two sectors together: in this way, factories are relieved of the burden of disposing of much of their own waste. It is a common observation that the privileged and prosperous quarters of many African capitals have no litter problem: this is quite

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(55) See Birkbeck (1977, 1979) for a detailed analysis of such relations in the context of Colombian refuse-scavenging.

(56) See interview VI.

(57) See interview V.

simply because, to the poor, what is thrown away by the rich constitutes an important input into subsistence production. Everything that has potential value to the working poor is recycled, since they cannot afford to discard such essential raw materials.

A striking example of this enforced "waste not, want not" mentality is the utilisation of industrial packaging. Steel drums, wooden packing-cases, cardboard cartons, rope, twine and padding are all a necessary accompaniment to the majority of Senegalese imports, and the majority of these incidental items eventually find their way into petty production, often through a number of intermediaries. Though brick and concrete buildings are rapidly becoming more common, large numbers of the Dakar people live in wooden shacks in peripheral or interstitial shantytowns; due to the extreme anti-shantytown urbanisation policies pursued by the Senegalese government, it is not difficult to find African suburbs in which over half of the constructions are built of wood and other recycled materials. Consequently, the demand for wooden packing cases, flattened out tin cans (58) and steel drums, plastic sheeting, etc., is still very high. Steel drums are highly sought after for the manufacture of the fourneau malagache (59), the local charcoal stove. Used butane canisters can be transformed into serviceable oil lamps for the large numbers of households that either cannot afford, or have no access to electricity (60). Metal bed-frames are mainly made by Africans and sold through Lebanese wholesalers and retailers. Since new beds are subject to the full commercial mark-up, the local renovation, repair and subsequent sale of second-hand and/or broken bed-frames is a common occupation: many small workshops purchase old and damaged beds, dismantling and re-

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(58) See interview III.

(59) See interview V.

(60) Taking four typical Dakar suburbs as the example, the proportion of households without electricity is as follows: Rebeuss, 42%; Pikine Central, 58%; Grand Dakar, 39%, and Nimzat Anglemouss ("redeveloped" in 1975), 97% (Bugnicourt 1973).

assembling what is usable, to resell to the poorer sections of the urban population. Often such small enterprises work in tandem with mattress-makers and -repairers. Trunk-makers buy old packing cases from the Port (from which they make the wooden container), and misprinted or discontinued tin-plate from the canning factory (to make an attractive and durable exterior): the finished product provides cheap storage space in many a shanty-town household.

#### 4.2.2. Interviews with 'recuperators' and recyclers'.

The following illustrations give empirical content to the comments and assertions already made. The first group of interviews summarised below and the accompanying comments include two sellers of second-hand clothes (frippiers), government attitudes towards such activities as articulated by a member of the weights and measures inspectorate, a "recycling" furniture-maker (61), the young apprentices of a small scale carpenter (62), a maker of metal stoves (63), and an elderly mattress-maker (64).

##### I. A second-hand clothes vendor (1): Nimzat market (19.3.1974)

"I've been to Dakar many times. I come during the dry season and go back to my village in Kebemer [between Dakar and St. Louis] to cultivate during the rainy season. But the harvests have been so bad in recent years that I must come to Dakar again. I live alone in Nimzat, where I rent a room. Only sometimes do I earn enough to send something back to my family. I began in the second-hand clothes business just last year. I sell mainly shirts and trousers. I buy my bundle from the "Apollo" warehouse out on the Route de Rufisque: it costs me 50 francs CFA to hire a horse and cart to get

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(61) Interview III.

(62) Interview IV.

(63) Interview V.

(64) Interview VI.

my bundle back to Nimzat market, and there I have to pay 50 francs each any in order to sell my wares. "Apollo" sells clothes in bundles: woollens come in 45 kilo bundles, and shirts are sold by quantity, usually 200 to a sack. In this business, it's all a question of luck. A bundle can contain nothing but high-quality stuff, or just be a load of rubbish. You can ask for specific articles, but you can never determine the quality. So sometimes, I only break even, or maybe even lose money. For example, some articles will need cleaning or repairing before they are fit to sell: I have to do all this myself and that adds to my cost.

Normally I can make between 3,000 and 6,000 francs profit per bundle. Last year, business was very good and I usually made 5,000 francs on a 16,000 franc bundle. This year prices are up (woollens are now 20,000 francs and 200 shirts cost me 18,000 francs) but the profits are still the same. At the end of the month, when people get their pay, I can sell between 4,000 and 6,000 francs worth of stuff, but it will usually take me another three weeks to get rid of the rest. In the meantime, I have to support myself and my family, and have enough capital to buy the next bundle. I concentrate on selling good quality pullovers and cardigans for between 75 and 100 francs each. Smaller articles, or ones that are of lower quality will go for 50-75 francs. I sell shirts, too, at 125-200 francs each, according to size or quality. For trousers, the prices are much higher. I have had to increase my prices, because "Apollo" has put up its prices. There are too many regulations and controls: if we were free to trade without interference, everyone would be a lot better off".

## II. Selling second hand clothes as a last resort: Nimzat market 6.1.1974 - 27.3.1974.

Thiam, a resident of Nimzat-Angle mouss, formerly worked on building sites as his uncle's labourer. When his uncle retired, Thiam had no claim to continued employment, did not know the right people, and rapidly became almost totally without work. At the

height of his problems, a market trader in second-hand clothes suggested a scheme to him: the frippier had a large pile of rags and damaged clothes that he had not been able to sell; he suggested that Thiam should try his luck with them, while the frippier replenished his own stock with something better from the Apollo warehouse, where bales of second-hand clothes and new items of inferior quality (so-called "seconds") were sold. Thiam was to pay over a part of his earnings if he managed to sell anything, but any takings in excess of a certain sum would be Thiam's to keep. Thiam cleaned and repaired as much as he could, and subsequently sold almost all his stock. With the profits, he was able to buy directly from other market frippiers and eventually hoped to be able to buy from Apollo itself. Within a few months, Thiam had a thriving market stall and a regular (albeit variable) income.

#### Comments on Interviews I and II.

Second-hand clothing is a very important part of a typical urban Senegalese's basket of subsistence goods. The tailor in whose shop a number of the Nimzat-Anglemouss interviews took place, confirmed this: many of his orders consisted of making "new" garments either out of old ones, or out of old fabric. An adult's robe can make numerous children's kaftans; pullovers can be cut down to fit smaller bodies; second-hand clothes can be altered. The quantitative data given by interviewee I imply that a reasonable living can only be made by second-hand clothes dealers working on a relatively small scale if they are able to obtain good quality merchandise:

##### 1) COSTS

Bundle of 200 shirts	18,000 francs
28 days x 50 francs market tax	1,400 francs
Transport	50 francs
Allowance for repairs/clearing	550 francs
TOTAL COST	20,000 francs

2) <u>REVENUES</u>	<u>MINIMUM</u>	<u>MAXIMUM</u>
200 shirts each sold at:	125 francs	200 francs
generates between:	25,000 francs	40,000 francs
giving a net profit of:	5,000 francs	20,000 francs

The attitude of the authorities towards frippiers is far from encouraging, as one might expect. Second-hand dealers, of clothes or of anything else, are often considered to be only on the borderline of both legality and propriety, as the following report (from the Dakar daily newspaper "Le Soleil" 14/15 August, 1973) indicates:

"The quartier of Colobane has been invaded by second-hand clothes dealers. All the way along Rue 14, 14 and 46, very early in the morning, they can be seen undoing packages of clothes corresponding to all tastes and sizes. Colobane's flea market has become quite sizeable over the last two years, and is occupied predominantly by farmers whose lives have been devastated by the severe drought.

Ever since a warehouse for fripperie was established these dealers have found their wares to be in great demand. But at Colobane, they have set up their market in complete chaos. As the suburb's Party representative says: 'The place reserved for the dustbins and skips has been taken over by the frippiers; the roads to the market and the public showers are equally obstructed. People are also unloading fruit and wood in the same spot' (...).

Seventy traders have already been told to leave the market. 'We used to pour our dirty water away here', said a housewife, 'but now we don't know which way to turn'. The traders we talked to were quite aware of the situation. Noss Cisse, one of the frippiers told us: 'Clothing and rubbish don't go very well together; we would like to be offered a decent location where we can be more comfortable' (...).

Prefect Cissé Diarga N'Diaye told us that a set of market stalls arranged in a circle would be provided once the frippiers were relocated (...). Originally, the Bechard Plan [for Dakar] had envisaged the replacement of Colobane market with a housing development. This project has never been started, and many people have spent up to 400,000 francs acquiring plots of land on which they have provisionally built wooden shacks. The market at the moment earns money for the municipality: 25,000 francs a day are collected from stall holders, lorry drivers and warehousemen. But before Colobane can be renovated, it will have to be decongested [my translation, CG]".

If second-hand clothing constitutes an important item in the urban worker's subsistence income, the use of recycled materials and what might appear to be rubbish is absolutely essential to the provision of low-income housing. The floor of the average shanty-town wooden hut (barraque) will normally be of cement, but little else that could be found in the premises of a conventional builders' merchant: the walls are made either from planks that were formerly part of packing cases arriving at the port, or are constructed from flattened-out tin cans nailed on to a wooden framework. Furniture is either made from scrap wood and metal, or has been repaired and renovated such that its original form is hardly discernible. Internal walls are normally covered with pasted-on magazine or newspaper cuttings that serve both to make the rooms more attractive and to impede the entry of unwanted pests. A mortice or padlock is probably the only "technical" artefact (apart from, perhaps, a battery-powered transistor radio) to be found in such a residence.

The following two interviews (and accompanying descriptions) relate to the problems faced by a shanty-town furniture-maker, and the solutions found by some young carpenter's apprentices.

### III. A carpenter: Nimzat-Angleouss (23.1.1974).

The "workshop" consists of a compound surrounded by a high wicker fence, with two lean-to structures inside. Only hand-tools are visible, and of those very few. All the wood he has in stock is "recovered" (dechets). Apart from the wood, large tin cans are also much in evidence, some of which have been cut along the vertical seam, flattened out and nailed upon a wooden frame, to make the wall of a shack. The carpenter tells us that the tins are bought from the "Gazelle" brewery, where they have been used for storage of fermentation agents. The carpenter is old and ill, and no longer works. His son, who is a qualified [category 4]

carpenter, looks after the business, having failed to find other work. He is the only economically-active member of the household.

Work is only done to customers' orders, the majority of these coming from residents of Nimzat-Anglemouss. There is only one apprentice, who receives a variable proportion of the revenue from each sale, according to how much profit is made. He is 35 years old. Apparently such "elderly" apprentices are not uncommon, and apprenticeships may last 15 years or even longer. The son explained that if the chance of wage-employment occurred, he would take it, leaving the workshop and its activities in the hands of the apprentice, who was quite up to the task.

It is always difficult to find decent raw materials, the son said. He has little to put on display outside the workshop to attract customers: the only stock he has consists of a few shack-walls (made of flattened-out tin cans nailed onto wooden frame) and a bed of rough timber. He claims to have the knowledge and ability to use all the most modern tools and materials, but he cannot afford to make such furniture, nor could his customers afford to buy it. Occasionally he is even forced to turn people away, or at least to try to get a cash advance from them, for want of the necessary raw materials.

#### IV. A carpenter's apprentices: Anglemouss (26.1.1974)

All work done by the master carpenter was exclusively for clients' orders. The small workshop was situated on a main road and had a moderately good clientele. Goods were displayed outside, but these had been made by the apprentices and not by the master. The principle materials used in production were wood and Formica, and the apprentices were permitted to use up whatever scraps of wood and other materials were available, and to use the master's tools and equipment. At first, the youngest boys only make wooden stools, benches, money-boxes for children and beggars, and polish-boxes for shoeshine boys. Later they progress to more difficult

and lucrative articles, such as bedroom cabinets, which sell for around 1,500 francs CFA, or small chests of drawers (2,500 francs CFA). Offcuts of wood can be used, along with spare Formica for the top, and sections of brightly-coloured plastic tablecloth are used to line the insides.

Apprentices are not paid as such, but rather receive cadeaux (gifts) at Moslem festivals; these may be as little as 100 francs or as much as 2,000 francs depending on age, skill and seniority. Additional money is earned by selling the articles that have been made during slack periods. The apprentices claim that these were not difficult to sell, as they were well-made and relatively cheap. Articles are put on show outside the workshop or, if this produces no sale, they are taken into the city centre and hawked from market to market. Apprentices sometimes even take orders for themselves, thereby bypassing their master (65).

V. A shanty-town metalworker: Nimzat (28.2.1974)

The smith lives and works on the same plot; he has a small room and a lean-to workshop for which he pays 1,000 francs rent a month. He is a bachelor and lives and works alone. He has always worked with scrap-metal and specialises in the manufacture and repair of household utensils: his work consists of making or repairing knives, axes and other tools, stoves, kettles and kitchen utensils. He also repairs beds and other metal articles. If he has the cash, he buys broken beds, which he repairs and resells. For a price, he will paint your bed frame with a rust-proofing preparation that he principally reserves for treating water-sellers' steel drums.

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(65) During this interview an agreement was made between my research assistant and one of the apprentices to provide a bedside cabinet: 500 francs had to be paid in advance to buy "good quality" Formica and the appropriate adhesive, and 500 francs more would be paid on completion.

To manufacture his fourneaux malagaches stoves (66), he buys steel barrels on the Route de Rufisque (Industrial Zone), which cost 250 francs each. These have to be cut, shaped and soldered together. If he concentrates on this activity, 6 stoves can be made in a day, starting from scratch. Repairs are normally done while the customer waits. Metal is usually bought each day, or less frequently, if business is bad; solder is purchased in town as required. He buys his solder in very small amounts from hawkers or market traders, but most of the other basic inputs are "recuperated". He intends to remain in his present occupation, since it is the only skill he possesses. He claims that his earnings are just sufficient for his requirements, but he was unable to give any real idea of his monthly earnings: "I spend what I earn, and I earn what I spend", he said with a wry smile.

VI. A mattress-maker: Nimzat 23.1.1974.

This short interview was conducted with an elderly Nimzat resident who made and repaired mattresses in the yard of his wooden shack.

"Whenever I need the raw materials - that is, whenever I have a customer who has ordered a mattress - I have to walk 10, 15 or even 20 kilometres into the countryside, to collect the straw. I carry this back home to Nimzat on my head. It's very dangerous out there in the brush: there's always the chance of being bitten by a snake, or even being attacked by jackals. Even though I'm an old man, I still have to do this. I can only get hold of enough straw if the rainfall has been good that year. With the drought

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(66) The traditional method of cooking in Dakar's poor suburbs (and, indeed, throughout the rural communities) is the metal fourneau malagache, comprising a low inverted conical receptacle for coals on top of a hollow cylinder that allows air into the stove. These ubiquitous devices are nowadays almost exclusively made from dismantled steel drums, cut and welded into shape.

that we're suffering, I have to spend a great deal of time getting together enough straw for my mattresses. I can carry back enough to fill one mattress. If I walk out of town early in the morning, I can have a mattress made by 4.00 or 5.00 p.m.

But I cannot make mattresses just out of straw; I have to buy rice, millet or peanut sacks, to make the cover. These I buy from specialised sack-sellers, or from the Narr [Mauritanian or Lebanese] shops. But there aren't always sacks to be found when I need them. They cost 90 francs for small ones and 100 francs for bigger ones. I also have to buy thread for sewing and binding the covers. My customers sometimes supply their old mattresses to be taken apart and given a new lease of life. I use what is good to make a better mattress. Nevertheless, it is much quicker, and much less trouble to make a new mattress from scratch. I charge 750-800 francs for a new mattress, and 500-600 francs for a repaired and refilled one. Demand is quite slight, and fluctuates considerably; sometimes I get no orders for a week, then later on I may get three orders in a day, and people have to wait."

#### Comment on Interview VI.

In 1974, a basic mattress purchased from a Lebanese retailer, made from synthetic cloth and stuffed with all manner of textile and other waste, would cost between 2,000 and 3,000 francs. For the majority of poor consumers, this is too expensive. Consequently, mattress covers are made of all sorts of other fabric, often old sacks sewn together, then stuffed with paper and/or straw. For those who have virtually no money for such "luxuries", an old mattress can be patched, repaired and restuffed, or the remaining sound materials can be pulled apart and used, along with newer fabric, to make a serviceable mattress.

#### 4.2.3. Concluding remarks on interviews with 'recuperators' and 'recyclers'.

The list of recuperative activities, examples of which have been given above, is virtually endless. These examples only serve to give the flavour of this wide range of occupations: but a mere list would be worthless unless a framework were provided that could aid in the analysis of the complex of forms and modes of production, rather than leaving us at the level of appearances. Recuperation and recycling, like many aspects of non-capitalist economic activity in under-developed economies, are merely a manifestation of a deep-rooted structural malaise. Capitalist industry in under-developed economies produces mainly either for export or for consumption by the more privileged strata of society. The working poor, like the peasantry, must look after themselves, and, in the face of great adversity and institutionalised discrimination, manage to produce many of the basic necessities of life at low cost. Such petty producers may be looked upon as low productivity workers with little expertise, but such an analysis would ignore a whole range of constraints that deny major sections of the labour force adequate access to the means of production, whether wage-employment, self-employment, or any other form of income generation. Their level of technology is undoubtedly low, even though European capitalists benefit from small producers' purchases of sewing machines, woodworking equipment, and the like.

Nevertheless, initiative and innovation abound: after Renault, in collaboration with the Senegalese government, ceased exporting spares for the popular privately-operated car-rapide mini-buses, in order that the State-run and Renault-supplied Dakar Bus Company (in which the French company had a large shareholding) could be secured the monopoly that would ensure its viability, local vehicle-mechanics were forced to improvise spares for their customers. Minibus-operators, whose very livelihoods were threatened, gained access to hand-made components and cannibalised

engines, enabling them for many years to thwart the monopolising strategies of the company and its government supporters. Numerous other examples of what might be termed "ingenuity-in-adversity" can be cited to show the extent to which alternative technologies - indeed, what in Europe might even be termed good ecological management techniques, are a necessary fact of life for petty producers in under-developed capitalist economies.

Hard-won skills are underutilised and inferior materials used mainly because of the structural constraints located in the national (but nevertheless rooted firmly within the international) economy; thus opportunities are restricted in the first instance to the capitalist class in the developed metropolis, and secondly to the privileged strata in the dependent under-developed economy. The whole structure of prices, the terms of trade, education and skills acquisition, market opportunities and credit availability works against any amelioration of the low standard of living and the marked degree of inequality characterising the mass of the population. The so-called marginalisation problem, and the specific phenomenon of recuperative production merely reflect the deep-rooted nature of the complex network of relations and institutions which constitute the base and superstructure of Senegal's capitalist underdevelopment.

#### 4.3. COMPETITION, MIDDLEMEN AND MARKETS: SOME RESPONSES BY PETTY PRODUCERS TO MARKET CONSTRAINTS

One of the principal problems confronting manufacturing or commercial enterprises of any scale and of anything more than the most rudimentary level of development is competition. Whether multinational corporation, large national company, aspirant small capitalist, or a representative of Marx's "pygmy property of the many" (Marx 1970: 762), economic enterprises survive by competing successfully. Large degrees of monopoly power confer considerable advantages on enterprises, irrespective of size or location. In

the context of urban small scale activities in Dakar, competition is keenly felt, and special privileges, monopolistic or otherwise are highly sought-after. Since the capacity to accumulate enough to move up from the lowest scale of production is limited to an extremely small fraction of indigenous producers (as will be argued and substantiated in chapters 6 and 7), petty commodity production tends to be highly competitive, with large numbers of producers (who are also poor consumers) seeking to attract the maximum number of (normally poor) clients (many of whom will also be small producers or traders).

The acquisition of a stable clientele, and access to stable and relatively lucrative long-term government or private contracts constantly preoccupies petty producers. Acquiring better tools, materials and machinery, in order to produce higher-quality goods and attract more wealthy clients, is also an important consideration for small scale operators. But for the majority, such outcomes are little more than pipe-dreams, and their day-to-day reality continues to be the maintenance of whatever clients or contacts they already have and the continued search for sufficient working capital, which very often puts them into the hands of middlemen and/or usurers, in a relationship sealed through the medium of credit.

The following interviews are intended to give a flavour of the market environment in which petty producers operate: a more detailed and concrete analysis is reserved for later.

#### VII. A fish-trader: Tailor's shop, Anglemouss (2.3.1974)

Cheikh Ka was interviewed in a tailor's shop where he often comes sits and talks when the market is closed or business is slack.

"I was born at M'Bour (67). My family still lives there, and that is where I started selling fish. Not long ago I decided to try my luck in Dakar, and that's how I come to be working at Nimzat market. I live with these people here - with the tailor and Monsieur Fall the shopkeeper (68). They are my cousins. I took over Fall's spot in the market when he set up his shop. I buy my fish at Gueule Tapée market on the coast road: there are lots of wholesalers there and they keep me well-supplied. I buy early in the morning - at 5.00 or 6.00 a.m. - and start selling here between 7.00 and 8.00.

I normally buy one basketful, either of medium-sized or large fish, depending on availability. Ordinary fish cost between 2,000 and 4,000 francs CFA [a basketful], but the large fish has to be bought individually, and they cost anything from 300 to 1,500 francs each. I take my fish back on the car rapide (69) and that costs me 75 francs.

I have to be very clever only to buy what I can sell in one morning; I don't work in the afternoons at all. So experience is very important. I sell mainly to housewives who buy one or two smaller fish or part of a larger fish. If there is something left over at lunchtime, I buy 100 francs worth of ice and keep the fish in a bucket until the next day. I'm only buying big fish at present, because they are much better value: on a good day, when fish is scarce and not too many people are selling at Nimzat market, I will pay out 3,000 francs CFA, and get back between 4,000 and 4,500 francs, leaving me with a thousand or more francs for the morning's work. When times are bad, and there's too much fish and lots of sellers, admittedly I will be able to get my fish cheaper at Gueule Tapée, maybe only 1,000 or 1,500 francs, but

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(67) A fishing village on the Cap Vert Peninsular, close to Dakar. See Interview IX. Fall and the tailor share premises.

(68) See Interview IX. Fall and the tailor share premises.

(69) Minibuses providing private sector public transport.

I'll only make 250-300 francs profit. Out of that, I have to pay 75 francs for the car rapide and 50 francs market tax:

I sleep and eat at Fall's house: I don't pay rent and I'm not asked to contribute on a regular basis to the household expenditure. When I have money, I always help out, or if Fall's wife asks me for money, because she doesn't want to worry Fall, I give her a hundred francs or so. My elder brother looks after the family in M'Bour. I send them money whenever I can, and if I've had good luck I go there myself with 500 or 1,000 francs or more.

Selling fish has its problems: I can sell a lot sometimes, but when things get really competitive, you have to be careful not to buy too much. Thanks be to God that I'm not a wholesaler! They have to have documents to prove where the fish came from and whether they are healthy or not. I just pay my market tax. I get credit from the wholesalers sometimes, but only if I buy from them every day. If I make a loss one day, they will let me take my usual basket of fish and pay for it when I've sold the fish. They don't make you pay more than the standard basket-price.

I give credit to some of my customers too, but only if they are honest and regular. Credit is good in this way - it makes sure the client buys only from you. If business remains good, I might be able to start saving money one day. It's up to me really: I had problems to start with, but I listened to the advice and comments of other traders. They told me you can't really win: if you're too soft on prices, you lose; if you're too hard, you lose too!"

#### VIII. A wood-sculptor: Anglemouss (28.3.1974)

"I learnt my trade in Dakar, from my uncle. After my apprenticeship, I continued working for him, because I didn't have the money to be independent. I used to carve 4 articles a week, and my uncle would give me one-third of the profit he received on them. After a year, he took on more apprentices, and I was made

chef d'atelier and had to supervise their work and training, as well as buying raw materials from the wholesalers.

Soon I came to the conclusion that my uncle was treating me unfairly, so I decided to leave and set up on my own. I had a little money saved by then, and found a place in a workshop where I could do my own carvings. The man from whom I rent the floor-space is a master sculptor who owns the workshop. All his workers are paid a fixed sum every month, and all he does is tell them what to carve and how to go about it. But I was never part of this arrangement: I pay him 25 francs each day and, at the beginning of each month, he gives me enough wood on credit for everything I'm likely to do during that month. I pay him for the wood when I've sold my carvings. Now I can save money in a way I never could at my uncle's workshop. Nevertheless, I'm well aware that the credit arrangement costs me between 200 and 250 francs for each article I sell.

Daily turnover is very variable: towards the end of the month, when people have been paid, I can sell 10,000 francs worth of goods, but during the slack first two weeks of the month I may sell nothing for 3 or 4 days at a time. I use about 50,000 francs' worth of wood each month and the articles I make sell for 80-90,000 francs, leaving me with a satisfactory income of around 30,000 francs when other expenses are taken into account.

Life is much more stable now than when I was with my uncle. I sell a lot of objects d'art to tourists, and mortars and pestles and the like to housewives. I would like to be able to set up my own workshop, but for that I would need to save about 125,000 francs. I would be happier on my own; though life is good, my relations with the master-craftsman and his workers are changeable and not altogether satisfactory. He does help me out, though, and I co-operate, too: he picks up ideas from me and I from him. He recommends my work if he can't fulfil an order, and I supply him with articles he cannot produce in time."

IX. A shopkeeper: Anglemouss (26.1.1974)

Fall is the brother of a tailor (to whom he rents a small space on the veranda of his small shop) and cousin to Ka the fish-seller. He has no occupation other than commerce, and was formerly a market-trader, selling very small quantities of vegetables in Nimzat market. He gave this up when he acquired the shop, and let his cousin take over his place in the market. From his small trading activities, Fall had managed to save enough to pay the first month's rent on the shop and to buy a small amount of stock. He pays 1,500 francs to rent the premises, and another 1,500 francs for the single room behind the shop, where he and his wife and Ka all live.

Fall is a relative newcomer to the shanty-town and has not yet been able to establish a regular clientele. He said that you have to become well-known and "established" before you can acquire a stable group of customers. Then you can afford to broaden the range of the products you sell, and start to maintain your clientele by providing credit facilities.

Fall's brother, the tailor, pays him 75 francs a day for the use of the space on the veranda he occupies with his bench and sewing machine. Fall's stock is purchased in Dakar from small wholesalers (demi-gros), but he has no fixed suppliers and therefore no regular credit relationships. It is possible to get credit from these suppliers but you have to use them regularly and fairly exclusively in order to gain their trust. In the beginning they might offer you, say, 500 francs' worth of goods for an initial payment of 100, the balance to be paid the next time you buy.

The shop has only a limited range of goods, all in very small amounts: tea-bags, tinned and sterilised bottled milk, cigarettes and matches, sugar, mentholated cough sweets, oil, biscuits, soft drinks, rice, flour, vinegar, and very little else. Fall said that

e thought he sold on average around 750 francs' worth of goods each day - but that this varied enormously from the start to the end of the month; his mark-up was generally around 10% (70). Additionally, Ka the fish-trader made intermittent contributions to the household budget (71). However, business seems to be getting worse, and Fall has been forced to consume a large part of his stock himself. Unless things improve, he cannot see how he will afford to restock his shelves.

To arrive at his retail prices, Fall notes the general level of prices in town and among other shopkeepers in the shanty-town, and maintains similar prices. The prices of many commodities are fixed by the government, which places severe constraints on his price-setting: for example, the government regulates the prices of milk, sugar, vinegar, oil, rice, and imported cigarettes. Some of these controlled prices enable Fall to make a profit, while others mean that the sale of the corresponding goods is more of a service to his clientele than a profit-making activity.

Recent price rises and new controls have caused him severe problems: the price rises permitted by wholesalers, and the general lack of vigilance over wholesale prices by the Contrôle Économique (72), have placed Fall in a risky situation whereby, if he attempts to maintain his profit-margin, he risks prosecution

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(70) This would give Fall a daily income, excluding the weekly cost of transporting his stock from town, of little more than 2,000 francs per week, or less than £4 at 1974 exchange rates. This seems extremely low, and clearly insufficient to support himself and his wife. However, it was clear that, in addition to the 75 francs a day he received from the tailor, his brother, for the work space he occupied, the tailor also helped Fall financially from time to time.

(71) Thus, all in all, the monthly income of M. and Mme. Fall might amount to 16,000 or 17,000 francs, compared with an average monthly income among Nimzat-Anglemouss residents of about 20,000 francs, according to NEDECO (1972) and Bugnicourt (1973).

(72) Equivalent to the U.K. Office of Fair Trading or former Weights & Measures inspectorate.

for overcharging. For example, cigarette prices at the wholesalers warehouses increased not by 25 francs per carton as decreed in the Official Gazette, but by 30 francs; the retail price is now supposed to be 35 francs for a packet of local "Camelia" cigarettes, which gives a profit of about 4 francs a packet; however, Fall must charge 40 francs or lose on the transaction. Forty francs gives a profit of 8 francs/packet. Thus, by responding to the unfair practices of his suppliers, Fall appears to be profiteering, and could conceivably be denounced by a disgruntled client to the Contrôle Économique (73).

Contrôle Économique [CE] officers pass by the shop every day, and regularly make spot checks. They often take away your scales, claiming either that it has no official stamp, or that it weighs inaccurately. But the official stamps are very difficult to obtain unless you know someone at the Office, and so the whole cycle of denunciation, spot-checks, confiscation and fines continues unabated. It can cost as much as 1,500 francs to obtain a stamp, most of which consists of bribes; if your scales are taken away, you must pay 1,500 francs to get them back. CE officers are frequently paid 500 francs to leave shopkeepers and other traders in peace for a while.

Fall and his dependents consume part of the shop's stock themselves; Fall's wife only needs to buy a little fish or meat at the market in order to feed them. All prices have been steadily rising recently, and Fall has noticed that the money for two days' food now only buys one days' provisions in the market-place. Their consumption of fish and meat has had to be reduced: before, Mme. Fall would buy 2 kilos of fish or meat to last a few days, and now they make do with half that quantity or less. The clientele of the

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(73) In a world where credit can be extended, but may be withdrawn if the shopkeeper's own financial situation deteriorates, disgruntled clients are not difficult to find. See interview X.

shop has diminished, and even the Lebanese wholesalers in town complain that business is dropping off.

Fall explained that the best way to establish your clientele at the outset is to offer small amounts of credit (when possible), and to gain a reputation for giving a good measure - not every time a customer calls, but often enough to give a good impression. Small credits lead to bigger credits and Fall felt that a clientele dependent on credit ensured stability, as long as you were careful and a good judge of character. Whenever he has a little extra money, Fall introduces a new product onto his shelves, the choice of these goods depending mainly on what customers have asked for in the past, but that at the time Fall was unable to supply.

The shopkeeper works from 7.00 a.m. to 10.30 pm, seven days a week. He has no assistant: the tailor deputises when Fall has to leave the shop, and likewise, Fall takes orders or collects money for the tailor in the latter's absence. Fall wants to be successful, but recognises that in Nimzat-Angle mouss there is a ceiling to how high he can climb as a retailer. Nonetheless, he has been able to buy a second-hand refrigerator (costing 3,000 francs) since he started his shop.

#### X. A "Contrôle Économique" Officer (24.5.74)

"Contrôle Economique" [CE] is part of the Ministry of Finance, and has officers and inspectors throughout the country. The Director of The CE is above all responsible for the smooth and orderly operation of commercial activities in Senegal. CE officers in the various regions of the country are obliged to visit all commercial enterprises from the largest down to the smallest. These activities are normally co-ordinated by an inspector, who is responsible for programming, advising officers and planning schedules. Inspectors also attempt to resolve misunderstandings and conflicts between visiting officers and entrepreneurs over,

for instance, contraventions and fines, and the accurate interpretation of the relevant regulations.

One of the main functions of the CE is the collection of the Taxe des Abbatoirs et Marchés (popularly known as simply the "market tax"): this is normally paid daily by small retailers and hawkers [often referred to as bana-banas], market traders, and the like. Payment of the tax confers the right to display and sell wares and replaces the site permit (permis d'occuper) normally required of more permanent small enterprises with a larger scale of operations. Since virtually all these tiny businesses are mobile, CE officers visit them each day to ensure that no-one escapes payment. There are so many of us circulating in the markets that it is very difficult to avoid us. If small traders don't want to pay this tax, they must cease their activities: otherwise we can confiscate the stocks of habitual offenders and fine them heavily, too. Sometimes we confiscate in order to force them to pay outstanding tax and/or fines, then we give the stuff back to them. Hawkers are subject to the same regulations: if they are caught with contraband items, the fines are much heavier. Those who supply them are often sent to prison or fined very heavily, or both. Of course, all contraband is confiscated without possibility of recovery.

The level of market tax payable depends on the turnover and stocks of the enterprise, but we also have to make sure that traders and retailers give value for money, so the CE has a special group that deals exclusively with weights and measures. Scales and other equipment in bad condition will often lead to fines and confiscations. All errors have to be rectified by repair or replacement. We put an official stamp on the scales to show that it is accurate according to our own standards. To use scales without such a stamp is also illegal. If your scales are faulty, you are liable to a fine of between 1,500 and 3,000 francs.

We are also required to enforce the laws relating to the prices of particular commodities (74). In these tiny businesses, there are always problems: either prices are raised illegally, either deliberately to make a bigger profit, or simply because the retailer doesn't know the controlled price. Even when prices are deliberately raised, the small shopkeeper is really doing nothing more than passing on a wholesaler's illegal price rises. Other times, petty retailers think that a few francs added to the price of insignificant articles is alright; but it isn't. But the biggest problem is the wholesalers: a small illegal increase in wholesale prices may force retailers to put up their own prices so as not to lose on the transaction (75). With medium-sized and large enterprises, who often deal in much larger quantities of better-quality merchandise, there is much less of a problem: they have too much to lose, and can be denounced more easily because they have a much larger clientele, often with more awareness of the controlled prices, and fewer misgivings about filing a complaint.

In the small shops and businesses, on the other hand, the clients are less capable of defending their own interests; people often don't know what the price should be, and are thus easily duped or manipulated by an unscrupulous shopkeeper or trader.

CE officers concentrate on the smaller shops and businesses, so there's always a good chance of catching someone breaking the rules. Such enterprises are found mainly in the shanty-towns, because in the better suburbs, the shops tend to sell at legitimate prices. Some of these little shopkeepers try to take advantage of the situation if they haven't seen us around recently: up go the prices, even of basic foodstuffs! We solicit information wherever we go in order to identify the worst and most

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(74) See Table 14A for a typical list of official prices.

(75) See interview IX with Fall, the shopkeeper.

habitual offenders. But we can't be everywhere and we can't catch every crook".

XI. The hay-seller: Nimzat market (20.3.1974)

"I've sold hay all my working life, and I'm an old man now. My hay comes here from Saloum [i.e. Sine Saloum, one of the central regions of Senegal] by lorry; the transporters come to their regular customers every three days or so, but I don't necessarily buy that often. Sometimes they sell out quickly before they reach me and I have to wait for the next consignment. When the groundnut harvest nut harvest is over, there is always a lot of hay available, and its price is much lower than in the dry season. Immediately after the harvest, I pay 15,000 francs a lorry-load, but later I have to pay 18,000 francs for the same amount. I sell hay by the sackful (250-300 francs) or by the measure (25 francs).

The problem with selling hay is that we get too much competition from the hay-sellers who have horses and carts: they aren't really hay-sellers - they just go to meet the lorries before they reach town and they buy up everything. Then they drive the hay into town and sell it to us at higher prices. They work together and can buy hay very cheaply. It's always been the same, and we real hay-sellers suffer a lot.

If I am able to sell my hay quickly, I can make a profit of 5,000 or 6,000 francs. But if sales are slow, it may take a whole month to get rid of it. The trouble is that I must pay my 50 francs market tax every day, whether I make a sale or not. Sometimes I keep the hay so long that it cannot be sold at all, and I have to borrow money to buy my next load. The suppliers don't care about our plight: it's all the same to them, whoever buys the hay. If we cannot, the horse-and-cart transporters certainly will.

I have a large family and we all live here on my son's plot near the market. He is a carpenter, another son used to teach in

**TABLE 4.1 - GOVERNMENT LIST OF STATUTORY PRICES FOR ARTICLES OF MASS CONSUMPTION (1974)\***

ARTICLE	UNITÉ	PRIX AUTORISÉS AU CAP-VERT	ARTICLE	UNITÉ	PRIX AUTORISÉS AU CAP-VERT
Riz brisé		60 F	Lentilles	boite de 1kg	304 F
Riz en paquet			Haricots		292 F
"Aunt Caroline"	paquet de 100gr	149 F	Pois cassés		240 F
Sucre morceaux	paquet de 1kg	150 F	Pois chiche		232 F
Sucre en pain	Kg	140 F	Cous-cous marocain	Kg	277 F
Sucre cristallisé	Kg	120 F	Pomme de terre d'importation	Kg	41 F
Sucre semoule	Kg	150 F	Oignons d'importation		76 F
Semoule de maïs	Kg	56 F	Bananes		75 F
Farine de blé	Kg	62 F	Oranges		104 F
Huile raffinée en vrac	litre	140 F	Pommes		140 F
Huile raffinée en bouteille :	litre	140 F	Piles Tropic	pièce	45 F
Huile Valor raffinée	litre	158 F	Bougie 30 x 8 GM		10 F
Huile Lésieur Surfine	litre	142 F	Bougies 30 x 16 PM		5 F
Lait concentré sucré	boite de 397g	79 F	Allumettes	boite	5 F
Lait concentré non sucré	boite de 410g	60 F	Savon barre de 3 kg 400	Morceau	408 F
Lait concentré sucré	boite de 170g	29 F	Savon barre de 2 kg 500		301 F
Concentré de tomate			Savon morceaux de 750 gr		92 F
"Coplot"	boite de 4/4	270 F	Savon morceaux de 500 gr		68 F
Concentré de tomate			Savon morceaux de 300 gr		38 F
Dies Boudiar	boite de 4/4	220 F	Savon morceaux de 200 gr		27 F
Dies Boudiar	boite de 2 kg	536 F	Charbon da ménage	Kg	13 F
Pain de fantasia	400 Kg	40 F	Vinaigre d'alcool 6%	Bouteille	58 F
	280gr	28 F	Vin Kiravi	Bouteille	180 F
	200gr	15 F	Vin Valpierre		180 F
	80gr	10 F	Vin CDB		180 F
Pastilles Valda	paquet	40 F	Vin Cevenor		180 F
Pastilles Valdouces	paquet	35 F	Vin Rémillons rouge		180 F
1/6 club 30 sardinelles			Viande mouton 1 <sup>er</sup> choix	Kg	275 F
tomate	boite	51 F	Viande mouton 2 <sup>o</sup> choix	Kg	240 F
1/6 club 30 sardinelles	boite	60 F	Viande de boeuf 1 <sup>er</sup> choix	Kg	250 F
1/1 P. Filets sardinelles			Viande de boeuf 2 <sup>o</sup> choix	Kg	200 F
à l'huile		288F			
1/2 Haute pâte sardine		109 F			
1/2 Ovale pilchards à Zoute		101 F			

\* During 1974 there were 522 CFA francs to the £ sterling.

a private school but left because the pay was so bad. Another boy is working in Abidjan (Ivory Coast), and yet another is a trained welder but cannot find employment. My youngest boy

helps me: this is not what I wanted for him but, at the beginning of the school year, he fell ill and I could not afford to pay for private classes for him to catch up with his studies. Altogether I feed eight people.

I have great confidence in my boys, even though some of them have no work. I have brought them up well, and they have all been to school. They have not acquired the bad habits that many young Senegalese have, and they do not frequent the sort of places where they might learn such bad behaviour. They are good to each other and have a very good attitude towards work and their family."

XII. A charcoal-seller: Anglemouss (30.1.1974)

"I have two wives and five children, but they are all at home in Guinea [Conakry]. They cultivate the land, and I go to visit them whenever I can. I never send them money, but when I return home, I always take money and presents for them. I've always sold charcoal; in Guinea I had a small wholesale charcoal business, I kept animals, and grew some vegetables. But business wasn't very good there, so I came to Dakar.

I buy my charcoal from the wholesalers who drive their lorries to Dakar from the countryside, where the charcoal-burners work. Officially, the prices are set at 500 francs a 50 kilo sack (wholesale) and 13 francs a kilo (retail); but though the government controls the prices I charge, they don't seem to bother the wholesalers, who refuse to accept less than 650 francs a sack. When I talk about a sack, it may mean something different each day: the weight is nearly always less than it should be. The suppliers allow no credit at all. I used to sell my charcoal on credit, but experience has taught me a lesson. Now I only accept cash. My charcoal-store costs me 1,500 francs a month; I rent it from the man next door. I don't live in this suburb, but up in Pikine where I rent a room for 1,000 francs a month. My income varies a lot: some days I can sell 500 francs' worth of charcoal,

other days it can be as much as 1,000. If business is good, I sell my consignment of 20 sacks in 15 to 20 days; when things are bad, it takes me the whole month or even longer to sell it all."

Comments on Interview XII.

Buying 30 sacks a month at 650 francs per sack requires an outlay of 19,500 francs; by selling 30 sacks (no more than 1500 kilos) in a month, at an average mark-up of 3 francs/kilo, which reflects real wholesale prices of 650 francs per 50 kilo load (i.e. 13 francs/kilo) and real retail prices also of 13 francs/kilo - the charcoal-seller seems to be making no profit. Deducting 1,500 francs/month for rental of his charcoal-store and 50 francs/day for market tax, he is left making a loss! So the data he provided needs to be looked at from a different perspective. He admits that he is forced to "profiteer" by charging more than the official 13 francs/kilo, since he passes on the higher wholesale price to his customers. Since the charcoal-seller believes he earns around 8,250 francs in an average month, this would indicate a turnover of 19,500 + 8,250 francs, i.e. 27,750 francs: The sale of approximately thirty 50 kilo sacks of charcoal each month would suggest he charges a retail price/kilo of about 18 francs. In other words, to earn what is indisputably a miserable monthly income, the charcoal-seller is forced to sell his product at five francs above the regulated price.

XIII. The Koundoul family of basket-weavers: A newspaper report ("Le Soleil", Dakar, 17.8.1973)

The following newspaper article (76), inevitably less detailed than some of the interviews transcribed or cited above, nevertheless adds to the overall picture of petty production in Dakar,

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(76) Author: Abdoulaye Ba; the translation is mine (CG).

and gives some idea of the rather romanticised manner in which the national press sometimes presents the life and labour of the artisan, as opposed to the more aggressive attitude that characterised the report by "Le Soleil" on second-hand clothes dealers cited above. The newspaper report on the basket-weavers carries the headline - "After 69 years at M'Both, the basket-weavers move to Fass!"

"Established in the quartier in 1904, the basket-weavers of M'Both have now left their city-centre workshops for good. After the recent tragic fire, the authorities offered the artisans a plot on which to build permanent workshops; Koundoul and his family are therefore now at Fass, near to Canal 4. With extraordinary courage they have started up their business again and are doing as well as can be expected. Their only regret is at being rather isolated from the tourists. Nevertheless, the quality of their work will ensure that their clients will seek them out without delay.

It was three months ago that the dreadful fire swept through the M'Both quartier; the basket-weavers along Rue Sandiniery were among those who suffered considerable losses, and were greatly distressed to see the fruits of several weeks of craftsmanship and hard work going up in flames. In addition to these losses, they were faced with the sad news that they must leave for good the site they had occupied and where they had worked since 1904.

But this was not the first such fire to occur in M'Both by any means. The local authorities therefore found it necessary to require residents of the area to replace their huddled-together cafes, low-ceilinged shops, etc., with bricks and mortar. However, a solution was found to the basket-weavers' problem; as you leave the main road in Fass, close to Canal 4, your eyes are drawn to a plot of land surrounded by a corrugated iron fence. This is where the basket-weavers have established their m'bar or workshop.

There is plenty of space in Fass for the basket-weavers activities. They can work comfortably here, in the almost religious silence that characterises their profession. At the gate, an old man welcomes you with the words 'Would you like to buy one of our cane chairs'? Since we moved here from the city-centre, we have lost half our clientele'. Most residents of Dakar imagine that the basket-weavers - all from the Koundoul family - have returned to their village of birth in Jollof, but this is not so. Père Koundoul explains. 'The Governor of the Cap Vert Region was good enough to find us this place'. Baskets, containers of all types, cane chairs, wickerwork tables, etc., fill the workshop, manifesting the proud craftsmanship of the artisans. 'Just look!

This is the latest thing the youngsters have dreamed up. It's a goblet magnificently woven out of rônier leaves' (77). Nevertheless, their wares don't always sell like hot cakes. As yet their new workshop is almost unknown.

Once in the workshop, customers enjoy bargaining: 'We don't have any fixed prices. It's all decided by the final offer made by the client. We sometimes get interesting orders, too. One merchant had us working non-stop for 6 months. And those baskets over there are on order, and will eventually be used for packing market-garden produce en route for France'. The raw materials, the rônier leaves, are to be found at Joal-Fadiouth. 'We have to pay 2000 francs for the right to harvest the leaves', said Uncle Koundoul.

The Koundoul Family are inextricably bound to the art of basket-weaving. Their ancestors, who made the first baskets in Dakar, came from Fouta Toro. "We have been here for 71 years now, passing on the craft from father to son. When we go back to Jollof, it's only to tend our fields." At the new workshop, children aged from eleven to fourteen are initiated into the mysteries of basket-weaving. "Each year, during the school holidays, our youngsters come to work here for a while. At school, success and failure are equally possible, but here success is guaranteed."

In actual fact this craft acts as a moral support for the entire family. Père Koundoul confided that even the members of the family who have important jobs in public life take advantage of their leisure time and holidays to renew their links with tradition. "As soon as they are in the workshop, it's off with the jacket and tie, and everyone sets to work on the rônier leaves. What a way to renew oneself - by maintaining one's links with such a strong tradition!"

#### 4.3.2. Closing comments on competition, middlemen & markets.

The interviews presented so far give some impression of the conditions under which small scale activities operate in Nimzatt-Anglemouss, one of the poorest suburbs of Dakar. From the wide range of interviews undertaken in the same shanty-town, it was clear that many small scale producers and traders feel that government employees and/or more powerful commercial or producer groups place undue pressure and constraints on the least fortunate

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(77) Palmyra palm, probably borassus aethiopum or borassus akeassii.

members of society in their day-to-day efforts to make ends meet. For example, while credit arrangements are recognised as being a useful means of securing and maintaining a stable clientele, the price controls imposed "from above" are seen as being extremely restrictive and exploitative. In general, small scale operators consider the supply conditions under which they work as being almost inevitable, and develop a philosophical and stoical attitude to their material circumstances.

Competition between small scale producers or traders was rarely mentioned in the open-ended interviews conducted in Nimzat-Anglemouss. Interviewees seemed far more preoccupied with tensions and conflicts they could be attributed either to those "above" i.e., "upstream" by suppliers, wholesalers, etc., or from "below" i.e. as a result of "downstream" problems such as bad debts or slow-paying or otherwise difficult customers.

More structured interviews conducted with petty producers elsewhere in Dakar gave further details regarding perceptions of and attitudes to competition between petty producers themselves. When asked whether their clientele had expanded since the enterprise's inception, over 68% of the larger sample of 285 petty producers surveyed across Dakar believed that it had: twice as many had experienced a substantial growth of clientele as those who felt it had only been moderate. One in eight had experienced no apparent growth in the number of clients, and a similar number felt that their customers had in fact declined in number. Only 6% reported a severe drop in the number of clients during the enterprise's history.

These data are not particularly easy to interpret since they reflect an aggregation of 285 experiences over varying periods of business activity, since they reflect a mass of personal experiences of success, failure, stagnation, stable residence or circular migration, long-term self-employment and recent self-employment preceded by wage-employment, and so on. Migration, and

the lack of a parallel development of stable and relatively well-remunerated employment clearly should be accompanied not only by the proliferation of apparently-independent small producers, but also the multiplication of potential clients, increasingly concentrated in urban centres. Inevitably, the struggle for survival among the city's poor, even though it may only produce an infinitesimally low success rate among petty producers and traders, may generate absolute increases in "client-contact", while simultaneously engendering relative stagnation or decline, as evidenced by those who reported a decline in the number of customers (19%) (78).

The subjective evaluation of competition also produced interesting results: while 20% felt that there were too many competitors of a similar scale to their own in their particular field of activity, only a few less (19%) believed that the market could support more producers of the same type.

However, the majority of respondents (over 61%) seemed (in subjective terms) to be experiencing no difficulty with competition, which suggests that the number of producers in the same localised market was "about right". The problem with such responses is that the subjective evaluation of the difficulty or ease with which competition can be confronted may be quite different from the objective aggregate competitive situation faced by petty producers in the long run.

Three quarters of the petty producers interviewed did not feel that clients were "defecting" to larger, more powerful enterprises. Eight per cent had experienced a considerable loss of clients to larger firms, while almost 17% felt that only a few clients had been lost to such enterprises. The majority of petty producers who had experienced a loss of clientele to larger firms felt that the best way to avoid such defections would necessarily

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(78) Interestingly, only 11% reported a general decline in profitability over their independent working careers.

included concentrating on higher quality production, more effective price controls to permit the small to compete with the large, the maintenance of fair but moderate prices for the articles produced, the provision of better locations for workshops (including facilities for displaying their output in an attractive way), and an adequate supply of equipment and materials to enable all orders to be punctually met.

Some producers were highly specific about problems of competition and attendant loss of clients: one shoemaker, for example, clearly attributed a decline in sales and clientele to the ease with which imported footwear penetrated his own market, and demanded that such imports be restricted or banned altogether. Another petty producer argued that the good reputation that small scale manufacturers enjoyed with their regular clients should be extended to all potential customers at home and abroad: to do this, the petty producer suggested that the government should help to promote small enterprises and their products.

Those interviewed were also asked to comment on the type of products and techniques characterising their larger competitors. Over half of the respondents referred to a wide range of factors ensuring larger enterprises' success in relative terms. These factors broadly fell into the following categories:

- i. state-imposed preference and privilege;
- ii. the ability of bigger firms to provide a quicker response because goods were almost always in stock, due to the larger funds available to them; and
- iii. the irrationality of clients who were attracted by brand-names, and spurious claims of higher quality products and service (79).

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(79) A vehicle-mechanic bewailed the foolishness of civil servants who were prepared to pay double or treble the price for the same service offered by large garages.

Over 18% of respondents felt that large enterprises could attract some of their current clients even though these products tended to be very much more expensive, simply because they were generally of higher quality. A further 20% agreed that quality was generally higher, but were equally divided about whether prices were higher or lower (80). Only 7% of the petty producers surveyed pointed exclusively to lower prices as the major advantage of large firms: indeed, all those who replied in this way were shoe manufacturers in the highly competitive field of low-cost footwear, in which they often directly compete with a major multinational corporation, BATA.

It is hardly surprising that a relatively large proportion of those interviewed (almost 39%) had little or no idea about the techniques used in larger enterprises; on the other hand, those who had previously worked in larger enterprises as wage-workers or apprentices would have had access to such comparative information. Twenty-three per cent of petty producers indicated that their larger competitors used roughly comparable techniques, while almost 39% claimed that such firms had more expensive, more comprehensive and more productive equipment at their command. As for the type of raw materials inputs used by larger competitors, about 21% said that these were basically the same, but could be acquired at much lower prices than those available to petty producers, while a little over 10% indicated that their own raw materials were cheaper because they were of their inferior quality. In summary, then, petty producers in general exhibited varying levels of information on and consciousness of the type and degree of market and technological competition they faced both from similar and from larger enterprises.

The questionnaire data presented above does not advance our knowledge of the gap (both in market and technical terms) between

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(80) This disagreement reflected different articles competing in different markets.

small and large firms, since this is already well-documented and established in the literature, as well as being intuitively discernible. What it does indicate is the perception of competition on the part of small, often relatively ill-informed and isolated small producers. A lack of information about competition, "market imperfections" and potential avenues of accumulation may well serve to reinforce a stoical acceptance of urban subsistence and the mere reproduction of a given and low standard of living, and help to reproduce the idea that only by single-minded endeavour and individual hard work may such obstacles be overcome (81).

#### 4.4. FROM SMALL ACORNS DO GREAT OAK TREES GROW: PETTY CAPITALISTS IN THE DAKAR SUBURBS

The following interviews were conducted with three small businessmen who, even though the Nimzat-Anglemouss survey constituted an attempt to encounter the widest possible range of poor petty producers and other workers, actually turned out to be moderately comfortable petty entrepreneurs. Though these initial encounters were accidental, in retrospect they provided some valuable pointers to the mechanisms by which a low level of accumulation could be achieved, and a stagnating, near-subsistence economic activity turned into a relatively prosperous small business: these initial and inadvertent clues were later taken up and elaborated upon in the main questionnaire survey (82).

#### XIV. A Minibus Owner-Operator (29.1.1974.

The minibus driver owned his own vehicle, a 20-seater Renault car-rapide; before entering this profession, he had been a

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(81) See chapters 6.v. and 7.

(82) See chapter 7 in particular.

factory-worker, but had been made redundant after 12 years of service. He was thus entitled to a compensatory payment of a little over one million CFA francs (just over £1,900). He had already learnt to drive, and therefore renewed his licence and bought a car-rapide with part of his redundancy payment. The vehicle had previously been operated by an acquaintance, and it was agreed between the two that a down-payment of 400,000 francs should be made, followed by four subsequent payments of 80,000 francs whenever the new owner could afford to pay the instalment.

It took a lot of work to visit all the government offices to acquire the necessary documentation: he needed insurance, his road tax (vignette) for 3 months, a certificate of roadworthiness (police) and the vehicle's log-book (carte gris). As soon as this was done, he began working on the Dakar-Pikine route.

There were considerable financial problems to begin with. In the first year his insurance premium was high, and he was trying to pay off as much of his debt as possible. Virtually every month he appeared to be losing money and was continually drawing on the remains of his redundancy payment. From the second year onward, things began to improve and today things are proceeding satisfactorily. Nevertheless, he still has problems with the police, who appear to discriminate against car-rapide drivers in general, and individual owner-operators in particular (83), subjecting them to considerable harassment. He was forced to pay off virtually every policeman who stopped him in the first few months, until he became "known". These "fines" (as they are euphemistically called by police and drivers alike) were normally between 500 and 1,000 francs on each occasion; however, they obviated the necessity of paying official fines of between 3,000 and 6,000 francs, and so he considered them a useful "investment". The individual owners are

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(83) Each car-rapide has a company emblem and name painted on it, along with some pithy slogan; it is not difficult to distinguish well-known and relatively large operators from individual owners.

regularly stopped by the police and required to produce all their papers in perfect order; and yet these are the very people who have least time and personal contacts to keep their credentials completely up to date. Bigger operators rarely have such problems: vignettes can be renewed for the whole fleet at the same time by a single employee, whereas such a responsibility stops the individual operator from working. The larger fleet-operators often have friends in the key government offices, or can readily "make friends" when necessary.

On a good day, with plenty of passengers and no delays or break-downs, the car-rapide owner-driver calculated that he can earn between 6,000 and 7,000 francs. When customers are scarce, or he is stopped or the vehicle lets him down, he may only earn 5,000 francs. Taking petrol and maintenance into account, this leaves him on average with about 5,000 francs profit a day. Now he only manages to save a little each month, mainly because of his considerable family commitments: he has four wives, twelve children and six other relatives who depend upon him. Also, repairs and spares are expensive, and he recently had to replace the entire engine. Nevertheless, he is comfortable, having built his own bricks-and-mortar 7-room house, at a cost of 500,000 francs. This house was built over the last two years with his savings from the business and what was left of his redundancy payment.

It costs about 60,000 francs a month just to feed his family, In addition to this expenditure, he aspires to see his children educated. He wants to make sure the boys all go to primary school and then to some technical institution to learn a skill; as far as the girls are concerned, he is not really motivated to provide for anything more than primary education. He intends to continue driving until he is too old; then he will sell his car-rapide and buy a retail provisions shop, to ensure that he has an income for his years of retirement.

Comments on Interview XIV.

The interviewee cannot accurately be designated as a capitalist as such, since the owner-driver employed no-one other than a young apprentice, whose function was to cling onto the back entrance of the minibus, collecting fares and thumping the roof of the vehicle to signal when to stop and start. Nevertheless, such operators are often faced with the possibility of acquiring additional vehicles and gradually establishing a fleet. Working on the quantitative data given by the respondent, we can see that such an expansion would not be out of the question:

<u>Receipts:</u>	140,000 francs net of running costs (i.e. 5,000 francs/day x 28 days/month worked).
<u>Household expenses:</u>	100,000 francs (i.e. 60,000 francs, plus an additional 40,000 francs/month additional expenditure).
<u>Leaving:</u>	103,000 francs/month.
<u>Assuming an investible surplus of:</u>	40,000 francs/month (over 2 years = 480,000 francs/year).
<u>Plus the residue of his redundancy pay:</u>	1,020,000- 720,000 francs = 300,000 francs Less, say, 50,000 francs for licence and other papers = 250,000 francs.
<u>Cost of house over 2 years:</u>	500,000 francs (i.e. 250,000 francs/year, requiring savings of at least 125,000 francs/year for and related building costs.

These rough calculations suggest an investible surplus over and above the cost of house construction of about 355,000 francs/year. In other words, it is quite conceivable that in the 2-year period in question, something approaching the cost of a second-hand car-rapide (similar to the one initially purchased) could be made available. Notwithstanding the likely inaccuracies in these figures, they at least give some idea of the order of magnitude of the investible surplus that can be realised from a one-man-operated one-vehicle minibus driver. The following interview elaborates on this point.

XV. A Minibus-Owner (29.1.1974).

"I used to work for a Lebanese in town, but, after Independence, he left the country. Before he did so, he bought a car-rapide and acquired all the necessary documents. We signed an agreement whereby I was to receive a gift of 200,000 francs for my faithful service, and I would pay the rest of the cost of the bus over ten years. The vehicle was very new and in excellent condition and cost a million and a half francs. I had to pay the instalments to the younger brother of my employer who had decided to remain in our country. I only had a car license at the time, but I knew my nephew was a good driver with a passenger-vehicle licence, so I took him on at 30,000 francs a month. I paid for fuel, repairs and maintenance, and my nephew had to pay over to me 5,000 francs each day in receipts. Anything he took over this sum was his to keep: this is the way we generally arrange things in the transport business. We collaborated happily for four years and then my nephew left to start his own business. I found another driver whom I paid 22,500 francs a month, and I received 4,500 francs a day in receipts from him. He stayed with me for five years and then I had to find another driver, who was paid 20,000 francs a month, and gave me 4,000 francs a day in takings.

I managed to pay off my debts in five years instead of ten, and from my savings, I recently (84) managed to buy a second car-rapide: it was an older second-hand vehicle and only cost me 600,000 francs. I employed a second driver at the same wage and with the same conditions of service.

I had no real business problems to start with, since my former employer had arranged everything for me. I have had to find people to drive my buses for me because I am too old to do it myself. I am an ex-serviceman (ancien combattant) and I receive a pension of 160,000 francs a year, payable quarterly. But my family responsi-

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(84) Two years before the date of the interview, i.e. in late 1971 or early 1972.

bilities are heavy: I have six wives (85), 18 children and a dozen other dependents. Only two other members of my family work, but they only contribute a total of 25,000 francs a month. Every day I give 3,000 francs for general household expenses, and breakfast alone costs me 1,000 francs for the whole family. Every month I spend 25,000 francs just on rice and cooking oil.

My main problem is the family: all my children are minors, and their education and maintenance burdens me considerably. Two of my dependents, my nephew and a cousin, are without work. I would like to do something for them, but so far I have had no success. Also, I would like to save enough money to make the pilgrimage to Mecca before I die. We all live together happily in a 12-room brick-and-mortar house; I think that my situation is fairly stable".

#### Comments on Interview XV.

The available income and expenditure data are much too "scrappy" to permit a calculation of investible surplus over such a long period (the period from Independence to the date of interview being approximately 12 years). Nevertheless, some indications can be gleaned from the available information.

- (i) the balance of the purchase price of the first car-rapide (1,300,000 francs) was repaid in 5 years, implying savings for this purpose of around 21,500 francs a month.
- (ii) the cost of the second car-rapide (600,000 francs) was saved, let us assume, during the second five year period, implying savings of about 10,000 francs a month.
- (iii) the cost of building a 12-room house (say, 1 million francs) spread over the first ten years would imply available funds of around 8,250 francs a month.

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(85) Among Moslems, four wives are permitted, but it is not uncommon to encounter men with more wives than this, especially in countries where polygamy has long been practiced.

Thus, remembering that the car-rapide owner's family commitments had increased considerably over the period in question (all his children being minors), we can at least predict that in the first five years, an average of approximately 30,000 francs/month over and above household and other expenses was available for loan repayment and savings for house-construction, while in the second five years, at least 18,250 francs/month was similarly available.

XVI. A scrap metal and timber merchant (6.9.1974)

N'Diaga Fall has a large compound on the Route de Ouakam, near to the University of Dakar, where he sells scrap-metal and timber. Great heaps of scrap and a dozen written-off cars litter the compound. Fall walks around town each day attempting to buy cars that have been damaged so badly in accidents that they are only fit for scrap. Normally he pays between 30,000 and 40,000 francs to take them away. Once they arrive on his premises, his six employees begin to strip the vehicles down, carefully storing those parts and components that can be reused or sold, and piling up the other metal pieces. One of his workers is a mechanic and from time to time he repairs those vehicles for which spares are available, concentrating mainly on Peugeot cars.

Fall thinks that his normal daily sales of scrap metal amount to 50,000 francs, and the occasional sale of a renovated car will bring him between 100,000 and 150,000 francs. He also occasionally has the opportunity to buy army vehicles that have become obsolete, and government cars that are being replaced. These he has serviced and subsequently sells for cash or is paid in instalments.

On the other side of the compound there are extensive stocks of timber, consisting mainly of three and four metre planks of wood that carpenters (in particular) buy to make the walls of shacks or to manufacture cheap furniture. His price is 750 francs

per cubic metre. Most of his wood comes from the Casamance [the southernmost region of Senegal, bordering Guinea Bissau].

Many of his employees said that they would like to go into business for themselves, having seen how successful their boss is. But none of them yet has the financial means to buy the necessary metal and/or wood; neither do they have the contacts to acquire land on which to build a store or workshop. Each one receives 20,000 francs a month plus a midday meal. Fall pays turnover tax of 40,000 francs a month and rents his compound for 60,000 francs a month. He calculates that the net profit from his sale of metal, vehicles and wood amounts to approximately 150,000 francs each month. There are two other scrap metal dealers whom Fall allows to sell from his premises, but their sales are very small compared with his, for Fall is very well-known among those who buy metal and timber.

#### Comments on Interview XVI.

This is an interesting example of the way in which a relatively high income can be earned from dealing in the sorts of materials that form the basic inputs into the recuperative activities described in the opening section of this chapter. The possibilities open to small entrepreneurs and the constraints with which their activities are confronted are discussed in more detail in Chapters 6 (Section 5) and 7.



Illustration 1: Nimzat-Angle mouss 1973/4




Illustration 2: typical Dakar barraque housing



Illustration 3: a Dakar  
artisanal jeweller



Illustration 4: a narrow-  
loom weaver




Illustration 5: an open-air carpenter's workshop




Illustration 6: a vehicle-mechanic's workshop



Illustration 7:  
modern small-scale  
metal-working



Illustration 8:  
a street-corner  
shoe-repairer



Illustration 9:  
artisanal foundry-  
work: the finishing  
off process



Illustration 10:  
artisanal foundry-  
work: sorting  
through the slag  
for re-usable metal



Illustration 11:  
foundry-work: house-  
hold and agricultural  
implements for sale



Illustration 12:  
foundry-work: inside  
the underground  
workshop




Illustration 13: Recuperation & recycling: new beds from old




Illustration 14: the Koundoul family of basket-  
weavers in their mbar



Illustration 15: a group of 'traditional' weavers (1)



Illustration 16: a group of 'traditional' weavers (2)

4.5. BY ACCIDENT OR DESIGN: CONTRABAND AS AN INCOME OPPORTUNITY  
AMONG THE "SELF-EMPLOYED" IN DAKAR.

4.5.1. Introduction.

A point clearly made in Keith Hart's influential study (1973) of the shanty-town economy in Accra, Ghana, concerned the importance of administratively and/or criminally illegitimate activities as sources of income generation among the urban poor.

The first indication that Nimzat-Anglemouss might provide as many examples of these opportunities as Hart had found in the Nima area of Accra, was an encounter in Fall's small shop (see Interview IX). On a number of occasions an old Mauritanian had come into the shop with a small suitcase, out of which he would take a large bag of coins. These were handed over to Fall, who would change them into larger denomination notes. Fall was asked to say more on the nature and frequency of this transaction, and explained that the Mauritanian hawked small bottles of perfume, scissors, sweets and particularly contraband tablets and medicines around the shanty-town and, at the end of each day, came to change his petty cash at Fall's shop, for which service the latter received 100 francs. For example, the Mauritanian sold British aspirin bought in the Gambia at 100 francs a bottle, while the French-manufactured equivalent sold for 113 francs in the city centre. Fall had suggested that it was relatively easy for small shopkeepers to deal in contraband goods if they can establish the necessary contacts; however, first you needed to be "that way inclined", and secondly be prepared to take the risk of selling what are obviously contraband goods (i.e. those with U.K. trade marks).

Once it had become apparent that such activities were relatively common, a few discreet enquiries were made and contact established with rather more substantial 'dealers' of this sort, operating in and around the shanty-town. The following three interviews concern the activities of (1) a female smuggler who had entered the profession more by accident than design; (2) a group

of smugglers with a complex form of co-operation and a specific division of labour; and (3) an individual professional smuggler.

XVII. A lady smuggler: Colobane market (20.2.1974).

The subject was a young married woman with four children. Her husband was unable to work, since he had lost a hand in an industrial accident. Following the accident, her husband had been provided with a quarterly pension, but this had proved inadequate for the family's needs: it only amounted to a little over 16,000 francs each month.

The couple had carefully discussed their future prospects following the accident and had come to the conclusion that the lump-sum compensation of 125,000 francs could be used - at least in part - to establish her in some sort of business. She began with 50,000 francs; a woman acquaintance of hers regularly travelled east to Mali to buy cloth, which was subsequently smuggled over the border to be sold at substantial profit in Dakar. The two women met and discussed possible collaboration: the woman agreed to buy 18,000 francs' worth of contraband cloth from the smuggler's next consignment, which she would try to sell among her friends and neighbours. She eventually managed to sell everything she had received for a profit of 7,000 francs. Her husband suggested they might open a bank account for future profits.

During the next month, the same transaction was repeated, this time with 40,000 francs worth of cloth, which tied up virtually all the working capital and profits of the first transaction. This time, having gained some experience of the price at which the cloth could be sold, a profit of 27,000 francs was made. Most of this was banked with 7,000 being retained for household expenditure.

The following month, she purchased 50,000 francs' worth of cloth, and took some of her merchandise to sell in the countryside, making a total profit of 30,000 francs, 20,000 francs of which were put into the bank account and 10,000 francs kept for the family.

Subsequently, she arranged to buy all the smuggler's next consignment, with an option to buy all subsequent Malian cloth. 70,000 francs' worth of cloth realised on average 40,000 francs profit. The monthly household requirements at this time comprised 15,000 francs for food and 4,000 francs for rent; consequently, she was able to retain about 40,000 per month for the business, keeping 20,000 francs for family needs. After one year's activity, she had managed to save enough to make the journey to Mali herself, and so on subsequent occasions accompanied her smuggler-friend over the border with about 100,000 francs in funds - 20,000 francs for the trip, 10,000 francs for bribes at the border (if necessary), 10,000 francs for miscellaneous expenses, and 60,000 francs for the purchase of cloth.

So far, she has not had any serious problems with customs officials. She aims to build a house outside Dakar once she has saved about half a million francs. Further savings could enable her to open a small shop for her disabled husband. While she is away from Dakar, her younger sister looks after the children, only two of whom are of school age. She enjoys her work, and thinks it is a reasonable solution to the problems faced by the family because of her husband's lost earning capacity. She sells her material to traders in Dakar, some private individuals and small traders, the majority of whom call at her home to collect their goods and to place future orders.

#### Comments on Interview XVII.

This interview illustrates a concrete decision to engage in a risky and potentially physically-dangerous illegal activity. Nevertheless, a woman with four children and a disabled husband depending on her, and with the advantage of a small amount of working capital, is considerably constrained in her choice of income-earning activities. The example of a friend offers a possible solution, which turns out to be a satisfactory one. The most interesting aspect of the interview is possibly the manner in

which the young woman starts her new career in a relatively passive and dependent relationship with her smuggler-acquaintance, and subsequently increases her participation in the business, finally becoming the dominant partner (86).

The following two interviews illustrate more deliberate and professional attitudes to the buying and selling of contraband. Both cases are characterised by a much more elaborate organisation of smuggling, and a more professional and less spontaneous involvement in the activity.

#### XVIII. A gang of smugglers: Nimzat (1.3.1974)

The group consists of 5 men, two of whom are heads of families. All five have contacts in and commercial dealings with the Gambia and with Mali. Merchandise is normally purchased through relatively large wholesale and retail stores in these two countries. The group deals in all types of goods and has a small warehouse combined with their own retail outlet, selling only Senegalese goods, the latter being used as a 'front' for their illegal activities. One member of the group is always in the shop, this responsibility being borne in turn by each member. While one minds the shop, two others work between Dakar and Mali, and two more between Dakar and the Gambia. Clients in Dakar know the warehouse, and what it sells: contraband goods are not sold in small amounts by the group, but only in "wholesale" quantities.

Each trip abroad costs approximately 100,000 francs, and returns a profit of around 100,000-200,000 francs. Normally, the Malian operations are more profitable than the Gambian business, mainly because the customs officers and border guards on the Malian frontier are less strict and far from vigilant. Each group of two smugglers makes one trip each month. Initially, they all lost a lot

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(86) To some degree, this story mirrors Lenin's description (1972b:360-9) of how dependence gradually replaces equality after a group of rural lace-makers elect one of their number to be responsible for selling their wares in Moscow.

of merchandise, were often interrogated and fined. One was even imprisoned for six months in the Gambia but refused to denounce his accomplice. He was fined 100,000 francs and had half a million francs' worth of contraband and their truck was confiscated. Altogether this catastrophe cost them over a million francs.

The group use a bank account which was opened in the name of the oldest of the smugglers, who had formerly been a shopkeeper and who employs his nephew to look after his own, strictly legitimate, business. It is this smuggler who manages the financial side of the operation and organises the fair distribution of the profits. Three-fifths of the total profit is shared equally among the members of the group, and the rest is left to finance future operations.

The group has agreed that their entire operation will be terminated at the end of 1974, and all assets shared out. One other member intends to use his share to buy a car-rapide, which he will drive himself. He foresees no problems acquiring the documentation, because he will be able to afford to pay bribes to any officials who create difficulties. Another member of the gang, a Lebou (87), hopes to buy a pirogue (88) and employ a team of fishermen whom he will pay according to the size of their daily catch. One of the bachelors first intends to get married and only then will he buy a house, probably in Guediawaye (89), with a shop attached, so as to ensure his future income. The other married man, a former peasant farmer, wants to build a bricks-and-mortar house for his parents in their village. He himself will stay in Dakar with his own family and has no concrete plans for his future. The shopkeeper wants to use his share to expand his legitimate commercial activities: he would like a new shop which he would manage himself. He reckons that each of his colleagues will receive something like 2 million

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(87) The indigenous ethnic group of the Cap Vert Peninsular, at the tip of which Dakar is situated.

(88) Traditional Senegalese inshore fishing canoe.

(89) A peripheral district of Dakar's satellite township of Pikine.

francs each from the share-out. They have never had any arguments between them, but wouldn't recommend anyone to follow in their footsteps, because of the risks involved. Of course, there are considerable profits to be earned, but for smugglers there are only three possibilities - success, prison or death.

XIX. A professional smuggler: Anglemouss (21.2.1974)

This smuggler is young and unmarried. He had spent several rainy seasons in the Gambia as a navetane (90). He sold his groundnut crop and purchased several metres of cloth for the female members of his family but, on his return to Senegal, was offered very good prices for the cloth in the town of Kaolack. He decided to return to the Gambia to replace the cloth; what he had previously bought had cost 3,000 francs and he had been able to sell the cloth for 10,000 francs. The price had been so good because it was just before the Moslem festival of Tabaski, when many people buy material for new clothes. On his second visit, he bought 10,000 francs' worth of Gambian cloth; he gave some cloth to his mother and sister and sold what was left for 18,000 francs to a Lebanese trader.

Having seen that these transactions were very profitable, he decided to repeat the process on a larger scale. After six trips, and having never declared the goods he was bringing over the border, he had amassed a profit of 150,000 francs. After eighteen months, he was regularly making the trip every two months, and was considerably diversifying the contraband he carried over the border. Once, however, he was caught by the customs men with 300,000 francs' worth of goods (including cloth, liquor and some firearms): this frightened him so much that he stopped smuggling for three months.

But the attraction of large profits finally got the better of him and he began again. After his first five years of smuggling, he was able to buy a bricks-and-mortar house for his parents. He had

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(90) The term for migrant farm workers from Senegal and the surrounding countries who work on Gambian cultivators' land in return for a small plot and some groundnut seeds.

come to the conclusion by now that smuggling was the most worthwhile career he could imagine. At times he was able to earn up to a million francs in a trip, while he could easily lose the same amount or more if he were caught. Subsequently, he was able to buy livestock for his parents and was, at the time of the interview, preparing to purchase a small shop for his younger sister, who had just left school. In this way he was able to establish a reputation and a good social position for himself in his village of birth.

He doesn't regard marriage as a priority at present, though he has two children who are looked after by his mother. When they are old enough, the smuggler wants to place them with a missionary group and in that way avoid the long-term burden of their upkeep and education. He has no precise plans for his future - he realises that he could easily face a long term of imprisonment or even be killed in pursuit of his chosen career. Nevertheless, he is well on the way to accumulating a sizeable nest-egg, just in case his worst fears are realised.

#### 4.5.1. Concluding remarks on contraband as an income opportunity.

As well as providing data on smuggling as a means of generating incomes among the urban poor, and indicating the relative ease with which one can become involved in such activities, these interviews are also a source of information on the aspirations of those small scale illegal 'operators' who manage to accumulate sufficient capital to set themselves up in (more) legitimate business. In this latter respect, the interview with the gang of smugglers is of particular interest, since we are presented with five distinct plans relating to how accumulated surplus from smuggling will be used. This constitutes at least preliminary evidence to support the hypothesis that the flows of income generated by such illegal activities play an important redistributive role in the economy in general, and in the provision of working capital for the initiation of legitimate activities in

particular (91). The interviews were conducted with the a priori assumption that many illegal activities could be more appropriately analysed if they were seen as economically rational, rather than socially aberrant or deviant.

#### 4.6. THE CASUALTIES: THREE EXTREME CASES

Finally, it is important to look at some examples of the real casualties of the urban struggle for survival. To this end, three interviews were selected: one with a man who was perhaps the only case of 'true' unemployment encountered (92); another with a peasant farmer visiting relatives in the city (an example which enabled the situation of the urban poor to be seen in a wider context); and lastly, an interview with an unemployed, yet educationally well-qualified youth.

#### IX. A 'parasite': Anglemouss (30.1.1974)

Diarine Diouf is a former peasant farmer from Cayor. He had relinquished his land to take up commerce, at which he claimed to be adept, despite his fairly evident lack of success. He had sold cloth, and with his profits had managed to sustain both himself and his family. But his working capital had been progressively eroded by a series of 'unlucky reversals' and he found himself unable to continue trading. He spent four years trying to secure wage-employment in factories but had met with no success: he had not even been able to get day-work on a regular basis. With no trade and no qualifications, he found the task extremely hard, and

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(91) I am grateful to Chris Birkbeck for pointing out this possibility.

(92) A priori, neo-classically-based assumptions would lead us to expect to find large numbers of under- and unemployed individuals in the urban potentially-active labour force. This shanty-town resident was perhaps closest to the 'model' unemployed individual, living as he did, predominantly from transfers, in money and kind, procured from friends and relatives. Such was his state of mind, he no longer seemed to make an effort to seek other sources of income.

had to depend on personal recommendations and word-of-mouth information on work possibilities.

Diouf is 47 years old and has been in Dakar for 8 years; he has a household of 6 persons, including his wife, sister and his own children. No-one in the family works: even his wife has had no luck, since they cannot raise the necessary working capital for her to trade in the local market. His two eldest sons are apprenticed to local mechanics, who are friends of Diouf. He, his wife and sister, manage to borrow money or be given food through "chance encounters" with friends and relatives. But the majority of these benefactors are themselves very poor: they all work locally as petty carpenters, mechanics, etc. He rents two rooms in Anglemouss which cost him a total of 2,500 CFA francs a month. Diouf reckons that he needs between 300 and 400 francs a day to feed his family (93). He has no fixed ambitions or aspirations, and lives from day to day and from hand to mouth: "I wake up each morning and think only of how we will survive this day". He felt that he could succeed in commerce if only he had some money, however. Though he lived on about 11,000 francs a month, he knew that the family really required something like 20,000 francs for a basic standard of living.

He spends much of the any circulating between friends and relatives, and said that if he used his time to actively look for work, firstly he would not have much chance of success, and secondly, that he would consequently have to spend his spare time begging from friends, and this would destroy him. He felt he needed at least some period of peace and relaxation, spent mainly talking to his friends in the tailor's shop (94) in order to maintain both his self-respect and the esteem and friendship of his neighbours.

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(93) i.e. approximately 11,000 francs/month.

(94) See interview IX.

XXI. A visiting farmer: Anglemouss (1.3.1974)

"My name is Abdou Sarr and I am from Kebemer, near Diourbel (95). Monsieur Fall the shopkeeper (96) is my cousin. I have only ever been to Dakar once before, and I am only here because of the terrible situation in the countryside. I am a farmer, and the drought has caused my harvest to fail yet again. What little I was able to grow has been sold to pay off last year's debts to the cooperative and the Marketing Board. I have come to see Fall, the only relative whose whereabouts in Dakar I know, to see if he can help me.

My father is the oldest man in the village, and had eleven sons in all. I am the eldest son and bear the full responsibility for my family in this time of disaster, because my father is very old. They are all waiting to see what help I can get in Dakar. They are all farming people and know no other trade. When the harvest fails, there is no money, and we cannot even afford to plant beans or cassava. You only have to see the village to understand the gravity of the problem.

It cost me 800 francs to buy the return ticket to Dakar. I have other relatives here, but I don't know where they live. I can only stay here a short time, because I left the family with practically nothing: the ticket was our final hope. I know Fall is poor, and cannot do much for us, but perhaps something will turn up. If only the rains would come, our problems would be lessened. This is the worst period I have ever lived through.

My immediate family are twelve in number: six of them are men with their own children now. Perhaps the younger men could come to Dakar, but they would only be a burden on my cousin Fall, and would anyway be very lucky to find even the most temporary and badly-paid work. Life in the countryside is impossible now, and there's no chance for us in town. We find it very hard to become

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(95) A major town in the main groundnut-producing zone of Senegal.

(96) See Interview IX.

townsmen overnight, except for the young ones, who arrive here and seem to disappear altogether.

Perhaps the younger men could look for farming possibilities elsewhere. They could become navetanes, but even that costs money for transport and maintenance before the harvest, and bringing back the crops afterwards. The problem is that we peasants have to continue paying whether we have a good harvest or not! Often we don't even understand what it is that we are paying for; we have to trust the officials and hope we aren't being cheated. The cooperatives nowadays are accused of exploiting us through profiteering, giving short measures of seeds, underestimating our harvests, and keeping the surplus for themselves.

All the techniques of farming are being changed too - because of the drought, because of the co-operatives and so on. If we receive two tons of groundnut seeds, we really only have 1.2 tons when we've de-shelled them ready for planting. Now they have to be machine sowed, 50 centimetres apart in weed-free, sandy soil. We can't use the old technique of burning out the weeds and fertilising the soil with the ashes. We weed, carry away the weeds, burn them elsewhere, and use fertilizer provided by the co-operative.

We have been sold new, drought-resistant seeds that only need 70 days to mature. But these seeds are smaller and lighter in weight and so our harvest must be much, much better (even taking into account the hardness of these seeds) for us to cover our costs and pay off past debts to the village co-operative and to the Marketing Board.

I don't know what to do: my family is a burden, to be sure. But what is more, my responsibilities extend to my 15 talibés (97), with whom I cannot part company. They are virtually members

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(97) Students/disciples of a local Moslem religious teacher: among the Mouride Moslems of Senegal, the tailibés work in the fields in return for religious instruction. See D. Cruise O'Brien (1971).

of the family, and all have contributed to our work in the fields. They rely on me for spiritual guidance, especially in these difficult times. I could no more rid myself of this responsibility than I could deny my duty to one of my family."

Comments on Interview XXI.

The interview with the peasant was not an isolated one: it was impossible to discuss everyday matters with petty producers in Dakar (many of whom were relatively recent migrants) without their raising questions related to relatives in the countryside, the prolonged drought, shrinking food supplies and rising prices, failures of government policy, etc. Another peasant, who was interviewed (27.2.1974) while visiting relatives in Nimzat said:

"I need something like 20,000 francs to cover my needs for the next 12 months. With that I could feed my family, plant beans, cassava and millet and keep going. This year taxes and debts have taken all my groundnuts, and even my millet crop. Now I have to buy everything we eat, just like a townsman! Last year it was obvious that the rains would fail yet again, but the government refused to announce this publicly, and continued to encourage the use of new machinery, inappropriate types of fertilizers, and thereby encouraged our indebtedness when we could least afford it. The technical advisors are supposed to teach us new methods, but these so-called experts don't know what they are doing. They tell their bosses that everything is fine in the countryside so that they can keep the comfortable jobs they have. The equipment is too costly for us, the fungicides and fertilizers ruin the soil rather than improving it, and the small scale of our lands makes all these new things of little value to us. We have initial instruction in the new methods, but then the 'experts' never come back, and we're just left either to return to the old ways or guess how to use the new ones. What little advice we get is all directed towards more and more groundnut production; we are never told how

we might produce more millet, cassava or beans which are much more important to us than the cash-crops, especially nowadays".

XXII. An 'unemployed' youth from Thiaroye: Nimzat market  
(13.12.1973)

"There are many unemployed youth in Thiaroye (98). Most men here fish for a living, especially during the rainy season, and do some farming, too. They set their nets late at night and bring their catch in at daybreak. It is usually the wives who market the fish locally or even in Dakar. Fishermen who have land of their own will work on it in the afternoons, when this is required. They tend to pass their occupation on to their sons. During the dry season, fishing is not so good, so this period is spent doing inshore piroque fishing and repairing the boats and tackle.

I've been unemployed for some time now. My father sells cement from a small shop, and I help him. Of course, I don't get anything for doing this; I work to offset the burden I am on my parents. The cement business is not very profitable, particularly because building tends to be a seasonal activity. No matter what my own aspirations may be, I am obliged to look for whatever work there is as diligently as I can. I have made numerous applications to firms and factories, without success. I would like to be an electronics technician, but I need 50,000 francs, in order to do the training course.

It has been quite common in the past for young men to emigrate illegally, but nowadays the loopholes have been tightened up, it seems. They go to Abidjan (in the Ivory Coast), or to France, via Mauritania and Algeria. This sort of thing requires quite a large outlay initially, and is getting more and more dangerous. Did you read about those Senegalese boys who died trying to get to France?

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(98) Thiaroye comprises a group of settlements (one a railway stop, another a fishing village, others more residential) situated to the South of Pikine, on the main road between Dakar and Rufisque.

If your parents don't have the ready cash, you can sometimes get the money through a 'club'. Every month, the members each put in, say, 500 francs, and one of them takes it in turn each month to make use of the whole sum. The pool is rotated among the participants on this basis every month. These 'clubs' are quite organized, with a president, secretary and treasurer. We use the same sort of system to enable people to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The wages in the factories are very low, and start at about 11,000 francs. But this is only enough for one person to live on nowadays. The price of rice has now gone up to 6,000 francs a sack, and the average family will eat at least a sack every month. You may ask why this should be, when rice is grown both in the north of the country [in the Senegal River Basin] and in the south [in the Casamance]. But who can say why these things happen? The same applies to sugar, which now costs 100 francs a kilo, and yet sugar-cane grows well in some parts of our country.

You can get work on the big farm near Dakar (99), but the work is very hard indeed - I think one man has to work a square kilometre himself. But if you grow things yourself, no good comes of it; the government marketing board only pays about 25 francs for a kilo of potatoes, and yet you can sell them for 50 francs at the market. Those of us who have a bit of education try to get some solid qualifications, so that we have a better chance of getting a reasonable job with a good salary. Nevertheless, it is well-known that there are people unemployed who have the baccalaureat, or even a degree! If you want to work abroad legally, you need a visa: this is easy if your family is well-known or favourably placed, or if you are prepared to pay a bribe to the necessary officials. This sort of thing makes illegal emigration the only option for people without the money or background. To get there you need 37,500 francs for the boat plus about 50,000 francs to set yourself up.

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(99) The American-owned multinational corporation BUD.

Our system of close family solidarity allows the unsuccessful son to live at home, even if he is married. He will have a room, or will build an extension for himself and his wife. To leave the family compound will be extremely and unnecessarily expensive. Very few young men, even if they are unemployed or away looking for work, will leave the family home on a permanent basis. As far as factory work is concerned, if you are in the right place at the right time, when work is being offered, you may have the chance of being taken on as a day-worker. This means you can be laid off, temporarily, permanently, at any time and without notice. You could start on Monday morning at 8.00 a.m. and be sent home at noon, and be paid only for 4 hours of work! But if things work out alright, and the factory needs you for longer, you could even become a permanent worker there."

#### 4.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE 22 INTERVIEWS.

The twenty-two interviews presented above have required relatively little commentary since they largely speak for themselves. Many of the issues raised in this overview of urban poverty-in-employment are taken up in subsequent chapters of this study. However, in the remaining chapters, the focus will be shifted away from life and work in the shanty-town, to the specific nature of petty commodity production and its contemporary problems as evidenced by the questionnaire survey covering workshops in a number of different occupations and locations in Dakar (100). We begin by examining in detail the division of labour and relations of production characterising petty commodity production in the city.

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(100) For a reminder of the methodology employed in the questionnaire, the reader is referred to Appendix III.

## CHAPTER 5

### RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION AND DIVISION OF LABOUR AMONG DAKAR'S

#### PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCERS

In economies where capitalism has reached a relatively mature level of development, what has been described as petty commodity production (PCP) in previous chapters has certainly not disappeared, and yet it must be considered as playing a subordinate and residual role in the aggregate production process. If there exists a long run tendency for PCP to disappear in metropolitan capitalist economies, it appears that such is not the case in the context of contemporary under-developed capitalist economies where, even though the capitalist mode of production is dominant, it continues to co-exist with various subordinate forms of production which constitute the contemporary forms of hitherto more autonomous systems and structures.

Thus the production of many essential commodities of mass-consumption remains in the hands of essentially non-capitalist organizational forms, since in general terms this production is not sufficiently profitable for a capitalist mode of production principally oriented towards the provision of commodities for export (either in minimally- or highly-transformed states) or for consumption by a small and privileged stratum of the domestic population (Williams & Mutebile 1978). This latter production permits the maintenance and reproduction of the local dependent ruling class, which in turn favours the continuation of foreign capital's dominant position in the local economy. The combination of production-for-export and the satisfaction of domestic ruling class demand shows clearly how the capitalism of the 'periphery' acts as a bridgehead for an internationally-active capitalist mode of production to increasingly penetrate

and dominate new and already-existing spheres of activity (LeBrun & Gerry 1975:29).

It hardly appears useful to speak of the 'dependency' of a 'peripheral capitalism' on a central capitalist mode of production, either in a general or a purely technological sense. The generalised need to maximise profits in the long term means that similarities between 'central' and 'peripheral' technologies will be greater than their corresponding differences: only a progressively higher organic composition of capital will permit profits to be kept at high levels. At both poles, increases in labour-productivity imply a slowing-down of the growth of capitalist wage-employment (at least in its present form) which is more pronounced in circumstances in which increases in labour productivity exceed the rate of capital accumulation.

Since industrial capitalism will tend to employ only a very small proportion of the urban active population of an under-developed capitalist society, the local market for commodities produced by industrial capital will be correspondingly small. Under such conditions, only petty commodity production can satisfy the majority of the consumption requirements of the urban masses (101).

In Dakar, petty production and petty trading activities are to be found both within the major centres of capitalist commerce (the central business district of the Plateau) and also spreading out through the urban and periurban residential districts to the very periphery of the city. Some activities are spatially concentrated, while others are to be found throughout the city. Not all petty producers can have equally favourable business locations, for this is the real world of day-to-day human endeavour, not the abstract existence of the perfectly-competitive individual producer. The

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(101) This explains the abundance of small scale producers in such occupations as tailoring, food-processing and selling, house-building, furniture, shoemaking, transport and personal services (See Appendix III for details of the structure and composition of petty production in Dakar).

suburbs of Dakar constitute a multi-faceted complex of numerous forms of gainful economic activity.

Data collected from the 'activity maps' provided by NEDECO (summarised in Table III.4. of Appendix III) are suggestive of the fundamental role played by small scale activities in the satisfaction of mass consumption requirements. In NEDECO's mapping exercise the establishments most frequently observed were: the retailing of essential provisions (over 38% of all enterprises observed); a further 20% consisted of tailors and embroiderers (102); restaurateurs and charcoal-vendors were also to be found in relatively large numbers (over 10% and over 5%, respectively). The relative weight of the commonest activities is summarised below:

TABLE 5.1 Petty producers by occupation, Dakar, 1973/1974 (%)

Retail provisions	38.3
Tailoring/Embroidery	19.9
Restaurants	10.6
Charcoal-vending	5.3
Jewellery-making	4.0
Hairdressing (male & female)	3.5
Shoemaking & Repairs	3.3
Laundering	2.0
Hay-selling	1.9
Mattress-making	1.7
Others	9.5
TOTAL	100.0

Source: NEDECO survey (1972)

(102) The high incidence of tailoring establishments can probably be best explained (a) in terms of the importance of clothing firstly as a general article of essential consumption, and (b) by the fact that, although it is not the least expensive trade in which to become established, the period of apprenticeship/training is often comparatively short, at least it has become so in recent years (on average, apprenticeships in tailoring last 5 years, in vehicle repairs 6 years, in furniture-making 6½ years, and in shoemaking and repairs over 8½ years.

Ready-cooked meals constitute an essential service to young and/or unmarried workers, as well as those industrial and other workers whose employment is situated far from their homes (103). Other activities such as weaving, wood-sculpting and basket-weaving occupy many, but tend to be concentrated in particular suburbs.

Certain suburbs do have some elements of occupational specificity, or at least relatively high concentrations of one particular activity. For example, in part of the Médina, and in two districts of Pikine, vehicle repairs are particularly prevalent, and the Medina seems to be an area of concentration for tailoring concerns. This latter also emerged as the principal concentration of mass market-oriented petty footwear production (Gerry 1978: 1152-1155). Metal-working (particularly the production of cooking vessels and utensils) was also highly concentrated in just one street in the Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker suburb (Tricoire 1973).

#### 5.1. ARTISANS AND PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION.

Before examining in detail the relations of production and the division of labour indicated by the survey of 285 petty producers in Dakar, it is essential to clarify some of the apparently ambiguous categories both in use in the literature, and to be used in this analysis. In Lenin's work on small scale production (e.g. 1972a; 1972b), he is mercilessly critical of the Narodniks' loose employment of the term 'handicraftsman', and suggests that it had little or no analytical utility. Nevertheless, he appeared to be relatively satisfied with Bücher's definition of the artisan, namely those who have contact with the market only as purchasers of the means of production, and who produce articles to the direct orders of clients who consume these articles themselves. The purchase of the means of production should be understood in this context to exclude the

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(103) For instance, in suburbs where retail-provisions stores are few in number, restaurants will be more prevalent.

purchase of labour-power, since otherwise the category 'artisan' would straddle pre-capitalist and capitalist relations of production.

However, such a clarification does not advance the argument very far: there still remains the problem of what constitutes a market (if this is the feature distinguishing artisanal from other producers). In rural society in Senegal, several forms of non-agricultural activity can be identified (at least at the level of appearances): production for personal domestic consumption (such as but construction, manufacture of household and farm equipment and the provision of other elements of subsistence), and the 'artisanal' production of articles ordered by peasants for their own consumption (104) are the principle forms in evidence. Petty production of both types (and particularly the latter) are found to an ever-increasing extent in urban Senegal (105). The identification of such 'urban artisans' has led to statements concerning the structure of urban petty production that contain confusions about the nature of the market and how it can be identified:

"Firstly, there are those whom Lenin defined as artisans (...) Secondly, there are petty producers who, though still satisfying individual clients' orders, produce for the market as sellers of commodities (...) Thirdly, there are traditional petty producers who are now more or less subordinated to commercial capital (...) (The) existence of assured markets (...) favours the organization of group production and certain mass-production techniques. This inevitably involves a differentiation between various types of petty producers who, according to the degree to which they have become attached to clients, contacts or markets, themselves develop unequal levels of productivity (...) in contra-distinction to purely

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(104) Such articles are sometimes made with tools and materials by no means traditional, as in the case of rural smiths who produce spare parts for agricultural machinery. Rural petty production was and is still closely related to agriculture, rural artisans (smiths, woodworkers, jewellers, potters, leatherworkers) being at the same time peasant producers.

(105) Their presence in almost all "Third World" cities will reflect the level of development of forces and relations of production.

artisanal production which is generally characterised by the absence of such differentials" (LeBrun & Gerry 1975:21-22).

In hindsight, this statement commits the error of making an artificial distinction between "client" and "market", thereby leading to an equably misleading division between artisans and commodity-producers. However, the error is more one of omission than commission: the major dividing line needs to be drawn between production for one's own subsistence (i.e. the sorts of decisions and conditions facing Robinson Crusoe before his discovery of Friday) and production for other persons. This latter can only be undertaken (assuming we exclude gifts) on the basis of some exchange transaction, whether or not this involves money. Thus in practice, the shanty-town shoemaker, tailor or smith who waits in his workshop for a customer to place an order, eventually must exchange his own labour-power, crystallised in a specific product, for a mutually-acceptable quantity of money or goods provided by the person placing the order. The order may consist of one pair of shoes, or a dozen pairs, and this is where the key distinction begins to emerge.

What we have termed the 'artisan', normally produces to order and is paid a sum of money which permits labour-power to be reproduced and the production process to continue (albeit sporadically). What about those who produce sporadically and to order, but are satisfying the needs of traders rather than direct consumers? They have the appearance of artisans, and yet are dealing (albeit indirectly) with the 'abstract' market. Yet what has happened is that the direct producer's contact with his potential market of direct consumers has been 'short-circuited', by a trader with capital sufficient to intervene profitably between producer and consumer. Thus what is ostensibly 'production for the market' emerges as something quite different, namely production for a trader

or a number of intermediaries (106). The distinction of greater analytical significance neither focuses solely on the division between production of use-values and production of exchange-values (which is, of course, important), nor on the division between production for a sporadic clientele of direct consumers and that for a more fixed group of commercial intermediaries. Nor does it concentrate on production-to-order versus production-in-advance-of-orders. The distinction that is required needs to provide us with an analytical framework that permits all these artificial (and necessarily abstract) distinctions to be unified into something capable of describing reality.

To meet this requirement, we must return to the concept of petty commodity production as elaborated in Chapter 2. The extent to which PCP will exist in an objective socio-economic formation will depend upon the degree to which commodity relations have been extended within that formation to the buying and selling of labour-power. The tendency among the mass of petty commodity producers will be for the process of production to enable the reproduction of the value of the corresponding means of production, rather than its accumulation. The intervention of merchants (large or small) and merchants' capital between petty commodity producers and the final consumer will tend to either cause the progressive emergence of commodity relations at the point of production and/or the conversion of small proprietor or producer (and, perhaps, the labourers they employ) into quasi-wage-workers. Both aspects of this tendency bring the petty commodity producer out of his/her isolation, integrating their production processes - normally in a subordinate manner - into a larger process of capitalist production and/or circulation. Thus

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(106) So far, the assumption has been that intermediaries are located in the post-production phase only: a complicating factor may be that a small producer may produce to orders of directly-consuming clients, and yet face relatively monopolistic suppliers of essential means of production (See Chapter 6.1.).

production-to-order and production-in-advance-of-orders (for example) have a number of implications that can only be identified if they are seen in the context of PCP as a totality.

It should be noted that the following implications are not mutually exclusive. Many other implications will also be present, such as the tendency for higher levels of productivity (and hence often more mechanised and/ or series-production) to be present, both as a prerequisite and as a consequence of being in a position to produce in advance of sales.

Figure 5.A: Implications of production-to-order (PO) and production-in-advance-of-orders (PAO)

A. Production to order

1. Competition limits clientele to members of the relative surplus population for access to the means of subsistence (107).
2. Insufficiency of working capital and/or security of sales (108).
3. Absence of intermediaries.

B. Production in advance of orders

1. Clientele relatively stable; higher degree of monopoly acquired (e.g. via product-differentiation) or imposed (via credit, contracts, contacts).
2. Working capital sufficient; clientele relatively secure; PAO can be achieved accidentally, as a result of over-production or broken contracts.
3. Presence of intermediaries.

In conclusion, and before presenting the empirical data collected, we can say that, in abstract terms, petty commodity production encompasses both production-for-order (contractual) and production-in-advance-of-sales, (sub-contractual, in its widest

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(107) Or high-value orders of a unique and/or highly-personalised nature (e.g. luxury tailors).

(108) Often accompanied by the inability of the direct producer to advance the entire sum necessary for producing the item ordered, and therefore partially/totally reliant on client for an 'advance'.

sense). The intervention of an intermediary between direct producer and direct consumer will tend to modify the degree of control over the distribution of the product's final value exercised by the direct producer. A further extension of this process would actually impinge upon the direct producer's ownership of the means of production, thereby wresting a large part (if not all) control over the distribution of the final product's value away from him/her.

Clearly some artificiality remains in the categories used so far: few, if any, producers who produce for sale to wholesalers or retailers do more than produce in advance of sales about the realisation of which they are (from experience) relatively confident. In addition, production for stock (implying the efficient use of means of production) enables producers to accumulate stocks of articles for which constant demand has been proven to exist. Undoubtedly, the distinction between 'artisans' (producing to order) and those producing in advance of such orders can be a useful one, especially when dealing with occupations that bourgeois economics has rather confusingly termed 'services'. The Dakar street vendor of hot food (akara, pasties, kebabs) and cold drinks, for example, produces for and sells to a section of a mass market rather than to individuals ordering in advance (109). But the 'pure' artisan may readily be transformed into someone producing in advance of sales. Apart from the obvious difference made by a long-term or windfall increase in the enterprise's circulating capital, there are a number of other possibilities: an order may not be collected, or a casual purchaser or passing petty trader buys an article which has long been taking up workshop space, thereby laying the foundation for subsequent orders. Shoemakers in Dakar, for example, are so worried about the financial threat of uncollected orders that they often demand an advance not merely to cover the cost of the raw materials required, but to pay towards

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(109) For an excellent example of the exigencies of this type of petty food selling, see Rusque & Bromley (1979:201-202).

the cost of labour involved, particularly in the case of expensive and/or extensive repairs. In this trade, the enforced stocking of unsold/uncollected articles that cannot easily be sold presents a serious problem, since competitively-priced footwear is readily available on the mass market, produced by large capitalist firms.

Seen in the context of a dominant capitalist mode of production, in which virtually all transactions are monetised, nearly all small scale production will involve the production of exchange-values. Some transactions bring together direct producers and direct consumers without mediation; others involve the intervention of merchants, or indeed, of capitalist producers (the latter via subcontractual relations). Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of this intervention (the major subject matter of Chapter 6), we will undertake an examination of the relations of production and division of labour within PCP, at the level of the unit of production, namely the enterprise viewed, for the moment, as if no such 'outside' intervention existed.

## 5.2. MEANS OF PRODUCTION, LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY AND DIVISION OF LABOUR IN PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION

Central to the concept of petty commodity production is the notion that the direct producer owns the means of production. This is easily verified when we are confronted by individual economic activities. However, when faced with a small scale producer who has a number of apprentices, or indeed, workers whose status appears to be closer to that of wage-worker than apprentice or family worker, our theoretical concepts are once more confronted with the complexity of the real-life situation. If we ignore for the moment that such a complexity exists, and assume that all labour employed in these small enterprises is either apprentice or family labour (non-wage), the situation is as follows: in only a little over 1% of cases was it found that those working with or for the person who owned the workshop used their own tools. Put another way, this means

that in 99% of the sample, the workshop-proprietor was also the owner of the instruments of production; there were only 8 cases (3.7%) of workers supplying a certain amount of equipment themselves to complement that owned by the workshop-proprietor: thus, to all intents and purposes the latter can be regarded as the owner of the instruments of production. However, evidence also existed of some proportion of workshop equipment being rented.

In order to examine the means of production employed in petty commodity production more closely, we can first of all survey the various sources of tools and equipment both in general and with respect to specific occupations. Table 5.2. illustrates the sources of petty commodity producers' essential equipment.

Table 5.2. Sources of essential equipment by occupation (%)

Equipment acquired	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metal workers & Mechanics	ALL
Mainly new and paid for in cash	65.4	51.5	30.9	38.7	47.3
Mainly second-hand	15.4	14.8	47.9	24.2	25.3
Gifts	7.7	18.9	9.8	8.1	11.2
Loan from a relative/friend	-	-	2.8	4.8	1.8
Several of above means	1.3	-	-	12.9	3.2
Other means	10.2	14.8	8.6	11.3	11.2
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In the sample of 71 tailors and embroiderers, approximately two-thirds used electrically-operated machines, the remainder working manually-operated equipment. Additionally, these 71 enterprises of varying scale could boast a total of 118 machines of varying types and functions. The distribution of such machinery is summarised below:

Table 5.3. Distribution of sewing machines among tailors

	Workshops		Machines	
	(N°)	(%)	(N°)	(%)
Workshops with:				
1 machine	45	63	45	38
2 machines	12	17	24	20
3 machines	10	14	30	25
4 machines	2	3	8	7
5 machines	1	] 3	5	10
6 machines	1		6	
TOTAL	71	100	118	100

Of these machines, 47 (40%) were purchased new (42 for cash and 5 on hire-purchase terms), and 49 (41.5%) were acquired second-hand (47 for cash and 2 on hire-purchase terms). Eight additional machines were acquired as gifts from relatives, former artisan-masters, etc., and 14 (12%) were currently being rented (at a monthly rate of between 1,500 and 2,000 francs CFA, though more advanced embroidery machines could cost as much as 10,000 francs per month to hire). There appeared to be no obvious correlation between the number of machines owned and the means by which they were acquired, though from other interviews it seemed to be the case that in enterprises where several machines were in operation, perhaps two would have been purchased new, while additional machines would be subsequently bought on credit (either private or institutional) or rented (from individuals).

Fourteen of the 78 furniture-making enterprises surveyed operated circular saws (probably the most rudimentary form of mechanised equipment in this occupation), while four deployed machines combinées (multiple-operation devices comprising circular-saws, drills, mechanised planes, routers, etc.). Three others had a wide selection of electrical equipment. Only four vehicles (belonging to three enterprises) were to be found in the entire sub-sample. The vast majority of furniture-makers had only hand tools; at one extreme only a few very rudimentary tools were used,

while at the other, a wide range of carpentry equipment was available.

The relatively small number (27%) of furniture-makers who had power-driven equipment of one sort or another appeared to favour new machinery (over half of such machines were so purchased) to second-hand-buying (only a quarter of the equipment was thus acquired). Credit purchase was almost non-existent, while it is interesting to note that others had succeeded in assembling their own machinery from old motors, scrap metal and recycled spare parts, often producing acceptable substitutes for expensive woodworking machinery. Others were given machinery by former employers (in particular by French and Lebanese small employers who left after Independence).

Shoemakers and allied craftsmen generally use only very limited and simple tools. Even shoemakers in the Médina district, in whose enterprises a considerably higher division of labour manifested itself, made their entire output by hand. A small number of leatherworkers producing bags, belts, etc., for the tourist trade had specialised or modified sewing machines, and some had finishing machines. Only one 'modern' shoe-repair enterprise was encountered, and there repairs were done partially by hand and partially on a finishing machine. Here, again, very little mechanisation was to be found. Almost one-third of the shoemakers and leatherworkers had machinery of some sort, nearly two-thirds of which was purchased second-hand. A further 25% of the existing machines was being rented, but purchases from large companies (e.g. Singer) were rare. All other purchases of machinery were made from individuals.

Similarly, among metalworkers and mechanics there was little evidence of advanced technology in the workshops; 14 of the 62 enterprises had welding equipment (22%), three other enterprises had compressors. Amongst the others, there were occasional presses, paint-spraying equipment, generators and battery chargers, but in only three additional cases was evidence of expensive mechanical or

electrical machinery found. An additional part of mechanics' and metal-workers' equipment is worthy of mention: those who used welding equipment quite often rented single or additional units as and when the need arose, on a monthly, daily, or even hourly basis. The bottles of compressed air were also often purchased on credit, the balance payable at the end of the month. For much of the remaining time, their work only required hand-tools (i.e. a vice, saws, files, hand-drills, spanners and wrenches).

A fairly strong correlation (though not for all occupations) was found between the value of capital-equipment employed in the workshop and the monthly income of the small proprietor, it being assumed that the latter variable constituted an appropriate proxy for general business success. Little correlation was found in the case of furniture-makers; however, if gross receipts per month (rather than net income) is used, a strong correlation exists for all occupations (110).

So far, we have tended in this chapter to use the term 'proprietor' with respect to basic instruments of production, but as yet no mention has been made of the actual premises in which production takes place. Clearly the ownership of a workshop constitutes a considerable investment, ranging from a few thousand francs to erect an improvised shanty-town workshop, to perhaps 100,000 francs or more for a bricks-and-mortar establishment. Table 5.4. (overleaf) presents

(105) VARIABLES CORRELATED:	CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BY OCCUPATION:			
	Furniture-makers	Shoe-makers	Tailors	Metalworkers & mechanics
Income/month x value of workshop equipment	0.1(+)	0.5(*)	0.5(*)	0.3(**)
Receipts/month x value of workshop equipment	0.6(*)	0.7(*)	0.6(*)	0.4(**)

(\*) significant at the 1% level or better; (\*\*) significant at the 5% level or better; (+) statistically insignificant.

the incidence of petty commodity producers' ownership, rental, etc., of the premises they use:

Table 5.4: Ownership of premises by occupation (%)

Premises	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
Owned	19.3	4.1	1.4	14.5	9.9
Co-owned	-	-	-	3.2	0.7
Rented	58.9	60.8	97.2	69.4	71.2
Other (111)	21.8	35.1	1.4	12.9	18.2
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Many shoemakers had no real workshop as such, but worked in the same customary location in the open air, paying only market tax. Other occupations with neither rented nor owned workshops usually operated on the basis of a personal or government loan of limited duration. Again, furniture-makers and mechanics, etc., figure as the more 'advanced' among the occupations, both having relatively high degrees of ownership of their workplaces.

Tailors rented their workshops almost without exception, while those shoemakers who actually operated from a workshop tended to do so on a rental basis. Furniture-makers paid average workshops rentals of 2,000 francs (Grand Dakar), 1,500 francs (Pikine) and 7,000 francs (Rebeuss). Shoemakers' rents (where payable) were 1,500 (Grand Dakar), 2,500 (Rebeuss and Pikine), and 5,000 francs (Médina). Tailors paid 1,500 (Pikine), 3,300 (Rebeuss) and 4,000 (Grand Dakar), while mechanics, etc., paid rents averaging 2,000 francs (Pikine), 2,500 (Grand Dakar) and 5,000 francs CFA in Rebeuss.

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(111) Other situations encountered included (i) working in the open air (i.e. no property rights over place of work and no rent paid), (ii) workshops lent to petty producers while owner is abroad, ill, etc., (iii) gifts, (iv) loans by individuals still present, (v) loans made by government departments, i.e. from such departments as the Local Governor's Office, Service d'Hygiene, etc.

The types of premises occupied by petty producers varied from (1) a purely notional workshop, i.e. a 'place of work' such as the shoemakers' moveable street-corner location, to (2) the fixed, relatively modern workshop, brick-built with an electricity supply. Table 5.5. shows the range of workshop-types found in the sample of petty producers:

Table 5.5: Types of workshop by occupation (%)

Type of Premises	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
Shack H2O/electric	1.3	-	-	3.2	1.0
Shack electric	6.4	14.1	17.6	9.7	11.9
Shack only	21.9	16.9	10.8	32.3	20.0
Brick H2O/electric	6.4	1.4	1.4	3.2	3.2
Brick electric	3.8	46.5	25.6	8.1	21.1
Brick only	5.1	11.3	17.6	11.3	11.2
Other (*)	5.1	-	18.9	11.3	8.8
Combi (†)	50.0	9.8	8.1	20.9	22.8
<u>TOTALS</u>	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
of which:					
shacks	21.8	31.0	28.4	45.2	41.0
brick buildings	23.1	59.2	44.5	22.6	35.5
combined structures	55.1	9.8	27.0	32.2	31.6
no electricity (‡)	79.5	36.6	54.1	80.6	49.1

(\*) including mechanics working in the open air, lean-to sheds etc.

(†) 'Combination' workshops comprised those constructed out of bricks and wood and other materials, brick houses that had been extended by various shanty-type materials, and so on.

(‡) These figures are not derived from the same source as the rest of the table, due to lack of data on some of the 'other' and 'combination' workshops. The data comes from another question all small producers were posed, asking if their electricity was directly provided by the State Electricity Board, or 'subcontracted' via some other individual's supply.

As can be seen from the presentation the types of premises occupied, and access to electricity and water supplies, the working conditions of the four occupational groups differ to some extent.

While furniture-makers occupy a significant number of brick-built and combination premises, over one-fifth of the sample pursued their activities from improvised shanty-type premises, and over three-quarters of furniture makers had no electricity supply (an indication of the preponderance of hand- as opposed to machine-work). Shoemakers occupied even more brick-built premises, but this is largely explained by the fact that the numerous shoemakers in the Médina sample all occupied such workshops; without them, the proportion would be very much lower. Only a little over half the shoemakers had no electricity supply. Tailors had the highest proportion of brick-built workshops as well as the highest proportion of workshops with electricity. This can be explained by the fact that a large proportion (approximately two-thirds) of tailors had electric sewing- or embroidery-machines. Over three-quarters of the mechanics and metalworkers occupied shacks or combination workshops, and only a fifth had access to electricity.

Another way of looking at how small workshop proprietors organise their respective production processes is to examine the different degrees to which a technical division of labour has emerged. In this context we would be interested in the extent to which small proprietors have been able to differentiate the functions of their labourers and introduce some form of series production in which they themselves may or may not be directly involved.

Among furniture-makers, only 4 cases of significant division of labour among the workers were encountered; this constitutes only 5.6% of those furniture-making concerns who employed labour. In two of the cases the division of labour was between master and apprentices. In the third case, the division of labour was based upon wage-labour, whereas in the fourth case, the production process was organised substantially along the lines of a multi-

skill co-operative. Of those producing for the mass market (9 enterprises) only one had any significant technical division of labour among its workers.

Of the 31 shoemaking concerns employing labour of some sort, five operated on the basis of 'series production', i.e. individual phases of the aggregate production process being the responsibility of one individual or group, those individual phases being exclusively undertaken and repeated by that individual or group. These five constituted a little over 16% of those employing labour. Four more such enterprises were engaged in partial or intermittent series production. Consequently, nine (29%) of the shoemaking concerns employing labour, used it in series production of differing intensity. There was also one enterprise run on a co-operative basis (112). Of these 10 enterprises in which some degree of division of labour had emerged, 8 were producing principally for the mass market. Nevertheless over 72% of all those producing for the mass market had no marked division of labour.

Only four of the 64 workshops employing labour in the tailoring sector showed any evidence of a division of labour; this constitutes little more than 6% of all tailors using apprentices or other labour. There appeared to be virtually no correlation at all between those producing for the mass market and those in which some division of labour had been imposed. This is not altogether surprising, since the tailoring concerns that produce predominantly in advance of sales - such as those commonly found around central market areas - and employing labour in series production (i.e. one apprentice cutting out, another sewing seams, another fitting sleeves, another ironing, etc.) tend to employ relatively

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(112) Many family groups in shoemaking operate as more or less formal co-operatives. When business is relatively slack, each works at his own pace with his own orders. If a large order comes to one who is unable to fulfil the entire contract in the agreed time, he will allocate parts of the whole to his co-workers on the basis of a portfolio of socio-economic criteria - how much of the order he can fulfil, his own financial needs, and/or their seniority.

large numbers of both workers and apprentices, whereas those in the above sample typically employ only up to a maximum of eight apprentices and/or workers.

Of the 58 mechanical repairs and metalworking concerns which employed labour, only nine (15.5%) had any appreciable division of labour, seven of which were situated in one suburb (Rebeuss - Niayes Thocker). Of the eleven mechanics/metalworkers producing mainly for the mass market, only two employed an appreciable division of labour.

Though the division of labour among workshop employees seems to be little developed (except perhaps in the production of footwear and other leather goods) and production for the mass market appears not necessarily to go hand-in-hand with the development of a marked division of labour, the data from shoe-making did indicate that, while production for the market does not necessitate series production, nevertheless when series production does exist, it is likely that the enterprise in question is oriented towards the mass market rather than individual clients.

In summary, by looking at the type of equipment used by the four occupations in the sample, its mode of acquisition and utilisation, and how much is actually owned by the petty commodity producer, we find little to contradict what was suggested earlier, namely that a substantial proportion of the means of production are owned by the petty commodity producer. However, though little equipment is bought on institutionalised credit terms, much is rented, a fact that may, under certain circumstances, circumscribe the petty commodity producer's autonomy to a considerable degree.

Thus 12% and 25% respectively of the tailors and shoemakers interviewed rented major pieces of equipment, whereas metalworkers will hire specific pieces of equipment (such as welding gear and gas) only as and when needed. Finally, the data on furniture-makers implies that rental is extremely rare, possibly because the

machines that would be the most useful to them are simply too expensive to be made available by the typical machine-hire firm.

### 5.3. RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION IN PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION.

The social relations of production characterising petty commodity production at the level of the enterprise tend to have as their principal aspect the direct domination of the individual, a relation essential to appropriation of surplus under these conditions (113). Relations of personal dependence are characteristically paternalist, a feature exemplified in the relationship between master and apprentice.

#### 5.3.1. Social relations of production in PCP: Apprentices and apprenticeship

As will be shown later, the bulk of the labour utilised in the workshops covered in the Dakar survey comprised apprentices and typically relatively young (114). Such apprentices are normally closely tied to their respective masters, since the latter often provide lodging, food and/or clothing as well as the provision of some basic skills. Even when only skills are made available through the apprenticeship relationship (increasingly the case in contemporary Dakar), the extent of dependence is still considerable.

Apprenticeships remain common in the so-called traditional occupations and, in particular, in those still organised along caste lines, where the craft is reproduced by the transmission of skills from father to son. Each occupation of this sort (shoemakers, wood-carvers, jewellers, potters, etc.) will have its

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(113) I am indebted to Olivier LeBrun for his contributions to our lengthy discussions on the subject of relations of production in PCP.

(114) Apprentices in their twenties and thirties are not altogether uncommon, and several interviewees detailed several consecutive apprenticeship relations in the earlier years of their working lives.

own particular rites and regulations; the end of an apprenticeship will be an occasion for special celebrations, and the relations of personal dependence between apprentice and master may continue indefinitely after the termination of the formal apprenticeship (115) which typically has an unlimited duration, its completion being at the discretion of the master craftsman.

Apprentices in general are remunerated either only in kind (this being especially true in the case of relatives) or in cash, or some combination of the two. In the majority of cases, perhaps three times a year (at the main moslem or christian festivals), apprentices will receive the equivalent of £2 - £5; money for transport and/or the cinema is given more regularly according to the week-to-week success of the business. The following two tables show how apprentices are remunerated both in kind and in cash.

TABLE 5.6: Apprentices' remuneration in kind (%)

Remuneration	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
None	56.7	18.8	61.7	28.5	45.2
Food only	29.9	21.9	13.3	30.4	24.2
Food, lodging, clothes	10.4	56.2	21.7	35.8	26.9
Clothes only	3.0	3.1	3.3	5.3	3.7
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(115) In an open-ended interview arranged following the completion of a questionnaire by a carpenter in his early seventies, the latter remarked in a quite matter-of-fact way that, over his career, he had trained more than 200 apprentices. During the interview, a younger man approached, greeted the interviewee formally, made polite enquiries concerning the carpenter's health and the state of his business, and departed after having pressed a few bank notes into his hand. When asked who the visitor was, the carpenter said he was one of his first apprentices; he often came to visit, always repeating the same expressions of gratitude for a training that had allowed the younger man to establish a successful career as a master furniture-maker. The gift of money, it transpired, symbolised the feelings of gratitude and was an unsolicited expression of the high esteem felt by the ex-apprentice for his ageing former master.

TABLE 5.7: Apprentices' remuneration in money (%)

Remuneration	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
None	19.5	31.2	36.7	22.8	26.9
A gift at festivals	25.3	25.0	41.7	24.5	29.6
A regular fixed sum	55.2	43.8	21.6	52.7	43.5
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In a large number of cases, apprentices work, are often fed at lunch-time, often given a small sum regularly (usually sufficient for fares or for a small treat) and are traditionally given a gift at religious festivals (116). Often apprentices can expect that during periods of slack, both they and journeymen might make use of the master's equipment and/or scraps of materials, to make articles to sell for their own profit. Usually the articles produced by the apprentices are of a fairly rudimentary nature and generate only pocket-money. Naturally there is an implicit, unspoken set of conditions under which this work can occur; apprentices found touting for or diverting orders to their own advantage would be severely sanctioned [see Chapter 4, Interview IV].

In what might be described as 'traditional' activities (namely, those with their roots in the precolonial agricultural environment), the apprentice is practically always a member of the master's family: according to the data available on Dakar (117), 73% of jewellers, and 91-100% of shoemakers' apprentices were close relatives of their masters. In more technologically-advanced activities, the picture was rather different: 43-53% of tailors' apprentices, 33% of plumbers', 28% of mechanics' and metalworkers',

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(116) The relatively high proportion of shoemakers giving their apprentices food, lodging and clothing is due again, to their much higher propensity to utilise family apprentice labour.

(117) Combined data from (1) the survey of 285 petty commodity producers and (2) a UNESCO study (LeBrun & Dieng 1974).

21% of furniture-makers' and only 6% of car-rapide apprentices were close relatives. The master craftsman tends to treat his apprentices as his subordinate kinsmen, irrespective of their origin. Indeed, in many cases friends and relatives entrust their own children to craftsmen, and they work and learn alongside the craftsman's own children [See Chapter 4, interview XX]. Whether the master treats his apprentices as he would his own children, or as labourers at his command (to whom he owes little or no responsibility), will vary considerably from case to case. Apprenticeships can be very long, the duration depending firstly on the master's evaluation of the apprentice's abilities: this works both ways, however, since a good apprentice may deserve to be released and permitted to establish his own business, but from the master's point of view this would imply the loss of cheap skilled labour. Secondly, the duration of apprenticeships will vary according to the absorptive capacity of both the labour market (in all its facets) and the extent to which the product market is saturated.

From the interviews with petty commodity producers, reflecting on their own apprenticeships (rather than relying on data from their own current 'stock' of apprentices), the following major points emerged concerning the duration of apprenticeships. The majority of those interviewed were apprenticed to petty commodity producers, and many of the remainder served apprenticeships in companies.

TABLE 5.8: How petty producers learnt their skills

Predominantly:	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
Via technical training	3.8	1.3	-	4.8	2.5
Via apprenticeship to petty producer	57.7	95.9	83.1	54.8	73.3
As apprentice in a company	34.6	-	9.9	22.6	16.8
Other methods of training	3.9	2.8	7.0	17.8	7.4
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

While there was a small amount of technical training in a formal framework, large numbers of petty commodity producers had gained their skills predominantly on-the-job as apprentices to independent craftsmen. Among furniture-makers in particular, and, to a lesser extent mechanics and metalworkers, as well as tailors, skill-acquisition via apprenticeship in large companies was also noticeable. Only for mechanics does training as a company wage-earner figure significantly. The table below shows which type of enterprise provided petty producers' training:

TABLE 5.9: Initial training of petty commodity producers

Where training received:	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
Large foreign company	2.5	-	-	3.2	1.4
Small African firm	19.2	8.4	-	14.5	10.5
Small European firm	15.4	2.8	-	14.5	8.0
Small Lebanese firm	-	1.4	1.4	3.2	1.4
With artisan or jobbing craftsman	48.7	83.1	95.9	53.3	70.5
Public sector enterprise	10.3	-	2.7	4.8	4.6
Other sectors	3.9	4.3	-	4.9	2.6
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The significance of 'artisanal' apprenticeships is again clear, averaging over 70% of the sample. Those who had served their apprenticeships in small European, Lebanese or African enterprises (defined here as having a marked division of labour, relatively stable wage-labour force and a distinct bureaucratic (118) aspect were nevertheless relatively numerous in furniture-

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(118) By 'bureaucratic' is implied the distinct managerial function undertaken by a member or members of the labour-force (including the owner).

making and the metal trades. Almost half of the sample were undertaking or had passed through their training period before 1960, and therefore there would be little or no training in foreign-owned enterprises (other than French ones): were a similar sample to be taken now (1979) or in the near future, it would be possible to ascertain the impact of training facilities in multinational firms, which only began to penetrate the Senegalese market after Independence.

Those who had received a certificate recognising their completed apprenticeship (74% of furniture-makers, 2.7% of shoemakers, 26.7% of tailors and 62.9% of mechanics, etc.) were qualified at the following levels:

TABLE 5.10: Certification levels of petty commodity producers after apprenticeship (absolute quantities)

Certification levels	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
1 (lowest)	1	-	-	-	1
2	1	1	-	1	3
3	7	4	-	5	16
4	32	9	1	16	58
5	13	1	-	8	22
6	2	2	-	3	7
7 (highest)	1	-	-	2	3
TOTALS	57	17	1	35	110
Unknown	1	2	1	4	8

The 110 former apprentices who received a certificate attesting to the successful completion of their apprenticeship constituted 41.4% of the sample of petty commodity producers. This category system (119) is embodied in the various collective agreements in operation in the country's different industrial sectors, and is

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(119) I am grateful to Maureen Mackintosh for the information relating to the certification system.

used to index wages for each type of work to the SNIG or legal minimum wage, each agreement setting out in detail the types of work involved and the categories corresponding to them.

Once an apprentice has reached a certain age and level of competence, it is customary for him to be paid a more substantial sum on a more regular basis. Thus, before an apprenticeship is completed, the nature of the master - apprentice relationship may take on some of the characteristics of a wage relationship, the apprentice becoming something akin to a journeyman (120). However, in many cases apprentices are released and 'certificated' as soon as they are old/competent enough to command this more substantial payment. Due to the insecurity of markets and clientele, the seemingly fixed relations between master, journeyman and apprentices are subject to temporary modification. Nevertheless, the fundamental differentials in status and remuneration normally leave their mark on these modified relations:

"We encountered (...) a tiler [who ...] worked as a wage-earner for his own employees whenever they had work and he had not; nevertheless, (...) he demanded and received 5,000 francs a day, whereas he normally paid them 3,000 for the same work." (LeBrun & Gerry 1975:25).

Clearly there exists substantial scope within the master-apprentice or master-journeyman relationship for exploitation to occur. The exploitation of subordinate labour in petty commodity producers' workshops is masked by the combined and yet distinct illusions under which both parties work: the petty commodity producer believes that one day he could become a big entrepreneur (121), while journeymen and apprentices see their own futures more or less in terms of the present situation of their masters. Both

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(120) The journeyman is not really a wageworker in the normal sense of the term: he normally receives a flexible share of the profit from each completed order and may (like the apprentices) be permitted to use waste materials during slack periods in the workshop.

(121) This phenomenon is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6.v.

illusions are reproduced by the fact that some petty commodity producers do meet with entrepreneurial success, and apprentices are often able to make an independent income despite the increasing pressure of competition for clients. Some aspects of the possible exploitation within petty commodity production are evidenced by the evaluations made by contemporary petty commodity producers of their own past apprenticeship experiences.

Among furniture-makers, shoemakers and tailors, a little over half of those interviewed felt that their apprenticeships had been of sufficient duration for them to learn the requisite skills, while two-thirds of those in the metal trades were of this opinion. A third of both the shoemakers and the tailors were dissatisfied with their training on the grounds that it was too brief, while only 7% of furniture-makers and mechanics were dissatisfied in this regard. Nearly 15% of shoemakers, tailors and mechanics felt they had been kept in apprenticeship too long, while among furniture-makers the figure was as high as 30%. The duration of apprenticeship by occupation is shown in Table 5.11. A tiler from Anglemouss (122) commented:

"It's the masters who have the right to award the Certificat de Travail [evidence that a satisfactory period of apprenticeship has been successfully completed] but they often don't give them immediately (...) but retain them (...) so as to keep the apprentice tied to his work as a source of cheap labour. If he leaves, he has spent a great deal of time, and has nothing on paper to show for it."

The differences between occupations can be clearly seen: over two-thirds of the furniture-makers were apprenticed for periods in excess of five years, but none for longer than 15 years. The same can be said of the shoemakers, except that apprenticeship duration here tended to be less concentrated in the 6-10 years range, many shoemakers enduring apprenticeships of fifteen years and possibly more. Over two-thirds of tailors were apprenticed for five years,

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(122) The tiler was the subject of the interview quoted in Appendix III.

while the vast majority of mechanics, etc., spent up to 10 years as apprentices; almost half of this occupation spent only five years or less in acquiring their skills. The average duration of apprenticeship for the occupations were as follows: furniture-makers 6½ years, shoemakers 8½ years, tailors 5 years, mechanics and metalworkers 6 years, and that of the entire sample 6½ years.

Table 5.11: Duration of petty producers' apprenticeship by occupation (%)

Duration of Apprenticeship	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
≤ 5 years	32.1	69.0	31.1	48.4	44.6
6-10 years	60.2	24.0	41.8	40.3	42.0
11-15 years	7.7	7.0	23.0	8.1	11.6
> 15 years	-	-	4.1	3.2	1.8
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

There is some evidence to indicate that the initial training undergone by the apprentices of the petty producers surveyed is shorter than when their masters were apprentices. It seems to be the case that a substantial degree of skill-dilution and skill-underutilisation has permeated petty commodity production: at least, many of those interviewed claimed that market conditions would not permit them to exercise all the skills they had learnt during their apprenticeship. Also, children in Dakar today tend to spend much more time in full time education than did their predecessors; Table 5.12 (overleaf) illustrates this change.

From the above data, it can be seen that apprentices exchange several years of nominal remuneration of their labour-power for a greater or lesser degree of training in what is generally considered

TABLE 5.12: Educational levels of the petty producers surveyed  
and their apprentices (%)

Educational level	Petty Producers	Apprentices
Never been to school	73.0	46.0
Elementary education (123)	13.0	12.0
Middle-school education	12.0	34.0
Secondary education (to form 4)	2.0	3.0
No information	-	5.0
TOTALS	100.0	100.0

to be a marketable profession. The conditions under which the training is given and received are not generally onerous only for the apprentices: though the personal relations of dependence provide a framework for apprentice-exploitation, the contemporary context of petty commodity production makes it relatively difficult for the small proprietor/producer to do otherwise. As will be shown in more detail in the next chapter, the petty commodity producer's position as a 'price-taker' both in most factor markets (other than that of labour) and in the final market for the product they manufacture (due to fairly continuously intense competition with other petty commodity producers), leaves him only two possibilities when faced with price rises. Caught between the two blades of this "price scissors", the petty employer either reduces his payments to his labour-force (hence the flexibility of journeymen's and apprentices' payments) and/or squeezes his own mark-up or profit (namely both his own income and fund of circulating capital). It is more common (and probably more helpful to the survival of the petty commodity producer's fund of capital) to intensify the exploitation of the labourers first of all, before sacrificing personal consumption and business viability. In capitalist production, the rate of exploitation cannot be intensified (124) in the contemporary situation via such straightforward measures: neither

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(123) includes Koranic education.

(124) or, alternatively, a potentially falling rate of profit cannot be maintained at a relatively stable level.

the introduction of high technology, labour-saving equipment nor the establishment of a higher degree of monopoly are options open to many small scale producers.

### 5.3.2. Technical relations of production and forms of employment in petty commodity production.

The technical relations of production in the industrial labour process are characterised by the domination of the means of production over the worker, labour being subordinated, turned into a commodity and alienated by its subjection to capital. Indeed, workers are denuded of much of their skills, these being progressively taken over either by machines, or by so-called specialists. In this labour process, any worker with a minimum of training is capable of producing.

The technical relations of production that typically are to be found in artisanal and petty commodity producers are characterised by the domination of the producer over the means by which labour is realised as exchange-value. These means consist primarily of the instruments of labour, but also the materials worked upon. The ability of the artisan or petty commodity producer to create products is closely linked to the skills involved, learnt principally through apprenticeship.

The petty producer himself effects the whole process of transforming his chosen raw materials and is in control of the production process, deciding when and how he shall work, what tools he shall use and in what manner, and he has no need of others to tell him what should be done. The apprentices and journeymen perform the same or similar work, under his direction. In the case of certain tailors, metal-workers and makers of aluminium-ware, production for the market, albeit on a small scale, implies a certain degree of uniformity in the articles produced, a larger scale of purchasing and stocking of raw materials, the use of more productive techniques, and the

appearance of relations of production that are not typically found in artisanal production among the urban poor.

This represents the beginnings of a technical division of labour - that of manufacture in the real sense of the term. The most significant technical division is between the owner of the means of production (who occupies himself more and more with organisation, buying and selling) and his journeymen and apprentices (who perform the greatest part of the productive work). To this technical division of labour there corresponds a new social division of labour: the owner of the means of production performs progressively less productive work himself and thus appropriates surplus-labour, thereby heralding the evolution of wage-relations. This phenomenon is clearly explained by the Marxist concept of the formal subsumption of labour to capital. As Marx (1971:194) writes:

"The artisan who was master craftsman vis-à-vis his journeyman is now no more than an owner of capital, whereas his journeyman does nothing more than sell [him] his labour-power (...) Capital dominates the labour process such as it is, based upon the labour processes developed by different ancient modes of production. Capital thus dominates a pre-existent and determinate labour process, such as artisanal labour (...)" [emphasis in the original].

Once this transformation has taken place, social relations will be identifiably capable of appropriating surplus labour. The relations of direct domination that previously existed dissolve, and production becomes primarily focused on the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the owner of the means of production.

The empirical evidence upon which this more generalised theoretical conclusion is based, consists of data relating to the extent to which the owner of the means of production is directly involved in the production process itself, since this can be used as part of an index of the degree of development of capitalist relations of production. There need be no correspondence in time between the withdrawal of the owner from direct production and the

concretisation of wage-payments: nevertheless, there will inevitably come a time when the paternalistic relations of personal dependence within the small enterprise's production process, at least in their complete form, become more of a hindrance to than a basis for accumulation. This does not mean that all aspects of the preceding relations of production will dissolve or be dismantled: it may well be more beneficial to the owner of the means of production to exploit his labour both through classic capitalistic mechanisms and via the maintenance of pre-existing forms of personal dependence and traditional types of status differentials.

It is in this context that a number of central questions were posed and the responses analysed. Since the methodology of this study is based upon the hypothesis that there exists a complex inter-relationship (rather than some sort of dualistic separation) between petty commodity and capitalist commodity production, it was assumed that the extent to which small production units tend to employ wage-labour (125) would give a strong indication of (a) the penetration of capitalist relations of production in general terms and (b) the existence of intermediate and/or 'transitional' forms of employment indicative of the dynamics of petty commodity production.

Consequently, questions were posed so as to gather data on the degree of involvement of petty commodity producers in the process of direct production. Were their functions generally those of an entrepreneur, or were petty proprietors/producers still intimately involved in directly productive activities? Those who had been identified on a preliminary basis as being proprietors of small workshops were asked how they tended to spend their working day: did they work predominantly with the others in the workshop, did they tend to supervise the activities of others, or were they

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(125) i.e. individuals freely selling their labour-power on the basis of a relative stable determinate wage.

mainly absent from the production unit? The table below summarises the responses to this question, categorized by occupational groups.

TABLE 5.13: Principal Functions of Petty Workshop Proprietors (%)

Principal Functions:	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
I work alongside the others	26.9	29.6	29.7	14.5	25.6
I only supervise the work of others	1.3	-	-	14.5	3.5
I work & supervise	34.6	26.7	13.5	27.4	25.6
I mainly deal with clients/suppliers	7.7	8.4	10.8	3.2	7.7
I work, supervise and deal with clients/suppliers	21.8	22.5	4.0	34.0	20.1
Other activities	7.7	12.8	42.0*	6.4	17.5
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(\*) This large proportion of the shoemakers comprised mainly individual (i.e. one-person-operated) concerns.

We can see that, apart from the example of mechanical repairs and metalwork, there is little evidence to suggest that the technical relations of production are any more advanced than the degree of development of the corresponding social relations of production would suggest. In the case of mechanics and metalworkers, far more direct supervision was discernible than in the other three occupations covered by the survey. Among the other occupations virtually no cases of technical non-involvement in the process of direct production were encountered. Indeed, a large majority of petty producers considered their roles in the labour process to be multiple ones, involving both directly productive activities, as well as supervisory, administrative and marketing functions.

The corollary of the above comments is that the incidence of forms of employment based on something other than personalised

and/or hierarchised cooperation will be higher among mechanics and metalworkers than in other professions. But why should this be? In order to answer this and other questions, we need to examine each occupation in terms of specific forms of employment and the types of enterprise in which these forms of employment predominate.

The four key analytical categories to be used (presented in Figure 5.B. below), are what we might describe as 'ideal types' constituting a continuum ranging from apprenticeship to wage-labour.

FIGURE 5.B. Analytical categories for the study of forms of employment in petty commodity production

<u>Form of Employment</u>	<u>General Definition</u>
1. Family apprentice	Essentially unpaid kinsman, acquiring skills in return for the provision of labour-power (*). The relations of production are based upon the specifics of kinship structure and the corresponding respective status.
2. Non-family apprentice	As 1. above, except that relations of production are relatively less dominated by kinship structure and corresponding respective status (†).
3. Family wage-worker	Typically, these are adult relatives earning a relatively stable (though often very low) remuneration. A complex combination of relations of personal dependence and emerging commodity relations and production co-exist.
4. Non-family wage-worker	Adult, normally skilled or semi-skilled, who exchanges labour for a fixed wage. The relations of production are essentially those of (petty) capitalism.

(\*) Often found in 'traditional', caste-organised occupations such as shoemaking, pottery and weaving.

(†) Often found in more 'modern' (i.e. concomitant with capitalism) occupations such as tailoring, vehicle repair.

The fourth category, that of the non-family wage-worker, constitutes the more-or-less final product of the process of dissolution of 'artisanal' relations of production based upon kinship or similar hierarchisation: here, the relations of personal dependence of apprentices on their masters have been transformed into those of a buyer confronting numerous sellers of labour-power.

Thus, for example, vehicle mechanics may exhibit a greater tendency to be 'pure supervisors' of other people's labour, due to the relatively recent and 'modern' nature of the occupation, the fact that it is more amenable to a (not necessarily particularly 'productive') division of labour based on large numbers of workers, and that it nonetheless has a significant requirement for skilled labour. The workshop proprietor may well spend much of his time acquiring contracts, searching out spare parts, and supervising the work of a mixture of skilled wage-earners (many of whom may be 'promoted' ex-apprentices) and young trainees (engaged, for the most part, in only indirectly useful tasks, subsidiary to the major tasks of the occupation).

In vehicle repair, for example, it is not uncommon to find a host of young apprentices whose main activity is to clean spark-plugs, charge batteries, make tea, run errands, and generally watch the proceedings in the workshop until they are sufficiently trustworthy to attempt work more directly connected to the job in hand. Apprentices in the other occupations always appeared to be far more usefully integrated into the labour process, probably due to the fact that there exists in furniture-making, shoemaking and tailoring (a) rather more continuous production and (b) what appears to be a rather shorter learning period for the acquisition of basic skills that can be exercised relatively unsupervised.

If we now look at the degree of involvement of petty commodity producers in direct production and the corresponding degree of family and non-family wage-employment, a somewhat puzzling picture

emerges which casts some doubt upon our analysis of the development of social and technical relations of production. A more detailed analysis of forms of employment is given below, but it is worthwhile examining here the connection between what we have identified as the major features of social and technical relations of production.

Mechanics and metalworkers exhibit a relatively high incidence of 'pure supervision' or similar functions and employ relatively more wage-workers (of both types). While shoemakers and tailors both exhibit a relatively lower propensity to supervise labour and have smaller numbers of wage-workers (especially non-family wage-workers), furniture-makers have proportionately the most wage-workers and yet have a smaller tendency to withdraw from the process of direct production.

Table 5.14: Wage-employment and degree of 'pure supervision' among petty commodity producers employing 6-15 workers (126) (approximate average %)

	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics
Wageworkers (family and non-family) as % of labour force	18	11	11	14.5
Wageworkers (non-family) as % of labour-force	13	2.5	8	11
Index of 'pure' supervision (127)	9	11	8	18

Clearly, in order to clarify the progression of social and technical relations of production, and the relationship between their corresponding evolutions, far more detailed surveys are required of the hour-to-hour, day-to-day activities of workshop-

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(126) Few wage-workers were found in those workshops employing 1-5 workers; very few cases of enterprises employing more than 15 workers were encountered.

(127) Total of those who "only supervised others", those "mainly dealing with public suppliers" and those with "other activities".

proprietors and the nature of their production processes (in terms of division of labour, level of technology and related factors). Such data are extremely difficult to collect, and were not available in sufficient detail to integrate them into the results of the present study.

In order to further examine the labour processes characterising petty commodity production, we also need to look closely at the incidence of specific forms of employment in the occupations in question, focusing on different scales of employment. Table 5.15 below gives a general impression of the incidence of the two types of both apprentice- and wage-labour.

TABLE 5.15: Forms of employment by occupation (%)

Type of labour	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
Family apprentices	13.2	37.5	82.5	23.0	27.0
Non-family apprentices	69.1	51.2	6.3	63.2	58.0
Family wageworkers	5.1	3.6	8.7	3.8	4.3
Non-family wageworkers	12.6	7.7	2.5	10.7	10.7
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

There is nothing particularly surprising about this breakdown: as one might expect, apprentice-labour is preponderant. Shoemakers are an exception inasmuch as the bulk of their unpaid workers are kinsmen, whereas this is much less so for the other occupations, who resort to predominantly non-family trainees for their unskilled and semiskilled labour requirements. Family wageworkers make up a similar proportion of each occupation's labour-force, except that small scale shoemakers (understandably, due to their still strongly family-based production) tend to remunerate older kinsmen on a more stable basis to a greater extent than in other occupations. Among


furniture-makers, tailors and in the metal and mechanical trades, wage-labour constitutes a minority form of employment. Nevertheless, it does provide an important framework for employing relatively small amounts of skilled labour to complement the larger quantities of unskilled labour available to small proprietors/producers. As can be seen from Table 5.15 (above), in both furniture-making and the metal trades, there are significant numbers of wage-workers.

### 5.3.3. Forms of employment and 'market orientation' in petty commodity production.


It would seem fairly self-evident that the more labour a small producer acquires, the more proportionately abundant will become his wage-workers, since family labour-resources are limited, and for a given number of apprentices with limited skills, a certain number of skilled workers will be required (according to the technology of the enterprise). Let us see, then, how the various forms of employment are distributed among units of production with different levels of overall employment: for this purpose, enterprises were categorized into one-person operations, and those employing 1-4, 5-8 and more than 9 workers, and the family and non-family categories of apprentices were amalgamated. The rationale behind this particular grouping of petty commodity producers consisted in the fact that when the scale of employment was plotted against type of employment, the sample appeared to more or less naturally fall into the above scale-grouping, as the graph below indicates: (See Figures 5.C and 5.D. overleaf).

As was clear from Table 5.14. (above), with regard to the scale of employment in the enterprises surveyed, one-person operations constituted 21.4% of the sample of 285 units of production, while workshops employing from one to four workers made up over half the sample (54%). Those with between 5 and 8 workers constituted 21.1%, and those employing 9 or more workers only 3.5% of the sample. Ninety per cent of furniture-makers and 93.5% of mechanics and

**FIG.5.C. WORKER TYPES AND SIZE OF THE LABOUR FORCE**



**FIG. 5.D. FAMILY & NONFAMILY WORKERS BY SIZE OF LABOUR FORCE.**



metal-workers made use of other people's labour in their enterprises; 41% of tailors had others working under their control, while only 26.5% of shoemakers and related occupations were employers in the general sense (128).

TABLE 5.16: Forms and scales of employment (%)

<u>Form of employment</u>	<u>Scale of employment (N° workers)</u>		
	1-4	5-8	≥ 9
Apprentices	91	83	77
Family wageworkers	5	5	2
Non-family wageworkers	4	12	21
TOTAL	100	100	100

The data summarised above, in its original form of absolute quantities, was tested to see if wage-employment did in fact increase as the scale of employment rose. This hypothesis, as might be expected, was substantiated with a very high degree of statistical significance (129). However, it is important not to misinterpret or read too much into this proof. The data tested is synchronic in nature, and it would be both dishonest and dangerous to draw diachronous conclusions from them. It has not been proven that, as a small enterprise increases its labour-force, it necessarily acquires proportionately more wage-workers; while this may indeed be an acceptable generalisation, the diachronous data is not available in this case to substantiate the claim, nor can we assume that other factors will not intervene to conserve rather than dissolve non-wage relations within the small scale sector.

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(128) In the additional Medina sample of shoemakers, there were very few (18%) who did not employ others. It should be recalled that this sub-sample comprised mainly small manufacturers, compared to the mixture of artisanal shoemakers and shoe-repairers, leatherworkers, etc., who made up the main part of the sample.

(129) With 2 degrees of freedom and at a 95% confidence level, a relatively high  $\chi^2$  of 19.65 was obtained, i.e. as compared to the tabulated minimum acceptable value of 5.99.

As we will indicate in the next chapter, there may even be cause to suggest that, among larger, capitalistic enterprises, operating beyond a certain scale of employment and under specific technological and socio-economic conditions, a far more complex process takes place, both in aggregate terms (at the level of the national wage labour-force) and at the level of the individual enterprise. For the moment we can only conclude that the larger employers among the small units of production have tended to develop something very close, if not identical to classic wage-relations with a significant section of their labour-forces. Hence the tendency of the larger small producers to employ proportionately more wage-labour than the smaller enterprises can be expressed more exactly: nearly two-thirds of all the wage-workers encountered in the sample worked in enterprises that were not only relatively large, but also oriented towards the production of commodities for the mass market (rather than to satisfy individual clients' orders for items destined for the clients' own immediate consumption).

However, it should not be assumed that wageworkers (whether family or non-family) could be so readily identified. The decision as to what constitutes a wage, and thus a wage-worker contained a number of rather subjective elements. A wage is not merely a stable and relatively contractual form of remuneration, but the manifestation in monetary terms of a social relationship.

Thus in the case of some of the 'wage-workers' identified, even though the amount involved may have been rather low and subject to some marked fluctuations, the nature of the relationship between petty proprietor/producer and his workers was unambiguously that between a buyer and seller of labour. Moreover, a worker might be paid a much higher level of remuneration on the basis of some paternalistic arrangement with his employer e.g. that of the journeyman receiving a variable proportion of a contract's profit, sharing with the petty proprietor the good

times (via a high 'commission') as well as the bad times (perhaps receiving no remuneration at all).

Among furniture-makers, of those who did not pay regularly or in fixed amounts, payment for work performed was affected after each order or piece was completed in 15% of the cases, the rest paying very irregularly with no real regard for the quantity, quality or value of the work performed. This sort of 'piece work' was virtually non-existent among shoemakers, only occurred in 8.5% of the remaining tailors, but accounted for nearly 36% of the remaining mechanics and metalworkers. In this latter case therefore, over 50% of the sample either paid a regular wage or operated an embryonic (and obviously somewhat variable) piecework system (130). Workers in all four occupations remained in the workshop whether work was on hand or not.


Across the whole sample, the incidence of casual employment was extremely rare; this is easily explained by the very nature of casual employment, and of petty production. Casual employment usually implies a need on the part of the employer for a labour-force which is both extremely flexible and seasonally variable; on the other hand it usually also implies a large and 'latent' fraction of the industrial reserve army being in existence (i.e. variable demand for, and highly elastic supply of labour). As much as 92.6% of the sample stated that they never employed labour on a temporary or casual basis. Of the remaining 21 cases, 6 (2.1%) employed such labour very rarely, 6 from time to time, while another 6 often employed day-labourers.

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(130) In this context 'piecework' should not be understood in the industrial sense of the word (i.e. payment by results in which the final remuneration is determined virtually exclusively by the worker), but rather a system in which the payment received by the petty producer on completion of an order is shared between his own personal/family requirements, his enterprise's circulating fund, and differentiated remuneration for the labour he employs.

When the monthly incomes of small producers with wage-workers were compared with the monthly wages paid (where wage data were available), no significant correlation could be discerned (131). The wide variation in wages paid by workshop proprietors with different levels of income can be illustrated by several examples. A shoemaker earning on average 200,000 francs a month paid wages of only 8,000 francs; another shoemaker who himself apparently earned only 37,500 francs/month, also paid average wages of 8,000 francs, while a mechanic also earning 37,500 francs/month paid wages averaging 17,000 francs/month. The scatter diagram in Figure 5.E. (below) illustrates this highly differentiated situation.

FIGURE 5.E: Scatter diagram of petty commodity producers' monthly incomes plotted against mean monthly wages paid (000 CFA francs)



Despite the high degree of scatter, there appear to be two groups of matched data. Of the 25 cases in which matched data was

(131) A sample correlation coefficient of  $< 0.1$  indicated that virtually no association existed.

available, there were 13 cases in which the ratio between petty commodity producers' incomes and the corresponding wages paid was less than 2½:1. In these 13 cases there existed a strong positive correlation between the two variables, significant at the 0.1% level, the correlation coefficient being 0.87. The remaining 12 cases had an income-wage ratio in excess of 2½:1, and exhibited very little association between proprietors' income and workers' wages.

In the highly-correlated group of 13 cases, no proprietors' income exceeded 50,000 francs, while in the latter group of 12, virtually all the proprietors earned more than 50,000 francs per month (132). In the former group, higher incomes appear to be associated with wages increasingly closer to recognised and stable remuneration for age and skill-level; in the latter group, business success added significantly to workshop proprietors' incomes, while wage-levels tended to have already reached recognised and/or acceptable levels (indicated by the high income-wage differentials). Wages and wage-relationships that could be identified with some measure of confidence ranged from as low as a token 3,000 francs/month for some family wage-workers up to 27,500 francs/month for skilled labour. Where precise wage-levels could be determined, it appeared that twelve out of 27 wages (44%) were lower than 10,000 francs/month, while 15 (56%) exceeded that level.

The fact that the sample yielded only 137 wage-employees out of a total labour-force of 909 workers (15.1%) should not be interpreted, however, as a denial of the importance of wage-employment in small scale production. It is important to note

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(132) While accepting that grouping the sample data undoubtedly improves the degree of correlation, this approach nevertheless shows that a large part (i.e. around 75%) of the dispersion in the sample was due to the presence of the group with high wage-income discrepancies. This group would doubtless be characterised by a much smaller proportion of monthly receipts re-entering the wages-and/or circulating fund, compared to the case of those with a much less marked wage-income discrepancy.

that, contrary to the results presented by, say, Lenin in his analysis of the development of capitalism in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century (133), we should not expect to find an ever-widening and rapid evolution of wage-relations in a contemporary under-developed capitalist economy. Lenin analysed a situation in which embryonic capitalism was in the process of rapidly subordinating and/or reconstituting preceding modes of production; this is why the conclusions at which he arrived indicated a wholesale, rapid and highly significant development of wage-relations. In contrast, contemporary Senegal is characterised by an already-developed and well-entrenched capitalist mode of production, already having much of the commanding heights of industry and commerce under its control (134); the continued existence and viability of petty production is important to capitalism inasmuch as it provides cheap wage-goods for the industrial labour-force, the self-employed and the reserve army of labour, enabling the magnitude of the variable capital which capitalists have to advance to be kept to a minimum (135).

Nevertheless, it is quite clear that the larger small producers (perhaps transitional between petty-commodity and small capitalist production) are characterised by an increasing tendency to utilise wage-labour, which itself indicates the significance of the buying and selling of labour-power even within the confines of petty-commodity production. It is interesting to note that those producing predominantly for the mass, rather than individual, market showed an equal if not greater tendency to utilise

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(133) See particularly Lenin (1972a) and (1972b:355-458).

(134) For a brief summary of evidence relating to the control of the commanding heights of Senegalese industry and commerce by (pre-dominantly French) capital, see the introduction to Chapter 7.

(135) While this is obviously an area in which the seminal works of political economy can be of the utmost value, it is equally an area in which we should be aware of the dangers of mechanistically transposing concepts and conclusions from one social formation and one historical epoch to another.

proportionately more wage-labour at larger enterprise-sizes (as measured by employment). Also, those producing predominantly for the mass market - constituting under one-fifth (19%) of the entire sample and 20% of those employing labour - had a disproportionately large share of the labour surveyed in the sample, namely almost a quarter (24.6%); this share comprised a fifth (20%) of all apprentices, and over two-thirds (68%) of all wage-workers. Equally, of the 104 wage-workers active in enterprises employing five or more individuals, 65 (62.5%) worked in enterprises principally oriented towards the mass, rather than individual, market.

It has already been suggested that very few petty commodity producers who employed others could say with confidence that they remunerated those workers with a fixed and substantial sum because, as indicated above, the majority (84%) used only apprentice-labour. However, there were 39 cases in which such wages clearly were paid. 29 of these employed non-family wageworkers and various apprentices, while an additional 10 used family labour remunerated on a wage basis. Of these 39 wage-paying enterprises, 14 (36%) were predominantly oriented towards production for the mass market. However, of these 39 enterprises, 16 (41%) claimed that the wage levels were fixed and paid regularly, while 20 (51%) said that fixed wage-levels existed but were often paid irregularly, due to the uncertainties of business contracts and receipts. There were equal numbers of producers for the mass market to be found in both the regular and irregular wage-paying categories.

A major component in the value of the means of production will be the materials worked up in the labour process, namely the raw materials inputs of the enterprise. With the exception of mechanics and metalworkers, the sample indicated a relatively high degree of correlation between the value of raw materials inputs and the amount of labour employed; the relationship between the

size of the labour-force and the value of the materials worked up in the labour process indicated a more than proportional rise in the latter as the former increased.

Was this correspondence between the size of the labour-force and the value of the materials entering the production process also to be found among those petty producers principally oriented towards production for the mass market? There appeared to be no significant correlation between these two variables among such petty commodity-producers; however, as inputs of raw materials tend to be of an intermittent nature, corresponding to the intermittent nature of the production process itself, even among those producing for the mass market, it is not so surprising that orthodox statistical checks do not produce the correlation one would expect. Data would have to be collected over a much longer period in order for valid results to be derived: the growth in the value of the means of production may well take place over an extended period in the lifespan of an enterprise, may occur gradually or in leaps and bounds. Such trajectories cannot be identified from the sort of synchronous data analysed here.

In summary, while there are 39 enterprises employing wage-labour of some sort (in varying amounts), and 45 enterprises who employ labour and produce mainly for the mass market, only about one-third were both wage-employers and producers for the mass market. However, if we make a comparison between the labour-force structures of those petty commodity producers predominantly oriented towards the mass market (normally through intermediaries) and those still predominantly oriented towards the provision of goods for direct consumers, we find that the presence of wage employees is proportionately more significant, the larger is the total labour-

force employed in an enterprise, but not among those units of production with little orientation towards the mass market (136).

This comparison also suggests that the employment of workers of all types tends to be greater among those enterprises principally oriented towards the mass market: on average, and disregarding the size-grouping of enterprises, the average number of workers employed by such units of production was almost 6, while among 'artisans' it was well below 4.

#### 5.3.4. Concluding remarks on relations of production at the workshop level.

In this chapter an attempt has been made to look at the situation inside the small workshop, namely at the ownership of the means of production, use of various types of labour, and the division of labour through which the former are brought into action by the latter.

It has been maintained that in this context no clearcut distinction could be made between those who produce for direct consumers and those who produce in advance of orders and/or for intermediaries. In the next chapter, as we move up and away from this micro-level framework to look at various forms of employment at the level of the urban (rather than enterprise) labour-force, the importance of this distinction will emerge, since the intervention of commercial intermediaries is an important factor in differentiating between these various forms of employment.

We concluded in this chapter that, even though far more minutely-observed information data collected over a considerable

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(136) A  $\chi^2$  test of enterprises categorized by the size of the labour-force they employed and their mass-market orientation (or otherwise) gave a value for  $\chi^2$  (with two degrees of freedom) of 9.6 and only 2.7, respectively.

length of time is required, there nevertheless exists considerable evidence to support the contention that wage-employment plays a quantitatively small but qualitatively important role in the labour process. Larger firms tend to employ proportionately greater quantities of wage-labour, even though dependence on cheap semi-skilled apprentice-labour remains high. The increasing importance of wage-labour will thus have a complex dialectical relationship with changes in the overall relations of production, since a significant number of small enterprises will be based on both (and possibly other) forms of employment, thereby forcing the small proprietor to enter into relations with his labour-force that may often be internally contradictory. Whereas in the past an apprenticeship may have been the prelude to a career as an independent small scale producer, nowadays it can also be the introductory phase to employment as a wage-worker in a small firm.

It has also been suggested that while wage-employment can be readily identified within petty commodity production, this is not an altogether simple articulation. To suggest that the payment of a certain number of francs, dollars or dinars each month constitutes a wage ignores the fact that, above all, a wage is a relationship. A wage is not just paid as soon as an employer can afford it, nor as soon as a worker's productivity attains a specified level: various fundamental changes have to take place in the very way in which the means of production and labour come together within the production process.

Evidence was also advanced to indicate than an orientation towards a mass market, or involvement with a regular commercial intermediary does not necessarily accompany the growth of wage-labour. Indeed, as will be suggested in the next chapter, there may be a tendency in some cases for pre-capitalist relations of production to be preserved within the workshop while the proprietor's own position becomes ever more circumscribed, and he eventually becomes converted into supervisory wage-labour working

on behalf of those who have gained control (rather than ownership) of the means of production.

In the following chapter, which is divided into a number of separate sections, many of these issues will be addressed again in more detail, in an attempt to analyse the structure and dynamics of differentiation within the labour-force of small enterprises and among petty commodity producers themselves.

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CHAPTER 6  
FORMS OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE GENERALISATION OF  
CAPITALIST RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

In this extensive penultimate chapter, we will examine in more detail the various forms of employment to be found among small scale producers, this time focusing principally on more meso-social relations (that link enterprise to enterprise, for example) rather than the micro-social relationship in evidence at the level of the individual unit of production. In undertaking this, we shall be returning to many of the concepts introduced towards the end of the first chapter of this study, and elaborating on issues raised in subsequent chapters.

After this introductory section, we will first of all look at the position of and problems faced by the relatively unambiguously self-employed petty commodity producer, an analysis which concentrates on what might best be termed the 'backward and forward linkages' which link such direct producers to both the market for means of production, as well as that in which the final product is sold. Since this will involve a discussion of the constraints which that the above-mentioned markets may impose on the ability of petty commodity producers to accumulate (137), it also provides a preparatory framework for the more detailed examination of accumulation and the transition to petty capitalist production to be provided in the final section of this chapter. This is so because if we are to discuss the forces which inhibit such a transition, this clearly poses the question "what forces can be harnessed to facilitate the transition to capitalist production among specific petty commodity producers?"

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(137) The question of accumulation, raised indirectly in the previous chapter, is more fully discussed in the final section of the present chapter.

The second section of this chapter deals more specifically with those petty commodity producers who, rather than producing predominantly to the orders of direct and final consumers, produce more for the mass market, an orientation which almost inevitably involves them with commercial intermediaries and/or productive industrial consumers of intermediate products. The intervention and often progressive dominance of such intermediaries opens up the possibilities of a form of employment which we have termed "disguised wage employment", in which the relative autonomy of the owner of the means of production becomes diminished through sub-contractual and other relations with outside enterprises.

The third section addresses the problem of the casual wage worker in capitalist industry and commerce and attempts to show the links between such workers and those in petty commodity production, both with respect to the similarity in their living conditions and income levels, and with respect to the functional relationship both groups have with the dominant capitalist mode of production.

A short fourth section identifies and assesses what appear to be tendencies towards 'de-proletarianisation', through which wage-workers are converted into autonomous or semi-autonomous small scale producers.

The final section addresses an extremely important issue previously discussed in a general historical-theoretical framework in Chapter 1, and reintroduced at the beginning of the present chapter - namely the possibility that some petty commodity producers may be able to make the transition from the simple reproduction that characterises their existing conditions of production, to (petty) capitalist accumulation.

### 6.1. MARKET CONSTRAINTS ON PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION

In Chapter 4, it was suggested that many of Dakar's working poor make a living through either the buying and selling of recuperated or recycled materials, or the production of articles using such recycled materials as inputs. However, it should not be assumed that petty commodity producers in general are somehow excluded entirely from capitalist factor markets. In very many ways, petty producers find themselves confronted by considerable barriers to their expansion and/or accumulation processes. One such barrier is constituted by the sheer weight of competition that each tailor, furniture-maker or street-trader faces from individuals in similar economic and social circumstances. These product-market constraints will be examined in more detail later, as will the relationship between the outputs of petty commodity production and the input requirements of capitalist industry.

Petty commodity producers are often required to purchase raw materials (on a continuous basis) and instruments of production (on a more intermittent basis) either directly from major foreign-controlled industrial-commercial enterprises and/or through smaller commercial intermediaries. This applies equally well to the more 'traditional' production processes such as shoemaking, as it does to those occupations that emerged only after capitalist penetration had reached a relatively high level (e.g. vehicle-maintenance and dry-cleaning).

As was shown in the previous chapter, in the section on the apprenticeship-experience among the sample of petty commodity producers, initial skill-acquisition was often acquired in wage-employment in large enterprises, especially among the relatively older individuals, even though training on-the-job in petty workshops was the dominant mechanism of acquiring skills. As far as basic workshop equipment is concerned, it must be stressed that considerable differentiation exists among petty commodity producers: some have quite costly machinery, some bought new, other

second-hand and/or from former employers, but generally workshops are very poorly equipped. LeBrun & Dieng (1974) report that of the 26 workshops owned by carpenters residing in the peripheral Dakar suburb of Grand Yoff, 21 were mere wooden shacks; these carpenters on average had a journeyman and three to four young apprentices and only rudimentary tools. While nearer the city centre workshops tended to be better equipped, the gulf between the best and worst-equipped was even more marked.

Much of the equipment (whether rudimentary or technically advanced) necessary for petty commodity production is directly or indirectly dependent on capitalist production (whether locally or externally located), inasmuch as a proportion of the equipment is purchased new and directly, while (as indicated in the previous chapter) another part is acquired more indirectly through second-hand purchase or recuperation. In this way petty commodity production in Dakar is dominated by a quasi-monopoly of supply, repair and maintenance, etc., which operates to the advantage and profit of a mode of production distinct from its own, the ownership and/or control of which is largely foreign. Clearly, this has serious implications for the development of an indigenous manufacturing industry largely independent of foreign control, as well as for the growth of a domestic capital-goods industry so crucial in the establishment of a viable, developing and self-sustaining economy.

Before moving on to a closer examination of the backward and forward linkages in which petty commodity producers are involved, it is worth summarising the major facets of the subordination of the small and economically weak to the imperatives of the large and powerful. The penetration and establishment of foreign-controlled capitalism in Senegal provided both the relatively 'modern' petty commodity producers, as well as the more 'traditional' artisans (whose production processes were modified and

reoriented through contact with capitalism) with three important possibilities:

- a) the ability to acquire some initial (though often not protracted) training and skill development in capitalist (colonial) wage-employment;
- b) the ability to acquire limited quantities of means and instruments of production which were otherwise unobtainable; and
- c) access to the more concentrated markets of growing colonial cities.

Initial training has tended to be a 'once-and-for-all' input into petty commodity production, since the majority of today's youth who are actually receiving training will be doing so in small workshops rather than in large capitalist factories.

#### 6.1.1. Backward linkages: the sources of raw materials inputs

It is not merely the acquisition of skills and productive equipment which have brought petty commodity production into close contact with the capitalism. The impact of capitalism on skill-acquisition and provision of equipment also extends to the supply of raw material inputs into small scale production. This observation is valid even in the context of the evolution of import-substitution, which has very often meant that semi-finished rather than finished commodities are imported into the country, or that certain Senegal-based enterprises produce commodities that in no way can be considered as contributing significantly to the process of social development (e.g. branded soft drinks, cigarettes, etc.). Consequently, and in general, Dakar's petty commodity producers rely to a large extent on raw material inputs which originate outside Senegal's national boundaries, specifically from France and certain other developed capitalist countries.

There are certain exceptions: some shoemakers are still supplied by the Mauritanian tanners and traders who market

locally-produced leather. Other 'traditional' occupations (such as basket-weaving, wood-sculpting and some jewellery-making, for instance) are largely independent of inputs which originate abroad, or even from foreign owned or controlled local industry. It must be added, however, that these are the very occupations which, in the market place, are heavily dependent on the demand generated by the tourist trade and the predilection for purchasing objets d'art manifested by more long-term foreign residents such as Technical Assistants, diplomats, and foreign consultants.

However, other such occupations are now almost totally dependent on imported finished and/or semi-finished commodities for their production processes. Traditional weavers who work in Dakar throughout the dry season, must purchase either from the large French-controlled ICOTAF textile mill or imported thread of Ivoirian origin. This latter source was formerly a wholly-French owned concern which now has Ivoirian State participation. Traditional shoemakers who formerly produced their entire output from leather have changed almost without exception to the use of imported vinyl and crepe materials, especially since the multinational corporation BATA established its factory in Dakar and received a government-protected monopoly of local fine leather (see below Chapter 6, section 2).

This sort of modification of pre-existing production processes may be viewed by some as part and parcel of 'modernisation'. It should be remembered that, from the shoemakers' viewpoint, this transition has involved the replacement of traditional market relations with local Mauritanian tanners (an interaction between two highly competitive production processes) by market relations involving European multinationals (the producers of raw materials) and a Lebanese local retail monopoly.

Petty commodity producers were asked to give details of the types of enterprises from which they principally purchased raw materials:

Table 6.1: Sources of raw materials inputs (%)

	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics
1) Purchased mainly from large capitalist enterprises	79.5	43.3	12.2 (4.0)*	50.9
2) Purchased mainly from medium or small producers/traders	20.5	56.7	87.8 (96.0)*	49.1

\* The percentages in brackets refer to the more mass market-oriented Médina shoemakers only.

A large proportion of furniture-makers purchased raw materials (wood, glue, varnish and fittings) predominantly from large (mainly French) industrial concerns in the city. Most of these firms imported and treated wood from other African countries (mainly Gabon and the Ivory Coast) and bought other materials mainly from Europe. A minority of furniture-makers tended to purchase wood from small woodyards and/or traders, using recycled wood (originating from the Port, construction companies, etc.) when necessary. Those furniture-makers who dealt predominantly with large suppliers and importers (numbering some 62 enterprises) mentioned only 16 different enterprises with which they dealt regularly; however, only four of these companies (namely SOA, Société LeBois, Sénégalbois and La Société Forestière de Maine) represented over three-quarters of all enterprises mentioned by petty producers. From this it appears that a large proportion of small furniture-making concerns purchase raw materials inputs from a relatively small number of large foreign-owned companies.

Small scale producers of footwear and fancy leather goods were also linked to a greater or lesser extent, to the commercial and

industrial circuits of the city's economic system; the extent to which this applies depends primarily upon what commodities were being produced. Shoe-repairers and sandal-makers dealt mainly with their traditional Mauritanian suppliers of hides, yet a small proportion, selling their products mainly on the tourist market, bought leather from the large shoe-manufacturing company BATA, usually in the form of offcuts and/or reject hides. Equally so, those producers of fancy goods (belts, bags, etc.) requiring animal and reptile skins purchased these from the artisan-traders of the interior regions without working through other intermediaries. The skins of land reptiles are obtained and sold by the Laobé caste (who are predominantly woodcutters and sculptors), whereas supplies of crocodile skins are generally the province of the river fishermen. Nevertheless, those shoemakers who manufacture for the mass market were dependent upon imported synthetic materials, obtained from Europe through a local retail monopolist (see section ii of this Chapter).

Most tailors and embroiderers purchased minimal inputs; their customers almost invariably supplied the material to be made up into garments, while the tailors provided thread, buttons, and other haberdashery. Only those tailors working as wage-employees for larger African or Lebanese entrepreneurs were found to be involved in tailoring for a mass market, i.e. cloth and haberdashery being purchased and made up for the market, with no clear orders made on an individual consumer basis. Nevertheless, those tailors interviewed did show evidence of different sources of supply; over 13% of the tailors used large haberdashery stores for their essential requirements while almost 57% tended to use the corner shop and market for their supplies. The choice of supplier is largely dependent upon what articles of clothing the tailor is able to produce; the tailor catering to an essentially poor and highly localised clientele, only needs to buy the occasional needle, elastic and regular quantities of thread, all of which can be bought at a small Mauritanian corner shop or the

local market. However, the tailor who has a more prosperous clientele and is able to produce suits, shirts, etc., will be obliged to buy more specialised haberdashery (i.e. interfacing, collar-stiffeners, lining materials, etc.) which will only be available at the medium or large retail establishments. Thus the 'import-content' of the haberdashery purchased by the more 'advanced' tailor, and indeed that of the finished article, will be considerably higher than that of the goods purchased and the garments produced by the more restricted tailor.

An example of the variations to be found outside the sample is that of the numerous tailors' groups operating around the central market area of the city; here, a tailor will rent a large workshop and assemble a commensurate number of others to work there. Much of the output will be sold to small African storekeepers or to itinerant traders. Nevertheless, most of the articles produced are made from bulk-purchased cloth, and often involve production in series, while work and remuneration were allocated along the same principles described with respect to shoemaking groups. These workshops, mainly in the Lebanese suburbs of central Dakar, are normally let for what can only be described as exorbitant rents, calculated expressly on the basis (well-known to the landlord) of how many tailors could be accommodated there, and how much a tailor must pay to rent alternative work-space on an individual basis. The rent would be equally divided among all the tailors occupying workspace. Tailoring enterprises of a similar scale, run on an entirely capitalist basis (namely that of wage-labour) are typically the domain of the Lebanese manufacturing entrepreneur.

The mechanics and metalworkers of Dakar had considerable commercial connections with large suppliers of, and concessionaires for, vehicle spares, specialised materials and equipment. Very few vehicle-mechanics, for instance did not purchase spare-parts either directly or indirectly from such monopolistic suppliers. There are often periodic and, indeed, chronic diffi-

culties in acquiring spares which particularly affect these mechanics and repairmen. Concessionaires have in the past only permitted sales to recognised and/or registered garages, thereby excluding many small enterprises from the potentially wider market. Nevertheless, by utilising personal contacts with more successful and 'acceptable' mechanics, or with technicians employed in the large European-owned garages (such as SCOA,-AUTO, a branch of the Lyons-based Société Commerciale de l'Ouest Afrique, or Peyrissac (of Bordeaux), small vehicle-mechanics are able to purchase (albeit indirectly) the spares that will make their services attractive to a wider clientele. As indicated in Chapter 4, in extreme cases, mechanics manufacture their own parts, or cannibalise available spares to fit vehicles whose own components are difficult to obtain; this solution is particularly prevalent in the case of repairs to the car-rapides form of public transport vehicle.

The metalworkers surveyed were divided into two distinct occupational subgroups, namely those dealing with tin, aluminium and similar metals, and those dealing predominantly with iron and steel. The former group, located primarily in the city suburb of Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker, obtained their metal inputs mainly from scrap (empty tins and metal containers, vehicle scrap, industrial waste, etc.). The metal was either purchased from specialised dealers, or is collected by metalworkers themselves, or is brought by clients themselves. Those metalworkers who used iron and steel mainly produce more advanced articles than those of their colleagues in petty foundry-work, and had much stronger links with large commercial and industrial firms, particularly those who imported transformed metal products, and those who supplied welding and industrial gases.

If one compares the sources of raw materials inputs between petty commodity producers selling principally to individual

clients, those producing for the mass market, and the sample as a whole, the following picture emerges:

Table 6.2: Sources of raw materials by market orientation (%)

Petty producers buying from:	Individual clients	Mass market	Whole sample
Medium & large firms	45	50	46
Petty & micro-suppliers	55	50	54

In other words, there appears to be only a slightly higher propensity among those producing predominantly for the mass market to purchase their raw materials inputs from relatively large industrial or commercial enterprises and, as there will inevitably be a considerable 'grey area' between the two categories, the data does not indicate any particular difference between those producing 'artisanally' and those producing predominantly for the mass market. Nevertheless, the data refer to direct commercial relationships, and exclude purchases through small scale commercial intermediaries, and therefore understate considerably the degree of overall dependence of a large proportion of petty commodity producers on raw materials inputs from large capitalist firms.

In general, few petty commodity producers were able to purchase raw materials on credit, wherever these inputs might have originated. Table 6.3. (overleaf) presents the various arrangements open to such producers and indicates that, while over 18% of all tailors had the greatest possibility of purchasing at least some of their (albeit minimal) inputs on credit, such a facility was available to only a little over 10% of the entire sample.

In terms of the conditions under which the principal material inputs for petty commodity production must be acquired, therefore, we find that something like half of those interviewed indicated that they predominantly purchased directly from large or medium-sized capitalist enterprises, while the remainder either purchased

Table 6.3: Availability of credit purchases of raw materials (%)

Occupation:	Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe makers	Metalworkers & mechanics	ALL
Never able to buy on credit	91.0	81.6	93.3	92.0	89.5
Occasionally buys some items on credit	5.2	14.1	6.7	6.4	8.0
Always able to buy some items on credit	3.8	4.3	-	1.6	2.5
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

indirectly from such sources (i.e. through much smaller trading intermediaries), or bypassed these input-circuits almost exclusively, depending upon recuperated scrap and waste products to provide the majority of their raw materials. In terms of their backward linkages, petty commodity producers are confronted by merchant capitalist (large, small, relatively autonomous, or affiliated to industrial concerns) who are in business to buy cheaply and sell expensively. Petty commodity producers are thus 'price-takers' in their raw materials markets and have little room to manoeuvre vis-à-vis those prices. Bulk-purchasing on an individual basis is only possible if the extent of one's working capital is considerable; bulk-purchasing on a co-operative basis is relatively easier, but is subject to all the problems of establishing and maintaining co-operative behaviour in an essentially highly competitive market for final goods, an environment that encourages the individualistic rather than co-operative ethic.

#### 6.1.2. Forward Linkages: the clientele of petty commodity producers

There is little evidence to suggest that large industrial firms in Dakar buy inputs other than labour-power on the domestic

market, unless these originate in sectors directly dominated by capitalism, such as groundnut cultivation. The questionnaire survey enabled certain conclusions to be drawn concerning the extent to which petty commodity producers sell their output to individuals from the same socio-economic milieu as themselves, to other petty producers and/or traders, to larger African or Lebanese enterprises, to large capitalist firms or to the State. Distinct problems arise in the collection and interpretation of data on this subject, since there is as little necessity for the majority of petty commodity producers to remember or record recent sales data as there is to record input-purchases. Much of the data collected relied wholly on petty commodity producers' memories; additional discrepancies necessarily arise from the fact that while some respondents might have exaggerated the magnitude and flow of receipts in order to impress, others might have underestimated these figures in order to emphasise their personal and business problems. Respondents were asked to recall their last ten orders, specifying also to what type of client the transaction related.

A. Furniture-makers.

Only 10% of furniture-makers had 'forward' commercial linkages of any importance with medium scale commerce, Government or large private enterprises. Two of the eight cases in question were not merely involved in furniture-making, but were also active in house-painting and construction. These enterprises were in reality hardly 'artisanal' and in very few ways 'petty'. In fact, they were on the fringe between petty commodity production and small capitalist activities, though in many aspects of the way in which they organised their work, they were considerably closer to the latter than the former. A further 10% had minimal commercial relations with small clients who themselves were petty commodity producers - some making items such as shop windows and display

cabinets for tailors and jewellers, as well as occasionally received orders from small offices. The remaining 80% of the sample sold their production exclusively to individuals either from their own social stratum, from the African middle class, or to a lesser extent from the French and 'international' elements of the population. In summary, most of the furniture-makers were principally oriented towards production for direct, final consumers; it should be remembered, however, that their input-requirements tie them very closely into the capitalist market.

#### B. Shoemakers.

The petty commodity producers who manufacture traditional footwear and other leather goods, as well as small scale repair workers and makers of charms and amulets, are quite numerous throughout the city of Dakar. The amulet-makers, repairers of sandals, etc., are completely 'artisanal' and sell directly to the final consumer. On the other hand, those who manufacture sandals, shoes (both traditional and modern) and fancy goods are essentially petty producers of commodities which are sold on the market rather than directly purchased by the consumer. Half of the shoemakers interviewed were artisans, though this probably underestimates the latter's numerical importance, since they probably constitute something closer to 75% of all leatherworkers in Dakar. The extent to which petty leather workers have access to large scale marketing, or experience relations with the 'formal' commercial circuit, varies considerably. A small number produce (albeit not exclusively) for Lebanese traders and shopkeepers, whereas the majority sell their output to a range of individuals, petty traders, and market stallholders in central Dakar. It is clear that for the majority, the greater part of their receipts is derived from sales to the petty and medium scale commercial circuit.

An additional sample was taken in Médina district of Dakar, where there is a disproportionate concentration of petty shoemaking enterprises who have tended to phase out leather in

favour of imported synthetic materials. Ninety-two percent of these shoemakers dealt to a considerable extent with both petty and medium size traders (including Lebanese retail outlets). Only two 'artisanal' shoemakers were found, and though this understates the presence of the pure artisan in the district, it gives a fairly accurate impression of the relative homogeneity and the level of development of shoemakers in this district.

By contrast, in Pikine - a vast, sprawling township outside Dakar - 76% of the shoemakers were artisans. The remainder specialised in the production of handbags, wallets, belts, and other personal articles particularly for the tourist trade. Such articles were either sold to street-traders and hawkers, or to tourist shops in the city-centre, or to the Government-operated Artisans' Village on the coast. Grand Dakar had two mestizo shoemakers from the Cape Verde Islands, and only one example of shoe-selling on a non-artisanal basis, in which a shoemaker sold half his output regularly to a single Lebanese merchant-cum-shopkeeper. The other shoemakers in this district were African artisans. In the Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker suburb, there were traditional sandal-makers (who mainly did repairs and covered charms), some tourist-oriented shoemakers, and a single 'modern' shoe-repairer. It is not surprising that a large number of traditional leatherworkers were to be found in that district, since it has a substantial Soninké community (either from the Senegal River Valley, or from the Republic of Mali) who migrate to the city during the dry season in order to earn money from a craft for which their ethnic group is well known. The tourist-oriented shoemakers of the main thoroughfare tend to be Guineans or from quite close to Dakar; they produce almost identical articles despite their dissimilar origins, i.e. all-leather sandals made to 'popular' rather than traditional designs, and some reptile-skin fashion shoes for women. These articles are not marketed in bulk like those of the Pikine producers, but are sold either to passing tourists, resident

French, Lebanese, etc., or to city youth who resell them closer to the city centre where a higher price may be charged.

The close proximity of the major centre for traditional tanning (undertaken by Mauritanian women) to the township of Pikine to some extent explains the large numbers of leatherworkers of various types to be found there. Though the average frequency of shoemaking and leatherwork establishments in Pikine as a whole does not differ much from that found in the city's Médina district (where such activities are also strongly in evidence), it did exceed the frequency of this occupation in Grand Dakar. Also, individual zones of Pikine, such as Tali Boubess, Tali Boumack and Route des Niayes, displayed the highest frequencies in the sample (138). Pikine shoemakers and leatherworkers do have the advantage in spatial terms at least, inasmuch as Pikine is also close both to the city abattoir, and to where the Mauritanian tanners work.

### C. Tailors.

Only three enterprises in the sample of 71 tailors were found to have commercial linkages with enterprises (rather than individuals) involved in marketing final consumption goods. All three of these tailoring concerns were situated in the Grand Dakar district. These three tailors were exceptional in the following way: one tailor produced modern clothing, and, though he had a viable individual clientele, appeared to sell a large proportion of his output to various European enterprises, one of whom had

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(138) The NEDECO activity-maps yielded the following frequencies for shoemaking, measured as a % of all activities enumerated in a particular suburb: Grand Dakar A, 3.1%; Grand Dakar B & D, 3.8%; Grand Dakar C, 1.3% (Grand Dakar average = 2.75%). Nimzat-Anglemouss, 2.8%; Médina Mairie, 4%; Médina Tilène, 3.3% (Medina average = 3.65%). Pikine Ganavé Rail, 1.2%; Pikine Tali Boubess, 2.6%; Pikine Tali Boumack, 4.5%; Pikine Tali Icotaf, 5.4%; Pikine Route des Niayes, 4.7% (Pikine average = 3.65%). The overall average frequency of shoemakers and leatherworkers throughout the suburbs surveyed was 3.32%.

recently placed an order for suits to the value of 160,000 francs CFA (a little over £300). This tailor was in the highest income bracket (over 100,000 francs CFA/month) and had been trained in the Military Tailoring School. A second enterprise did much of its business with the State, particularly in the manufacture of uniforms for both military and civilian services. This tailor was also a relatively high earner, though not as high as the first example. A third tailor had numerous individual clients but had recently secured a Government contract, also for the provision of uniforms. The first enterprise employed both wage-earning tailors and apprentices, while the other two employed only apprentice-labour. As was the case in other enterprises encountered outside the survey areas, those tailors who had some degree of marketing links with either capitalist enterprises or the Government purchasing authorities, tended to be characterised by some degree of institutional training, often a degree of experience in industrial wage-employment and, as a consequence, it may be suggested, had earnings higher than the occupational average.

The only exceptions to the 'artisanal' norms in Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker were a small number of tailoring workshops that produced traditional embroidered garments; some of the output of these workshops was purchased by market traders, though most of the proprietors' receipts depended upon the orders of individual clients. In Pikine, all tailors interviewed were characterised by production of articles exclusively for individual clients. In addition to the tailoring enterprises covered by questionnaire-survey, additional open-ended interviews were undertaken in other tailoring enterprises outside the survey areas. Many of these additional interviews were with tailors situated around the Sandaga Market area of central Dakar. The characteristically suburban tailor is far less in evidence in the main market area; indeed, there exists a wider range of enterprises altogether, from individual tailors (both 'traditional' and 'modern'), through tailoring co-operatives and groups producing for the market, to

relatively advanced petty capitalist enterprises (i.e. using predominantly wage-labour with some paid apprentices) typically owned and managed by Lebanese or non-Senegalese African entrepreneurs. For example, a Dahomeyan proprietor of a Sandaga tailoring business also ran a TV and radio retail stall in the market; moreover, his wife was a successful market-trader nearby.

Though in the majority of cases tailors do not do business with large capitalist enterprises, it is clear that in the market-areas, where buyers and sellers are concentrated, and transactions are far more continuous, one finds the evidence of a rapid evolution and differentiation in organisation, relations of production, orientation towards the mass market, a differentiation which is far less pronounced in the suburbs. Relations between Lebanese wholesalers and rentiers, African petty commodity producers and traders, European clients, and others are all manifested; the development of wage-employment, bulk-purchasing, sweat-shops, and petty manufacturing characterises the Sandaga Market and the surrounding areas, while many of the tailors outside this zone struggle to find a regular clientele. Much of the clothing that is not produced for immediate consumption (whether it originates from an African tailoring co-operative, or from a Lebanese capitalist workshop) finds its way almost inevitably into the hands of the petty trader, or Lebanese shopkeeper, whence it is sold to the final consumers. Much clothing is nevertheless imported, despite the proliferation of tailoring concerns, and the relatively high prices of garments manufactured abroad. Clothing of foreign origin arrives both for the luxury market, the black market (139) and for those who can only afford the very cheapest attire (140). Though there will always be a demand (both at the top of the income-scale and at

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(139) often consisting of imported 'seconds'. American tenpin bowling shirts and windcheaters, both very popular among young people, are always available at the Port's street-corner markets.

(140) See Chapter 4 on "recuperation and recycling" and Dakar's frippiers.

the bottom) for the individual self-employed tailor, the growth of local clothing manufacture, already in its early stages, is inevitable. This process inevitably affects the mass of petty tailors in the most adverse manner, though the employment effects would be more beneficial in this sector (with its relatively limited ability to substitute capital for labour) than in many others. It seems likely, though, that the enterprises which would form the basis of a clothing industry would be predominantly non-Senegalese, unless the Government decreed that all employment (including management) was to be a target for Africanisation, and provided credit for such a policy. The comments of two of the tailors interviewed are illuminating (and by no means unrepresentative):

"Young people nowadays don't wear the traditional garments, but make do with a single pair of blue-jeans. I'd be better off doing something more profitable like trading. The government ought to ask the smaller tailors to fulfil their orders rather than giving them all to the larger firms."

"What we all need is more enterprises like SIV [Société Industrielle du Vêtement], run by and employing only Senegalese. We need to organise ourselves into a trade union or professional groups, too."

#### D. Mechanics and Metalworkers.

Despite the relative 'modernity' of vehicle repairs and the demand continually present for the products of the metalworkers' workshops, again, little in the way of widespread 'forward' commercial relationships can be found from the interviews undertaken in these occupations. The suburb of Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker had more than its proportionate share of repair-workshops, as well as a substantial concentration of metalworkers. Most of the transactions in these occupations link petty commodity producers to individual customers, or to a small African enterprise; vehicles are repaired either for individual owners, or for small transport enterprises, such as those operating one or two cars-rapides.

However, there were a few cases of mechanics doing maintenance work for State institutions, but most of the Government departments' maintenance contracts were undertaken at the garages of the large European concessionaires, rather than piecemeal in the workshops of small repairmen.

As for the metalworkers, many of the more technologically advanced were integrated to a more substantial extent into commercial (and to a lesser extent, industrial) markets. The traditional African foundries sold predominantly to individual clients, but were not classical artisans, given that much of their output is produced without firm orders having been received, i.e. they are producing for a mass market, the demand conditions in which are well known to them.

Of the 11 cases of metalworkers encountered in Rebeuss, 6 had regular marketing relations, supplying either enterprises similar to themselves, or commercial or manufacturing enterprises much larger than themselves. There were four enterprises that sold predominantly to larger enterprises. One produced metal bed-frames for a large Lebanese retail outlet; another, metal armchair frames to a Lebanese firm of furniture-manufacturers; a third, metal fittings (grills, doors, railings, window frames, etc.) for large firms and institutions; another sold scrap metal to La Société Minière (a large metalworks) as well as to individual metal-founders. The remaining two enterprises - which had relations only with other petty commodity producers - comprised an African foundryman who supplied cauldrons to restaurants and street food-sellers, and a metalworker who made armchair frames that he mainly sold to a small African upholstery enterprise.

In Grand Dakar, some mechanics repaired the vehicles of small and medium sized transport firms, did maintenance on taxis and cars-rapides, but otherwise had no work from large enterprises or

the government. Metalworkers were characterised by a much greater tendency towards artisanal market relations.

In Pikine, only three out of 14 mechanics and metalworkers worked for or sold their products on any regular basis to larger enterprises; nevertheless, in these three cases the linkages were considerable, all of those concerned regularly supplying metal bed-frames, windows, grills, etc., to Lebanese wholesalers and retailers.

It is clear that at least in metalwork, there exists a substantial degree of exchange between petty commodity producers and larger (mainly commercial rather than manufacturing) enterprises; this is not so in the case of vehicle-repairs, since the European concessionaires have a relative monopoly in the supply of components. Very few small repair-shops can get regular clients from among the sections of industry, administration, etc., where regular work is available. This tends generally to be a question of their lacking competitive muscle rather than technical expertise, as one mechanic explained:

"Our greatest problem is that, in general, clients don't believe our work to be good enough, and this occurs between African and African! They seem to forget that when they take their cars to the big garages, it isn't the white man who does the work, but his Senegalese employee. And you can't bargain the price down at those places, you just have to accept the bill as it stands. Our clients should realise that we Senegalese mechanics know our job perfectly well."

From this examination of the backward and forward linkages in which petty commodity producers are involved, two major conclusions emerge. First, the majority of small scale producers are highly dependent upon (mainly imported) raw materials and capital equipment central to their chosen occupations; second, relatively few petty commodity producers interviewed in the large questionnaire survey appeared to be selling their output to larger industrial concerns (as intermediate goods) or to large commercial establish-

ments (for eventual sale to the public). In the same way that Amin (1971: 32) has claimed that Senegal's economy is extremely dependent upon imported goods to sustain its own distorted manufacturing sector, it is possible for us to propose that indigenous petty commodity production is heavily dependent on materials and equipment made available by or through Dakar-based capitalist enterprises. However, the fact that forward linkages appear to be minimal, it is nevertheless important to look more closely at the circumstances under which such relations develop and try to explain why this might occur. To do this, data on specific aspects of the four occupations surveyed here, along with other comparable aspects of other occupations, were collected outside the context of the questionnaire survey, the interpretation of which forms part of the next section of this chapter.

## 6.2. THE PARTIAL PROLETARIANISATION OF THE "DISGUISED WAGE WORKER".

In this section, an attempt will be made to show that the intervention of merchant capitalists (or other potentially powerful intermediaries) between the petty commodity producer and the mass market, may seriously limit and/or diminish the relative autonomy of the former, to the benefit of the intermediary in particular. To do this, we shall employ the concept of the "disguised wage-worker", a term intended to make a distinction, as Marx (1971: 191-223) initially did, between labour that is formally subordinated and labour that is really subordinated to capital and capitalist relations.

In the previous section, it became clear that the majority of petty commodity producers, though extremely dependent on and vulnerable to changes in the capitalist provision of many raw materials and pieces of equipment, do not have comprehensive selling relationships with larger capitalist enterprises. Those that did have such links were identified, and it is our purpose

here to provide further empirical evidence (drawn from a limited number of additional case studies), buttressed by additional theoretical considerations, so as to explain in more detail how these relations emerge and the impact they have on those involved.

The first case study related to the small sample of 25 mass market-oriented shoemakers situated in the Médina district of the city. Their case was and remains a complex one: market forces, manipulated by a multinational company and a group of Lebanese merchant capitalists forced the shoemakers to revolutionise the raw materials they used for shoe production, a change which brought many of them into subordinate positions vis-à-vis individuals, enterprises and mechanisms that, hitherto, they had not encountered.

#### 6.2.1. The Medina Shoemakers: from autonomy to subordination.

The co-existence of capitalist and petty commodity production in overlapping or directly competitive final product and/or raw materials markets has led and will continue to lead to a progressive denial of petty commodity producers' traditional access to the basic means of subsistence. Its limited strength in the competitive process favours a transformation of petty production (in so far as it finds necessary the modification of raw materials, client-type, technology, etc.) or even a complete re-orientation of its production when, for example, faced with a competitor that enjoys a high degree of monopoly. Foreign capital invested in the provision of commodities for the local market seeks to establish an unassailable market position, including privileged (if not exclusive) access to inputs, in order to ensure maximum profitability. The production of footwear (at both small and industrial scales) in Dakar, illustrates some of these tendencies.

BATA, a large multinational corporation operating in Senegal's footwear sector, produces leather and synthetic footwear on an

industrial scale; there is also a large number of enterprises (141) that, despite their relatively small scale and lack of technology, mass-produce hand-made footwear particularly in the Médina suburb of Dakar. These petty commodity producers usually work in family-organised caste groups, and had traditionally produced leather footwear to standard islamic and regional patterns as their forefathers had done. With the advent of BATA's operations, indigenous production had to switch from the use of leather to that of synthetic materials, since BATA was able to achieve a virtual monopsony in the purchase of fine leather, and has been the beneficiary of considerable Government protection. A Report on the 1968 situation of a number of Dakar-based capitalist firms, presented to a Ministerial Council Meeting, stated:

"The increase in competition in foreign markets, and the competition from local secret and illegal production of shoe-soles [using independent pieceworkers for the cutting of rubber and foam, CG] has led BATA to ask for a revision of the protection agreement from which it currently benefits."

The Report went on to suggest that piecework be prohibited in this sector, since it was clearly working to the disadvantage of the traditional small scale shoemakers and the giant firm BATA. This identifies the presence, as early as 1968, of entrepreneurs who were employing local labour to cut and shape shoe-soles on a piece-rate basis, presumably enabling shoes to be manufactured on a large scale in competition with BATA (especially) and the small workshops. A further examination of the Médina shoemakers illustrates the potential penetration of the petty commodity production process by merchant capital.

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(141) The average workshop capital of the Médina shoemakers is approximately 2,000 CFA francs for unmechanised production, and around 44,000 CFA francs for mechanised production. These units of production comprise on average a master craftsman and 2 apprentices; nevertheless, the number of workers ranged from none at all (i.e. one-person operations) to those with 8 employees.

The majority of petty commodity producers in this sector working in the Médina now produce the traditional babouche slipper almost exclusively from vinyl materials imported from EEC countries through a monopolist supplier in Dakar, though some sandals are still manufactured using local leather. Even the petty producers who work entirely for the tourist trade have tended to develop commercial relations with BATA (as indicated in the previous section of this chapter) from whom they purchase leather, opting to relinquish their traditional connections with Mauritanian women tanners, who now have been reduced to supplying only shoe-repairers and amulet-makers. This use of vinyl substitutes has brought a section of urban petty producers under the domination of industrial capital (abroad) and merchant capital (at home).

The Lebanese merchant who operates as the sole supplier of vinyl to the shoemakers has made several attempts himself to 'reorganise' these workers, using his own capital and marketing outlets. Despite the fact that many of the shoemakers are perpetually indebted to him, this 'reorganisation' has so far been unsuccessful. In this case, however, an essentially pre-capitalist production process has been progressively denied access to its traditional raw materials, and has been forced into a subordinate relationship with both industrial and merchant capital. Worse still, many of the petty producers of footwear and their workers now face the prospect of either partial proletarianisation at the hands of the merchants who, in reality, control their production, or a progressive slide towards the margins of petty production.

The transformation of self-employed producers into wage-workers in this case, as in many others, is neither possible across the board, nor is it imminent. Such a transformation can only make use of a very small number of those workers currently involved in shoemaking, since either capital-intensive and/or 'sweat-shop' techniques would be introduced in order that the reorganised production process might be competitive with existing industrial

production. For the remainder, the change would involve a reduction in the availability of their current means of production, and the consequent absorption of large numbers of self-employed into the ranks of the industrial reserve army. This does not appear to be an immediate possibility, but hardly for the reasons advanced by the Lebanese monopolist of raw materials:

"Many of the shoemakers are peasants who come here in the dry season to make a little money from their artisanal activities, returning to their villages during the rainy season to cultivate. They eat the money they earn in town, and have no long-term ideas for improving their lot. When they come back to Dakar after the harvest, they never have anything with which to start work, so they come to me, asking to borrow the materials, which they will pay for according to the success with which the year's activities meet. Mostly they don't manage to repay everything, and some never pay anything back."

The instability hinted at by the Lebanese merchant may contain some element of truth, but in all probability this generalisation reflects his experiences with the poorest and least stable of the shoemakers buying from him. Further inquiries into the attachment of these shoemakers to rural farming, and the possibility that they might merit the epithet 'unstable', indicated that none of the shoemakers with whom this merchant might reasonably have had commercial relations (either selling raw materials, or buying up the shoes they produce) actually claimed to be recipients of additional incomes, either from agriculture or elsewhere. While the shoemakers' statements may be open to some doubt, they had on average resided in Dakar for approximately 16 years, and their average age was almost 41.

Consequently, there is little to indicate that the Médina shoemakers were financially as inextricably bound to agriculture as the Lebanese had suggested. It seems likely that they are actually characterised by considerable stability. If so, why have the suppliers of raw materials been unable to reorganise footwear production more 'efficiently', given the apparent indebtedness to

and dependence on a few Lebanese merchants? Apart from the fact that the petty producers of Dakar have been known in the past to strongly resist the possibility of capitalist takeover of their activities (142), the existence of a large industrial concern such as BATA is a potential threat to any such scheme, protective investors fearing a price war with the industrial giant. At present the two footwear production processes in Dakar produce largely differentiated articles, with only a moderate degree of direct competition. Any incursion into more efficient and competitive production based on those who currently operate as petty producers would upset that fragile balance. Shoe production for mass consumption is certainly an area that capitalist industry would wish to monopolise; only the small producers of footwear in the Médina stand in the way of such a monopoly, and the erosion of their independence, which is already at its intermediate stage, may be merely a matter of time (143).

The merchants interviewed tended to rationalise their own inability to overcome the constraints affecting their attempts to reorganise footwear production, by reference to petty producers' lack of business motivation, their profligacy, their inability to co-operate and their individualistic ambitions:

"They all have this idea of becoming a boss, and it is this, I believe, which holds them back. This is why you see shoe-making workshops all over. Everyone wants to produce by himself, and so the competition is cruel and few manage to succeed at all. It would be good fortune indeed if they could all get together and have a large workshop, well-stocked and well-run."

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(142) See Tricoire (1973).

(143) That BATA is concerned about a substantial heightening of competition is verified by the Report to the Ministerial Council cited above.

### 6.2.2. The Artisans' Village: from weaver to wage-worker.

Another example of the transition from the relative autonomy of the artisanal petty commodity producer to the more subordinate position of a quasi-wage worker is given by the weavers of the Artisans' Village in Dakar. This Government-sponsored institution invited a wide range of master-artisans to set up their workshops at the Village, primarily to make articles for the tourist trade. The Government would advertise the Village at Soumbédioune as the only place where tourists could buy souvenirs with confidence. At the Village there were principally wood-sculptors, weavers, leather-workers and jewellers, the majority of whom produce for individual tourists' orders and purchases, for local petty commerce, and for large orders negotiated by the OSA (the Senegalese Artisans' Board, the public institution that manages the Village). The prices asked for these large orders were usually unknown to the weavers, and the remuneration to the producers for their articles was fixed annually by the Board. Initially, guaranteed prices and supplies of raw materials were arranged, and no workshop rents were asked. Later, the guarantees were suspended and the weavers forced to purchase their thread on the open market at double the ruling price at the time when the Village was created. Workshop rents were also imposed. A certain number of master craftsmen and their apprentices left, either to return to their villages as artisan-peasants, or to attempt to reintegrate themselves into urban independent weaving.

The interpretation offered by van Dijk (1976a:23) of why the OSA's involvement in the Artisans' Village was considered a failure does not really examine the objective conditions of the Village artisans more than superficially:

"OSA also provided raw materials for the artistic artisans. It was supposed to fix the selling price and in effect published a list with these prices. But since costs are not known (no adequate book-keeping existed) and the artisans preferred to determine their own prices, the system did not work (...)

The system of providing raw materials was suspended at one stage because the money did not come back quickly enough. One of the reasons for the poor payments record was that the government had also been slow to pay for its orders for which OSA had pre-financed the raw materials."

The chef d'atelier of the weavers at the Artisan's Village had heard that we were interested in working conditions there, and gave a long interview from which it was abundantly clear that the weavers themselves had the impression that "they had lost their freedom" and "were now nothing more than wage-workers". The weavers, who had been guaranteed a supply of raw materials at pre-determined prices and other forms of assistance at the inception of the Village soon found these facilities curtailed. Credit-provisions, which had allowed yarn to be purchased and woven up, and only paid for when the cloth had been sold, were also suspended. Originally, a weaver could buy the three packets of thread necessary to produce a large tablecloth for a total of 1,800 francs CFA, produce the article and sell it for 6,000 francs CFA. This arrangement was satisfactory to the craftsmen, and could earn them approximately 25,000 francs CFA net per month. As from 1971, however, the weavers were obliged to purchase on the open market; usually several of them would order thread simultaneously, thus permitting a bulk-purchase to be made. Since the guarantee system ceased, the price of thread has almost doubled, while the administered price of the weavers' finished articles has not risen more than marginally. The consequent drop in weavers' real incomes is evidenced by the corresponding figures for the more recent period: in 1974 thread had to be purchased at 3,450 francs CFA for a tablecloth, which could be sold for less than 7,000 francs. In the interim period, relatively high workshop rents have also been introduced. Consequently, many weavers have ceased the production of costly cloth for the tourist trade and concentrate on producing pagnes or skirt-lengths for Senegalese women, to whom they sell either directly, or through an intermediary (usually a petty trader). This production requires less costly materials and

realises something like 450 to 700 francs per day from the production of 5 such skirt-lengths. But costs are still higher, and the normal overheads (apprentices' upkeep, transport, food, etc.) must be covered. Some weavers (144) have decided to leave weaving altogether, or at least to concentrate on the mass market rather than the tourist market.

Weavers who had managed to secure a place at the Artisans' Village must have originally considered themselves fortunate, but the increasing costs, the revoking of price- and supply-guarantees, and other changes made their situation no better than their independent colleagues. The management of the Village also caused considerable problems for the weavers, as well as conflict between workers and the authorities. It was the OSA rather than the weavers who received the large orders, which were then communicated to those who would carry out the work; the weavers were paid according to an agreement arrived at in the early months of each year. The weavers also did not know what bargains had been struck between the OSA and potential larger buyers, as all the marketing and administration functions were centralised. Many weavers objected to this monopolisation of large scale marketing and believed that this prevented the development of a viable small industry based on the production of traditional woven cloth. The weavers were unable to direct their own work, alternating between small orders for individuals and for sale to tourists, and what amounted to wage-work for the OSA whenever large orders could be secured. And yet the OSA seemed reluctant and/or unable to manage the purchasing of raw

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(144) The weavers who operated in the Artisans' Village were only a small minority of the total number of weavers working in Dakar; the rest are 'independent' and unattached to any formal organisation other than the large collective work-groups of which most independent weavers are members. Such weaving groups produce pagnes for individual or commercial purchase, but do not operate in the city throughout the year. Most weavers of this sort come to the city only during the dry season, particularly from the Senegal Valley region close to the Malian border.

materials, a task which was very soon left to the weavers themselves. This is a good example of a proletarianisation process which commences with the taking-over of the marketing function the petty commodity producer in a somewhat anarchic and profiteering manner, and which eventually evolves into a more 'rational' and complete process in which the employer becomes a true capitalist by also supplying the workers with means of production, thereby enforcing the real subsumption of labour by capital, where only a formal subsumption had previously existed.

Naturally, the weavers would have preferred materials with relatively constant prices, and in relatively constant supply, in order to ensure stable incomes and continuity of work. There existed no real facilities for the weavers to make bulk-purchases, and even though some had discussed the possibility of approaching banks to establish the requisite credit facilities, the weavers were in no position alone to fulfil the conditions laid down by the banks for access to such credit. It is clear that the weavers at the Artisans' Village had benefitted little from their involvement with a government institution, and from being relatively autonomous producers had been transformed into "disguised" wage-workers.

These types of results are not uncommon when attempts are made to intervene in order to 'promote', for instance, the tourist industry: craftsmanship is destroyed, the artistic integrity of much artisanal production is debased, villages are swept aside as tourist complexes spring up, and the character of entire regions is modified to fit in with the development of a 'boom' industry. In such cases, it is not surprising to find concrete evidence of proletarianisation, since the principal way in which individual capitalists and/or the government can ensure (1) that the market is supplied to the extent required and (2) that an increasing surplus appropriated from those coming under the sway of capital, is by transforming the relatively independent nature of petty commodity production first of all into a formally autonomous but, in reality, subordinate product-

ion and second, to further subordinate the labour process by establishing 'disguised' wage-employment. In such a situation, the craftsman is divested of the last traces of autonomy, without a formal recognition of his new proletarian status. In this way, with flexibility and cost-efficiency built in, the capitalist mode of production in its dealings with petty commodity producers, wins both on the roundabouts and on the swings.

### 6.2.3. Co-operatives & brokers.

Another example of the manner in which relatively independent petty commodity producers are integrated into a framework in which exploitation may occur through an 'external' party gaining control over the production process (either continuously or intermittently (145), is that Government procurement contracts for such articles as uniforms, school furniture, etc. This can be illustrated by looking at the relationship between government contracts for commodities within the productive capabilities of petty commodity producers on the one hand, and the 'entrepreneurs' who locate themselves between the contract and the petty commodity producer. Such 'entrepreneurs' gain a quasi-monopoly of contracts and information relating to government and private sector local purchases, despite their often considerable ignorance of the production processes required to complete the contracts. They are able to use accumulated wealth and social and/or political contacts to secure valuable contracts, which they then subcontract to petty commodity producers unacceptable to the State or private enterprise as legitimate contractors. Few such producers are able to gain individual access to contracts,

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(145) as opposed to what might be termed - inaccurately, some would claim - "exploitation through the market", i.e. in the sphere of circulation rather than within the production and labour processes themselves.

and must fulfil numerous bureaucratic requirements (usually beyond their financial capabilities) in order to be accepted. Few are sufficiently endowed with equipment or the liquid reserves necessary to purchase raw materials in bulk, and hence are not taken seriously as potential contractors.

The cooperative perhaps offers a vehicle for becoming an independent contractor, enabling small producers to appropriate for themselves the remuneration which would otherwise accrue to the entrepreneur or freelance broker. Nevertheless, apart from the fact that cooperatives are a classic example of ostensible collaboration operating in a highly competitive and privileged tendering system, individual members of cooperatives may often have less confidence in being able to compete successfully as a co-operator in competition with established 'brokers', than in their ability to secure smaller contracts individually against known competition. Thus petty commodity producers are often unable to benefit from State or other contracts in any direct sense, their small scale and consequent lack of economic 'muscle', their limited access to information, and wide spatial dispersion permitting the rise of a new stratum of enterprising brokers. These intermediaries' accumulated wealth and/or business and personal contacts permit a transfer of surplus to take place from the source of their enrichment without their physical involvement in the production of commodities.

#### 6.2.4. Partial proletarianisation & chain-subcontracting.

Another example of a mechanism through which formerly autonomous labour (this time, specifically that of the petty commodity producer's own employees) may become subordinated to capital is the practice of chain sub-contracting in the construction industry and illustrates how contractual relations might provide the mode of articulation between capitalist accumulation (both among large foreign companies and indigenous entrepreneurs) and the gradual partial proletarianisation of the domestic labour force. A foreign-

owned construction company received a contract to build a small housing estate, and provided site personnel consisting of a manager, a carpenter and two labourers. The work of the entire site was subcontracted to various independent Senegalese entrepreneurs, some of whom fulfilled contracts themselves, others subcontracting their own share of the work to jobbing builders. The latter either completed these tasks themselves using apprentices and journeymen, or again subcontracted individual houses or parts of houses to others who performed the work with their own apprentices and journeymen.

This chain subcontracting indicates the way in which relative status and privilege, as well as differential liquidity situations, permit a succession of unproductive intermediaries to appropriate large portions of the aggregate remuneration, while those actually performing the work earn little (in the case of jobbing builders) or nothing at all (in the case of apprentices). Thus many of the costs normally accruing to capitalist firms are removed, the original contractor having no obligation to pay negotiated wage rates, pension contributions, etc., to a large labour force. The supply of cheap labour in construction is ensured by the profit available to the broker or subcontractor at each stage of the process.

Before attempting, in the next section, to elaborate a theoretical framework into which these trends towards diminished autonomy among petty commodity producers can be fitted, it would be interesting to know if petty commodity producers themselves entered into sub-contractual relations with each other, alongside and/or instead of with more powerful merchant- or industrial-capitalists.

Where such 'horizontal' subcontractual relations existed, and this was comparatively rare, they did so largely on a basis of mutual co-operation. If offered a contract which he was unable to fulfil within the allotted time with his current labour-force and equipment, a petty shoemaker, for example, might accept the order,

and allocate some of the work to a relative or colleague in a nearby shoemaking workshop. In such cases, the remuneration received by the petty producer receiving the additional work would not differ substantially from that accruing to him without the intermediation of another petty commodity producer. Other occupations also threw up occasional examples of this type of co-operative "subcontracting", while even more occasionally, relations between now self-employed petty commodity producers and their former employers took on a more concrete subcontractual form. A self-employed vehicle-mechanic explained:

"From time to time I do work for Anton Khoury [a relatively large Lebanese-owned transport company] if they have a particularly tricky piece of machinery to repair. I am paid for each piece of work performed rather than on the basis of any retainer."

Among tailors, some subcontracting takes place during one tailor's absence from Dakar (during a vacation, or if he returns to his village to plant or harvest crops), usually with a view to maintaining one's clientele intact and satisfied, rather than through any desire to earn a profit from a colleague's work. In other cases, less-skilled tailors may be given an order for clothes, part of which they are insufficiently skilled to produce; in order to fulfil the order as a whole, the difficult part would be taken to another tailor, who would be paid accordingly (since both parties to the transaction would be well aware of the 'normal' selling price of the article).

Similarly, vehicle mechanics occasionally subcontracted work they were unable to do themselves to those who had the requisite skills. In some cases, these colleagues may have no more than an amicable professional relationship with the 'contractor' (as in the case of a mechanic who contracts out paint-spraying, battery-charging, etc., to those either with the skills, or the equipment which he himself lacks); at the other extreme, there may be a degree of 'clientship' and dependence between contractor and

recipient, as in the cases where the owner of a repair-shop lets space out to small specialists such as battery-chargers, painters, welders, etc., and uses them as and when the need arises (Koll 1969). It is unlikely that all sub-contracting involves such patron-client relations, and the potential for a limited degree of exploitation, yet it is in these cases that the recipient of sub-contracted work may be in a position which precludes any discussion of 'a fair price for the job'. The dividing line between reciprocal co-operation (on the basis of gaining maximum profit from local skills and equipment to the benefit of all concerned) and outright exploitation (on the basis of relations of personal dependence) is vague in a society in which religion, caste, ethnic group, age group and a host of other variables interpenetrate with and exert influence over the economic activities of the petty producer, and where the existence of unambiguous impersonal relations of wage-employment is still only discernible to a relatively small extent. This is an extremely pertinent issue, since it relates quite directly to finding answers to questions such as "does exploitation only take place under capitalist relations?", and "can exploitation take place if, in reality, the labour process is characterised by a complex of relations of production (some inside the workshop, others outside) and degrees of proletarianisation?"

In the bulk of the present chapter, we are aiming to substantiate the fact that proletarianisation is a complex, analytically and empirically divisible process, rather than a simple once-and-for-all unambiguous one. In the final section, when the conditions under which petty commodity producers may undergo a transition towards capitalism, we will reconsider whether exploitation is already present, or only then starts to emerge.

#### 6.2.5. A theoretical digression: the formal and real subsumption of labour to capital

The claim that the objective relations of production under which the mass of the urban (or indeed rural) poor works in underdeveloped capitalist are more ambiguous than some theorists would have us believe, has been made a number of times in recent years (Bernstein 1979; MacEwen Scott 1979; Birkbeck 1977, 1979; Gerry & Birkbeck 1979; Bromley & Gerry 1979) (146). In fact, such doubts have led to the situation where a number of apparently distinct relations of production can be brought together under the same heading, such that we are confronted with a continuum rather than a duality or dichotomy. Different sections of the economically active population come under the sway of capital and capitalist relations to a greater or lesser extent through different mechanisms which link together the dominant capitalist mode of production and a number of subordinate forms of production (such as petty commodity production). In this way, rural cash-crop farmers whose economic activities are subordinated to monopolistic Marketing Boards or powerful commercial intermediaries have often been labelled "proletarians" or "semi-proletarians", even though they may clearly retain formal ownership (on an individual, collective, communal or 'customary' basis) of their means of production.

The important features to identify in such situations are the processes which may circumscribe all or any aspects of the direct producer's ownership (or more importantly his control) over the entire labour process. Thus questions need to be raised concerning not only who provides inputs and on what terms, nor just how the final product is marketed and the surplus distributed, but also about the limitations which may be placed on the labour process itself through changes in management, supervisory and other


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(146) See also the substantial hints in this direction given by Lenin (1972b: 527, 530-1, 534-5).

functions. The basis for such an analysis was long ago laid by Marx in his analysis of the progressive phases of what he termed the subsumption of labour to capital (see e.g. Marx 1971: 191-223).

In his discussions of 'marginal' occupations in Cali, Colombia, Birkbeck (1977, 1979) examines the hierarchically-organised market for recycled domestic and industrial waste. The market hierarchy is characterised by links between a Colombian affiliate of a trans-national corporation (Mobil Oil), through a number of intermediaries, and individual garbage-pickers working on the city dump, as indicated in Figure 6.A. (below).

FIGURE 6.A: The Market Hierarchy in Waste-Paper Recycling, Cali, Colombia\*



\* Simplified version of diagram in Birkbeck (1979:175).

The central and satellite warehouses that buy waste paper and other materials collected by pickers from the dump, are normally

financed to a greater or lesser extent by the factory, though they retain legal autonomy; though the inter-relationships are more complex than indicated above, Birkbeck (1978:9-10) concludes:

"[B]y his sales to any of the three kinds of intermediaries (...) the garbage picker is directly linked into the industrial system as a pieceworker (...) The income (...) is thus to a large extent determined by the prices commanded by recycled raw materials, and these prices represent nothing more than the price of the labour-power of the garbage picker at any particular time. The surplus generated by garbage picking is appropriated in the first instance by the various intermediaries who deal in waste materials, and more importantly by the factories (...) The garbage picker is thus little more than an industrial outworker - a disguised wage-worker."

In the same city of Cali, a substantial number of youth, and very many adults of both sexes earn either their entire income or a substantial part of it by selling tickets for a form of gambling called chance (147). Private companies provide the tickets, selling tables, and regulate to a considerable degree their work-patterns and to an almost exclusive extent the prices charged to the public. This, and a great proportion of so-called 'commission-selling' on the streets of cities like Cali or Dakar is carried out under analogous conditions, 'commission' being a euphemism for 'piece-rate'. Commenting on subcontractual relations, found in Lima, Peru, between small tailors and shoemakers on the one hand, and merchant capitalists on the other, Alison MacEwen Scott (1979:114-115) proposes that such relations indicate

"the inadequacy of the self-employed/wage-labourer dichotomy. There are artisans with differing degrees of autonomy over the production process, and outworkers who have none, yet to some degree all these producers own their implements of production. In both these categories there are workers who, strictly speaking, should be classified as employers since they utilise wage-labour, although they are not fully

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(147) The 'punter', in order to win a fixed multiple of the stake, must predict the last three numbers of that day's State lottery.

capitalist entrepreneurs, since they are themselves direct producers and also employ family labour (...)”.

Thus, as indicated both by the examples cited above and by the general theoretical considerations advanced in the first chapter of the present study, there exists a high degree of differentiation among what has been called either the 'informal sector' or 'petty commodity production'. In elaborating a Marxist analysis of the labour process characterising the 'low points' of uneven capitalist development, great care should be taken not to replace bourgeois dualistic formulations with equally static, ahistorical and inflexible analyses. To avoid this possibility, and to make progress in the elaboration of a more rigorous analysis of the labour process, class formation and class differentiation in under-developed capitalist economies, it seems appropriate to make use of what Wright (1976) has termed "contradictory class locations".

A recent (though not unproblematic) example of a move in the desired direction has been the literature on the petite bourgeoisie. At the level of appearances, at least, many petty commodity producers (or members of the 'informal sector' if this terminology still be preferred) would seem to have much in common with the classical characteristics of the petit bourgeois stratum. And yet no real agreement has been reached upon what constitutes a 'petite bourgeoisie, either in the metropolitan capitalist 'centre', or in the less developed capitalist zones of its 'periphery'.

Poulantzas (e.g. 1977) has identified a group in developed capitalist society that owns capital, controls the production process, and yet employs no wage-labour, which he calls the "traditional petite bourgeoisie". He also characterises various managers, technocrats and supervisory staff in large private and public enterprises as a "new petite bourgeoisie". Wright (1976) offers a critique and elaboration of this analysis. Wright finds himself in basic agreement with Poulantzas's definition of the "traditional petite bourgeoisie" but finds the identification of

a "new petite bourgeoisie" problematic in a number of ways. Wright lays particular stress on the importance of making a distinction (both theoretically and empirically) between what he terms "economic ownership" of the means of production and its "possession". This distinction clearly relates to the more common debate between Marxists over the possible co-existence of de jure social(ist) ownership of the means of production and their de facto private and/or corporate control.

Elsewhere (Gerry & Birkbeck 1979), Wright's analysis has been slightly modified and extended, so as to be more applicable to the empirical reality of fairly typical underdeveloped capitalist societies. The figure below summarises this reformulation (148): the labour-force is categorised according to more rigorously-defined relations with capital, and this categorisation is substantiated through a disaggregation of a number of possible ownership and production relations into their constituent elements.

FIGURE 6.B: Ownership, control and appropriation by degree of subsumption of labour to capital.

	Ownership of means of production	Control over production process	Appropriation of surplus by direct producer
Pure self- employment	+	+	+
Disguised wage- employment	+/-	+/-	-
Direct wage- employment	-	-	-

Though it might be argued that this formulation does nothing more than replace a dichotomy with a threefold division, this is

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(148) The stimulus of discussing the Wright thesis, and its applicability to underdeveloped countries, with my colleague Chris Birkbeck at the Centre for Development Studies, University College of Swansea, were instrumental to the development of the ideas set out in this section of the thesis.

not the case. The three categories of labour-capital relations are little more than discrete points or narrow bands on a continuum, the relative proportions of which will vary from time to time and from one social formation to another. It is possible to conceive of a category intermediate between 'pure' self-employment and 'disguised wage employment' which is characterised by the renting of the principal means of production, whereby control over the production process is still maintained and the appropriation of surplus still lies in the hands of the direct producer. Nevertheless, rent may be variable, according to general demand for the means of production in question and/or the surplus which can be generated by the particular economic pursuit. These categories are identified in order to illustrate a complex and subtle continuum of relations between labour and capital, some more, others less exploitative than the rest.

Wright (1976:26) terms such intermediate categories "contradictory class locations". In the context of underdeveloped capitalist economies, we could accept that "disguised wage-workers" (among others) constitute a group whose "class location" is internally contradictory, since the relations of production within a small workshop may encourage the reproduction of a petit bourgeois ideology (consisting e.g. of individualism, opposition to government control or intervention, etc.), while the 'extended' relations of production between it and a more dominant firm (for which it regularly provides inputs) may suggest that its workers are also (and perhaps predominantly) subject to relations of production that are objectively capitalist.

In such circumstances, we might not expect the small workshop proprietor to be subject to precisely the same tendencies as his work-force. If exclusive subcontractual relations between a small workshop and a large commercial or industrial concern exist, the workshop proprietor may be gradually converted into a co-opted, semi-autonomous worker operating on behalf of the larger enterprise

and its interests, even though a pretence of autonomy may be kept up or both sides. The workshop workers (apprentices and journeymen, for example) need not undergo such a conversion, since the conservation of pre-capitalist production relations in the small workshop may be more advantageous to both the formal workshop proprietor and its dominant 'partner'. But, as indicated in the first chapter, the dialectic of dissolution - conservation ensures that such a situation always has the potential for rapid and substantial change.

In concluding this section, a schema will be presented that attempts to summarise the various employment categories suggested above (and some additional ones introduced in the previous sections of the present chapter) in terms a number of concepts that are central to the Marxist analysis of class formation and the labour process. The schema presented below is of interest inasmuch as it permits a more detailed and disaggregated 'ideal typical' view to be taken of the urban labour-force in underdeveloped capitalist economies without committing the error common to virtually all bourgeois formulations and far from absent in the vulgar Marxist approach, namely the analysis of the mass of the urban working poor as a virtually homogeneous and residual category.

The schema is a first step in elaborating a more detailed view of the labour process and class-formation and is itself not unproblematic. The major problem may be a tendency towards a functionalist type of approach: when looking at the degree of penetration of formerly-autonomous labour processes by capital, it is relatively easy to see the pre-capitalist enterprise as having a subordinate and purely functional relationship with capital. Petty commodity production does not exist in order to serve and service capitalism: as Portes (1978) claims quite convincingly (even though only half the picture is so convincingly presented) there are senses in which capitalism itself also depends upon petty commodity production. Thus it is clear that we require a framework for the

FIGURE 6 C: LABOUR-FORCE FRACTIONS AND MARXIST ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES

FRACTION OF LABOUR FORCE	'DIRECT' WAGE EMPLOYMENT	RESERVE ARMY OF LABOUR	'DISGUISED' WAGE EMPLOYMENT	'PURE' SELF EMPLOYMENT	RESIDUUM (OPENLY UNEMPLOYED; LUMPEN-PROLETARIAT)
GENERAL DESCRIPTION	(1) Workers in capitalist industry (i.e. 'formal sector')	(2) Casual workers in capitalist industry (both permanent & circulating between this & petty commodity production; rare periods of more permanent wage employment)	(3) Small proprietors and/or their workers with consistent sub-contractual and similar relations with capitalist industry	4) Small proprietors independent of sub-contractual, out-working and similar relations, producing for individual clients or intermediaries.	(5) Unsuccessful sellers/users of labour-power.
LABOUR POWER REPRODUCED VIA	(6) Repetitious sale of labour-power in the capitalist production process	(7) Intermittent sale of labour-power + some petty commodity production, services & elements of (10)	(8) Piece-rate 'wage' + perhaps elements of (9) (apprentice exploitation in evidence)	(9) Petty commodity production (including some apprentice exploitation + intra-family transfers)	(10) Combined elements of (6) (7) (8) & (9) but also possibly begging, extortion, political 'employment', family parasitism, illegal transfers.
OWNERSHIP & PRODUCTION RELATIONS	Ownership maintained	-	- / +	+	+ / -
PRODUCTION PROCESS	Production process controlled	-	- / +	+	+ / -
RELATIONS	Surplus appropriated by direct producer	-	- / +	+	+ / -
FUNDAMENTAL LABOUR-CAPITAL RELATIONSHIP	Real subsumption of labour to capital	Real (but intermittent) subsumption of labour to capital, perhaps alternating with formal subsumption of labour to capital	Formal subsumption of labour to capital on a relatively permanent basis	Labour-process subordinated to capital in sphere of circulation, no subsumption in sphere of production.	Either minimal relations with capital, or differing degrees of subsumption of labour to 'illegal' capital.
GENERAL 'FUNCTIONAL' RELATIONSHIP WITH CAPITALIST MODE OF PRODUCTION	Labour directly 'functional' in capitalist production and accumulation.	Alternating membership of capitalist labour-force as well as 'functional' relative surplus population, varying with cycles of capitalist accumulation.	Labour directly 'functional' but also subject to changes according to cycles of capitalist accumulation.	Indirectly 'functional' (via the provision of wage goods and as a 'back-up battalion' to the industrial reserve army).	Occasionally 'functional' (in political rather than economic terms) but more typically 'dysfunctional' (i.e. disruptive and therefore costly).

analysis of this dialectical, rather than functional relationship. Nevertheless, it is hoped that some elements of such a framework have been suggested here.

To elaborate this schema in a little more detail, we can take each 'fraction' separately:

(1) Direct wage-workers in capitalist industry and allied commercial activities reproduce their labour-power through the relatively stable and continuous selling of that labour-power: theirs is a real subsumption of labour to capital.

(2) Casual workers in capitalist industry and allied commercial activities reproduce their labour-power either through the intermittent sale of labour-power, or through intermittent involvement in various labour processes, only one of which is a capitalist labour process (i.e. part-time casual worker, part-time petty tradesman or commodity producer). Casual workers are mid-way or transitional between what might be described as 'functional' participation in the 'active' (i.e. capitalist) labour-force and membership of the relative surplus population. Theirs is a real, yet probably intermittent, subsumption of labour to capital that alternates with a merely formal subsumption.

(3) 'Disguised wage-workers' operate in labour processes which, at the level of appearances, seem to be part of a subordinate form of production dominated by the capitalist mode, but which are in fact far more integrated into the dominant mode through extended relations of production (manifested in subcontractual, outworking and similar arrangements with capitalist firms). Labour may be formally under the sway of capital. In extreme cases, the only factor differentiating 'disguised wage workers' from 'direct' wage-workers will be that the administrative and juridical super-structure will refuse to accord the former direct and contractual wage-worker status. This implies that from the point of view of the

economic base, such 'disguised wage-workers' are very close to experiencing all aspects of real subsumption to capital.

(4) Petty commodity producers (i.e. members of the labour-force who exercise skills within subordinate forms of production, co-existing with but dominated by the capitalist mode through backward and forward linkages) reproduce their labour-power largely via relatively autonomous direct production. Petty commodity producers are directly 'functional' vis-à-vis capitalism, inasmuch as their production of relatively cheap wage-goods lowers the variable capital which is advanced for capitalist production, holds down industrial wages and facilitates capital accumulation. They are also indirectly 'functional' vis-à-vis capitalism inasmuch as they produce very large quantities of general means of subsistence for the mass of the population. Theirs is a subordination of labour essentially located in the sphere of circulation, while the process of production retains a relatively substantial degree of autonomy.

(5) Predominantly unsuccessful sellers of labour-power, who are largely parasitical (149) upon relatives, their own class, or on other groups, and may or may not constitute members of the 'lumpen-proletariat', have multifarious means of reproducing their own labour-power and providing for their families. These range from very intermittent wage-work, family parasitism, and various forms of illegitimate or criminal activity. Here minimal relations with organised capital exist; in many ways their relationship with capitalism can be described as at best non-functional, and at worst positively dysfunctional.

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(149) i.e. parasitical on a personal, non-coercive, overt basis (transfers of cash and/or services from person to person, support within the extended family for those least able to support themselves, etc.) or parasitical on a coercive and/or covert basis (transfers from individuals or groups through violence, threat or clandestine appropriation, e.g. pickpocketing, theft, burglary, fraud, etc.).

The above typology and its associated, while appearing to provide a useful starting point for a more rigorous, concrete and disaggregated methodology for examining the urban labour-force in underdeveloped capitalist economies, nevertheless has certain limitations: it is still relatively over-aggregated and oversimplified (inasmuch as it identifies 'ideal typical' fractions of the labour-force) compared to the reality that one confronts in Third World cities. In this sense, it provides the major elements of a continuum of labour-forms, each having a relatively discrete articulation with the dominant capitalist mode of production.

Marx (1970:643.4) used similar even more disaggregated sub-categories of the labour-force to illustrate the complex composition of the industrial reserve army:

"The lowest sediment of the relative surplus population finally dwells in the sphere of pauperism. Exclusive of vagabonds, criminals, prostitutes, in a word, the 'dangerous' classes, this layer of society consists of three categories. First, those able to work. One need only glance superficially at the statistics of English pauperism to find that the quantity of paupers increase with every crisis, and diminishes with every revival of trade. Second, orphans and pauper children. These are candidates for the industrial reserve army, and are, in time of great prosperity (...) speedily and in large numbers enrolled in the active army of labourers. Third, the demoralised and ragged, those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their incapacity for adaption, due to the division of labour (...)"

Another limitation of this approach is that it is relatively difficult to incorporate into this schema the different positions of petty proprietors and their workshop labourers vis-à-vis capital and the capitalist mode of production. As indicated in the latter pages of the first chapter, the relationship between, for example, master and apprentice, may appear to contradict the extended relations between workshop proprietor and a dominant industrial or merchant capitalist enterprise. We have attempted in this study to show the manner in which such an apparent contradiction may be

explained through the use of the concept of a dialectic of dissolution - conservation. In this way, and using the analytical categories outlined above, analysts may be better placed to determine the extent to which the extended relations of production experienced by the petty proprietor may condition and modify, or preserve and concretise the relations of personal dependence between him and his small labour-force.

### 6.3. THE INTERMITTENT PROLETARIANISATION OF THE CASUAL WORKER IN CAPITALIST INDUSTRY

An extremely sizeable and important section of the urban population in underdeveloped capitalist countries which tends to be frequently left out of account in analyses of the labour-force is constituted by the mass of casual workers which is employed either on a day-to-day or on a less frequent basis in relatively large enterprises. Seen in the appropriate context, (since it makes up the majority of the direct urban reserve army), this mass of labourers plays an important role in the aggregate urban labour-force. The labour market in cities such as Dakar allocates members of the casual labour-force in an extremely imperfect manner - at least from the viewpoint of those who are allocated: they can be regarded as constituting a mass of labour which is conjuncturally surplus to the requirements of capitalist industry and commerce. Casual workers often have few skills that can be profitably exercised in petty commodity production; many have only been intermittently successful in selling the only commodity they possess, namely their own labour-power.

As indicated in a more theoretical vein in Chapter 1, the intermittent and poorly remunerated employed offered by capitalist enterprises to casual workers, is entirely consistent with the aims of the dominant mode of production. The existence of a reservoir of unattached labour-power provides considerable

benefits to capitalist industry, depressing (as it does) the wage-rates applicable to more permanent members of the industrial-commercial labour-force, by dint of the fact that it offers capitalist enterprises the possibility of increasing labour-productivity - mainly through the selective introduction of more technically-advanced instruments of production - and simultaneously reserving a wide range of tasks to relatively unskilled workers, who can be employed as and when required. Clearly, the knowledge that there are always those who "stand and wait" outside the factory gates, ensures a greater degree of labour compliancy, than is guaranteed by the already close Institutional links between the trade union movement and the dominant political party (the UPS - l'Union Progressiste Sénégalaise).

The type of capitalist development which has been experienced during the 1960s and 1970s by countries such as Senegal has had a particularly palpable impact upon the more heavily-populated and industrialised urban areas. This development necessarily produces a relative surplus population of working-age which is made up of individuals who rely almost exclusively on infrequent and discontinuous periods of employment of various types in the urban areas. The 'superfluity' of this fraction of the labour-force should not be understood in any absolute sense; the surplus is a relative phenomenon, due to the fact that, in capitalist industry there is an inability and indeed, an unwillingness, to absorb anything more than a minute proportion of the annual increments in the potentially-active labour-force. This applies to all workers, to a greater or lesser extent, whether they are skilled or unskilled, experienced or otherwise, but it is crucially important in the case of new entrants into the labour market. However, in general it is those who possess few or inappropriate skills who inevitably suffer the worst consequences of a problem that consists of the grossly inefficient utilisation of the available labour-power in an economy in which that particular resource is abundant,

and the generation of an adequate income is a priority for the mass of the population.

The majority of those who are employed in this way by large industrial and commercial concerns are merely transient members of the industrial labour-force. Even though they are only minimally integrated into the small industrial working class, in terms of their aspirations, subjective consciousness of the work situation, and their attitudes to other members of the labour-force, the cultural, social and economic life of the casual worker has many similarities to that of the 'self-employed' petty commodity producer. Though experience in the industrial sector, and the continual knowledge that work - for him - comes and goes with apparent disregard for his own needs, the casual worker may be regarded as being inextricably linked to petty commodity production. He emerges as a highly mobile floating labourer, surplus in the long run to the requirements of the industrial sector. Unable to find regular employment, he is forced to apply whatever skills and ingenuity he possesses to the task of feeding and supporting both himself and his dependents. In addition, he must search for any kind of employment, unlike the educated unemployed who may well be 'parasitical' on friends and family until 'something turns up'. The response of casual workers to their objective situation is of necessity normally a defensive one, for it is this group par excellence that can be pushed from pillar to post, then left to its own devices when additional labour is no longer required.

Casual workers are therefore in an extremely weak position to act collectively; their militancy may well be expressed through other organisations (ethnic, community-based, or otherwise) which have internalised appropriate systems of collective responsibility or 'entraide'. Nor are casual workers in a strong position to develop a clear consciousness of their role in the overall process of underdevelopment, of which they are an integral part. Their

response is defensive and individual, as they circulate between wage-employment, small scale self-employment, petty services, trading and, far more rarely, open unemployment.

In addition to, and at the margins of this urban reserve army, there are the unsuccessful petty commodity producers, skilled and semi-skilled ex-wage-employees who have been forced to sell their labour-power on a casual basis when their own or their former employers' business has foundered. The competition for a greater share of a basically poor market which is characteristic of the proliferation of small scale enterprises produces a large number of casualties. Petty commodity producers are squeezed simultaneously by the twin forces of high, externally-set input prices and low, competitively-determined final product prices. Once a formerly-viable small enterprise becomes unviable, the petty commodity producer is often left with no option but to circulate among the factories and more prosperous residential districts, searching for small jobs or individual days' work. Such enforced spatial mobility does enable such workers, however, to keep informed (albeit on a competitive basis) of temporary work coming available in factories, on construction sites or at the Port (150).

Before the casual worker can be analytically situated within the urban labour-force, some basic information on his day-to-day activities is required. Some of his basic characteristics and an indication of the role played by casual workers in the urban economy, are examined below. It might have been assumed a priori that casual workers were a residuum of recent migrants, namely those who had failed either to establish a small workshop, enter petty-trading or acquire stable wage-employment. A first task was to examine the regional origin of casual workers. A sample of 100 casual workers was interviewed outside various factories in the

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(150) See the full text of the interview with casual worker Moktar Fall, presented in Appendix III, for more details of information networks and job-seeking techniques.

Industrial Zone of the city, a short questionnaire being used as the basis for data-collection (151).

Table 6.4: Region of origin of casual workers (%)

REGION OF ORIGIN	%
Cap Vert	28
Thiès	10
Sine-Saloum	18
Diourbel	7
Senegal Oriental	7
Region du Fleuve	11
Casamance	7
Unidentifiable Senegalese villages	5
Neighbouring countries	7
TOTAL	100

More specific data was also collected on the precise origin of the interviewee, from which it was concluded that 12% were Dakar-born, 10% were from other major urban centres (particularly in the Dakar hinterland of Cap Vert, Diourbel and Thiès), while 32% were village-born). A remaining group constituting 7% came from locations which could not be identified; it can be safely assumed that the majority of these would be minute villages or similar micro-communities. Again, this may appear surprising, since the impression is often given that the predominant drift of population is rural-urban, while the above result supports the thesis that those who eventually work in the cities are often of small- and medium-town origin.

But were the former migrants in the sample new arrivals, or were they well-established townsmen who had relinquished many of their rural connections? The mean period of residence in Dakar among those not born in the capital was over ten years, both for

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(151) For a more detailed description of the casual worker survey, see Appendix III.

those who had moved from other regions and those who had moved to the city from elsewhere in Cap Vert. In terms of their migrational status, 37% of the casual workers were clearly 'recent' migrants (5 years or less), 38% were 'established' migrants (more than 5 years of residence), while the remaining quarter were all from the metropolitan region. The complete breakdown of these figures is as follows:

Table 6.5: Residence periods in Dakar of casual workers (%)

Years of Dakar residence	Entire sample	Non Dakar born (*)
2 years or less	10	30.7
3 - 5 years	27	13.3
6 - 10 years	15	36.0
More than 10 years	23	20.0
Dakar-born	25	-
TOTALS	100	100.0

\* The figures in this column represent the proportions of the non-Dakar population to be found in each residence category.

Of the 37 recent migrants, less than half were under 30 years of age, indicative of the apparently relatively skewed age-structure of the casual worker sample (whose average age was just over 37).

Table 6.6: Casual workers by age-group (%)

Age group	%	%
≤ 25	14	23
26 - 30	9	
31 - 35	22	69
36 - 40	14	
41 - 45	17	
46 - 50	16	
51 - 60	7	8
> 60	1	
TOTALS	100	100

While among petty commodity producers, over 29% were house-owners and almost 51% lived in rented accommodation, the situation was considerably different among casual workers, indicating a much higher level of material insecurity:

Table 6.7: Residential Status of Casual Workers (%)

Residential Status:	%
House-owners	3
Rented Accommodation	74
Housed free by friends or relatives	23
TOTAL	100

The relative poverty of casual workers can equally well be indicated by the type of housing occupied.

Table 6.8: Casual workers and petty commodity producers by housing-types (%)

Housing type:	Petty commodity producers (%) (N = 285)	Casual Workers (%) (N = 100)
Wooden shack	46	78
Brick/cement house	54	22
TOTAL	100	100

In order to comment seriously on the level of income earned by casual workers, we need to know something about the number of those either partially or wholly dependent upon the casual worker's earnings, and what additional sums (if any) are available to supplement the main source of income. Almost two-thirds of the sample had at least one wife and up to five children to support. The breakdown of casual workers' dependents is presented below:

Table 6.9: Casual workers' household dependents (%)

N° of household dependents:	%
None	4
1 (normally wife)	3
2 other persons	26
3 other persons	23
4 other persons	14
5-10 dependents	26
More than 10 dependents	4
TOTAL	100

In the majority of cases no additional incomes were available to the family group other than that of the casual worker: only 7 cases were encountered in which such supplementary incomes were reported. Most of these were either pensions from elderly dependents or wages from young employees. However, a large number of casual workers had incomes additional to what they earned in factories or on building sites. Only 31% of casual workers had no additional incomes, and these can be broken down into four distinct categories:

- (1) Farming incomes, constituting 45% of all additional earnings reported in the sample, consisting mainly of remuneration for the cultivation of groundnuts - though incomes were also earned from millet production, rice growing and market gardening. The mean annual earnings from such activities were 21,500 francs, most of which would accrue to the farmer after the brief marketing period at the end of the rainy season. There were two examples of unusually high farming incomes (both around 60,000 francs) which, if ignored, reduce the mean annual incomes from farming to a little over 19,000 francs.
- (2) Trading incomes, representing 24.5% of additional earnings, were invariably earned in and around Dakar itself, producing a relatively low monthly income of just over 9,000 francs, though

there was considerable variation in such earnings, the median monthly earnings being slightly in excess of 5,000 francs.

- (3) Religious and 'traditional' earnings constituted a small proportion of additional incomes, namely 13%; these activities consisted mainly of transfers accruing to petty religious notables (marabouts), troubadours and praise-singers (griots), fetish makers and tam-tam players. Marabouts and fetish makers earned 10,000 francs per month from these activities, while the average earnings for griots, tam-tam players and other musicians tended to be closer to 5,000 francs, for their work performed at baptisms, marriages, funerals and other gatherings.
- (4) Earnings from other services. 17.5% of the additional incomes observed accrued to casual workers from small repair-work and other services performed in their localities; earnings from such work averaged only 5,800 francs per month. Occasionally casual workers had more than one such additional source of income, and the activities found in this category included the renting rooms, receipt of pensions and the keeping of animals.

While it would also be assumed a priori that relatively unskilled, low-paid casual workers inhabited not only the bottom of the urban economic but also educational pyramid, a surprisingly large number of those interviewed in Dakar had middle school education (equivalent to completing approximately six years of primary education):

Table 6.10: Educational level of casual workers (%)

Educational Level	%
No formal education	58
Elementary education only	14
Middle school education	25
Secondary education	3
TOTAL	100

Those without formal education were most commonly found among the under-30 age group: 61% of this age group had never attended Western-style schools, though doubtless had benefitted from some degree of Koranic education.

A surprisingly wide range of occupations were to be found in the sample: casual workers are not merely labourers, as they may appear at first glance. However, the majority of those interviewed had received no occupational training whatsoever prior to their entry into casual wage-employment, and could not be classed as anything more than unskilled labour. Only 2 workers had been trained in a small workshop, while another 7 had attended a technical institute of some description. Fourteen casual workers had received on-the-job training in industrial enterprises. The occupational breakdown of the sample was as follows:

Table 6.11: Occupational breakdown of casual workers (%)

Typically employed as:	%
Unskilled labourers	65
'Tradesmen' e.g. masons, carpenters, welders, painters, etc.	13
Services and administrative workers	13
Domestic servants	4
Drivers	4
Others	1
TOTAL	100

With this background data in mind, we can now attempt to assess what level of income is earned by the average casual worker. Data on earnings were available for quite variable periods of time (depending upon the memory of the interviewee). Rates of pay were summed and averaged to arrive at individual average daily earnings. Having calculated the average number of days worked per month, the level of monthly earnings could be ascertained. Among the 95 casual

workers for whom data were available, the mean monthly earnings were a little over 12,700 francs (152).

Table 6.12: Average monthly incomes of casual workers (%)

Average Monthly Incomes (francs):	No.	% of sample	Cumulative total
≤ 6,000	6	6.3	6
6,001 - 10,000	29	30.6	35
10,001 - 14,000	33	34.7	68
14,001 - 18,000	13	13.7	81
18,001 - 22,000	8	8.4	89
22,001 - 26,000	4	4.2	93
> 26,000	2	2.1	95
TOTALS	95	100.0	

The above figures should be viewed in the light of the number of days per month on which a casual worker finds employment.

Table 6.13: Number of days per month worked by casual workers (%)

N° days worked per month:	N° & % (N = 100)
≤ 10	6
11 - 15	27
16 - 20	26
21 - 25	25
> 25 days (153)	16
TOTAL	100

Clearly, only a small proportion of the sample worked just a few days per month. This should not be taken as evidence of a positive trend, however. It is more indicative of a comprehensive institutionalisation of casual employment, such that relatively large numbers of people are forced to hawk their labour-power from factory to factory on a 'permanently temporary' basis. Around one-third of the sample worked two weeks or less each month, while

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(152) The median value was 11,000 francs per month.

(153) i.e. a full month's casual employment.

another quarter worked three weeks each month. Another group appears also not to 'suffer' in terms of the number of days upon which work is secured, consists of those working in excess of 26 days per month. Nevertheless, whatever characteristics - such as strategic relationships with foremen at certain factories, or multiple skills that make for a greater probability of employment (154) enable these fortunate few to work a full month, their employment is still precarious and always subject to uncertainty.

These results, when coupled with the data presented on age distribution and migrational status, indicate that casual workers in Dakar are predominantly 'well-established' migrants, or even Dakar-born, with well-developed networks of job information and patterns of employment-seeking. They tend to work between 16 and 20 days per month (the mean being 19 days) and earn only very minimal wages (155). This level of remuneration is low in terms of contemporary purchasing power and, even if average incomes are recalculated to correspond to a full month's continuous employment, the earnings are only 29% higher at 16,400 francs per month, which constitutes only 65% of the monthly salaries earned by poorly paid construction-workers employed on a regular basis.

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(154) Dieng, a shanty-town jobbing mason exemplifies the situation of the unemployed skilled craftsman. A qualified painter, carpenter and mason, he toured the building sites, factories and residential suburbs in search of work. Sometimes it lasted a whole month, sometimes just a day. Nevertheless, his multiple skills attracted more employment than was the case for most casual workers.

(155) At the time of the survey, the average wage for a permanently employed but largely unskilled worker in industry was around the 25,000 francs/month mark. Data communicated to me by Olivier LeBrun suggest that for Category 1 short-contract labourers in Dakar's construction sector, monthly wages average only slightly over 10,000 francs. These workers, though not strictly casual, work according to the most unfavourable collective agreement in operation between workers and employers in Dakar. See LeBrun & Gerry (1975).

A subsample of the more 'mobile' casual workers (in terms of the number of enterprises at which they managed to find work) proved informative. When the time spent in any single enterprise was estimated, it was concluded that such casual workers tend to spend an average of about 16 days of continuous employment at a single workplace before being made redundant again.

Table 6.14: Job-turnover among the more 'mobile' casual workers

N° of days	N° of separate employments	% of all employments
0-5	57	26.5
6-10	41	19.1
11-15	33	15.3
16-20	25	11.6
21-25	25	11.6
26-30	12	5.6
> 30	22	10.3
TOTALS	215	100.0

These figures indicate that though casual workers who either have good information networks and/or contacts with foremen and supervisors can be assured of relatively long periods of continuous employment, even the more 'successful' can rarely count on a full month's work in the same establishment. Most casual workers are forced to look for another job at least once a month, and frequently more often than that.

It is worth examining the means of payment used with respect to casual workers: a little over half of those interviewed were being regularly paid via bureaucratic means, i.e. by the company wage office, while a third received their pay from fellow workers of higher status (non-office staff such as foremen, team-leaders, senior craftsmen, etc.). The rest of the sample (10%) who had had recent employment, were paid by small businessmen.

The frequency of payment is equally important as the method by which it takes place. Payment via foremen, for example, creates opportunities for corruption and extortion, such informal deductions being one the many perquisites material and otherwise enjoyed by foremen and supervisors; however, similar outcomes can be achieved without the mediation of co-opted members of the permanent labour-force. Nevertheless, short-term remuneration systems do not always reflect the objective degree of integration that casual workers experience vis-à-vis factory employment. Some factories deliberately take on casual workers on a short-term basis (cycles of, say, three days) for reasons explained above, but nevertheless pay all such workers on a specific day each week. A particularly striking example of this mechanism is given by the factory in Dakar's industrial zone that paid twice during the week, and employed temporary staff on the basis of a three-day cycle to avoid various sections of the labour code. The factory is a considerable distance from the main African residential districts of the city and it was common to find 'regular' workers who were forced to spend the night prior to commencing a cycle of work actually camped outside the factory. A group of shacks and all-night canteens had sprung up around the factory gates for the very purpose of catering to the needs of the waiting workers. Casual workers often travelled long distances on the evening before the day on which they hoped to commence work, waited overnight to ensure a good place in the queue, worked for perhaps three consecutive days, returning a few days later to collect wages which were only paid out on a specific day. Such a restrictive pattern of work often made it extremely difficult for workers to find alternative employment while they waited to become 'acceptable' once more in the eyes of their prospective (and past) employer. The notion of 'acceptability' not only refers to a fluctuating demand for casual labour but to the number of days a worker needs to be in continuous employment in order to have the right to sickness benefits, insurance, housing subsidies and similar payments.

In the light of the above, casual workers constitute a flexible supply of predominantly unskilled labour that can be integrated into or excluded from the capitalist production process as and when the need arises. Surely such casual relations emerge with the same frequency in small scale production? Very little distinction can be found between the different occupations surveyed, but one thing is quite clear: casual employment on anything resembling a wage basis (156) is almost never in evidence (157). Indeed, in quantitative terms, over 92% of respondents said that they had never had recourse to such labour.

In this context, the complementarity of some aspects of petty commodity production and casual employment in general can be identified: as indicated in the previous section of this chapter (on "disguised wage-employment") the capitalist production characteristic of many underdeveloped economies can considerably reduce the costs of its labour-inputs, training functions, etc., by either employing casual labour and/or by creating linkages (through sub-contractual relations, for example) with petty commodity producers. We are thus confronted with differential mechanisms and degrees of proletarianisation, namely the extent to which labour comes under the direct or indirect (mediated) sway of capital. Just as the "disguised wage worker" can be considered to be partially proletarianised (which involves his movement into what Wright has termed a "contradictory class location"), so the casual worker in capitalist industry or commerce finds himself partially and/or (more importantly) intermittently proletarianised, integrated into

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(156) Outside the process of direct production, petty commodity producers may avail themselves of the services of casual labour. A house may be built, repaired or extended by a jobbing mason, a latrine dug or a concrete floor laid by an itinerant specialist, or some similar piece of essentially domestically-oriented work undertaken by a self-employed (and often itinerant) worker.

(157) This is due, in part, to the fact that, in petty commodity production, work is not subject to the formal Labour Code and therefore employers feel no pressure to adhere to its stipulations.

the capitalist labour process on extremely unfavourable and unstable terms. Thus, while important differences can be found between the petty commodity producer and the casual worker, there is a 'functional' similarity and complementarity in their objective position vis-à-vis the development of capitalism in underdeveloped economies.

The casual worker survey uncovered certain characteristics of a part of Dakar's industrial reserve army: casual workers are fairly evenly divided between recent migrants, well-established migrants and those born in Dakar. There were many young workers even though the average age was around 37 years. As expected, most casual workers live in the suburbs with the poorest housing and living conditions in the city, either with their families or sharing accommodation with friends. The numbers of dependents varies enormously, but around two-thirds of the sample had five or less people to support. Other sources of income are infrequently found among these dependents, though the casual workers themselves earn additional sums through farming, trading, petty repairs and traditional community duties. Very few skills existed in the sample, and the level of educational attainment (in terms of formal qualifications) was low. Incomes are extremely poor, even when a full month's employment is obtained. Usually half that period is spent in employment, and much of the rest of the month in unsuccessful job-seeking. Payment systems reflect the high degree of subordination of this section of the labour force to the objective requirements of large scale capitalist industry in the city.

The casual worker is inextricably integrated on an intermittent and highly exploitative basis into the system of capitalist production, which has the inherent tendency to generate a relative surplus population within the potentially active labour force. Marginal employment policies and minor placatory measures will have no objective effect on the plight of such workers, nor will such policies make effective use of their underutilised labour power. To term them 'under-employed' stems from the inability of the

capitalist system, particularly in underdeveloped countries, to make effective and developmentally-positive use of the available labour force. Their labour will only become positively and equitably a part of the development process when lame excuses for the 'employment situation' are replaced with a policy based on the concept of the effective utilisation of the labour force for the benefit of the labour force. Only in this way that the future security of contemporary casual workers, petty commodity producers and the mass of semi-employed hawkers, traders and domestic workers can be assured; under any other 'regime', their insecurity, instability, and lack of fulfilment will continue to be at the mercy of the vagaries of capitalist underdevelopment.

#### 6.4. "DE-PROLETARIANISATION" AMONG WAGeworkERS UNDER CAPITALISM

In a previous section of this chapter we have discussed the way in which the labour of petty commodity producers (as well as that of their own workers) becomes formally subsumed by capital through various mechanisms such as sub-contracting and outwork. Additionally, the situation of the casual wage worker in capitalist industry has been analysed in terms of an intermittent subsumption of labour by capital in real rather than formal terms. In this short section of the chapter, an additional possibility is explored that is analogous to "disguised wage-labour", but involves the externalisation or 'farming out' of tasks that were formerly performed within the capitalist production process. Thus, rather than commenting on the way in which formerly independent petty commodity producers are more or less divested of their relative autonomy, here the focus is on the manner in which formerly dependent wage-workers in capitalist industry, commerce and, in particular, services, are to some degree forced to become "disguised wage-workers", nominally outside the formal wage-labour-force of the large enterprise, but nevertheless inextricably bound to its production process.

This process, which we have termed "de-proletarianisation" (perhaps somewhat inaccurately, since this is merely shorthand for partial and/or intermittent "de-proletarianisation") is not necessarily confined to the sphere of relatively underdeveloped capitalism and is, in fact, quite visible in Western Europe, the United States and Japan at the present time [158]. In the Senegalese case, the colonial period enabled French capitalism to establish enterprises in Dakar to service virtually the whole of French West Africa from Nouakchott to Libreville, and from Fort Lamy to Lomé. Little outside competition intruded, and local producers were largely confined to specific branches of production or distribution. Colonial factories tended to employ not only a directly productive labour-force, but also a significant number of ancillary workers such as maintenance men, carpenters, painters, drivers, night watchmen, and so on. The contraction of Dakar's potential market from a sub-continental empire to little more than a national market, following the independence of francophone African states in the 1960s and the subsequent failure of the Mali Federation, forced many French-financed enterprises to embark on a 'rationalisation' of the quantity and cost of labour employed in their factories and warehouses.

Such enterprises no longer replace these ancillary workers, and many firms have quite simply dismissed them. However, the majority of functions previously performed by such workers who had been on the company payroll, still have to be undertaken. Jobs now tend to be subcontracted out to small contract-workers on an individual, job-by-job basis whenever required. This enables the enterprise to lower its overall production costs by contracting work at low rates; competition for a stable contract to clean a specific factory's windows, for example, would be intense. Additionally, the small entrepreneur now bears the cost (unless he,

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[158] From the broader perspective of the development of capitalism, this phenomenon later came to be known as "outsourcing" [CG, 2017].

too, can avoid it (159) of insurance, social benefits, etc., instead of the large enterprise.

In this way, former wage workers have become dependent 'self-employed' craftsmen. Predictably, some have been able to assemble a number of contracts thereby ensuring themselves of continuous work, which may, in turn, enable them to evolve into successful capitalists. Clearly, however, as indicated by a number of interviews with casual workers and petty contractors, the predominant trend is in the opposite direction: many of the former ancillary factory workers almost automatically join the ranks of either petty commodity producers, or the reserve army of casual wage-labourers.

By way of both a comparison and a confirmation of this mechanism, it is interesting to refer to similar phenomena operating in the Colombian city of Cali (160). The policing and protection of property is considered to be an essential task in cities characterised by widely diverging income-levels and life-styles; consequently private houses, small offices and warehouses and even large workshops, market installations and factories tend to be guarded by day, but particularly throughout the night. Formerly, this would be done only by an individual or group of persons employed specifically to deter burglars, arsonists, etc. While this is still true for middle-class houses, many commercial and industrial enterprises have ceased to employ directly the labour required to provide the vigilancia private property is deemed to need. Thus a considerable number of 'freelance' vigilantes (armed watchmen) were released by such enterprises and their security function performed by contracted labour from one of the many agencies that have evolved in recent

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(159) In this case, it would be the individual workers who would have to accept insecure and unstable working conditions, as their own responsibility.

(160) I am grateful to my colleague Chris Birkbeck, both for discussions on this topic and for encouraging me to accompany him on late-night interviews with vigilantes (night watchmen) in Cali.

years. While it is true that multinational (and particularly North American) companies tend to dominate this sector, smaller indigenous concerns have emerged to provide security services to private citizens and companies alike (161).

Closer to home, similar trends are also discernible, as indicated in Chapter 2. Thus, in fact, we may not be experiencing an increasing degree of proletarianisation either at the 'centre' or in the periphery of capitalism's sphere of influence - at least not a crudely identified proletarianisation consisting of the conversion of independent or semi-autonomous direct producers into simple wage-workers. The process is more subtle and complex than this and, even if it appears that in some respects the process of proletarianisation sometimes becomes sluggish, grinds to a halt, or is even thrown into reverse, it is essential that we examine these differentiated currents in capitalist development in a rigorous and sufficiently penetrating manner.

#### 6.5. CAN PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCERS BECOME CAPITALISTS?

Having outlined some of the major facets of the process of partial, intermittent proletarianisation among Dakar's working poor, we now move to the minority pole of this dialectic of transition, namely the emergence of petty capitalists from among the ranks of petty commodity producers. We have already mentioned in the previous section of this chapter that conditions exist under which individuals from outside the petty commodity form of production can make the transition to capitalism (more often merchant capitalism than in the industrial sphere).

However, in examining through which mechanisms and under what circumstances petty commodity producers themselves may become

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(161) A three-month field trip was conducted in June-September 1977, as part of an urban employment project financed by the U.K. Ministry of Overseas Development.

small capitalist entrepreneurs, we are inevitably re-examining the question of the extent to which capitalist relations of exploitation are introduced into the workshop under conditions which permit the small proprietor to appropriate and re-invest 'productively' a surplus from the production and sale of the output of his workers. But before attempting to address this question in more detail, we need to have fuller information on how individual entrants into the labour market become 'self-employed' petty commodity producers.

#### 6.5.1. Paths to self-employment.

Petty commodity producers were asked as part of the questionnaire survey to recount in as much detail as possible the various stages of their careers and their respective durations; the crude data took the typical form shown overleaf.

This example is neither typical nor exceptional: some respondents had had far more colourful working lives, and a greater variety of employment. Others had made the transition to self-employment immediately after apprenticeship and had remained own-account workers ever since. The background to contemporary self-employment varies from occupation to occupation, some having considerable degrees of wage-employment experience and relatively short training periods as apprentices while, in other trades, long apprenticeships and rapid transition to self-employment is far more the norm. Work histories make it possible to examine the details of the transition towards the state of self-employment.

In order to judge through which career-stages petty commodity producers are most likely to pass before establishing themselves in relatively autonomous direct production, the simple mathematics

Figure 6.D: A sample work history of a petty commodity producer

DATE	REGULARITY OF EMPLOYMENT	CATEGORY OR SKILL	PLACE OF WORK	MONTHLY WAGES (Fr.)	REASON FOR JOB CHANGE
1945-1950	regular	apprentice	Port of Dakar	600	End of apprenticeship
1950-1954	regular	mechanic	Société de Dragage	18,000	Own choice
1954-1955	regular	mechanic	Grands Travaux	18,000	Own choice
1955-1958-	regular	mechanic	Sintra	19,000	Own choice
1958-1971	intermittently regular	mechanic	In the [French] Congo	approx. 250,000	Repatriated
1971-1972	unemployed	-	Back in Senegal	-	Help from a relative to set up my own business
1972-1974	regular own account work	mechanic	Grand Dakar	15,000	-

of transition matrices can be used (162). The full matrices summarising the working careers of the sample survey of producers are reproduced in Appendix VI. Computations based on the aggregate matrix yielded the following results for the average number of 'steps' (each corresponding to approximately one year in the respondents' careers) that are required to reach the 'absorbing state' of self-employment.

In the light of the contemporary constraints and limitations on the transition from self-employment in petty commodity production to self-employment in small capitalist production, the assumption that self-employment, as examined here, is an

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(162) I am grateful to my former colleague Bernard Pearson of Exeter University's Department of Economics for his guidance on how to analyse these work histories and the training I received in the construction and interpretation of the respective matrices.

'absorbing state' (i.e. one from which no further transition is made) is, of course, overly restrictive. However, as a point of departure, this method enables us to examine the stages through which individuals may pass on their way to self-employment, even if this transition is temporary and, subsequently, the process is reversed i.e. they become wholly, partially or intermittently "re-proletarianised", rather than evolving permanently into small capitalist producers.

Table 6.15: Mean number of steps (years) to reach self-employment

Form of employment:	Type of employer:	Steps to self-employment (in years)
Apprenticeship	small African workshop	9.5
	municipal enterprise	10.7
	European/Lebanese capitalist firm	12.3
Journeymanship	small African workshop (with variable share of receipts)	3.7
Wage-employment	capitalist industry/commerce	9.8
	municipal enterprise	15.0
	African enterprise	8.0
Casual wage-employment	capitalist industry/commerce	6.2
Casual wage-employment	African enterprise	3.6
Open unemployment (subjectively assessed)		6.2
Armed Forces		11.1
Trading (full-time)		15.7
Intermittent self-employment, combined with other jobs		8.9
Peasant farming		4.5

Notwithstanding these reservations, the data in Table 6.15 above can nevertheless be interpreted in very general terms as indicating that, for example, the average apprentice will take somewhere between 9 and 12 years to establish himself relatively

securely as self-employed (163). The average permanent wage-worker, having lost his permanent status, would probably take 8-10 years to attain self-employed status (except if he were a Municipal employee, in which case the time would be almost doubled). Casual wage-workers tend to make the move to self-employment relatively more quickly (taking from 3-6 years, approximately).

However, it is not clear whether apprentices, wage-workers, casual workers, etc., are just waiting for the opportunity to become self-employed (as if located in a 'queue') or spend specific periods in a particular phase (such as wage-work) in order to make a once-and-for all, rational and well-financed move to self-employment. Another possibility is that individuals unwillingly become self-employed (out of peasant farming, open unemployment, or after a redundancy in wage-employment, for example).

A further problem exists in that these work histories are drawn from contemporary petty commodity producers of extremely different ages (and hence variable career-lengths). In order to resolve the problem of being unable to discern from aggregate data the distinguishing features of petty commodity producers who have attained this status along different paths and for very different reasons, and to clarify the differences between those with relatively long and relatively short careers, the matrices must be reformulated on a more disaggregated basis.

If we compare disaggregated matrices for current petty commodity producers who were involuntarily ejected from wage-employment and those who made the move to self-employment through choice, the

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(163) Clearly the variations about the mean length of each phase in the working life are significant here; in fact, the variances relating to these mean variables were noticeably high, indicating that the mean values should only be accepted as very general (and in some cases even misleading) measures. This is to be expected, since the sample consists of work histories which span as many as five decades, while others are of just a few years' duration.

following conclusions can be drawn. Since, not surprisingly, those who had been made redundant in wage-earning jobs were more likely to be predominantly those with longer working-lives, the results were not dissimilar from those yielded by the analysis of petty producers with working lives longer than the mean value (see below). However, it seems that once out of regular wage-employment, such workers, if they become casually employed in capitalist industry or commerce, or in larger African or Lebanese establishments, spend less time on average in this phase of their careers than is the case with, say, older workers in general. This result, again, is not surprising, and in fact should be fairly self-evident. Nevertheless, the mean number of steps/years such workers take to attain self-employment from this situation of casual wage-employment is only half that applying in the case of older workers.

Also, workers made redundant tend to attain self-employment out of unemployment slower than anyone else; the mean numbers of steps/years were similar for both younger and older workers (6.25 and 6.22 years respectively), but in general workers made redundant tended to require on average 8.75 years of other employment to attain self-employment after being unemployed. An explanation of the 'slowness' of the transition from redundancy to self-employment may be that after redundancy, many ex-wage workers continue in intermittent (i.e. casual) wage-employment for a considerable time, using personal links with former employers or fellow employees to maintain a sub-optimal level of wage-earning capacity.

If, on the other hand, the aggregate matrix is divided into 'young' and 'old' petty commodity producers (164), the average number of 'steps' (years) to attain self-employment are as follows:

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(164) 'Young' is defined as having a career duration lower than the average of  $22\frac{1}{4}$  years, and 'old' as having one that is higher.

Table 6.16: Comparison of the number of years required to attain self-employment between 'young' and 'old' petty commodity producers

Form of employment	Type of employer	Mean No. of steps (years)	
		'young'	'old'
Apprenticeship	small African workshop	6.9	12.1
	municipal enterprise	6.8	14.3
	European/Lebanese capitalist firm	7.8	16.7
Journeymanship	small African workshop (with variable share of receipts)	1.0	5.8
Wage-employment	capitalist industry/commerce	5.8	12.2
	municipal enterprise	1.0	21.8
	African enterprise	3.8	12.1
Casual wage-employment	capitalist industry/commerce	2.4	9.4
Casual wage-employment	African enterprise	3.8	-
Open unemployment (subjectively assessed)		6.3	6.2
Armed Forces		7.9	14.3
Trading (full-time)		-	17.1
intermittent self-employment, combined with other jobs		6.3	11.4
Peasant farming		2.9	8.8

These data suggest that, almost without exception, and notwithstanding the limited precision of the average values, the transition to self-employment is relatively more rapid for those whose working life spans the era 1952 onwards (or who entered the labour-force after that date), compared with those who have been actively employed in various stages of their careers over the longer period (say, 1925 onwards). This generalisation should be placed in the context of the data available on the dispersion of dates of enterprise establishment given below. Tables 6.17 and 6.18 illustrate

the establishment dates of contemporary self-employed petty commodity producers and the length of time they have been resident in Dakar. Regardless of their profession, the largest group in the sample is that which established itself in or after 1970. The largest number of shoemakers in the survey had established themselves in self-employment in the period 1960-1964. While furniture-makers, tailors and mechanics, etc., display a quite steeply rising trajectory of 'business creation' as 1974 is approached, in contrast shoemakers in the same period apparently experienced a slowing-down of their rate of enterprise creation.

Table 6.17: Establishment dates of petty commodity producers in self-employment (%)

Period	Furniture- Makers	Tailors	Shoe- Makers	Mechanics & Metal- workers	ALL
since 1970	41.0	42.3	8.1	35.5	31.6
1965-69	19.2	26.8	9.5	25.8	20.0
1960-64	20.5	16.8	20.3	19.4	19.3
1955-59	9.0	8.5	12.2	11.3	10.2
1950-54	5.1	2.8	16.2	3.2	7.0
1945-49	2.6	-	13.5	3.2	4.9
Pre-1945	4.6	2.3	17.6	1.5	6.3
Unknown	-	-	2.6	-	0.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

When the distributions of establishment dates and arrivals in Dakar are compared (see Figure 6.E. overleaf), further conclusions can be drawn. It appears that while both furniture-makers and mechanics and metalworkers have been arriving in the city fairly continuously (though with some evidence of cyclical fluctuation, with increased numbers arriving during the Second World War and following Independence in 1960), the arrival of the shoemakers who currently operate in the capital only began to increase markedly after the war, and with little evidence of fluctuations over time.

Tailors now in Dakar, on the other hand, appear to have predominantly arrived in the 1960s, with only a very small proportion before this period, and comparatively few since. Dates of enterprise establishment show an upward trend for all groups except shoemakers, with the rate of business creation in the latter occupation appearing to slow down significantly from the 1960s onwards. It is quite likely that this can be explained, at least in part, by the dominant position of the multinational shoe firm BATA, and the fierce competition with which it has confronted indigenous petty producers of footwear.

Figure 6.E: Non-Dakar born petty commodity producers: a comparison of dates of arrival and establishment as self-employed.




Table 6.18: Arrival dates of petty commodity producers in Dakar.

Period	Furniture-Makers	Tailors	Shoe-Makers	Mechanics & Metal-workers	ALL
Born in Dakar:	16.6	9.9	5.4	14.5	11.6
Arrived:					
1970 or later	6.4	14.1	24.3	3.2	12.3
1965-69	7.7	18.3	16.2	16.1	14.4
1960-64	18.0	28.2	16.2	9.7	18.2
1955-59	16.7	15.5	10.8	19.4	15.4
1950-54	5.1	2.8	6.8	6.5	5.3
1945-49	14.1	1.4	4.1	9.7	7.4
1940-44	3.8	2.8	4.1	9.7	5.3
1935-39	2.6	-	4.1	4.8	2.8
1930-34	1.3	-	1.4	1.6	1.1
1925-29	1.3	-	6.8	-	0.4
Pre-1925	-	-	-	1.6	0.4
Don't know	6.4	7.0	6.8	3.2	5.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Thus the 'boom period' for the establishment of petty enterprises was undoubtedly during the 1960s. Also, when examining the section of the sample having a more significant degree of wage-experience in capitalist industry and commerce (consisting of 89 petty producers), a striking trend was uncovered: during the few years 1969-72 around 40% of those with wage-work experience made an apparently definitive transition to self-employment. While the trend is more marked for mechanics and metalworkers than for furniture-makers, it embraced both relative newcomers to the labour market as well as those with considerable accumulated work experience.

The explanation behind all three facets of this structural change (increased rapidity of transition to self-employment, a surge in the setting-up of small enterprises, and a 'boom' in the change-over from wage- to self-employment) can be drawn from recent Senegalese economic history: there was a marked deterioration of the country's terms of trade immediately after Independence with

French guaranteed prices for Senegalese groundnuts quickly revoked and the former colony's belated full exposure to the exigencies of the world market in 1968. Thus considerable changes were likely to take place in the distribution of skilled workers between wage-work in the capitalist sector and self-employment: this structural change manifested itself in what appeared to be both a voluntary and involuntary shake-out of employees, over a period of years, from industrial employment, and a concomitant rise in migration to Europe both among the experienced and inexperienced sections of the labour-force.

Also, from 1970 onwards, inflation became a serious problem in Senegal, which may have shifted demand from industrially- to more artisanally-produced mass-consumption goods, at least in certain sectors (of which furniture-making and mechanical repairs are possible examples) and with respect to the major strata of the population (e.g. the urban masses, and more particularly, the privileged domestic petty bourgeoisie).

It can also be calculated from the data presented above that furniture-makers had a considerable degree of experience of wage-employment (of some type and duration), 70% of them having been in such employment at some point during their career. Mechanics, etc., too had a fair degree of wage-work experience, almost 55% of them having been so employed. Tailors to a lesser extent had been involved in wage-relations, though in this occupation, only 21% had been wage-earners; among shoemakers, only a very small number, some 10% of the sample of such workers, had had wage-earning experience.

Those petty commodity producers who had at some time worked as wage-employees had spent on average over half their working lives in such employment; the mean proportion of the working life spent in wage-employment was 59% for tailors, 54% for mechanics and metalworkers, and 48% for shoemakers and 51% for furniture-makers.

Table 6.19: Occupational & aggregate average periods spent in different phases of petty commodity producers' careers (in years)

Mean N° years spent in:	Furniture-Makers	Shoe-Makers	Tailors	Mechanics & metal-workers	ALL
African workshop apprenticeship	5.6	7.8	3.9	5.5	5.7
Municipal apprenticeship	6.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.8
Apprenticeship in capitalist industry	6.0	1.0	3.7	4.7	3.9
Peasant farming	9.5	3.0	-	-	6.3
Wage employment in capitalist industry	3.2	2.0	3.8	2.6	2.9
Wage employment in African/Lebanese firms	5.7	3.0	1.6	7.6	4.5
Casual wage employment in capitalist industry	3.5	12.0	-	8.0	7.8
Intermittent wage employment in African/Lebanese firms	1.3	-	-	-	1.3
Municipal wage employment	3.5	-	-	8.0	6.3
Unemployment	4.8	1.0	1.0	1.0	6.3
Armed Services	2.7	-	1.0	6.0	3.2
Journeymanship	-	3.0	-	3.0	3.0
Intermittent self-employment	3.0	-	12.0	3.5	6.2
Full-time self-employment	6.2	16.0	5.4	8.5	9.0

With the petty producers' work histories organised in matrix-form, it was also possible to calculate the average periods spent in each phase of particular groups' working lives (as opposed to the transition matrix mean values, which measured the mean time required to reach self-employment from a particular phase in a petty producer's career). This data, at least in static terms, does give a relatively detailed picture of specific differences between the occupations; it must be reiterated that, since the observation of

particular phases (e.g. unemployment) will take into account the incidence of that phase among both the older and younger members of the sample, the mean represents the average of data from work histories that will often have highly variable durations.

The average periods of wage-employment range from 2 to almost 4 years in large enterprises, from 1½ to 7½ years in smaller Lebanese or African firms, and from 3½ to 8 years in State and Municipal enterprises. Many interviewees had experienced much longer periods of wage-work, often in bouts of 2 or 3 years, followed by a change of employer, and so on. In a number of cases, individual workers had been in continuous wage-employment for more than 10 years, but in a number of different enterprises. The analysis of the matrices also indicated that wage-employment extended the period over which self-employment was attained, principally, perhaps, for the oft repeated reason that wage-employment, if regular and extended, provides an efficient method of accumulating savings, useful skills and valuable contacts, all of which can be later employed in individual enterprise.

There were only 16 individual cases of unemployment to be found within the work histories of the petty commodity producers, representing a very small proportion of both the aggregate number of career phases and the total number of years represented by the sample's work histories. While furniture-makers displayed longer periods of unemployment than the other occupations (periods of two, five and even seven years of continuous unemployment), the incidence of unemployment was similar for all occupation, being encountered among furniture-makers, shoemakers, tailors and mechanics and metalworkers, four, four, five and three times respectively.

#### 6.5.2. From petty commodity production to petty capitalism

So far, the transition from petty commodity to capitalist production has been examined in rather scant detail and only with

respect to the changes that might take place within the enterprise. Moreover, it has been suggested that a contradiction in this process of transition may exist, since the concomitant process of proletarianisation may be disguised or partial. 'Transition' must not be viewed as an ahistorical process reproducing identical results ad infinitum (i.e. as in the term "business success") from identical raw materials (i.e. labour invested with the vital entrepreneurial 'spark' by which it is differentiated from all other labour). The development of capitalist relations of production within domestic industries in underdeveloped countries is merely one of the possible outcomes of generalised capitalist development. In underdeveloped countries, this localised evolution does take place, but not as an historical replication of Western capitalist development, but rather as a somewhat minimal, distorted and dialectical counterpoint to the more striking aspect of transition experienced by labour in underdeveloped countries - the partial and/or intermittent and/or complete proletarianisation of the mass of the labour-force.

'Social change' in general, and the process of differentiation affecting non-industrially-employed members of the labour-force in particular, has two distinct poles of transition; the first is the evolution of indigenous capitalists both in individual and class terms, and the second is the process of proletarianisation examined in the preceding sections. Both poles of transition tend to be partial and subject to structural limitations in that a transformation of the mass of petty producers into wage-workers cannot take place without either a vast increase in the absorptive capacity of industry with respect to labour, and/or the evolution of a viable and partially autonomous indigenous capitalist class. The term proletarianisation is not intended to imply that petty producers will become permanent wage-workers en masse; in the context of underdeveloped countries, this process will be partial and will also operate in an intermittent fashion, both at the individual and macro-levels. Various sections of the labour-force -

ranging from petty commodity producers whose enterprises have failed, members of what Marx (1970: I, XXV, 4) referred to as a 'latent' industrial reserve army, to partially-proletarianised migrant peasants and unskilled urban casual workers - will be drawn into the active labour-force from time to time, and thus into direct relations with capital. The ebb and flow of labour-power in and out of the active industrial labour-force will correspond to the ebb and flow of the accumulation process in the capitalist mode of production.

It is clear that in the majority of underdeveloped countries, the extent to which the mass of petty commodity producers throws up embryonic local capitalists is quite small, even in economies such as Nigeria, where a relatively sizeable domestic petty bourgeoisie has managed to make some inroads into small capitalist manufacture. However, those who become small capitalists originate for the major part in the bureaucracy and the traditional ruling class. In the colonial and even pre-colonial periods of most underdeveloped countries' history, specific ethnic groups became specialised in certain branches of commerce, and later production, often as soon as these had become monetarised, the Somalis in Kenya and the Dioula of Senegambia being examples of such ethnic specialisation. Such influences obviously shaped and to an extent determined the composition of the social group(s) from which a domestic capitalist class would emerge. Nevertheless, these influences apart, how can the transition from, say, petty commodity production to small capitalist commodity production be explained?

First, as argued in Chapter 5, the transition seems to require what amounts to preferential or privileged access to bank and/or private credit facilities, in addition to the personal relationships that constitute the long-term prerequisite and framework for the acquisition of credit, contacts and contracts. The search for business contacts, and the maintenance and expansion of relations with individuals and groups from whom advantage may be gained, are consistent with the progressive change in the technical and social

relations of production characteristic of the transition from petty commodity to capitalist production. The petty producer occupies himself more and more with the organisation of business, with the purchase of raw materials, the marketing of output, while simultaneously making a first partial then complete withdrawal from the process of real production.

Wage-employment evolves, too, since this is the system of relations most appropriate to the extraction of surplus from the direct producers (namely, apprentices, journeymen, wage-workers). This innovation progressively permits the labour process to be further oriented towards the expansion of value and the accumulation of wealth, rather than the mere reproduction of circulating capital that characterises petty-commodity production.

But it is important at this stage to ask to what extent the majority of petty commodity producers are able to appropriate surplus from the direct producers, once this process of withdrawal from direct production has commenced on the part of the petty proprietor. Here we should not talk of surplus in a vague and imprecise way. In the majority of cases examined in this study, the remuneration received by the workers in petty enterprises (rather than the income generated by the petty proprietor) could not be considered as constituting sufficient to wholly reproduce the labour-power of those workers. Journeymen and quasi-wage workers in the workshops of petty proprietors may make up the deficit through additional income opportunities as was clearly the case among casual workers (165); apprentices can use slack time and waste materials to earn small quantities of money, or otherwise must have their subsistence subsidised by their immediate families. If we assume that the word 'exploitation' can be employed under circumstances in which the labour-power of the direct producers is not entirely reproduced via the payment of a wage (an assumption which would not be acceptable to everyone), we must ask the

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(165) See section 3 of this chapter.

additional question whether such 'exploitation' can take place under conditions in which the income of the petty proprietor is itself, in many cases, only sufficient for subsistence plus an allowance for the replacement of the small fund of money and materials (including depreciation) necessary for the simple reproduction of the conditions of labour.

It would appear that logically the petty proprietor must be in a position to appropriate enough surplus from the direct producers to make net investment possible, rather than allowing this circulating fund to be reproduced. The petty proprietors interviewed suggested that any surplus over and above the circulating fund (or, indeed, a windfall gain of some sort) would be used in one or more of the following ways:

- (1) acquisition of a piece of equipment which would permit 'better' (166) articles to be produced;
- (2) improvement of the workshop infrastructure itself;
- (3) the establishment of a parallel workshop, or of some entirely different concern, such as a small retail shop;
- (4) the acquisition of particular raw materials or other items of stock contributing to more 'up-market' production; and/or
- (5) improvements to the house in which the family lived, additional rooms, building a new house, installation of water, electricity, latrines, etc.

It seems reasonable to assume that if the use of such windfall gains or receipts surplus to the requirements of simple reproduction tends to be restricted to the maintenance of productive capacity within a given narrow range, and is not transferred to any great extent into improved material living standards on the part of the petty proprietor, the word 'exploitation' is perhaps misplaced. Even if the proprietor's living standards are improved and productive capacity only

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(166) When pressed, interviewees tended to define "better" in terms of the increased value (added), or 'up-market' nature of the item.

maintained, we should still be in some doubt as to the appropriateness of the term, since we should be primarily concerned with the significance of a surplus (if such exists) in the aggregate cycle of reproduction. In this context we should be able to make a distinction between the respective apportioning of wealth and poverty on the basis of the ownership of the means of production, on the one hand and, on the other, the differential sharing-out of poverty on the very same basis (167).

Before examining the ideological framework in which the transition to petty capitalism may take place, some consideration should be made of the quantitative data drawn from the interviews with petty commodity producers. Data conducive to comparative analysis was available for only 139 enterprises (i.e. a little under one-half of the total sample).

Petty commodity producers keep few, if any, accounts except in rare circumstances; those who do use some elementary accounting techniques tend to characterise that 'grey area' between petty commodity production and small capitalist production. Once accumulation rather than reproduction of capital is the rule for a small proprietor, some knowledge and monitoring of cash-flows, stocks, etc., becomes crucial to the cost-minimisation process, and the maximising, retaining and recirculating of profits.

Therefore it would be surprising if the data obtained (both directly and indirectly) from the interviews on the value of monthly receipts, petty commodity producers' own personal incomes, the rates of remuneration of their workers, etc., could be made to respond in a well-behaved manner to conventional correlation and regression analyses. The data is accurate in the context of the enterprises from which it was collected, but can hardly be expected

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(167) I am grateful to my colleague Gavin Kitching of the Centre for Development Studies, University College Swansea, for his helpful comments on the question of how surplus might be generated in petty commodity production.

to indicate with any particular precision the respective contribution of capital stock, entrepreneurial incomes, profit on turnover, etc., to the general business success of the firms under scrutiny. Nevertheless, certain other conventional manipulations of the data were possible, and the results tended to confirm the conclusions that have been arrived at via other techniques.

There appeared to be few physical inputs of capital in petty commodity production; interviews suggested that the existing capital stock (often having been in use for many years) was not added to unless a windfall gain or unlooked-for business success enabled new equipment to be purchased. 'Ploughing back' competes with other forms of consumption of such gains, such as personal and/or family consumption, adding to domestic 'capital' (such as housing), gifts to religious brotherhoods, or poorer relatives.

First the ratio of workshop proprietor's income to gross receipts (as a proxy for surplus or 'profits') was rank-correlated for individual occupations, firstly with the value of workshop capital equipment and secondly with the number of workers employed. The results were inconclusive in the case of tailors, but the 'profitability' of repairs and metalworking, shoe- and furniture-making concerns appeared to be negatively rank correlated with the value of the instruments of production.

When occupational distinctions were dropped, and the rank-correlation repeated for those not oriented towards the mass market, (i.e. 'artisans') and those who were, the same association was found. Among vehicle repair and metalworking concerns, and in the shoe-making profession, profitability was positively rank-correlated with the size of the labour-force; in tailoring and furniture-making, no such association was found. While no association between labour-force size and profitability was visible among 'artisans', among those principally oriented towards a mass market, there appeared to be a strong negative rank correlation between these variables.

It appears that in the majority of cases, an increase in the value of workshop capital equipment (whether this consists of one expensive acquisition or a number of relatively cheaper ones) has little to do with and may actually be an impediment to profitability. While this may be self-evident in the short run, constituting as it would a transformation of surplus (as proprietor's consumable income) into investible surplus, it is more difficult to explain it in the longer run. This is an important point since often expensive workshop capital had been acquired several years previously without seemingly contributing appreciably to profitability.

In general, the level of technology is fairly low in petty commodity production; given the existence of a high degree of competition among continually proliferating producers, intermittent and low-paid work is of no use at all. What is required is a steady turnover based on an adequately-sized clientele. Once this is in existence, equipment of a relatively highly-productive nature may enable sales to be further expanded, and the resultant entrepreneurial income to be enlarged. Thus the market structure, and the constraints placed upon petty commodity and other 'non-capitalist' producers by their subordinate position with respect to capitalist production and commerce, will largely determine the contribution that the addition of relatively costly equipment will make to such enterprise profitability. Looking at the petty commodity producer's situation at the individual level, and from the point of view of optimal use of technology, much of the equipment used is more than commensurate with the requirements of the production process and the market situation in which it operates. Why have an electric embroidery and sewing machine when one has a small clientele and only very intermittent orders? Why not save the cost of such a machine and use a treadle-operated one? Competition demands however, that one produces commodities well and quickly, and for this and the reputation, clientele, etc., which hopefully follows, obsolete second-hand not equipment will not be

used if something better can be obtained. Thus many petty commodity producers (neither necessarily the most impoverished, nor those who are 'transitional') have invested super-optimal amounts of funds in expensive and sophisticated machinery which they do not 'need', but cannot do without.

When petty commodity producing enterprises are oriented towards the market it is even possible that the productive equipment which enables it to secure (and is in many cases a prerequisite of securing) private sector and/or Government contracts, will not add significantly to the profitability of the enterprise. Production for the mass market, and especially on the basis of a contract and/or piece-work, is just as competitive as the individualistic trading operations of artisanal production. In the former case, the myriad petty commodity producers are replaced by a heterogeneous grouping of enterprises, many of which will have far more powerful market positions, more influential contacts, more trustworthy 'track records'. Additionally, the contract system is often heavily weighted in favour of these new opponents, rather than the new entrant into the market, through various networks of corruption, monopoly agreements, nepotism, and the like. These sorts of factors may well explain why individual occupations and, in particular, those oriented towards the mass market rather than those organised along more artisanal (client-focused) lines, are not characterised by any marked association between the value of the capital equipment used in production, and the surplus which the petty proprietor may appropriate from the production process.

Among mechanics and metalworkers, even though they appeared to be a problem occupation when an association was sought between the numbers employed and the surplus appropriated by the proprietor, there existed a strong positive correlation between the ratio of surplus to gross receipts and the number of workers employed in the workshop. Similarly, shoemakers appeared to be characterised by a high correlation between 'profitability', measured in this way, and the size of the enterprise in terms of workers. It is

conceivable that the clear lack of an association between both tailors' and furniture-makers' profitability and the size of their work-forces, could be due to the fact that in both these occupations, far more so than in the others investigated, appreciable additions to the instruments of production are required whenever significant (especially skilled or semi-skilled) additions to the labour-force are made. Thus increases in employment, and the concomitant increases in expenditure on equipment and the amortisation of its cost, will clearly have a short term depressive effect on the surplus which the owner can withdraw from his monthly receipts and appropriate for his own and/or his family's consumption. This sort of intermittent reversal would tend to occur until the changes in technology are sufficiently radical for increases in profitability to rapidly outweigh the investment in new equipment and the cost of employing additional workers (i.e. when those technological changes involve considerable increases in both profitability and productivity).

Having referred at some length in both aggregated and disaggregated terms to 'surplus' i.e. the income (or returns) that accrue to the petty commodity producer himself, it would be useful to examine what this means in terms of concrete living standards.

Table 6.20 (overleaf) gives the distribution of monthly earnings in the four occupations covered by the survey (168). These income data should be seen in the light of other employment groups, average monthly earnings; as was indicated in section iii of this Chapter, casual wage-workers tend to earn around 12,700 francs/month, while regularly employed but nonetheless low-paid industrial and construction workers earned 25,000 and 10,000 francs/month respectively at the time of the survey.

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(168) At the time of the survey there were 522 CFA francs to the pound sterling.

Table 6.20: Distribution of monthly earnings of petty commodity producers by occupation.

Monthly earnings (CFA Fr.)	Furniture-Makers		Tailors		Shoe-Makers		Mechanics & metalworkers		ALL	
	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%	N°	%
< 5,000	7	9.0	10	14.7	15	21.4	3	4.8	35	12.6
5,001-10,000	6	7.7	14	20.6	13	18.6	7	11.3	33	14.4
10,001-15,000	13	16.7	16	23.5	8	11.4	11	17.7	48	17.3
15,001-20,000	20	25.6	8	11.8	8	11.4	7	11.3	43	15.5
20,001-25,000	12	15.4	9	13.2	8	11.4	10	16.1	39	14.0
25,001-30,000	5	6.4	2	2.9	5	14.3	4	6.5	16	5.8
30,001-35,000	3	3.8	4	5.9	3	4.3	4	6.5	14	5.0
35,001-40,000	5	6.4	1	1.5	4	5.7	4	6.5	14	5.0
40,001-50,000	0	-	3	4.4	2	2.9	7	11.3	12	4.3
>50,000	7	9.0	1	1.5	4	5.7	5	8.1	17	6.1
TOTAL	78	100.0	68	100.0	70	100.1	62	100.1	278	100.0
Median Income (CFA Fr.)	17,500		15,000		15,000		22,500		17,155	

Note: In 7 cases (3 tailors and 4 shoemakers), income data was insufficiently complete and/or accurate to include.

Finally, a word about the level of educational attainment among petty proprietors. The results of  $\chi^2$  test of incomes and education levels were significant overall at the 90% level, indicating a positive (albeit not impressively strong) association. Among metalworkers and mechanics no association was present, while for furniture-makers, tailors and shoemakers the association was significant at the 90%, 98% and 97.5% levels, respectively. This is not altogether surprising and is connected to the way in which the personal relations of petty commodity producers with a patron - be it 'a man in the Ministry', a wholesaler or a retail outlet - may be more effective among the relatively better educated. Firstly, they will probably have been more successfully socialised into the behaviour patterns and attitudes of the civil service, merchant classes, etc. and, secondly, will be more literate and fluent in French, perhaps more confident, perhaps relatively less status-

conscious with respect to such contacts, and therefore able to take more advantage of these opportunities as they arise.

Though personal relations seem to play such a vital role in the transition from petty commodity to small capitalist production at the level of the unit of production (where personal relations of dependence between petty proprietor and apprentice/journeyman are predominant in the early stages, tending to be replaced later by wage-relations), they play an equally important role outside the workshops (relations between producer and merchant, "disguised" wage-worker and "disguised" employer, for example). These 'external' relations (relations of production in their extended definition) establish a basis for the accumulation and distribution of a surplus and tend to reinforce the class nature of accumulation and appropriation (169).

The transition from petty commodity production to small capitalist production should normally be accompanied by (1) an increase in the size of the labour-force (as well as the introduction of wage-labour); and (2) an increase in the quantity and/or the value of the means of production. Taken together, the increase in the scale of the labour employed and the introduction of wage-labour enable a division of labour that is reflected in the changing relations of production, which themselves reflect the change in the principal orientation of the labour process. The fundamental distinction between capitalist commodity and petty commodity production resides in the fact that, in the former, surplus labour is appropriated by the owner of the means of production on the basis of a wage-relationship while, in the latter, the surplus (such as it is) cannot expand beyond a certain limit because of the limited level of technology and division of

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(169) From this perspective, a "disguised" wage-worker could be viewed as an outside 'foreman' or 'commission agent' of the dominant enterprise, co-opted from 'petit bourgeois individualism' into a much closer physical and ideological contact with capital.

labour, and the fact that non-wage relationships permit the direct producer to draw benefit from supplementary income generating possibilities. Nevertheless, variants and intermediate and/or transitional forms will exist between capitalist and petty commodity production: the artisan, for example, exemplifies production for use, and will relate personally to the nature of his product, his skill in its creation, and the quality of the product that is finally achieved. The petty commodity producer, still perhaps using techniques identical to those of the artisan, yet commencing to sell a proportion of his output on a regular basis on the mass market, is intermediate (and in transition) between production specifically for use and production exclusively for exchange. While subjectively retaining the artisanal philosophy of and relations with the means of production, his objective situation becomes transformed. He becomes less interested in the specific nature of his product, and more in tune with what will sell to a more abstract public. The veil between his own apparent control of the means of production and the erosion of that autonomy by the capitalists who supply his inputs, the merchants who market his output, and the State which regulates these relationships, is drawn aside. The labour he employs becomes a commodity, and he becomes little more than an owner of capital. For all concerned - petty capitalist and workers - the formal subsumption of labour to capital has been replaced by a real subsumption (170).

A veil that tends to remain firmly in place, however, restricting the extent of the petty producer's consciousness of his objective situation, as well as that of the labour he employs, is that which masks both the exploitation of labour by the petty producer, as well as that of the petty commodity producer by those more powerful enterprises who supply him or for whom he produces.

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(170) For the basic material on the formal and real subsumption of labour to capital see Marx (1970:1, XVI, 509-10). A much fuller analysis is given in the so-called "Unpublished 6th chapter of Capital" (Marx 1971:191-223).

The exploitation of apprentices and journeymen by the petty commodity producer is masked by social illusions that one day they, too, could become petty commodity producers, or even big capitalist entrepreneurs. Petty commodity producers themselves harbour such illusions, all the more so since a very tiny minority of them do actually become men of considerable wealth (171). Such successes, though statistically insignificant, nevertheless permit the reproduction of the illusion. Why should this be the case?

In Senegal, petty commodity producers tended to explain their personal poverty and the stagnation of their businesses either in terms of some powerful outside agency. Often, when asked what they expected to be doing five years hence, small workshop proprietors would say "the same as today, if God wills it". Alternatively, the Government would be seen as the mighty hand on the tiller. But attitudes towards the Government were often curiously unlike what has come to be associated with so-called petit bourgeois individualism: rather than affirming that the Government should keep out of petty commodity producers' affairs, the following complaints were typical:

"What's the use of asking us to learn modern techniques and to co-operate in the practical training of technical students when we are offered no work, find it impossible to get sufficiently large orders, and cannot even occupy our own apprentices?"

"Why should we learn book-keeping and go to all the trouble and expense of keeping everything in order, when the government offers us nothing in the way of work or orders?"

Finally, personal business failure or stagnation was commonly attributed to pure ill-luck (often with regard to one's own predicament) or incompetence (frequently when referring to problems

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(171) In view of the apparent strength of the illusion that many petty commodity producers can become capitalists, it was perhaps surprising that 60% of those interviewed aspired towards wage-employment, though many made it clear that their final objective was to return more successfully to self-employment.

suffered by others). In Colombia, while low-income workers may say "estamos en la olla" (literally "we're in the pot"), they seem to have no real explanation of why this might be the case, nor is it altogether clear whether such an explanation is actively sought. The experience of adversity does not necessarily lead to the attribution of blame, and even less the development of a conscious feeling of being exploited. Having indicated in earlier sections of this Chapter the complexity and contradictions inherent in the limited/extended relations of production under which petty commodity producers and their workers operate, it should come as no surprise that petty proprietors and their workers have an equally complex and internally contradictory ideology.

Powerful pressures reinforce a belief (if not a successful participation) in capitalism. This situation can be related to at least two important but inter-related factors - an attachment to the principals of individualism and an underlying belief in the miraculous. The first is of central importance, while the second is a deeper cultural reflection of the first.

A cornerstone of individualism is the belief that one's own economic situation can be remedied by one's own efforts; the corollary of this is that one has only oneself to blame for adversity. Such a belief permeates everyday discussions, and idiomatic expressions as indicated above, but is particularly strengthened by the existence of a few successful individuals who have emerged from the ranks of the poor to join the prosperous and influential.

In many occupations there exist classical (and occasionally apocryphal) examples of people who have done just this, and whose upward social and economic mobility offers a model with which the less and least successful petty commodity producers would almost certainly identify their own possible futures. One such example of the ideological 'beacon' provided by an individual success story is that of N'Djouga Kébé, a present-day Senegalese entrepreneur, who

is said to have worked his way out of poverty and illiteracy (172) into substantial wealth. Now he owns a half share in a major banking concern, hotels, supermarkets and luxury apartments. Such a story acts as a 'beacon' guiding all small entrepreneurs who believe that if Kébé could succeed under such circumstances, then hope exists for others. Hard work and perseverance, resilience and fortitude are seen as the key to success: a shoulder kept to the wheel today is a shoulder on which a fine garment may one day hang. The objective statistical improbability of success being achieved by a given individual petty commodity producer (gifted or otherwise) is masked by the belief that hard work brings its own rich rewards. Such a belief is openly and covertly encouraged by the State, the mass media and the ruling class. But for the mass of petty commodity producers (as is true for many other sections of the labour-force in Third World cities) hard work brings nothing more than survival.

For a "disguised wage-worker" to emerge from the ranks of petty commodity producers, or for an artisan to rapidly expand the scale of his activities by introducing wage-labour and more productive equipment, would constitute a "success" rather than a "failure" of the economic system in some people's eyes. Indeed the success of a friend or colleague may be applauded, even though its impact may be prejudicial. One way in which the objective reality of petty commodity production may be reconciled with the dominant ethic of individualism is through a belief in the miraculous. 'Miracles' are known to happen to certain individuals from time to time - windfall gains, winning a lottery prize or some other chance occurrence. A

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(172) The truth is extremely difficult to verify, but it appears that Kébé in fact came from a prosperous farming family with links to the Mouride Brotherhood. He worked in the Gambia and Sierra Leone (and perhaps even Zaire, where it is alleged he made the acquaintance of President Mobutu Sese Seko), returning to Senegal with a considerable fortune which was invested both in a series of business ventures and in religious works [This note has been corrected/updated since the thesis was defended, CG].

garbage-picker may find a watch on the dump or an artisan may receive a lucrative contract 'out of the blue'. The predilection of the urban poor for gambling is evidence of a belief in the miraculous; but unexpected gains may only enable the poor to gain a short respite from their chronic problems. Attitudes to co-operation are often ambiguous or negative, based on the suspicion that one's colleagues are not to be fully trusted. But such suspicions are more the product of the environment in which the working poor are forced to operate. Capitalism is extremely divisive at the lower end of the employment and income scale and thereby, paradoxically, maintains a large body of support.

Thus the situation to be found in many underdeveloped capitalist societies is not so dissimilar to that which Engels (1969:225-6) observed in Birmingham in the nineteenth century:

"(M)any small employers cannot well subsist on the profit divided amongst them, determined by competition, a profit under other circumstances absorbed by a single manufacturer. The centralising tendency of capital holds them down. For one who grows rich, ten are ruined, and a hundred placed at greater disadvantage than ever by the pressure of the one upstart who can afford to sell more cheaply than they. (...) The apprentices (...) are quite as badly off under the small employers as under the manufacturers, with the single difference that they, in turn, may become small employers, and so attain a certain independence - that is to say, they are at best less directly exploited by the bourgeoisie than under the factory system. Thus these small employers are neither genuine proletarians, since they live in part upon the work of their apprentices, nor genuine bourgeois, since their principal means of support is their own work. This peculiar midway position of [these small employers (...)] is to blame for their having so rarely joined wholly and unreservedly in the (...) labour movement."

The quantitative data drawn from the questionnaire survey tells us something about the problems faced by petty commodity production and which variables may play an important role in determining relative success or failure. But they cannot explain the process of transition in its entirety, and give us just a small amount of

imperfect, static and difficult-to-interpret evidence regarding the situation (173). This underlines the fact that, in order to fully understand the mechanisms that link petty commodity to capitalist production, and the nature of the relationship, it is the social and technical relations of production that characterise the internal workings of petty commodity production and the external relations between co-existing modes and forms of production that should be the principal focus of analytical attention. If small enterprises are bound and subjugated by capitalist enterprises in a web of sub-contractual relationships, then it is these relationships that should be examined, and the mechanisms that bring about their emergence and eventual erosion that should come under the closest scrutiny. If the relations of subordination between the dominant mode and a co-existing form of production are mediated through a domestic class or class-fraction (attached, perhaps to some aspect of the indigenous superstructure, e.g. religious brotherhoods), then it is these classes and these parts of the superstructure which should be carefully examined. If the transition from petty commodity to capitalist commodity production is possible on a limited scale, then the circumstances permitting, and the mechanisms facilitating these movements should be unearthed and clarified: only in these ways will the myth of indigenous capitalism (i.e. that it is merely a process of patient emulation) be shattered and the true nature of capitalist development in Africa emerge.

In summary, it can be seen that the examination of transition, whether it be from apprentice to own-account worker (on the individual level) or from petty commodity producer to small capitalist (part of process of differentiation), considerable care is required in distinguishing the world of manifestations from the real

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(173) A relatively simple and exploratory regression analysis of the principal variables mentioned in this section indicated that they explained just under two-thirds (63%) of the variation in petty commodity producers' net incomes.

forces and processes behind that transition. Orthodox analysis is preoccupied with appearances, not with the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production. Conventional economic theory, predicated ahistorically on the world of perfect competition and the independent petty commodity producer, distorted through its misapplication to the contemporary reality of an international system of capitalism based on large monopolies and oligopolies, redirected in this distorted form to the forms of production that co-exist with capitalism in the world's impoverished 'free' nations, has little or nothing to offer this analysis. Some of the explanation is to be found in the African social and cultural systems that conventional economic analysis regards as unnecessary (and unquantifiable, and thus superfluous) to a rational explanation of 'business behaviour'.

Clearly, a great part of the explanation of how transition from petty commodity to capitalist production may take place, upon what scale and in what circumstances, resides in the very relations (elaborated in the present chapter and elsewhere in the study) that much of bourgeois social science scorns to examine.

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## CHAPTER 7.

### PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCTION & GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: THE SCOPE OF SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION STRATEGIES.

To regard the State as an impartial arbiter and mediator in the relations between the dominant capitalist mode of production and co-existing subordinate forms is to ignore the State's principal role in a capitalist economy and in society at large, namely that of providing and maintaining the hegemony of the dominant mode of production while appearing to validate and justify that domination. This is certainly the role of many government and parastatal institutions in underdeveloped capitalist countries. Any study of urban small scale production that ignored the significance of the government with respect to this sector's fortunes would be doing itself and the subject matter a grave disservice. The government may in certain circumstances, provide contracts for petty commodity producers and it may introduce broader measures (including the establishment of institutions) that appear to have the interests of the small producer at heart; however, in doing so, it may also give rise to a stratum of the petite bourgeoisie with the capacity to insert itself between petty commodity producers and those who have contracts for tender or support services to provide. The relations between the governing institutions of the Senegalese state and the self-employed producers in its urban centres will be discussed in this final section of the study.

The Senegalese government participates in various aspects of the economy, and in various branches of production; in 1969 it wholly controlled two organisations, one for marketing groundnuts and other agricultural produce, and another for the development of rice cultivation. Apart from these, it also participated in 20 sociétés d'économie mixtes and two supranational (regional) organisations. The industrial enterprises in the latter were involved in such activities as oil-refining, fisheries,

refrigeration, construction and real estate, fertiliser, clothing, minerals, phosphates and foodstuffs. In addition, the Senegalese government had interests in banking and financial activities, and various public bodies of an economic and social nature, such as housing funds, the tourist bureau, the administration of 'social housing', among others.

#### 7.1. CAPITALISM & STATE INTERVENTION IN SENEGAL.

The industrial structure of Senegal approximates the model set forth by Amin (1971) inasmuch as a single export commodity (groundnuts) constitutes a disproportionate share of the value of national production, while the Senegalese 'modern sector', when not engaged in transforming groundnuts into oil predominantly for export, concentrates on light industrial activities, making available commodities that are mainly destined for consumption by the more privileged sections of the community. More precisely, Senegalese industry comprises a sub-sector that transforms primary products for export and which accounts for half the industrial turnover, as well as a sub-group of light industries producing almost exclusively for domestic consumption, accounting for the remaining half of industrial turnover.

Manufacturing is concentrated intensely in the Region de Cap Vert in which the capital, Dakar, is situated. Seek (1968: 33) states that of the 114 large manufacturing concerns identified in 1964, 90% were located in this region. There is no reason to suppose that this concentration has declined in recent years. So when one speaks of Senegalese industry, essentially one is considering Dakar and its immediate hinterland.

Industrialisation really only began during the 1930s and immediately after the Second World War, with the entire French West African market (as well as the French market itself) in mind.

The Dakar industrial complex has only recently been threatened by Abidjan (Ivory Coast) as the premier concentration of industrial activity in francophone West Africa. Referring to Senegal's (or rather Dakar's) industrialisation, Amin (1973:16-18) comments:

"Strict criteria of profit led French capital, on which this industrialisation was based, to confine itself within narrow limits; on the one hand industries which were given geographical protection in the form of transport costs and so had to be in Africa (...) and on the other to industries in which cheap labour was to be a decisive advantage (...) This absolute submission to the criteria of profitability within a structure of relative prices imposed from outside (...) has much reduced the scope and potential of industrialisation. One of its consequences has been to give a privileged position to industries which are profitable only at a very low level of wages."

On the distortions thus incorporated into the industrialisation process, Amin goes on to say:

"Senegal's industries have very little connection with one another, but are geared either to agriculture of which in some cases ([groundnut] oil manufacture) they are no more than an extension, or to final consumption. Furthermore, they import not only all their equipment, but also 35% of their raw materials and semi-finished products (...) Nevertheless, with fewer than 15,000 employees, they are able to meet 37% of local requirements for industrial products."

Diop (1972: Ch.8) shows in his detailed consideration of the structure and ownership of the industrial, commercial and financial enterprises located in Senegal that, in 1970, Europeans owned or controlled 47 of the 49 key financial institutions, and that 56% of the 1600 most important commercial enterprises were directly controlled by Europeans, with many of the larger Senegalese operations being more or less connected to French and/or other foreign capital. In industry, the milling of groundnut-oil is a quasi-foreign monopoly, while the mechanised shelling of groundnuts is mainly in the hands of the Lebanese. Food manufacture and processing is a virtual foreign monopoly, with refrigeration, dairy produce, sugar refining and soft drink

manufacture all dominated by foreign firms. Salt and phosphates have little Senegalese capital, and the petits blancs still have the quasi-monopoly in construction. Marine construction and vessel maintenance, the metal-using industries, textiles and chemicals, and, in fact, most other important sectors of the economy are cast in the same mould of foreign ownership and/or control. French-based maisons de commerce hold sway in many service and commercial activities. Alongside this Western metropolitan domination of industry and commerce one finds Lebanese and some non-Senegalese Africans controlling much of the medium commerce and the corner-shop retail outlets are comprehensively controlled by Mauritians. It is against this background that we can examine the recent attempts to promote indigenous small scale manufacturing and service enterprises.

## 7.2. INSTITUTIONAL SMALL ENTERPRISE PROMOTION AND CREDIT

### 7.2.1. Institutions involved in small enterprise promotion.

By 1976, according to van Dijk (1976: 22) there were nine institutions having substantial contact with small Senegalese enterprises. Two banks (BNDS, Banque Nationale pour le Développement du Sénégal and SOFISEDIT, Société Financière Sénégalaise pour le Développement de l'Industrie et du Tourisme) were formally asked by the Inter-Ministerial Council in July 1976 to undertake credit provision for the 'artisanal' sector. Loans from commercial banks to small enterprises can be guaranteed (in part) by SONAGA, the Société Nationale de Garantie et d'Assistance en Commerce. Rurally-based small scale activities wishing to organise themselves co-operatively may receive advice from ONCAD (L'Office National de Co-operation et d'Assistance pour le Développement). The Chamber of Commerce of the Cap Vert Region and the national employers' association (GES) both have sections for representatives of small scale activities. To date, however, the two key organisations created to promote small enterprises have

been the Office Sénégalais de l'Artisanat (OSA) and subsequently SONEPI (Société Nationale d'Etudes et de Promotion Industriel).

The OSA was created in 1973 to organise, train, provide credit and help market the output of Senegal's 'artisans'. Due to limited funds and a plethora of additional objectives later assigned to it, its success was limited (van Dijk 1976a:22-24). Another important factor behind its failure, officially recognised in 1976 when it was finally wound up, was the vagueness of its object of study and action. It is very difficult to discover what definition the OSA used to identify its artisans. One of the major ventures in which it had been engaged was the organisation of production and marketing among some of Dakar's "artistic artisans", centred on the Artisans' Village (as discussed in Chapter 6.ii.). Following the dissolution of the OSA, SONEPI took over responsibility for artisans and small scale producers in production and service activities, and a sister organisation (Société Sénégalaise de la Promotion de l'Artisanat d'Art) concerns itself with artistic craftsmen and now manages the Artisans Village at Soumbédioune. However, before looking at SONEPI's more recent activities, its basic approach and philosophy will be examined.

#### 7.2.2. SONEPI and promotion (174).

In order to become a beneficiary of SONEPI, i.e. of State promotion, one must pass through a lengthy process of selection. This corresponds to the promoters' concern with the provision of substantial aid to a relatively small number of enterprises, apparently in the interests of cost-effectiveness. In 1974 there were several stages to SONEPI's promotional scheme:

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(174) I am very grateful to Monsieur Amadou Wade of SONEPI and his colleagues for their careful explanation of the organisation's aims and methods.

(1) those small enterprises which had asked SONEPI for assistance, or who had been discovered by or recommended to SONEPI were invited to attend a series of meetings and interviews at which the various schemes and options available were outlined and discussed. These included credit and training schemes as well as re-organisation programmes.

(2) The enterprises in question were observed over a long period of time within their own work situation, in order for SONEPI to evaluate their potential for promotion.

(3) A programme of advice and discussion was integrated with the observation phase of the programme, and was open to enterprises irrespective of their likelihood of eventual selection. This programme enabled problems brought up in the observation phase to be dealt with via the training schemes which were also open to small enterprises.

(4) Concrete suggestions and advice relating to specific enterprises were then made by SONEPI, with the object of creating the conditions in which SONEPI promotion would be of greatest benefit.

These four phases were intended to solve the major problems identified by SONEPI, namely the lack of training and expertise in efficiently managing a small enterprise, a problem which SONEPI believed had to be solved before aid could be effectively applied. A fifth stage comprised more studies, budgeting and a recognition and detailing of mutual responsibilities. A final phase consisted of the actual acquisition of funds, or at least a fulfilling of the basic criteria necessary to finance the promotion project.

The fifth and sixth phases constitute a response to what SONEPI believes to be the remaining crucial issues in small enterprise development, namely the shortage of effective investment. Small enterprises are almost invariably unable to fulfil the conditions demanded of them by banks in order to receive credit: they are obliged to supply at least 35% of the proposed short-term loan themselves. If the enterprise can supply these funds itself, it does so. If not, SONEPI is permitted to supply the funds itself, with the bank supplying the balance. There are also various intermediate possibilities, with SONEPI topping up to the required 35% level the finance that is available to the small

enterprise from other sources. Banks also require collateral; if the entrepreneur has no land or property, SONEPI can join with the individual in forming a small company with a majority SONEPI shareholding, thus enabling a guarantee to be legitimately and acceptably offered to the bank. If the loan is still unacceptable in the eyes of the financial institution concerned, SONEPI is permitted in exceptional circumstances to underwrite up to 510 of the additional guarantee requirement, provided that the bank does likewise. It is worth noting however that van Dijk (1976a: 28) reported that neither BNDS nor SOFISEDIT were fulfilling the credit providing functions demanded of them, the former being overtly reluctant to do so, the latter being relatively new and inexperienced in the banking field. SONEPI's promotion 'agenda' and major priorities can be summarised as follows:

Figure 7.A: SONEPI's promotion-phases and priorities.

PROMOTION PHASES	PRIORITIES AIMED AT REMEDYING:
1. initiation	] lack of business expertise
2. observation	
3. training	
4. project elaboration	
5. project initiated	lack of investment orientation
6. Project financed	lack of capital for investment

SONEPI's criteria for selection can be reduced to 4 main categories:

- (1) the producer's initial level of technology and business expertise;
- (2) the producer's susceptibility to training and willingness to accept the reorganisation of the enterprise's activities;
- (3) the market potential for the producer's output, often considered to be the most important factor; and
- (4) the producer's 'character' or personality (175).

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(175) though sometimes basic entrepreneurial skill and 'charisma' may be sufficient for promotion to be provided, even if other criteria are not fulfilled.

In short, SONEPI was prepared to give assistance to any small enterprise, as long as it could be reasonably sure that a measure of success would be achieved. The provision of advice and technical training was prolonged for the maximum period possible, even after financial aid had been secured. SONEPI officials also suggested that if the opportunity presented itself for linkages to be created between promoted enterprises and other larger commercial, industrial or retail firms, so as to widen the market available to the promoted firms, such possibilities would not be ignored. There are obvious dangers in this policy variant, inasmuch as there would exist a very real threat that a promoted firm, once linked with a larger supplier or retailer, would lose its independent character merely because of a subjection to monopolistic or monopsonistic upstream and/or downstream relations. Concentration of production in larger and larger units of ownership and/or control is an inherent tendency in capitalist production, regardless of its geographical location. Generally, promoters of small scale firms do not ignore this fact, but nevertheless seem to accept the process as being part and parcel of the process of industrial development, rather than a threat to the enterprises they have helped to create (176).

In its short history of promotion to 1974, SONEPI admitted to two failures, one of which was a bakery concern, formerly owned and operated by a Lebanese, thereafter 'Senegalised'. However, the organisation considers that the period of time during which it has been operational is still less than that which would define their "period of accelerated growth towards the establishment of small industrial entities".

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(176) An interesting example of pre-SONEPI promotion being rejected by petty commodity producers was the case of the metalworkers in the Rebeuss suburb of Dakar. The rejection of promotion was mainly because of the heavy involvement in the scheme by a multinational corporation in the metal industry. See A.M. Tricoire (1973), passim.

Since no further data are available on specific promotional successes or otherwise, it would be informative to at least see what activities SONEPI has been engaged in relatively recently. Van Dijk (1976a:21-25) reports that a guarantee and participation fund, similar to that which is available to larger producers, has been planned for SONEPI's 'artisans' (i.e. its smaller small scale producers). Two small scale industry zones have been established outside Dakar (at Thiès in West Central Senegal and at Ziguinchor in the southern Casamance region) and three more are in the planning stage. Technical and training programmes are also envisaged once finance has been secured.

Such government bureaux can nevertheless be considered as promotional in at least two respects:

- a) certain conditions are created whereby a small section of petty commodity producers and embryonic capitalists is enabled to transform itself from one scale and type of productive activity to another, a transition which would otherwise be even more difficult; and
- b) such programmes also promote misplaced optimism among the mass of petty commodity producers, who, being 'further down the queue' will almost certainly never have the chance to make such a change.

The promotion of the few, whether the end-result is successful or not, acts as both an encouragement and a palliative to the many, helping to perpetuate the illusion among the working poor that upward social mobility is an option open to all. Since mechanisms of promotion have been installed, change appears to be possible, or even probable; the problems are being tackled on a global scale, so one is able to bear the burden of individual insecurity and exploitation without too much despair. In reality, the petty commodity producer has good reason to despair at least of ever becoming a wealthy entrepreneur, for this transformation would contradict the general laws of capitalist development.

There will be exceptions to this rule, but nevertheless the majority of petty commodity producers in the present circumstances

are doomed to stagnation and progressive marginalisation. And yet the volumes of policy prescriptions continue to pile up in government offices and international agencies. The aim in the following section will not be to make a comparison between one set of marginal policies and another, but to highlight the general similarity between them. To that end we shall examine the general policy recommendations made by van Dijk for developing what he refers to as the 'informal sector' in Senegal.

### 7.3. ORTHODOX POLICIES FOR DEVELOPING THE "INFORMAL SECTOR": THE CASE OF SENEGAL.

#### 7.3.1. Introduction.

More studies of the Senegalese urban informal sector (177) have probably been undertaken by van Dijk than any other researcher, and he has worked in close collaboration with 'promoting' institutions such as SONEPI. He remarks that most attempts to help small scale activities have met with little success because the

"development of the informal sector was never an important Government option; the organisations (...) did not have concrete ideas on how to provide the assistance; (...) the system of Government orders for artisans was not very effective" (van Dijk 1976a:38)

Commenting on the lack of concrete proposals, he adds that SONEPI's basic philosophy had little to do with reaching the masses, but focused on delivering assistance to "the most promising enterprises". "The selection criteria they use eliminate the typical informal sector enterprise".

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(177) Van Dijk has also written on similar activities in Upper Volta: see van Dijk (1976b).

The proposals advanced by van Dijk to improve the situation of the mass of small scale producers focuses on four aspects identified by a number of other researchers in various countries:

- (1) the encouragement of a positive attitude towards the sector (especially one supposes, on the part of the government);
- (2) credit and extension services on a large scale (to attack problems of supply);
- (3) attempts to increase the demand for the sector's output; and
- (4) more studies and project to enhance our understanding of the sector (van Dijk 1976a:39).

A better attitude on the part of the government would include: (a) more government contracts for 'informal sector' products, (b) extension of government industrial training, advisory and other services to the informal sector, (c) the establishment of special zones for small enterprises and (d) the improvement of 'formal' - 'informal' sector relations. Other improvements could be achieved, it is claimed, by providing regulations for the sector that are as uncomplicated as possible, some simple but legal form of "incorporation" for small enterprises, and other elements of a "informal sector development code".

Van Dijk (1976a:41) goes on to suggest that the volume, quality and price competitiveness of the 'sector' could all be improved. This would require a combination of credit, training and technical help to enable the mass of small producers to enhance their productivity.

"A sharp distinction must be made between a programme which strives for the transition of a small number of informal sector enterprises into the foreign-dominated modern sector and a programme which strives for higher productivity for the bulk of informal sector workers. Both are necessary in Senegal." (van Dijk 1976a:42)

Demand for the informal sector's principal products must be increased, too. This is certainly true if output expands. Since the population at large already buys on a regular and substantial basis from such enterprises, the main focuses of attention should

be the Government and its agencies and modern large scale businesses. Van Dijk suggests that it should be made more difficult - through changes in the investment code, tax exemptions and licensing for large firms, both in Senegal and/or abroad - to compete with much smaller ones. Links with large firms could be facilitated by a development code and a more systematic model for subcontracting. More research is required into new lines of production, new techniques and organisational forms, and innovations in marketing.

As can be judged from the above summary of van Dijk's proposals for helping the 'informal sector' to develop, no radical measures are foreseen. The general thrust of his comments identifies the problem in terms of attitudinal deficiencies on the part of the government, bad planning, and market and structural distortions, all of which can be minimised or even eradicated by relatively marginal improvements in legislation and government policy. Such an approach takes no account of the specific forms of articulation between the capitalist mode of production and petty commodity production that have been the object of the present study or, if it does, it considers that their progress requires acceleration rather than any radical re-orientation. However, in our view, in the present conjuncture, there is no possibility of such an 'acceleration' producing anything other than:

- (1) marginal, absolute rather than relative, increases in stable wage-employment;
- (2) an increase in the partial and/or disguised proletarianisation for large numbers of petty commodity producers;
- (3) the progressive impoverishment and 'marginalisation' of the mass of petty commodity producers.

This type of approach, even if it emphasises assistance 'for the masses', is so firmly rooted in the theory and practice of the international capitalist system that its superficial populism emerges as either pious optimism or cynical sophistry. The international context of policy-making (in the field of develop-

ment in general, and employment-expansion in particular) provides the theoretical framework, methodology and policy measures that are ultimately taken up at country-level. Equally so, it thereby provides a justification for the dominance of the international capitalist system and the support afforded it by the individual nation's ruling class.

From this perspective, therefore, some consideration should be given to the mechanisms of international policy-making in the field of small scale industrial promotion, the major element of which is currently the World Employment Programme (WEP) of the International Labour Office (ILO).

### 7.3.2. International policy & the 'informal sector': the role of the World Employment Programme.

Since the mid-1960s, 'pure' economic growth as the focus of development policy has been comprehensively de-emphasised, and an avowedly redistributionist orientation has now become the priority. In the words of the WEP (ILO-WEP 1976:6), this new focus could lead to a fuller participation in the country's wealth, employment opportunities and social progress for the mass of the population. Interest now centres on the creation of blueprints for reaching those who suffer from what might be termed "poverty-in-employment": this focus is directed predominantly on urban rather than rural problems, reflecting an all-too-unquestioning acceptance of Bairoch's assertion that the urban situation constitutes the most pressing problem:

"in terms of both human dignity and of personal satisfaction, the position of the underemployed farmer is (...) preferable by far to that of the unemployed urban worker" (Bairoch 1973: 66).

Perhaps such a prioritisation of the provision of urban over rural employment reflects nothing more than a belief that idle urban hands may fashion a revolution, while it is less likely that a

spatially-dispersed and culturally-divided rural population could get close enough to wrest away the reins of State power.

In the literature on capitalist development, problems of the underutilisation of human resources figure prominently, as do the questions of the role of transnational corporations, and the emergence of a more comprehensive capitalist division of labour at the international level. Though transnationals and the international division of labour are topics that appear to concern the WEP, the results of such investigations as they do appear to have minimal impact on policy-making at the country-level. It is relatively hard to pin down the WEP's theoretical framework with regard to employment policy, but the following appears to be their basic methodology.

First, there are certain causal factors - the forces that employment experts have identified as being instrumental in fostering low propensities to generate income among the world's working poor. These causal elements are considered to be remediable at the margin rather than amenable to eradication on a large scale structural basis.

Second, there are policy instruments, the remedial instruments. If the target variables are accurately identified and the policies correctly operationalised, the latter may act directly or indirectly to counteract the effects of forces that cumulatively generate poverty-in-employment. Little mention is made of the capacity of these policy instruments to attack the root causes of the problem. For the WEP, with its somewhat updated and modified 'redistribution with growth' philosophy, getting to grips with the level of appearances seems to be sufficiently challenging.

Third, there exist certain factors that continue to be neglected by WEP research, an omission now receiving token attention: these are the structures and institutions that are expected to channel the major elements of the remedial policies, but that may in themselves be problematical, in that they have an

empirically demonstrated propensity to block authentic development in the Third World.

Figure 7.B: 'Target variables' of the World Employment Programme


TARGET VARIABLE	TYPE OF VARIABLE	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population growth</li> <li>• National and inter-national migration</li> <li>• Overurbanisation and regional disparities</li> </ul>		<p>THE POVERTY IN EMPLOYMENT PROBLEM</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• causal</li> <li>• remediable</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technology</li> <li>• Income-redistribution</li> <li>• Education policies</li> <li>• Regional and rural development</li> </ul>		<p>THE POLICY INSTRUMENTS</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• remedial</li> <li>• practicable</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International division of labour</li> <li>• Multinational corporations</li> </ul>		<p>THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• instrumental</li> <li>• problematical</li> </ul>

Figure 7.B. categorises WEP target variables according to the above considerations. The types of inter-relations between 'target variables' and policy instruments are clearly more complex than can be shown here, and to map them all lies far beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless, some of the more obvious linkages constitute the focus of WEP research-and-action activities: technology and employment income distribution, land tenure patterns, appropriate technology, and so on. Other factors and forces that the present study has sought to integrate into the analysis of 'employment' are accorded low or zero priority: the role of the State and that of transnational corporations, the aggregate impact of promotional strategies, and the articulation (at global, national and local levels) between petty commodity production and capitalist production. The parts of the WEP con-

ceptual whole provide a superficially convincing picture, until one examines the overall dynamic of WEP policies.

However, the ILO-WEP vision of the comprehensive employment strategy for the Third World should not be seen separately from its general stance and pronouncements on development. The fusion of conventional growth theory with redistributionist refinements (on the one hand) and employment policy (on the other) is clearly visible in the ILO's country-level employment reports (178).

In these reports, a recurrent theme has been the central and determining impact of national-level structural disequilibria on the depth and extent of poverty. Little mention is made of the significance of structural imbalance at an international level, a problem which is ostensibly to be solved by the establishment of a new and more just division of labour between "North" and "South" - namely, the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO). However, the content of the published statements of the NIEO has been at best rather ill-defined and vacuous and, at worst, nothing less than cynical phrase-mongering. More emphasis seems to be placed now upon how the NIEO can be made to help developed capitalist economies to emerge from deep recession, rather than its supposed contribution towards ensuring acceptable standards of living for the mass of the populations of the 'Third World'.

Leys (1975:264) has argued in the specific case of Kenya (though his comments apply with equal force to the ILO country-level reports in general) that the reformist character of the Kenya Report's main recommendations doomed them to be rejected by the Kenyan government. Few, if any, of the recommendations could be implemented, he suggests, in any situation other than one of revolutionary change. Both WEP policy-makers and advocates of 'redistribution-with-growth' candidly admit that the focus should be upon evolution, not revolution. But once a 'recipient'

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(178) For example, the reports on Colombia (1970), Ceylon (1971), Kenya (1972) and the Philippines (1974).

government has made the appropriate dilutions, deletions and modifications, and the foreign consultants have accepted that the best compromise has been reached in the prevailing circumstances, the entire research and policy-making effort can be seen as having legitimised the national status quo and endorsed the proposition that continued dominance of the international capitalist system is fully compatible with the evolutionary road to 'development'.

Behind much of the debate over "Basic Needs" and "reaching the poorest of the poor", there still remain the fundamental propositions of conventional development planning, which clearly form the basis for WEP employment policies. Labour and the individuals who supply it are regarded quite simply as an input into the capitalist production process, and the employment policies through which this labour is to be channelled inevitably concentrate explicitly or otherwise on capitalist employment. It is worth noting in this context the considerable emphasis placed in much of the WEP literature on the 'urban informal sector' and the importance of strengthening its linkages with the 'formal' capitalist sector. However, as we have attempted to show, particularly in the latter stages of the present study, the mass development of large numbers of small scale producers and traders seems to be particularly unlikely in the context of current promotion schemes that seem determined to drive the nominally independent self-employed worker into low-wage-labour or exploitative subcontractual relationships with capitalist industry, either as 'disguised wage workers' or as full proletarians.

Much of the WEP's urban policy recommendations focus on the promotion of informal sector activities, an emphasis that in practical terms amounts to little more than, on the one hand, the marginal transformation of selected enterprises into small capitalist firms, and on the other, the widespread but partial proletarianisation of many workers who are currently at least nominally independent. But the WEP is as involved in producing this strong ideological impact as are national-level promotion

agencies. As argued above (Chapter 6, Section 5), just a few conspicuous examples of the "poor untutored rural youth who becomes a metropolitan millionaire" will encourage the majority of small scale producers and traders to persevere with their independent endeavours in the hope of 'making it' themselves, largely unaware that their combined efforts actually help to maintain and reproduce the hegemony of the political and economic system that ensures that minority and monopolistic interests (for the most part foreign-controlled) continue to prevail in an underdeveloped capitalist economy. This contention remains valid even in the case where various fiscal policies and forms of wage-restraint (the latter assisted by the existence of a mass of petty commodity producers who contribute to a reduction in the cost of reproducing labour-power) are employed to finance 'informal sector' promotion schemes and the expansion of labour-intensive forms of production.

### 7.3.3. Petty commodity production & government promotion: an evaluation.

From the evidence presented in the preceding chapters, it can be seen that the contemporary situation of petty commodity production poses serious problems for both internal and external attempts to organise and transform it so that it can participate fully in the process of development. Strategies for such 'promotion' involve a clear political option, to be placed squarely on the shoulders of the Government. In the current situation of externally-oriented, underdeveloped countries, petty commodity production cannot participate in any other way but a dependent and subordinate one (with the exception of the minority who succeed in relative terms in accumulating capital, capturing larger market-shares, establishing contractual relations and thereby moving out of petty production). If a country relies to a large extent upon imports to supply its industry (which in most

cases merely engages in the production of consumption articles of a relatively luxury status, and is largely dominated by foreign capital) relatively unprofitable activities are left to such groups as the Lebanese in commerce or, to a much larger extent, to petty producers.

The ILO report on Kenya (1972:94,505), while failing to draw what we consider to be the correct conclusions, did point out that the growth of petty commodity production tends to be predominantly involutory. Government promotion schemes may 'cream off' a small number of petty producers for 'development' and discriminatory advancement, in order to create viable small enterprises, or to give the impression that transition is taking place in order to placate the mass of petty commodity producers excluded from it. But such policies ignore the causes of the problem, and fail to help those who most need assistance. Indeed, petty commodity producers who are non-recipients of state promotion frequently allege that the government helps those who are already a long way down the road to small capitalist production, though they may not use precisely these terms.

Attempts by the government to aid the evolution of small scale enterprises also suggest that there exists an appreciation that some petty commodity producers are able to expand even without aid. Apparently, the problem is considered remediable, since much of the promotion undertaken in underdeveloped countries involves giving access to otherwise inaccessible credit facilities, guarantees, machinery and materials, along with advice on management and book-keeping. Little importance appears to be given to the aggregate repercussions of such schemes: when lip-service is paid to such considerations, it is based upon an essentially dualistic conception of the urban economy, hence the problems remain susceptible to marginal 'tinkering'.

Typically, governments decide whether to give much to the 'chosen few' or a little to virtually everyone, usually opting for the former. Visitors and potential investors see the prestige co-operatives and small factories that have benefitted from promotion and rarely visit the workshops of those who remain unaided. Such a preoccupation with the success of promoted few may entail discriminatory treatment that severely handicaps non-beneficiaries of this promotion. In open economies, this may not prevent promoted firms from falling victim to larger, local and/or foreign enterprises, whose expansionary strategies are not restricted by small budgets.

As indicated in Chapter 6 (Section 5), another means by which the State can 'involve' small indigenous enterprises in the transactions of the advanced industrial sector is by offering contracts for commodities the government itself wishes to procure. But the administrative criteria for acceptance as a registered contractor may militate against most small enterprises which, by their very nature, cannot fulfil the necessary conditions.

Yet these marginal problems apparently remain merely administrative details to be smoothed out, despite it being abundantly clear that profound changes have to be made if individual 'entrepreneurs', owners of accumulated wealth, are not to take advantage of their privileged position by acting as brokers of such contracts with the government. The result would almost inevitably be that the much-needed revenues of petty commodity producers would be siphoned off via subcontractual relations, reducing independent craftsmen to temporary hired labourers. The problems of positive government intervention are manifold and have wide repercussions: if promotional strategies for small scale production are formulated without regard to the interests of more self-sufficient and self-sustained growth, no real and positive change in the life conditions of small scale producers will be possible. In this context, we must inevitably pose the question

"What type of evolution of petty production is compatible with such an autonomous development strategy?"

Due to the highly competitive nature of most petty commodity production (including the provision of services), and the quasi-monopolistic nature of many of the sources of inputs, even if a small number of small producers were able to evolve into petty capitalists with the provision of government aid, the almost inevitable outcome would be a more or less rapid concentration of relative capacity, production and power, accompanied by accelerated social differentiation, as opposed to the situation of quasi-perfect competition and relative socio-economic homogeneity that currently exists within the small scale sector.

It is possible that certain petty commodity producers who are non-beneficiaries of government promotion might find wage-work in the successfully promoted firms more stable and remunerative than self-employed production. The majority, however, would be unable to find such work: economies of scale and government promoted differentiation and discrimination would reduce access to raw materials and lower their market share, thus worsening their situation. Some individuals and their families would benefit through the employment multiplier, but the aggregate effect on productive employment would probably be negative. The majority of petty commodity producers would find themselves less able either to reproduce their contemporary situation or maintain an already meagre clientele, and would be driven towards the fringes of production that depend almost exclusively on discarded raw materials, recycling and the poorest class of clients. Promotion of this sort would not only tend to compound existing economic and social difficulties, but would also intensify the rate of impoverishment and 'marginalisation', unless a massive programme of industrialisation and/or employment expansion were able to absorb the petty commodity producers whose activities had been made unviable.

The crucial question, given this evaluation of current trends, relates to how current backward and forward linkages might be transformed such that the devastating results outlined above might be avoided. Can existing relationships be used, or must they be transformed? Three general options are available:

- (1) the laissez-faire approach, permitting uncontrolled and little understood processes to continue their 'natural' course;
- (2) the promotional approach already indicated, 'creaming off' selected enterprises for transformation and launching into capitalist activities, more or less irrespective of their proposed milieu; and
- (3) positive promotion, coupled with a thoroughgoing and global re-appraisal of the economic system in which small scale activities and their probable successors (co-operative production units, etc.) might contribute and share in a real process of economic, social and cultural development based largely on the economy's orientation towards economic independence and self-sufficient development.

The laissez-faire approach appeals simultaneously to policy-makers who either have an extreme dualist conception of the nature and operation of the urban and, indeed, national economy or a rather paternalist and romantic idea that 'artisanry' is something that should be preserved, rather like an ancient monument, regardless of its position in the economy. Neither of these types of policy-maker believes the economy to be susceptible to structural change, even when such changes are so clearly required for the mass of the working population to participate in the sort of development outlined above.

The approach that selectively promotes a minority of already 'transitional' production units, so that they can successfully establish themselves at some level in the urban capitalist productive and/or distributive system, suffers from the same misconceptions as the laissez-faire approach, but may actually worsen the situation, not by 'formalising the informal sector' but by actively increasing the degree of differentiation between productive units outside the capitalist production process at the

very point where transition starts to evolve. This makes autonomous evolution in that direction unlikely if not impossible, and places control of the rate and nature of this evolution in the hands of the government, its advisors, and the heads of industry. Hence such a policy cuts off the mass of the urban petty commodity producers from the means of maintaining their present situation, and conclusively debars all but a favoured few from evolution towards the establishment of what may be for them more productive and remunerative activities.

Consequently, the likely results of using existing backward and forward linkages to improve the situation of petty commodity producers appear to be extremely limited. But this leaves us with the difficult question of how to approach the transformation of existing linkages and what the object of such a transition might be. The aim would be the construction of an all-inclusive system of production and distribution, involving and benefiting all sections of the population. In order to move in this direction, planning and implementation must be re-oriented away from policies designed to reinforce class privilege and distorted, dependent development. The promotion (or perhaps 'mobilisation' would be a more appropriate term) of small scale activities would inevitably contribute to such a re-orientation; however, in order for this to be done in such a way as to reflect a structural reorientation of development strategy in general, the relationships upon which petty commodity production has been based in the past and is based on today, must be clearly understood. Where existing relations are judged to be in conflict with the attainment of the mobilisation suggested above, they must be positively transformed. Such changes will not correspond to a set of textbook strategies, but will be governed by the particular situation under consideration.

Indeed, valuable lessons may well be learnt from the strategies followed in less-developed socialist countries, and this is why the study of small scale activities should not be

restricted to historical and contemporary studies of the subordination and restructuring of petty commodity production in colonial and post-colonial underdeveloped capitalist economies. There is now room for a perhaps more ambitious, but nonetheless complementary orientation, whereby we look at the ways in which the small craftsman, the artisan and trader are participating in and contributing to the building of socialism in countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique Cuba or China. In a period in which consistently more underdeveloped countries are actively trying to rid themselves of the yoke of capitalist domination, should not our attention also be turned towards the practical and political lessons that could be learnt from socialist construction in underdeveloped (or formerly underdeveloped) economies? Should not the research effort that formerly has concentrated upon the distortion, under-utilisation and etiolation of labour-power in these countries now also encompass work designed to assist the productive integration of small scale producers into socialist development programmes? This may be of crucial importance when we consider that, following such a radical social transformation, the provision of many commodities formerly produced and/or distributed by capitalism ceases; the accumulated skills and experience of the mass of small scale producers could be invaluable in the transition period of the construction of socialism.

For authentic development to be achieved, it is clear that the emphasis should neither be upon the institutionalisation of numerous forms of underutilisation of human resources (through informal sector promotion, the deliberate encouragement of hypertrophic growth of services and the public sector, etc.), nor on the reproduction of an ideological model destined to encourage acceptance of such policies. Rather, it must focus on the identification and resolution of the fundamental problems that inhibit development and growth in underdeveloped economies. In the attainment of authentic development benefiting the mass of the population of underdeveloped capitalist countries, there is no

room for placatory, ostensibly well-meaning yet often cynical reformism, nor the sorts of policy prescriptions it espouses. Furthermore, the firmly-held belief that all employment-oriented research should have an immediate and practical policy corollary stands accused of being instrumental in supporting the very policies that compound the effects of capitalist underdevelopment and further delay the time when the working poor in underdeveloped countries will have full, productive and democratic participation in the organisation of their labour-power for the direct benefit of the labour force at large.

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## CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS.

Petty commodity producers in Dakar are by no means an homogeneous element in the urban complex of production processes; this is perhaps a factor which has both led to methodological errors being made in the approach to their study, and which has made those errors more likely. The different strata and sections of petty commodity production relate in different ways to the dominant capitalist mode of production and this makes the problem of analysis doubly difficult. Such difficulties recede considerably, however, if the main thrust of the analysis deals with relationships and not characteristics.

In terms of the composition of the labour-force employed in petty commodity production, we can summarise our conclusions as follows. It is clearly unacceptable to replace a conventional dualistic interpretation of the structure and dynamics of this section of the urban labour-force with an equally dualistic and only superficially materialist formulation. Based upon the theoretical considerations and empirical evidence presented in this study, it can be assumed that a considerable degree of differentiation exists (and is likely to continue to exist) within the petty commodity producing labour-force. This differentiation comprises a number of relatively distinct 'trajectories' which are identifiable within that labour-force. In simple terms this can be reduced to a minority and highly circumscribed trend towards the emergence of capitalist employers, on the one hand, and a predominant trend towards progressive proletarianisation, affecting both petty proprietors and their respective workers, albeit differentially. The process whereby petty proprietors of means of production may, on a limited basis, become transformed into small capitalists is dealt with in some detail in Chapter 6.v. The discussion of the forms of differential (and/or) intermittent) proletarianisation takes up much of the rest of that same chapter. On the basis of the existence of

these relatively distinct degrees of proletarianisation, it would seem unacceptable to proceed with the analysis of the urban labour-force in underdeveloped capitalist economies, either on the basis of a simplistic dualistic model or an equally dualistic and necessarily too-aggregated analysis which uses Marxist categories. What is required, and what is proposed in this study, is a more disaggregated analysis of the labour-force based upon the use of rigorous and realistic labour categories, enabling us to understand the mechanisms and processes which directly or indirectly influence (and, we would maintain, severely limit) the ability of the mass of the urban labour-force to generate adequate incomes. It is in this way, rather than through the use of the dualistic and "target group" approaches, that both analysis of and policies for urban employment will be substantially improved.

The term "petty commodity producer" embraces both artisans producing for individual clients as well as others who deal almost exclusively with the mass market. Irrespective of such differences, all sorts of petty commodity producers must deal either directly or indirectly with the products and/or services of capitalist industry and commerce. Most petty commodity producers depend upon such enterprises for access to their raw materials, acquisition of machinery and tools, and in many other more minor ways. This proposition may, indeed, sound facile, yet its significance is great, not merely in terms of 'dependence' (179) but also in terms

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(179) The term 'dependence' should be employed with caution. In the past it has been used carelessly by many investigators who have raised it to the status of a "magic instrument that explains everything and avoids concrete investigation" (Quijano 1974: 427). It is clear that all individuals, groups, systems and sub-systems (not to mention complexes of systems) are in some way interdependent, though not necessarily on equal terms, or without relative dominance on the one hand, and relative subordination on the other. Hence our analysis should attempt to go deeper than merely stating that dependency exists, and should place the emphasis upon the mechanisms by which such phenomena, among many others, come about, are maintained and reproduced.

of market shares (where markets of mutual interest exist), and in terms of the impact of technical change.

The very fact that today it is almost unavoidable for petty commodity production to have some relations, (however apparently slight) with the dominant capitalist of production, virtually ensures that the dominant system will to some extent shape and restrict the activities of petty commodity producers. The fact that systems or sub-systems differ radically at the level of appearances is merely a manifestation of the relationship that they necessarily must have, one to another. Hence markets in which petty commodity production and distribution predominate are likely to be either those markets which would be of little interest to capitalism (since they do not involve strategic material or financial resources) or those in which it is conjuncturally unprofitable to operate.

The symbiosis between petty commodity and capitalist production does not exclude the possibility of the penetration of the latter's markets by the former's products; nevertheless, it militates severely against it at all levels. Additionally, since large sections of petty commodity production depend upon articles and materials which are discarded by industrial or ancillary processes (180), changes in the latter's technology, form, or even its overall viability have considerable effects upon the 'dependent' branches of petty commodity production, to which industry feels no responsibility at all, if indeed it is aware of the existing relationship. Petty commodity production in most of its varied forms depends upon capitalist industry and commerce to produce and distribute materials

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(180) As already suggested in the opening part of Chapter 4, the carpenters and furniture-makers of the poorest districts of Dakar have long depended upon wood and other materials which arrive in the city as packaging for imported goods. With the advent of containerisation, and alternative (and unserviceable, from their viewpoint) forms of packaging, the supply of such materials has become quite limited, which makes the construction, reconstruction and repair, as well as much of the furnishing of shanty-town barraque accommodation progressively more difficult and expensive.

and equipment it requires. This 'dependence' originates in the quasi-monopolisation of productive and distributive sub-processes by large and medium capitalist industrial and commercial concerns.

There are two inextricably connected trends within the evolution of petty commodity production and its contemporary external relationships; these trends relate to the continuing process of differentiation among petty commodity producers. Some manage to obtain certain relations through small contracts or sub-contracts with medium-sized or large capitalist commercial or industrial concerns. Similar changes in the status and mode of operation of petty commodity producers may evolve through organisation by government agencies. The changes involved in the more direct insertion of a particular individual or group of individuals in a network of relations dominated by capitalist industry and commerce often amount to the loss of all but formal control of their own processes of production; the mantle of relative autonomy is torn off, while that of the casual or 'disguised' wage-worker awaits them. This is so even though, after such changes, the pretence of autonomy is kept up by both sides: the petty commodity producer not only gets much of his materials and equipment from capitalist suppliers, but sells a part or all of his production to similar (though not normally the same) firms. The survey undertaken in Dakar, indicated that the number of petty commodity producers already dealing in an exclusive or considerable way with such firms was relatively limited. This is to be expected for several reasons.

Firstly, industrialisation in underdeveloped capitalist countries has not led to the establishment of the myriad backward and forward commercial linkages that it has in the now-developed regions of the world. Industrialisation has been partial and even though its influence is pervasive, it has affected far more limited areas of the underdeveloped country's geographical space. Much of it has been oriented towards the outside, supplying a particular metropolitan country, or as is now more common, a bloc of countries, with basic raw materials, foodstuffs, and increasingly, manu-

facturers. More recently, a part of the industrial system has been oriented towards the production of goods (a) necessary for the maintenance of the administrative and industrial structures required by the externally-oriented sector and its personnel, or (b) for the benefit of a small privileged minority of the population.

Hence capitalist industry, in its relatively less developed 'outposts' has a more limited scope, and, from the viewpoint of national development, an extremely distorted orientation. One would therefore not expect there to be much possibility for petty commodity producers to graft themselves onto this structure, given that the indigenous entrepreneur and owner of wealth, as well as his 'settler' counterpart, is himself limited in where his capital can be invested. The structure of industry permits little competition, hence enterprises which are intermediate both in size and role tend to proliferate, while projects and potential investments outside the existing structure of industry remain unprofitable pipe-dreams.

The second trend, and the predominating one, involves the impoverishment of the mass of petty commodity producers, who are progressively prohibited from access to the raw materials, basic equipment and the new techniques they require to earn even a basic urban subsistence income. Though the data were scanty, it appeared from the study that most of those who linked themselves through the mass market to large capitalist commercial or industrial firms achieved little progress. Only those exceptional cases where, through a long process of building up personal and business relationships with strategically-placed individuals, fulfilling basic economic and administrative criteria on the way, considerable advancement had been made possible, can be cited as indications of the opposite trend. Even these examples felt their progress was blocked by those higher up the ladder.

However, most petty commodity producers appear to be on altogether another ladder, the bottom rungs of which become more

and more crowded each year. Obviously, quantitative measures of this situation have to be treated with the utmost care; the subjective income figures for petty producers were around the level one would have expected - on average little different from the statutory industrial minimum rate of pay. However, in many cases, incomes were much lower than this: for example, artisanal shoemakers and repairers who worked individually (181) had incomes ranging from one-third of this level to no more than two-thirds.

The qualitative data were even more illuminating: the general opinion was that there was a chronic lack of work. This conceptualisation reflected the degree of competition, the poverty of the potential clientele, the limited and extremely expensive access to the necessary raw materials, equipment and services, and the state of 'recession' in which many considered themselves to be. Many of the petty commodity producers interviewed appeared to have the characteristics of the stereotypical underemployed; however, when these superficial characteristics are placed in their proper context, namely the types of productive activity they characterise and, more importantly, the relationships these activities have with the dominant forms of industrial production and commercial distribution, it becomes clear that, if the term 'underemployed' is to be used at all, it should be used as a verb rather than a noun or adjective, indicating the complex and circumscribed process that brings petty commodity producers into a 'functional' relationship vis-à-vis the dominant capitalist mode of production, rather than qualifying them in terms of individually or collectively ascribed characteristics, interpreted by others as evidence of an inherent inability to make full and productive use of potential working-time.

In the restricted context of their peculiar forms of activity and organisation, petty commodity producers could only be described as 'underemployed' inasmuch as there are relatively far too many of

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(181) i.e. excluding those working in the Médina district, where incomes are substantially above the average for this profession.

them compared to the demand, in terms of popular bargaining power, for their products; hence most of them suffer from a shortage of remunerative work. In terms of the other main urban form of productive activity, namely capitalist industry and commerce, they appear also to be 'underemployed', since the meagre input-linkages which exist do not warrant the large numbers of petty commodity producers operating, nor are such linkages particularly valuable in terms of the growth of the markets capitalist industry serves. It is only when this idealised viewpoint is relinquished, and the status of petty commodity producers is judged within the context of the relations it has with the capitalist 'commanding heights' of the urban economy, that the orthodox concept of 'underemployment' is seen in its true light as an ahistorical, culturally arrogant mis-specification that measures the performance of petty commodity producers by way of criteria that only logically apply outside their framework, ignoring the relationships which give rise to the factors that bourgeois social science rationalises as 'under-employment'.

Bourgeois theories have roundly failed to explain the nature and dynamic of 'emerging' economies, and the ensuing policy recommendations have generally been far from encouraging in terms of their effectiveness in improving the material living and working conditions experienced by the mass of the population. Evidence already exists from some of the less-developed socialist countries (in the form of developmental successes, tentative and sometimes fragile initiatives, as well as the lessons to be learnt from comprehensive errors of strategy) that an alternative is available for the under-developed capitalist economies. But this transformation will only emerge from new forms of political and economic organisation, based on the productive and democratic mobilisation of the labour-force in the interests of the labour-force.

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APPENDIX I. A SKETCH OF SENEGAMBIAN PRECOLONIAL & COLONIAL HISTORY.

Contemporary Senegal constitutes part of that historical-geographical region known to Western scholars as Senegambia, or, as Majhemout Diop (1972:13) considers it should be more accurately designated, Seneghana. During the pre-colonial period Senegambia was in the general orbit and an important part of the complex of West African Empires indicated in Map II, However, its evolution differs considerably from that of certain of these empires in as much as it managed to retain relative autonomy until quite late in the nineteenth century. The empire of Songhai, viable between the mid-15th century and the end of the 17th century, was considerably transformed by the Moroccan invasions of the 1590's. The empire of Mali was transformed and virtually dissolved after the close attentions of Tuareg invaders in 1431. The Senegambian region however, though dominated to a greater or lesser extent throughout its more recent pre-colonial history by the empire of Jolof (particularly between the early 14th and mid-16th century), remained a continually evolving collection of small states until the European presence on the coast of West Africa developed its almost exclusively trading activities into ones of colonial domination and eventual balkanisation.

The scramble for Africa was just as much in evidence in this region as elsewhere; coastal enclaves in Senegambia were constantly changing hands, particularly during the period of Anglo-French conflict during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, during which time established French enclaves such as St. Louis had both French and English governors.

Centuries of Atlantic trade, undertaken mainly between European mercantile agents and coastal African intermediaries, but progressively detrimental to the solidarity of the hinterland empires as the Trans-Saharan trade routes moved eastwards, favoured the establishment of tributary-feudal societies and the development of an

exchange economy until European colonisation was realised in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Secondary features of this evolution included conflicts between theocratic and military variants of these tributary-feudal societies (both variants being interested to a greater or lesser extent in the Atlantic trade) and the development of a more differentiated society based on domestic and trade-slavery with its concomitant stimulus to production based on caste lines.

The European presence on the coast, purely for trading of a relatively peaceful nature from the 1430's until the mid-16th century, later consisted of establishing trading forts and eventually small communities, principally for the purposes of formalising, maintaining and extending trading links. St. Louis was founded by the French at the mouth of the Senegal River in 1659, and in 1661 the British Royal African Company seized the ten year old trading fort on James Island at the mouth of the Gambia River, an establishment that had been built earlier by the Baltic Duke of Courland. The French soon established themselves at Albreda on the opposite bank, and at Gorée, an island close to what is now the capital of Senegal, the city of Dakar.

Prior to these developments, however, towns such as Rufisque (close to present-day Dakar) were meeting places for many nationalities for the sole purpose of trading (R. Cruise O'Brien 1972:29). The European presence undoubtedly expanded the power of the coastal kingdoms and states to the detriment of the formerly more powerful empires of the interior. This was particularly true of the Kingdom of Cayor, whose coastal position and progressive involvement in the Atlantic trade enabled it to throw off the yoke of Jolof domination. By this time the Atlantic trade had become the characteristic triangular trade of manufactures for slaves and slaves for raw materials (Rodney 1972).


A series of incursions into the neighbouring kingdom of Baol and the defeat of Futa Toro to the north-east, established Cayor as

an important coastal state. The peninsular of Cap Vert, where contemporary Dakar is situated, in turn threw off Cayor's hegemony in the early 19th century, but was itself annexed by the French in 1857 in a rather typically fraudulent manner as the strategy of complete colonial control began to gather momentum. Part of the coastal village was ceded to the French on the understanding that certain dues would be paid and that an area would be reserved for the indigenous population. The Lebou inhabitants claimed that they had been duped by faulty interpreters and the evil intentions of the French General Roume. The African location never materialised, but the French expansion continued apace. Onerous demands were placed, requiring that potential residents prove their long-term inhabitation of particular plots, and that houses be constructed of modern materials under forfeit of residence rights, criteria that only the Lebou dignitaries were able to fulfil. This led to the mass purchase of forfeited plots by French and Lebanese residents, or exorbitant rents payable to these new owners.

Basil Davidson (1970) concludes that, though the Atlantic trade enabled the coastal states to become independent of their former imperial overlords and to flourish initially in their contact with the Europeans, this development opened wide the floodgates for the total colonial domination of Senegambia by the beginning of the 20th century. Indeed, some of the revolts of subject ethnic groups actually facilitated colonial penetration: in achieving their independence from Cayor's domination, the Lebou of Cap Vert made way for the colonial occupation of the peninsular.

During the early 19th century, coastal traders continued their incursions inland; in encouraging this, the French administration hoped to expand their hegemony far further than its mere toe-holds on the coast. It was during this period that exploitation of the locality's production of gum-arabic became important, and the possible significance of groundnut production was recognised.

MAP II. SENEGAMBIA AND ITS MAIN CONSTITUENT KINGDOMS BEFORE THE COLONIAL CONQUEST (\*)



(\*) Dates refer to the earliest known occupation by major colonial powers (in the case of coastal settlements) and periods/directions of regional expansion/conquest (indicated by arrows).


It was not until 1848 that the trading posts that France had established in the coastal regions of Senegambia (R. Cruise O'Brien 1972) were officially designated a colony. Napoleon III made General Faidherbe governor and the latter began to pursue a policy of establishing an administration throughout the territory, as and when French hegemony was militarily achieved. The colonial capital, St. Louis, lost its initial importance, as the importance of gum-arabic started to diminish as more readily-available substitutes were found by European industries. Thus trade in gum-arabic declined and commercial activities began to become concentrated around Dakar. Soon, St. Louis, Dakar, Gorée and Rufisque became 'communes' which gave them effective local government, dominated to a great extent by the commercial patriarchs of the Bordeaux and other Mediterranean-French trading concerns.

Towards the end of the 19th century, and particularly after 1914, Levantines began to arrive on the coasts of West and Central Africa and, in Senegal, as elsewhere, rapidly established themselves as virtual monopolists of petty and medium scale trade. Today present in much larger numbers, their control of such commerce is considerable: Diop (1972) estimated there to be some 500 large and medium Lebanese establishments in Senegal by the year 1970. As the commercial success possible in Senegal became more widely appreciated in France, waves of French artisans and tradesmen came to West Africa to settle and work, competing with urban Africans and immigrant Lebanese alike.

Dakar became the administrative capital of Senegal and the rest of French West Africa in 1902. Groundnut cultivation, transformation and export became Senegal's principal preoccupation within the colonial network, placing the colony in total dependence upon the metropolitan, and later world price of groundnuts. Both Senegal's industrialisation and urbanisation have displayed considerable distortion. This dependence rests on Senegal's forced concentration on groundnut cultivation, and the orientation of its industry towards the production of commodities destined for the

privileged members of society. It was with this distorted structure, and its long colonial past, that Senegal achieved nominal political independence, first in 1960 as part of the Mali Federation with former French Soudan, and subsequently (as a result of disagreements with their federal partners) an independent republic later that same year. Yet it was really only in 1968, with France's revoking of guaranteed prices and purchases of groundnuts, that Senegal truly entered the world market.

**MAP III. DAKAR AND ITS TERRITORIAL EXPANSION (1914-1974)**




## APPENDIX II: THE DAKAR CONTEXT.

### II.1 Dakar: a brief history

The contemporary city of Dakar developed from a small fishing village situated on the coast opposite the island of Gorée, upon which the French had established their first colony prior to their mainland colonisation. Previously a Dutch possession, this island had been annexed by the French in 1677, and used for shipping slaves across the Atlantic. The Cap Vert peninsular, so called because of its relatively abundant vegetation after the wastes of the Mauritanian coastline, was taken by the French in 1857 and very soon grew beyond the limits originally envisaged by the intruders. By 1898 the town of Dakar had 15,000 inhabitants and was beginning to be used by the French as a port and colonial base. Until 1914 the town extended no further than the present Route de Bel-Air (See Map III), the contemporary dividing line between the city and the Industrial Zone and, between this road and the urban Rue Vincens (close to the harbour) there were few constructions other than wooden shacks and straw huts, in which some of the African inhabitants lived.

The plague of 1914 led the French to segregate the African population from the colonial inhabitants; hence the creation of the zone known as the Médina, whence the majority of the African population were forced to move. This increased the extent of the urbanised area, and included an 800 metre wide "no-man's land" between the Médina and the suburbs of the European "Plateau". This open ground was not built upon to any great extent until 1925 when medical improvements had made infectious disease less of a problem, and more sanitary infrastructure had been created for European residents.

MAP IV. RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL & INDUSTRIAL AREAS  
OF DAKAR (1973/74)




Though the threat of disease was real, and particularly so in the minds of the colonisers, its existence was quite clearly used as a justification for the segregation of Africans from Europeans, and the virtual exclusion of the mass of the African population from the possibility of owning large tracts of land in the central urban area, which had already been earmarked by the French for considerable industrial and commercial development. Nevertheless, some parcels of land were retained by the Lebou dignitaries of the peninsular, though the relative significance of this property-holding was, and remains, severely curtailed. What had been French colonial property in the city became, soon after Independence, the property of the Senegalese State.

The Médina, and the series of African districts that grew up around the suburbs of the European "Plateau" district, expanded considerably as and when labour was required for such undertakings as the creation of a road system and the building and development of the deep water port. But, as yet, the industries of Dakar were little more than embryonic, though commercial activities had started to spread down the Avenue Gambetta (since renamed Avenue Lamine Guèye) and the large, central Sandaga Market had been built. Most of the petty and medium commerce became progressively controlled by the Lebanese, whose activities extended the central commercial areas out along the new urban arteries, such as Avenue Jauréguiberry.

In Map IV, a distinction has been made between several suburbs, or groups of suburbs; the areas to the north-west (in white) contain housing estates constructed for indigenous and European middle and high income groups: the estates locally referred to as "HLM" are those constructed by the Office d'Habitation a Loyer Modéré (literally "The Moderate Rental Housing Bureau"), a public body similar to that operating under the same name in France. The area highlighted in dark grey designates the approximate extent and location of the Industrial Zone, where much of the city's industry is concentrated, (though the zone extends far outside of the city

MAP V. THE CITY OF DAKAR AND ITS IMMEDIATE ENVIRONS (1974)



limits and links up with industrial activities centred upon Rufisque, some 25 kilometres along the coast). The area highlighted in light grey corresponds approximately to the "Plateau" or European commercial, tourist and residential zone. If it appears from map IV that there is little room left for hundreds of thousands of Senegalese urban inhabitants, the impression is to an extent correct. Population densities are very high in the remaining suburbs shown on map, but, in fact, a large proportion of the poorer Senegalese urban population live outside of Dakar proper, mostly in the gigantic sprawling township of Pikine.

## II.2. A brief description of the urban areas covered in the survey (182).

### 1. Grand Dakar

Grand Dakar is situated at the outskirts of the city proper, and is surrounded by middle-class housing areas. It has a population in the region of 73,000 people, and an area of approximately 250 acres, of which 65% was actually covered by habitations (183). Between 50% and 60% of the housing to be found in the suburb consist of brick-and-cement constructions, the rest being wooden barragues, virtually all of which are concentrated in one south-western corner of the suburb. In the early 1970's, the average incomes in Grand Dakar were a little over 25,000 francs per month; two-thirds of the households had an electricity supply, while the remainder used petrol-lamps (27%) or candles (6%) for lighting. The suburb's future remains secure: it seems that improvement rather than clearance has been planned for Grand Dakar. In the context of the suburb displayed no striking occupational specificity.

### 2. Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker

The inseparable suburbs of Rebeuss and Niayes-Thocker are situated adjacent to the city centre and extend to the western extremity of the European 'Plateau' district. It has a relatively small population, somewhere between 9 and 10,000, and covers an area of only 90 acres. Similarly to Grand Dakar, 60% of the surface area is covered with houses; however, in Rebeuss, there is a wide range of housing types, comprising multi-storey Lebanese-owned buildings, early 20th century colonial-style houses, self-constructed brick-

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(182) For background information on the Médina suburb (where a small additional survey of shoemakers was undertaken), the reader is referred to Part 1 of the present Appendix.

(183) I am grateful to Gerard van de Roehr of NEDECO for granting access to NEDECO-IBRD data on the suburbs' population, housing and economic activities.

and-cement constructions as well as wooden shacks with corrugated or improvised roofing. The latter type of accommodation makes up 50% of the houses in Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker. In addition to the more numerous Senegalese ethnic groups there are also large numbers of Soninké, Cape Verde Islanders and Lebanese. The mean monthly income estimates for the African population are in the region of 17,500 francs. Effectively, Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker has no future: most of it is to disappear to make way for a cultural complex of museums, theatres, libraries, etc., and some middle-class housing. Its occupational complexion is less typical than most: there are large groups of aluminium and scrap-metal foundries, many vehicle mechanics, wood sculptors and other occupational groups not commonly found in most quarters.

### 3. Pikine Ancien

The vast Pikine township is situated some 12 kilometres outside Dakar, and has a total population probably as high as 250,000. Bouquillon-Vaugelade (1978:32) suggests that in 1970 the population was at least 100,000 which is almost certainly an underestimate, though the authorities are not really sure about its size. Pikine Ancien, the central and oldest district, has a population of approximately 80,000 living upon a surface-area of nearly 900 acres. Of that surface area 50% is covered by habitations. 20% of the houses are wooden shacks, and incomes are low, averaging under 15,000 francs per month. Pikine as a whole has somewhat better access to industrial employment; some already exists there and, with the extension of the Industrial Zone, this trend is likely to be maintained. However, while the township is quite isolated from the city of Dakar, it nevertheless acts as a reception area for people who have been driven out of the more central shanty-town and slum districts of the city. This Europeanisation of the city centre, known locally as "le blanchissement de Dakar" (a pun which implies both a physical cleansing and a racial 'whitening' of the city centre) continues apace, with the balance of the renovation-removal

scales still tipped heavily towards means that are both more socially-disruptive and physically destructive. Europeanisation is a term used to denote the destruction of long-established African communities (such as the Lébou) in the city centre, and their replacement by modern housing estates, destined for the nuclear families of the lower and middle bureaucracy and similar strata. Nimzat-Anglemouss (see 4. below) had lain at the centre of one area where these transformations are still taking place; the government had already built a wall ten feet high where the shanty town abutted the motorway - ostensibly for safety reasons - rendering it invisible to visiting dignitaries.

#### 4. Nimzat Anglemouss

This was the district (no longer in existence) chosen for the pilot-study. It was situated in a triangle created by the motorway and railway line, and has now been swallowed up in the expansion of estates built for middle-income groups under the auspices of l'Office d'Habitat a Loyer Modéré (HIM). It had a population of 21,000 crammed into an area of only 50 acres, producing a population-density in excess of 440 persons per acre. 75% of Nimzat Anglemouss was covered by houses, nearly all of which were wooden huts and shacks. Incomes are believed to have averaged 19,500 francs per month. Only 3% of households had electricity, 82% using petrol-lamps and 15% candles. In 1975, the district was bulldozed, and the population dispersed. Most went to Guediawaye on the north-western periphery of Pikine, to join those who had, in successive years, been driven from their homes in the districts formerly adjacent to Nimzat and Anglemouss (see Dieng, 1976 passim). A new HLM estate is being constructed on the land previously occupied by the shanty-town; preliminary plans announced that it would house approximately 7,000 persons, with rentals on the cheapest accommodation seven times higher than the cheapest rent in Nimzat Anglemouss.

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APPENDIX III. THE SURVEY OF PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCERS: SCOPE & METHODOLOGY

III.1. Introduction.

The collection of empirical data, and particularly the fashion and framework in which it is collected, is always a crucial and difficult stage of research. This is particularly so, though cynics would have one believe otherwise, in areas of research as yet relatively untouched. It is important at this point to remind oneself that the collection and analysis of fieldwork data are not two distant poles of a research project, but are inextricably bound together in terms of the methodology employed. Allen (1971:228) cautions the researcher as follows:

"Evidence obtained from questionnaires and interviews, always limited in validity because of their static nature, narrow scope, and dubious relevance to reality, become even less reliable when there is no documentary support, as happens so often in Africa. (They) are usually resorted to when there is insufficient documentary data, so that this method is most commonly used to get information about African unions, not employers' or government organizations. Where both kinds of material are available, the problem is how to use hearsay evidence, prejudiced interpretations, and fault[il]ly memorized details, alongside detailed documentary data. If all are given the same validity ranking, then the final analysis can be no more valid than the least reliable of the data employed."

The specific types of productive activity under scrutiny in this study and the general milieu in question are characterised by an almost total lack of administrative or official documentation, and little more in the way of scientific research, whether good, bad or indifferent. But this is no excuse for lax or anarchic data-collection, neither can it justify faulty or sloppy analysis.

The major part of the empirical evidence used in this study was collected by means of what could be termed a "purposive" survey. This term implies that, within a given location, an attempt was made to interview all of those persons exhibiting a particular set of predefined characteristics - namely those associated with being a self-employed small scale indigenous producer of goods or services -

and no-one else. Only a very small number of those contacted declined to fill in the questionnaire; however, since no valid data existed to check its coverage, it is difficult to estimate what proportion of a particular area's footwear manufacturers and repairers, furniture-makers, tailors and vehicle-repairs and metalworkers were actually surveyed. Nonetheless, for some estimates of the probable coverage, see Table III.5 of the present Appendix.

Such an approach is of course subject not only to the methods by which the interviewer has framed his enquiry, but also to the potentially large margins of error, exaggerations and prejudice that may characterise the responses of the interviewee. Since these data could neither be refuted nor corroborated by reference to official documents, they had to be checked (a) by recourse to the researcher's own comprehension of the milieu in question, and (b) by comparing questionnaire data and interview material with information culled from specific case studies and interviews (as well as some documentary research) undertaken independently of the main empirical data-collection.

The different stages of data collection were as follows:

- (1) A pilot-study, undertaken in one particular suburb of Dakar, Nimzat Anglemouss (see Appendix II), consisting of approximately 70 personal interviews with small self-employed producers, apprentices, casual workers, apparently unemployed persons and others, with a view to collecting general data on the life and work of the non-industrially, non-agriculturally employed urban residents of the city's poorest suburbs. It is interesting to note that of the 70 interviews undertaken in Nimzat and Anglemouss, only one related to an individual wholly without work. As the interviews in the pilot study were entirely random, this appeared at first to be surprising; however, it was later realised that the wholly-unemployed head of a household is particularly rare. Most technically unemployed evolve some access to income generation other than parasitism (i.e. living

exclusively off the gifts and loans of relatives and friends). This pilot-study was itself purposive, in as much as only groups and individuals as described above were interviewed.

- (2) A purposive survey, undertaken with a questionnaire, consisting of 285 self-employed small scale producers, in 4 occupational groupings, working mainly in 3 different suburbs of Dakar; this survey was undertaken in order to collect specific qualitative and quantitative data on small scale production, and was based on both the findings and, of course, the failings, of the pilot study. Using the data presented by IBRD/Bachmann (1974), (i.e. that for Senegal as a whole, there were approximately 50,000 'modern' self-employed and part-time family workers in small production, trade and services, and approximately 125,000 in 'traditional' handicrafts and trade occupations; definitions or detailed breakdowns of 'modern' and 'traditional' are not given), it may be possible to speculate that, since the Dakar purposive survey's sample covered just over 1,000 workers (petty-producers plus apprentices, family-workers and wage-workers), this represents around 2% of the 'modern' petty production and trade labour-force, and rather less than 1% of the total labour-force of that type (i.e. modern + traditional). Thus the purposive survey probably represents between 1 and 2% of the Dakar population of petty producers and traders (regardless of their degree of 'modernity').
- (3) A limited study of casual workers, undertaken in order to collect data on what appeared a priori to be an important facet of the urban labour market, and to test the hypothesis that some degree of interchangeability existed between self-employment in small scale production and intermittent wage-employment.
- (4) A series of small case studies, primarily to clarify, as and when necessary, points of confusion or areas of ignorance and doubt concerning any of the other data components.
- (5) A short series of interviews, similar to those undertaken in the pilot-study, but more pertinent to questions raised in the

questionnaire survey, effected for comparison outside the districts chosen for the main survey.

### III.2. THE PILOT STUDY

Initial fieldwork in a Dakar shanty-town provided the fundamental information required for the larger scale yet more precisely-focussed survey. It enabled study areas and occupational groupings to be identified in a relatively rational, informed and justifiable manner. It also provided the general, if somewhat superficial, understanding of the people and production processes in question; this was to be particularly important, not only in the analysis of the collected data, but in decisions as to which data were to be collected and from whom. The occupations covered in the pilot study are presented in Table III.1., (overleaf).

The data was collected in a random fashion, the emphasis being placed upon the gathering of a large amount of general information, sufficient to give a realistic framework and form to further enquiry. Individuals were often encountered rather fortuitously, and no attempt was made to somehow represent in this sample the objective range and distribution of activities characterising this particular district. Nevertheless, as can be readily seen, a considerable range of activities, both directly productive, as well as distributive, was covered.

The interviews invariably took the form of biographies, and were often constructed over several encounters, before being transcribed. The example overleaf illustrates the typical form taken by these 70 interviews collected in the Nimzat Anglemouss shanty-town (184):

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(184) Field-notes (30.1.74. and 6.3.74) and resulting transcription.

TABLE III.1. OCCUPATIONS COVERED IN THE PILOT-STUDY

OCCUPATION	No.	OCCUPATION	No.
Casual labourers	10	Charcoal sellers	1
Smugglers	7	Enamel workers	1
Drivers	6	Firewood sellers	1
Furniture makers	5	Hay wholesalers	1
Market traders	5	Market gardeners	1
Vehicle mechanics	4	Mattress makers	1
Petty retailers (stores)	3	Multi-skill crafts	1
2nd-hand clothes dealers	3	Restaurateurs	1
Bakers	2	Scrap merchants	1
Hawkers	2	Shoe repairers	1
Masons	2	Tailors	1
Visiting farmers	2	Tilers	1
Wood sculptors	2	Unemployed	1
Butchers	1	Vulcanisers	1
Carpenters	1	Watch repairers	1
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>70</b>

"Moktar Fall considers himself to be unemployed, and says he has been for 5 years. He was formerly a farmer in Bambey, after which he became a trader, selling mainly vegetables. He then moved to Dakar, where he became a tiler's labourer; his trading capital had been completely lost, and he was forced to find a job. After two years as a labourer, he continued to work for the same firms, but independently as a tâcheron (185). After two more years the main European firm closed its tiling department, and he was laid off. He has since only worked intermittently, occasionally finding day-work, mainly through his friends and former colleagues still active in the trade. As a tiler he could earn 750 francs a day, but as a day-labourer, doing exactly the same work, he receives only 450 francs, and can be laid off without notice. He does not know the rights and privileges attached to either permanent or temporary employment. (...) Fall says that the many craftsmen like himself would be prepared to

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(185) Literally, a tâcheron (from the French word for "task") is paid by the task), and could best be described as a jobbing craftsman who works predominantly on a self-employed, short-contract basis, but who often works for wages when such contracts are unavailable. This situation is particularly prevalent in the construction industry.

take even less than 450 francs a day in order to secure regular employment.

A regular certificated tiler could earn between 750 and 1000 francs a day in the European companies. But such workers are a very small minority, of which he is no longer a member.

When you are taken on by the foreman, you're usually obliged to pay him 50 or 100 francs as a 'retainer', so that you will be chosen next time there is work. But it is quite common in his trade to be without work for up to 6 months.

Fall reckons that with a job in a European firm, even if he worked only every other day, he would earn sufficient to keep his family. But with African employers, even if you work non-stop through the month, you will be lucky to have enough (186). Fall regards a monthly wage of between 20,000 and 22,000 francs as being "reasonable", but his current earnings never reach those levels, but fluctuate between a totally inadequate pittance and something that is barely sufficient.

Fall wants to remain a tiler, and is optimistic for his children; he already has two some apprenticed to two different carpenters, a trade Fall chose for them. One son went to the workshop of one of Fall's friends, the other son being found a place by the marabout who taught him at koranic school. Both the sons work in Nimzat-Anglemouss.

Fall's family numbers nine, including himself, and he is the only one who earns. He rents two rooms, costing a total of 3,000 francs a month; his landlord lives on the same plot.

Fall managed to get 6 days' work at Les Grands Moulins de Dakar; he was employed as a day-labourer for 3 days, laid off for a day, then taken on again for a further 3 days and on the 6th March, 1974, was having another day's lay-off. He hoped there would still be work when he returned the following day.

There is a good chance that the work will continue for several days more; a boat load of sugar has arrived and all this must be unloaded. The wages are relatively good, because the work is urgent. The labourers are being paid up to 1,000 francs/day.

Fall learnt of this job through a friend who had come to his house to tell him that he had been taken on at Les Grands

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(186) Based on Fall's figures and supporting evidence, the monthly earnings would be: (a) European firm: 10,250 francs including 'retainer'; (b) African firm: 5750 francs, also including a 'retainer'. This seems to support Fall's hypothesis, even though the European wages would leave almost no margin for error in providing for his family's subsistence.

Moulins as what can only be described as a "permanent temporary worker" (187). The boss and the personnel manager had had an argument as to who was to be taken on; the personnel manager is from Rufisque, and wanted to employ rufisquois, and was himself under pressure from his poor relatives to do so. The boss told him that rufisquois were lazy and not accustomed to this sort of heavy work, and that only seasoned labourers must be employed.

Another friend has given Fall some news of tiling work coming available; it is to be at the Brazilian Embassy, but Fall expects to be paid only 250-350 francs a day for this, and so will stay on at Les Grands Moulins at least tomorrow, since he knows there is still work to be done. He hopes to work there until the unloading is completed, and everyone is laid off. Then he will go on the pilgrimage to Touba to celebrate the Maagal (188), and will try his luck at the Embassy on his return (...)"

This interview illustrates the kind of information that was collected in the pilot study; in this case, the interviewee was not a self-employed craftsman, at least not for very long. The encounters with the self-employed were often a little less detailed than this, due to the relatively more stable nature of their occupations. The example above shows that personal qualitative data, quantitative work-data, and more general information can all be gathered from one specific encounter. It also shows how, albeit

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(187) This apparently contradictory status refers to the casual worker who is invariably chosen for work, due to a preferential relationship established with a foreman, etc. He works temporarily, but his ability to get work is relatively permanent. Sometimes this status is institutionalised, and one becomes the possessor of a card stamped "absolute priority" by the firm, signifying that if work is available in the section where one is normally employed, work will be provided on the basis of "seniority". The card gives no preference if work is available elsewhere in the factory. (I am grateful to Maureen Mackintosh for providing these details of how the priority system works.)

(188) The Maagal is the pilgrimage that members of the moslem Mouride brotherhood make to Touba (in the Region of Diourbel) every year, in celebration of the birth of the founder of the Mourides. All members make the effort to attend the ceremonies held at the Great Mosque in Touba.

over a very short space of time, the ups and downs in an individual's fortunes can be followed.

One must naturally be cautious about generalisations drawn from these 70 varied interviews, since it cannot be assumed that either the suburb or the interviewees concerned can be considered necessarily representative of all non-industrially, non-agriculturally employed African residents of Dakar. Nevertheless, the pilot-study interviews did give valuable insights into the sorts of occupations that might be fruitfully investigated in a larger scale survey, and indicated what questions might be posed in order to analyse in a more consistent manner the evolution, current situation and possible future of these small scale producers.

### III.3. THE PURPOSIVE SURVEY

Since no reliable census data referring to small producers was available, a sample survey was deemed impracticable. Consequently, it was decided to restrict the main part of the empirical study to certain major occupations and specific city districts. As can be seen above from the list of occupations covered in the pilot-study, the choice might well have been difficult. The choice was facilitated, however, by the existence of two other pieces of research (189): in 1971, l'Office Sénégalaise de l'Artisanat (The Senegalese Bureau for Artisanal Production) completed a survey of the artisans of the Cap Vert Peninsular, though no practical definition of 'artisan' was given. Data collection methods were fraught with difficulties since they merely contacted the local suburb leadership (chefs de quartier), asking them to make a census of artisanal activities in their respective districts. The Bureau concluded that the trades most widely practised in terms of the number of enterprises involved were as shown in Table III.2. below.

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(189) (i) NEDECO 1972. I am grateful to Gerard van de Rhoer of NEDECO for kindly providing access to their 'activity maps';  
(ii) O.S.A. (l'Office Sénégalaise de l'Artisanat) 1971.

Four occupational groupings were selected for further study based on: (a) the conclusions of the Bureau's study; (b) the supporting data derived from the studies that NEDECO undertook for a World Bank programme promoting the improvement of living conditions in shanty-towns; and (c) information gleaned from the site and survey work NEDECO had done prior to the launch of new housing schemes in Dakar. These four groupings were as follows:

- (i) manufacture of furniture and fittings for houses;
- (ii) vehicle repairs and metal-working;
- (iii) shoe repairs and footwear manufacture; and
- (iv) traditional and modern tailoring.

TABLE III.2. OCCUPATIONS COVERED IN THE O.S.A. SURVEY.

<u>Occupation</u>		<u>%</u>
Tailoring	(traditional, including embroidering)	18.1
Shoemaking	(in both leather and synthetic materials)	6.6
Jewellery	(traditional craft)	6.4
Carpentry	(furniture and furnishings)	6.5
Tailoring	(modern styles)	6.0
Building trades	(mainly bricklaying)	4.8
Vehicle repair	(including maintenance)	4.2
Weaving	(on traditional hand-loom)	4.0
Dyeing	(traditional, using indigo)	4.9
Mattress-making	(mainly using straw covered in fabric)	3.4
Smithing	(traditional metalwork crafts)	3.2
Hairdressing	(both traditional and modern)	3.0
Electrical installation		2.8
Painting and decorating		2.6
Others (190)	(numerous professions)	23.4
TOTAL		100.0

The Bureau's figures for the annual value of these occupations' production were as follows:

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(190) Individually, none of these "other professions" constituted more than 1% of the total.

TABLE III.3. VALUE OF PRODUCTION IN 4 OCCUPATIONS SURVEYED  
BY THE O.S.A.

OCCUPATION	VALUE OF PRODUCTION
Furniture-making	120-200 million CFA francs
Vehicle repairs	168-200 million CFA francs
Footwear	circa 35 million CFA francs
Tailoring	circa 35 million CFA francs

The first two of these occupational groupings were among those activities having the highest annual value of production, while the other two activities, though ranked lower by value of production, were numerically so well established that we felt obliged to include them in the purposive survey. The criteria used to select these occupational groupings also included their importance in the structure of employment and their contribution to the all-important production of mass consumption articles.

In order to underline the structure and distribution of occupations under scrutiny, the data collected in the present study as well as that in the NEDECO survey are presented side by side in Table III.4. (overleaf). Furthermore, before discussing the choice of districts covered in the purposive sample, a comparison of the three surveys' coverage is provided in Table III.5.

Ideally, the choice of sample areas (even if these areas are to be covered by a total or near-total census) should be based upon their representativeness of certain characteristics already proven to be generally applicable to the population in question. However, in reality, one is rarely the only researcher operating in a given area, and in an important urban centre such as Dakar, this is particularly true. Consequently, there exist certain geographical locations, or certain groups in society, who, at the risk of commoditising them, cannot be regarded as virgin territory for the researcher. In this respect, in practical terms, the

TABLE III.4. DISTRIBUTION OF OCCUPATIONS BY SUBURB (NEDECO + PRESENT STUDY)

OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS	DAKAR SUBURBS (% of sample)										
	(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)	(G)	(H)	(I)	(J)	(K)
Vehicle Repairs (**)	1.3	3.1	0.7	1.1	5.3	2.0	1.8	3.3	3.2	8.1	6.8
Charcoal Vending	8.9	6.8	6.6	5.7	4.6	2.7	12.7	2.6	2.9	2.0	2.7
Small Retail	50.6	43.2	59.2	47.3	29.2	22.1	62.5	26.7	27.3	26.8	27.0
Furniture (**)	5.7	1.9	2.6	2.8	2.0	2.0	3.6	4.6	3.2	3.4	4.1
Restaurants	13.9	22.8	19.1	17.0	26.5	33.3	6.1	30.1	23.3	22.1	12.8
Tailoring (**)	6.3	7.4	2.6	11.4	9.9	13.3	3.6	16.6	16.9	9.4	19.6
Watch Repairs	1.3	0.6	0.7	1.7	1.3	1.3	-	2.6	1.3	2.7	2.7
Hairdressing	1.3	2.5	1.3	1.1	4.0	6.0	-	2.6	2.9	6.7	4.1
Jewellery	1.9	3.1	0.7	2.8	2.6	6.0	-	6.6	4.5	6.7	4.7
Footware	3.8	3.1	1.3	2.8	4.0	3.3	1.2	2.7	4.5	5.4	4.7
Mattress Making	-	-	-	1.7	0.7	1.3	2.4	1.3	-	2.7	-
Laundries	1.9	1.2	2.6	2.3	3.3	2.7	-	0.0	1.3	-	2.0
Hay Sellers	1.3	0.6	-	2.3	-	-	0.6	4.1	-	-	2.7
Others	1.9	3.7	2.6	-	6.6	4.0	5.5	4.0	9.7	4.0	6.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Sample size	(158)	(162)	(152)	(176)	(151)	(150)	(165)	(151)	(154)	(149)	(148)

(\*) Calculated from 'activity maps' produced by the NEDECO projects in Dakar, 1973/4. The suburbs designated in parentheses i.e. (A), (B), etc., were those covered by both the NEDECO survey and my own. One, Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker, was not investigated by NEDECO, apparently because it was scheduled for partial demolition in the very near future, and the subsequent construction of a "cultural district" consisting of a museum, theatre, etc.

(\*\*) Indicates occupational groupings covered in the purposive survey in the present study.

choice of the sample cannot be reduced to a mathematical or statistical computation which is then transferred into a particular social situation. Obviously, one has to take account of the practical limitations of research in the real world.

TABLE III.5. COMPARISON OF 3 SURVEYS (NEDECO, OSA & THE PRESENT STUDY) (No. of cases)

<u>SUBURBS COVERED</u>	<u>NEDECO</u>	<u>OSA</u>	<u>PURPOSIVE SURVEY</u>
Pikine Central (*)	mechanics	32	14
	furniture	23	29
	tailors	41	35
	shoes	26	25
SUB-TOTALS	212	690	103
Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker	No data collected	30	27
		21	14
		65	20
		18	10
SUB-TOTALS		134	71
Grand Dakar	mechanics	2	21
	furniture	9	35
	tailors	22	16
	shoes	6	14
SUB-TOTALS	39	130	86
TOTALS	161	933	260 (†)

(\*) This coverage by the OSA's survey refers to the entire Pikine township, of which Central Pikine is just one part. Official figures give the total population of Pikine as being considerably more than double that of the Pikine Central. Official figures, however, are notoriously inaccurate, especially with regard to Pikine, and almost certainly understate the real demographic situation.

(\*\*) No data on Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker were collected by NEDECO, since the district had already been earmarked for clearance and the construction of a 'cultural area' (theatres, museums, etc.) and their study was had the primary focus of identifying ways and means of ameliorating living conditions in existing slum and shanty-town areas.

(†) As indicated below, an additional 25 shoemakers were interviewed in the Médina suburb, bringing the total purposive sample to 285.

There was little difficulty in deciding which areas could come under consideration for selection as part of the sample; Dakar is to a large extent 'zoned' in terms of productive activities, and particularly as regards the division between capitalist industrial production and its commercial adjuncts (on the one hand) and small indigenous non-industrial, non-agricultural production (on the other) (191). Virtually all the low-income suburbs of the city have a considerable amount of small scale economic activity and very often few other scales of business. Of course there are grey areas where the two major components of the urban economy overlap and both operate but, in general, they are spatially discrete, at least as far as directly productive rather than trading and/or retail activities are concerned.

With specific reference to Dakar, it had always been colonial policy to segregate African and European residential areas. The appropriation of land from the Lebou, and the creation of a "no-man's land" between the Plateau and the Médina districts both corroborate this. Small scale activities, such as those generally engaged in by the urban Africans, were naturally undertaken in and around the districts where Africans lived since there were the markets both for consumer goods and for inputs. Compromises often had to be reached if certain inputs were only available at a distance from one's own suburb, as in the case of a European factory or commercial supplier, or some rural source of raw materials. Nevertheless, virtually all activities of the type under consideration here can be assumed to be located in African residential areas.

After taking all these factors into consideration, and after examining many different parts of the city, the three districts of Rebeuss Niayes-Thocker, Central Pikine and part of Grand Dakar were selected for study. Part of the purposive survey (that investigating footwear producers) was actually conducted outside

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(191) See: Maps IV and V in Appendix II.

these three districts, in the market area of the Médina, since it was here that an important and distinctive segment of footwear production was located, without a consideration of which the footwear section of the present study would have been seriously deficient. The footwear production to be found elsewhere than in the Medina consists of a mixture of repair-work, shoe manufacture from either natural or artificial materials, along with the handicraft production of charms, bracelets and amulets.

In the Médina, however, there is a strong concentration of small workshops in which traditional footwear, and some fashion and tourist designs, are mass produced. The majority of styles are made from plastic-backed canvas, the Lebanese monopolist dealer in which has retail outlets nearby.

Consequently, the purposive survey finally consisted of 285 cases; those interviewed were self-employed producers of articles and/or services situated in the three above-mentioned African suburbs of Dakar. Though they have been loosely described above on numerous occasions as "small scale producers" or "petty producers", these self-employed producers were not selected on the basis of the scale of activities, or the number of workers they employed. It had already been observed that locational specificity existed as regards both these conventional measures of scale. It should be remembered, however, that this phenomenon is of a general rather than a specific nature; society is differentiated and, moreover, is in a constant process of differentiation and change; with the relatively homogeneous fractions being spatially co-terminous for the most part, in "close up", one often appears to be confronted with the co-incidence of like and like, while from further afield, one sees a juxtaposition of heterogeneous components.

TABLE III.6. NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS SURVEYED BY SUBURB

OCCUPATION	SUBURB				TOTAL
	Pikine Central	Rebeuss Niayes- Thocker	Grand Dakar	Médina	
Furniture-making	29	14	35	—	78
Tailoring	35	20	16	—	71
Footwear	25	10	14	25	74
Vehicle repairs/ Metalworking	14	27	21	—	62
TOTAL	103	71	86	25	285

The aim of the purposive census was to discover the characteristics of small scale producers operating in specific areas of a large city, on the assumptions that:

- a) there was a complex and substantial divergence of form between the productive activities found in the African districts and those operating in the commercial and industrial zones of the city; and
- b) that there was relatively little divergence of form between the various productive activities undertaken in different urban African districts.

The questions posed in the questionnaire survey are summarised in Appendix IV.

#### III.4. THE SAMPLE OF CASUAL WORKERS

Most of the data collected in Dakar referred exclusively to what appeared to be self-employed producers, yet, in the course of the study, it became apparent that casual wage-workers represented a significant section of Dakar's indigenous labour-force, and as such were relevant to the core of the study, inasmuch as they represented a link in the process of change to which that labour force was necessarily subjected. A priori it was thought possible

that some severely underemployed self-employed petty producers might supplement their small incomes with occasional wage-work. "Underemployed" is a term which should be used with caution (192). In this context, it indicates that the dominant form of activity, namely industrial production of the capitalist variety, has no direct need of the vast majority of indigenous urban residents of working age. Capitalist production deals directly with a small but relatively stable labour-force, and a fluctuating number of casual workers, some of whom may be otherwise self-employed. There exists an indirect relationship between petty and industrial production, inasmuch as petty producers provide many of the commodities necessary for the maintenance of the industrial labour-force, casual workers, themselves and their dependents, too, at a relatively low price - much lower than capitalist industry would be prepared to accept.

Similarly, and with particular reference to the pilot study, it was suggested that households could be supported in several ways, (ways in which were suggested by, and subsequently tested during the fieldwork undertaken for the Nimzat-Anglemouss pilot study):

- (i) by a single earning individual, engaged in one particular activity, for instance, a self-employed furniture-maker;
- (ii) by several earners, some or all of whom intermittently contributed incomes, as, for instance, in the case of a family supported by the head of the household (e.g. a jobbing plumber), his brother (e.g. a street hawker), and a son who was intermittently employed as a labourer on construction sites; or
- (iii) by a single earner, variously employed in a number of different capacities - for example, sometimes as a casual dock-

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(192) See Chapter 1, Section 2.

worker, other times as a street hawker or market-trader (193) and occasionally as a musician at religious or social gatherings. Consequently, and in order to test these hypotheses, a small sample of 100 casual workers was taken at the gates of various factories and other enterprises, while the interviewees were waiting for the possibility of a day or two of employment.

Enterprises in Dakar, as elsewhere in underdeveloped countries - particularly those processing local raw materials - do not take on casual labour with fixed frequency or intensity, and there is often a considerable seasonal variation in the demand for such labour (194) In view of the latter consideration, the time of year in which the sample is taken may be of great significance. These factors make the selection of a statistically representative sample extremely difficult. Furthermore, casual workers in this particular urban area often worked for only a few days at a time, and hence could amass during a single month considerable experience of a number of different enterprises. The sample was limited to the urban and peri-urban Industrial Zone and the selection of workers for interview was as random as possible within the framework of the study. The questionnaires were filled in during the month of June, immediately prior to the rainy season and the beginning of a relative decline in the demand for casual labour. It did not prove practicable to avoid some distortion - possibly due to the fact that some factories employ casual labour only intermittently, and

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(193) Dock working and trading are not unconnected. Numerous cases were encountered in which work in and access to the Port of Dakar enabled individuals who were so inclined to purchase contraband goods that could be sold either in the street, or to retailers in town. Jewellery, transistor radios, Russian watches, etc., were readily available from such sources.

(194) The interview with Monsieur Fall concerning work at Les Grands Moulins de Dakar, is such an example. He worked purely because a large shipment of sugar had arrived, and was to be unloaded immediately. Demand for casual labour can be highly differentiated even within a single factory; some departments' needs may be rather infrequent and highly seasonal, those of others more continuous.

yet very intensively when it is used, while others have a fairly small yet constant demand for casual labour. Nevertheless, as noted above, casual workers rarely worked in the same establishment for more than a few days at a time, so the distortion created by the differing intensity and frequency of their casual employment would only be slight, when a total of 100 workers and their substantial work histories are analysed.

The themes on which casual workers were asked to comment can be summarised as follows:

- (i) Age and place of birth;
- (ii) Length of time resident in Dakar;
- (iii) Current place and type of habitation;
- (iv) Number of household members and their contributions to family income;
- (v) Level of education;
- (vi) Trade or occupation (including qualifications);
- (vii) How this trade, if any, was learnt;
- (viii) How work is usually sought;
- (ix) Approximate number of days per month worked;
- (x) How payment is received;
- (xi) Contact with the official employment services;
- (xii) Trade Union membership, if any;
- (xiii) Party membership, if any;
- (xiv) Relations with employers, permanent workers and foremen;
- (xv) Views on the current state of employment/unemployment;
- (xvi) Views on the current price level of mass consumption goods;
- (xvii) Principal problems of casual labour;
- (xviii) Other sources of income;
- (xix) Details of employment history;
- (xx) Recent experiences of casual employment (details of salary, length of contract, hours worked, how employed, how/why dismissed, etc.).

Some questions had coded responses, while others were posed in an open-ended manner.

Even if the a priori propositions mentioned above were not substantiated, such a sample of casual workers at least throws light on their principle characteristics and their role in the urban economy for, at the margin, petty producer and casual worker employment forms might merge into a composite type. However, it was

desirable to examine the urban labour market in more than just static terms, and so detailed work histories were collected in the survey of petty producers, allowing us to discern any evidence of transition towards or away from petty commodity production as defined here. Additionally, the casual worker survey could indicate other components of the process of differentiation among Dakar's labour force. In disaggregated form, this data might consist of work histories indicating different directions of transition, differing rates of differentiation, or even examples of apparent stasis. The following schema illustrates some of the possibilities:

FIGURE III.A. A HYPOTHETICAL WORK HISTORY

Case	Occupation in successive periods			
	1	2	3	4
1	apprentice furniture-maker	self-employed furniture-maker	permanent wage-worker in large furniture factory	casual wage-worker in same factory + some casual dock work
2	casual labourer on construction site	totally without work	casual labour on individual house building	permanent wage-work on construction site
3	itinerant hawker of fancy goods	casual dock labourer	trader in contraband goods	stall-holder in central market area
4	apprentice tailor	military service	self-employed tailor	self-employed tailor with Army contract
	1	2	3	4

Reading the hypothetical cases 1, 2, 3 and 4, from left to right, one can see different rates of transition, involving different types and directions of change. For example, in Case 1, the apprentice furniture-maker becomes an independent petty producer, does not succeed in self-employment, but manages to obtain full-time wage-employment in a large furniture manufacturing

enterprise; demand conditions deteriorate and, as one of the least senior (in terms of the duration of the employment) workers, is laid off, but still continues to work there, and elsewhere on a short term casual basis. In Case 3, the itinerant hawker also makes little headway in his self-employment and loses his trading capital; however, he succeeds in gaining casual work at the Port, where smuggled watches, cameras, etc., are available. Out of some savings he buys a contraband article which he sells for a profit, enabling him to buy more. This activity becomes his principal one, and is facilitated by the contacts he has made in the Port as a casual worker; the profits made from this trade enable him to rent a prominent stall in the central market area, and deal in predominantly, though not exclusively legitimate commodities.

The length of the successive periods of time in which someone has a specific form of employment can be weeks, months or years. Individuals' experiences, the disaggregated elements of consistent and concrete historical trends, appear at the individual level to be haphazard until they are placed in the context of the evolution of the economy and society in question. Nevertheless they can clearly indicate the types of transition and differentiation taking place - acquisition of the means of production, their loss; partial proletarianisation, this process completed or perpetuated in its partial form; reproduction of capital, accumulation, and perhaps the development of a capitalist organisation of production; apparent stagnation or chronic decline.

### III.5. COMPLEMENTARY CASE-STUDIES AND INTERVIEWS

Whenever the questionnaire data appeared to provide insufficient material relating to areas relevant to the study, or where information required was unobtainable through questionnaire techniques, small case studies were undertaken in order to provide that missing data. For example, the role of the State in the evolution of petty production was an aspect of the study under

consideration; in order to clarify this aspect, it was necessary to undertake interviews both with the government organs of intervention (in this case the Senegalese National Corporation for Industrial Studies and Promotion - S.O.N.E.P.I.) and with those who had been recipients of State aid. It was also necessary to take into consideration both the situation and the opinions of those who were not recipients of such assistance. Equally, when a particular phenomenon, complaint, etc., arose with frequency in questionnaire interviews, it was important to collect data from other sources, in order to place a particular phenomenon in its true perspective. For instance, both in the pilot-study and in the questionnaire-survey, there was frequent reference to abuses of power by the government service that deals with fair trading and the collection of commercial taxes - the Contrôle Économique. To better understand the role of the latter, and to investigate its relationship with small commercial and productive enterprises, interviews were undertaken with managers and officers of this service that would corroborate or invalidate the interview material. The following excerpts from the field-notes relating to a pilot-study interview, highlight the need to collect such complementary data:

"The charcoal vendor (...) buys from wholesalers who in turn buy in the interior from charcoal-burners. The official prices should be 500 francs CFA per sack [wholesale, CG], and 13 francs CFA a kilo [retail, CG]. However, even though the government controls the retail price, the wholesalers refuse to accept less than 650 francs CFA per sack of varying [usually downwards, CG] weight. (...) It was later discovered that the Contrôle Économique had confiscated the scales of the charcoal vendor on the grounds that they were not accurate and bore no official stamp. He could collect them from the central office on payment of a fine. No official stamp appeared to be available to prevent subsequent 'mistakes' from occurring. In all, the vendor lost 500 francs in fines, and a day and a half's business. This happens regularly, he says, even if you are co-operative with the men from the Contrôle Économique." (195)

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(195) For the full interview, see Chapter 4, interview XII.

In order to put many stories like this in their proper perspective, one obviously had to be aware, not only of the regulations theoretically enforced by such organisations as Contrôle Économique, but the ways in which the regulations are put into practice, to what extent, and subject to which modifications.

In order to pursue the analysis of differentiation and change among footwear manufacturers in Dakar, once it was understood that raw materials were monopolised by a single Lebanese merchant, this latter was traced and interviewed. This encounter facilitated the understanding of the relationship both currently and historically, and considerably added to the data available on this particular section of urban petty producers. To return for a moment to Allen's (1971:228) caution over the use of personal interview data, the techniques used here both expanded the data-base available, allowed a certain amount of 'triangulation' of data drawn from various informants to be undertaken, and avoided the argument being based purely on one set of subjective assessments.

Other interviews, both individually and as part of a series, were done in order to expand the quantity of data available, and to collect material on appropriate occupations and activities not specifically studied in the questionnaire survey. Material on street food-selling, the wood trade, 'co-operative' (196) tailoring concerns, some examples of small mass production, luggage production, etc., was also collected, on the one hand to fill in gaps in the data on small scale production in general and, on the other, to supplement the coverage of the original pilot-study. These

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(196) These were mainly central workshops paying extremely high rents, each filled with independent tailors, each of whom had their own clients. By sharing a workshop and, of course, the rent, overheads could be reduced, and a more favourable location with quantitatively and qualitatively better flows of clients attained. Whenever larger orders were obtained, or orders unable to be effected by the tailor in question, the work was subcontracted (informally) or shared out, in order that no potential customer should remain unsatisfied, and no possible source of income should remain untapped.

additional interviews (not necessarily undertaken in the suburbs chosen for the purposive questionnaire survey) numbered approximately 30, and comprised the occupations presented in Table III.7.

TABLE III.7. ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS BY OCCUPATION

OCCUPATION	No.	OCCUPATION	No.
Food sellers	6	Fish sellers	1
Wood sellers	5	Gravel-makers	1
Drinks sellers	3	Restaurateurs	1
Carpenters	3	Shoe-sellers	1
Tailors	3	Tarpaulin-makers	1
Fruit sellers	2	Transporters	1
Brick-makers	1	Wage workers	1

Thus, in aggregate, the material available for the analysis of petty production in Dakar consisted of 100 personal interviews (from the pilot-study and the complementary interviews), 285 questionnaire interviews (i.e. the purposive survey of 4 occupations in 3 areas of the city), and a number of supportive case-studies.

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APPENDIX IV. (1) THE PURPOSIVE SURVEY OF PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCERS

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. NAME: [OPEN QUESTION]
2. ADDRESS: [OPEN QUESTION]
3. SUBURB: [OPEN QUESTION]
4. OCCUPATION: Furniture-maker  Tailor  Shoemaker  Mechanic/  
Metalworker .
5. AGE: [OPEN QUESTION].
6. MIGRATION STATUS: Village born  Urban born .
7. RESIDENCE IN DAKAR: How many years have you resided  
permanently in Dakar?
8. REGION OF BIRTH: Cap Vert  Thiès  Diourbel  Sine-Saloum   
Fleuve  Sénégal-Oriental  Casamance  Mauritania  Cape  
Verde Islands  Republic of Guinea  Guinea-Bissau  Mali   
Other [SPECIFY] .
9. ETHNIC GROUP: Wolof  Lebou  Serere  Toucouleur  Peul Fouta  
 Bambara  Soninke  Mandinka  Diola  Other [SPECIFY].
10. RELIGION: Moslem (unspecified)  Moslem (Tidjane Brotherhood)   
Moslem (Mouride Brotherhood)  Moslem (Layene Brotherhood)   
Moslem (Khadria Brotherhood)  catholic  protestant   
animist  no response .
11. MARITAL STATUS: married (1 wife)  married (two wives)   
married (three or more wives)  co-habiting  bachelor   
widow(er).
12. NUMBER OF CHILDREN: .
13. NUMBER OF CHILDREN ATTENDING SCHOOL .
14. NUMBER OF CHILDREN OF SCHOOL-AGE .
15. TYPE(S) OF SCHOOL(S) ATTENDED BY CHILDREN: private shanty-  
town school  private non-denominational 'bricks and mortar'  
school  Christian denominational school  State school   
Koranic school.
16. MONTHLY COST OF CHILDREN'S EDUCATION (including transport,  
materials, etc.) Total and per child (TO BE CALCULATED BY  
INTERVIEWER).
17. VALUE OF SCHOOLING: Does schooling gives children more chance  
of finding a job? Less chance of finding a job? Yes  No   
Makes no difference to children's job opportunities
18. FOLLOWING YOUR FOOTSTEPS: Do you think your children will  
follow in your occupational footsteps after their schooling?  
Yes  No .

19. YOUR SCHOOLING (1): Did you attend school? Yes  No .
20. YOUR SCHOOLING (2): If so, what was the last class you attended? Elementary  Middle-school  Secondary [SPECIFY].
21. TECHNICAL TRAINING (1): Did you receive any technical education? Yes  No .
22. TECHNICAL TRAINING (2) If so, at which establishment? [OPEN QUESTION]
23. WHERE SCHOOLED? Did you attend school mainly in Dakar  mainly elsewhere?
24. LITERACY IN FRENCH (1): Do you read and write French (to be assessed, if necessary, by the interviewer)? Yes  No .
25. LITERACY IN FRENCH (2): If not at school, how did you learn French? [OPEN QUESTION]
26. WHERE TRADE LEARNT (1): Did you learn your trade in: a professional institute  apprenticed to an artisan or jobbing tradesman  apprenticed in a firm  wage-earner in a firm  other [SPECIFY] .
27. WHERE TRADE LEARNT (2): In what sort of firm did you learn your trade? foreign company  African firm  small European firm  Lebanese firm  with an artisan or jobbing tradesman  the State  the Army  Other [SPECIFY].
28. WHERE TRADE LEARNT (3) Where did you learn your trade mainly in Cap Vert  mainly elsewhere?
29. SKILLS ACQUIRED: Which skills did you learn? [OPEN QUESTION]
30. FINDING FIRST JOB: Who helped you to find your first job? (SPECIFY whether friend, relative, etc.). [OPEN QUESTION]
31. LENGTH OF APPRENTICESHIP: Did your apprenticeship last, in your opinion, too long  sufficient time  not long enough?
32. CERTIFICATION (1): Did you receive certification on leaving your apprenticeship? Yes  No .
33. CERTIFICATION (2): If so, to which category were you assigned? 1  2  3  4  5  6  7 .
34. WORK FOR FORMER MASTER? Did you work for your former master after the apprenticeship? Yes  No .
35. FORMER MASTER HELPED TO FIND JOB? Did your former master help you in gaining your present situation? Yes  No .
36. TOOLS: How did you obtain your basic tools at the start of your career? Purchased new  purchased second-hand  gift [SPECIFY FROM WHOM]  on a loan from a friend or relative  on institutional credit  several of these methods [SPECIFY WHICH]  other methods  [SPECIFY].
37. EMPLOYMENT OFFICE (1): Have you ever been found work by the Employment Office? Yes  No .

38. EMPLOYMENT OFFICE (2): If so, was that employment found for you quickly and easily  after several weeks  only after a very long time ?
39. NUMBER OF EARNERS IN FAMILY (1): Are you the only member of your household who is currently earning? Yes  No .
40. NUMBER OF EARNERS IN FAMILY (2): If not, how many others earn?  [SPECIFY how much, through what occupation(s), and how much of this is contributed to household expenses].
41. EARNINGS THIS YEAR: What have been your average monthly earnings from January (1974) to the present? Less than 5000 francs CFA  5,001-10,000  10,001-15,000  15,001-20,000  20,001-25,000  25,001-30,000  30,001- 35,000  35,001-40,000  40,001-50,000  more than 50,000 francs CFA [SPECIFY HOW MUCH].
42. HOUSE-OWNER? Do you own your house  rent rooms  do you lodge at a friend or relative's house ?
43. HOME & WORK: Is your home on the same plot as your workshop  same suburb  another suburb?
44. HOUSE RENTAL: If you have rented accommodation, what is your rent/month? 1,001-1,500 francs CFA  1,501- 2,000  2,001-2,500  2,501-3,000  3,001-4,000  4,001-5,000  5,001-10,000  more than 10,000 .
45. HOUSE TYPE: In what sort of house do you live? Wooden shack with electricity and water  wooden shack with water  wooden shack with electricity  wooden shack without water or electricity  brick house with water  brick house with electricity  brick house without water or electricity  other  [SPECIFY].
46. OTHER INCOME SOURCES (1): Do you have any other sources of income apart from your primary occupation? Yes  No .
47. OTHER INCOME SOURCES (2): If so, specify source, activity, monthly income.
48. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (1): Do you own  co-own  rent your workshop ? [SPECIFY ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS]
49. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (2): If you are the (co-)owner, do you have a permit to occupy the workshop? Yes  No .
50. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (3): If so how much did you have to pay? [OPEN QUESTION]
51. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (4): Was there an intermediary? Yes  No  If so who [SPECIFY]?
52. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (5): Did you build your workshop yourself  or have it built ?
53. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (6): If you built your workshop yourself, did you obtain a permit to do so? Yes  No .

54. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (7): If so, how much did you have to pay? [OPEN QUESTION]
55. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (8): Was there an intermediary? Yes  No . If so who? [SPECIFY].
56. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (9): Do you own other workshops? Yes  No .
57. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (10): If so, are you the (co-)owner?  (co-)tenant?  [SPECIFY ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENT].
58. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (11): If you rent a workshop or workshops, how much rent do you pay? [OPEN QUESTION]
59. WORKSHOP OWNERSHIP (12): What type of workshop do you have? Wooden shack with water and electricity  wooden shack with water  wooden shack with electricity  wooden shack with neither water nor electricity  brick workshop with water and electricity  brick workshop with neither water nor electricity  workshop with combination of above  workshop with other working arrangements .
60. UTILITIES (1): If you have a water-supply, do you pay a bill yourself, direct to SONEES (The State Water Company)  do you pay a given amount to a private intermediary ?
61. UTILITIES (2): If you have an electricity-supply, do you pay a bill yourself, directly to SENELEC (The State Electricity Company)?  do you pay a given amount to a private intermediary?
62. UTILITIES (3): If you pay SONEES, what is your average bi-monthly bill? [OPEN QUESTION, TO BE CALCULATED BY INTERVIEWER, IF NECESSARY].
63. UTILITIES (4): If you pay SENELEC, what is your average monthly bill? [OPEN QUESTION, to be calculated by interviewer, if necessary].
64. UTILITIES (5): If you pay an intermediary for water, how much does this cost per month? [OPEN QUESTION].
65. UTILITIES (6): If you pay an intermediary for electricity, how much does this cost per month? [OPEN QUESTION].
66. TAXES/LICENCES (1): Do you pay Market Tax? Yes  No .
67. TAXES/LICENCES (2): If so, how much per day? [OPEN QUESTION].
68. TAXES/LICENCES (3): Do you pay a patente (commercial licence)? Yes  No .
69. TAXES/LICENCES (4): If so, how much and how often? [OPEN QUESTION].
70. RENTED EQUIPMENT (1): Do you rent any machinery, tools, etc.? Yes  No .

71. RENTED EQUIPMENT (2): If so, SPECIFY the type of equipment, for how long you have rented it and the monthly cost. [OPEN QUESTION].
72. RENTED EQUIPMENT (3): Was the equipment rented from an individual  a small firm  a large firm?  other?  [SPECIFY].
73. EQUIPMENT ON CREDIT (1): Are you currently purchasing or have you in the past purchased machines, equipment, materials, etc. on credit? Yes  No .
74. EQUIPMENT ON CREDIT (2): If so, what were/are the credit arrangements? (i.e. SPECIFY the equipment, the credit source, the cost per period and the rate of interest involved) [OPEN QUESTION].
75. EQUIPMENT ON LOAN (1): Are you currently (or have you in the past) borrowed tools, equipment or other necessities for your work? Yes  No . If so, SPECIFY.
76. EQUIPMENT ON LOAN (2): If so, please give details of the equipment, from whom it was borrowed and any conditions which were attached [OPEN QUESTION].
77. INVESTMENT: If you had 500,000 francs CFA (197) to invest in your work, what equipment or tools would you purchase and why? [OPEN QUESTION].
78. EMPLOYER (1)? Do you use other people's labour? Yes  No .
79. EMPLOYER (2) If so, do your workers own all their own tools  own only the basic tools  not own any of the tools?  other responses .
80. EMPLOYER (3): Do you pay a fixed amount each day/week/month to your workers? Yes  No . [SPECIFY PERIODICITY].
81. EMPLOYER (4): If not, do you pay a variable "piece-rate" when the work is complete and has been paid for? Yes  No .
82. EMPLOYER (5): If so, how do you work out your employees' share of the payment? [OPEN QUESTION].
83. EMPLOYER (6): when business is bad, do you pay your workers late never  rarely  sometimes  often .
84. EMPLOYER (7): When there is no work for them to perform, do all the workers stay in the workshop? Yes  No .
85. APPRENTICES (1): How are your apprentices remunerated in kind? Clothing only  food only  food and accommodation  food, clothing & accommodation  they receive nothing .
86. APPRENTICES (2): are your apprentices ever remunerated in cash? Yes they are given a sum at religious festivals  a fixed sum at regular intervals  they receive nothing .

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(197) Approximately £950 at 1974 prices.

87. APPRENTICES (3): If they receive cash sums either regularly or irregularly, specify how much and how often [OPEN QUESTION].
88. TEMPORARY LABOUR (1): How often do you use day labour or temporary labour? Never  rarely  sometimes  often  not applicable .
89. TEMPORARY LABOUR (2): If so, how are they paid, how often, and how much? [OPEN QUESTION].
90. SUBCONTRACTING (1): How often do you accept subcontracts? Never  rarely  sometimes  often  not applicable .
91. SUBCONTRACTING (2): If you do, please give details concerning payment [OPEN QUESTION].
92. SUBCONTRACTING (3): Do you subcontract to others? Never  rarely  sometimes  often  not applicable .
93. SUBCONTRACTING (4): If you do, please give details concerning payment [OPEN QUESTION].
94. DIVISION OF LABOUR (1): Do your workers engage in series-production (i.e. repeating the same specialised act throughout the day)  there is there no division of labour (i.e. each worker's tasks are multiple and varied throughout the day) . [SPECIFY FOR EACH WORKER AND APPRENTICE].
95. DIVISION OF LABOUR (2): How do you spend your working-day? Working with the others  supervising the workers' activities  work & supervision  discussion with clients & suppliers  work, supervision & discussion  mostly away from the workshop  other possibilities  [SPECIFY].
96. STOCKS (1): Are there stocks of raw materials or finished goods in the workshop? Yes  No .
97. STOCKS (2): If so, of what do these stocks consist and what is their approximate value? [OPEN QUESTION]
98. WORKING HOURS: Is the workshop open all day and every day? Yes  No . Do you close when no work is available? Yes  No .
99. INPUTS (1): Do you buy the materials necessary for your work: regularly  often but irregularly  only when are required  other responses .
100. INPUTS (2): Do your clients buy the materials needed to complete their orders: never  rarely  often  sometimes  always  other responses ?
101. INPUTS (3): Does the client have to advance you money in order that the basic materials can be bought? Never  rarely  sometimes  often  always  other responses .

102. INPUTS (4): From whom do you purchase your essential raw materials? (Specify the materials and the source) [OPEN QUESTION].
103. INPUTS (5): Are there kinship relations between you and your suppliers? With none  with a few  with many  with all .
104. INPUTS (6): How did you establish your network of suppliers? Thanks to other craftsmen  relative's or friend's recommendation  found them yourself  found some and some recommended  found some myself and some through other craftsmen  found some myself, some through other craftsmen, others recommended  some through other craftsmen, others through relative's or friend's recommendation  other possibilities .
105. RECENT SALES: Please list your last 10 sales, plus your largest sale since January 1974. (Specify the type of client: poor African  rich African  Lebanese  European  African workshop  Lebanese firm  European firm  State or local government  other . [ALSO SPECIFY THE AMOUNT RECEIVED, THE ARTICLE OR SERVICE PROVIDED, AND ANY KINSHIP RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN THE CLIENT AND YOURSELF].
106. CLIENTS (1): How, in general, do you obtain clients? You find them yourself  you wait for them to find you  you rely on a regular clientele  you have regulars but actively seek others  other responses .
107. CLIENTS (2): Do you sell on credit? Never  only to regular clients  sometimes  other responses .
108. CLIENTS (3): Do you have no  some  many  regular clients?
109. CLIENTS (4): Do you offer discounts to regular clients? Yes  No .
110. CLIENTS (5): Do you never  rarely  sometimes  often  always  deliver goods to your clients?
111. CLIENTS (6): If you deliver, are the costs included in the purchase price , or is it extra .
112. CLIENTS (7): Who usually effects the delivery? You or one of your workers  a porter (head/handcart)  a carter (animal traction)  a driver (motor)  other .
113. RECENT RECEIPTS: What have been your gross receipts (a) from the most recent work-day? (b) last month? (c) the slackest fortnight of an average month since January 1974? (d) the busiest fortnight of an average month since January 1974? [OPEN QUESTION].
114. BUSINESS EVOLUTION (1): Has your business expanded progressively over the years since its inception? Yes  No .

115. BUSINESS EVOLUTION (2): If not, why not? Lack of finance   
Lack of demand  unprofitable location  several of these  
reasons  other reasons [SPECIFY].
116. BUSINESS EVOLUTION (3): If so, what have been the factors  
instrumental in that progressive growth? [OPEN QUESTION]
117. DELIVERIES (1): How much did you spend on raw materials  
(a) last week? (b) last month? (c) an average month since  
January 1974? [OPEN QUESTION]
118. DELIVERIES (2): Do you never  rarely  sometimes  often   
always  pay for the transport of raw materials?
119. DELIVERIES (3): If so, how much did you pay last month?  
[OPEN QUESTION].
120. DELIVERIES (4): Who effects the transport of raw materials?  
[OPEN QUESTION]
121. REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE (1): Do you have to pay for  
maintenance and repairs of equipment? Yes  No .
122. REPAIRS & MAINTENANCE (2): Who effects the  
repairs/maintenance? [OPEN QUESTION].
123. SUPPLIERS (1): Do you never  rarely  sometimes  often   
change your suppliers?
124. SUPPLIERS (2): If so, what is the most common motive for  
such a change? [OPEN QUESTION]
125. SUPPLIERS (3): Can you buy raw materials on credit? never   
some articles sometimes  some articles always  all  
articles sometimes  always .
126. TECHNOLOGY (1): Has the level of technology of your  
enterprise improved over the years since its inception? Yes  
 No .
127. TECHNOLOGY (2): If so, in what way(s)? [OPEN QUESTION].
128. TECHNOLOGY (3): If so, has this technology made your  
enterprise much more profitable than before  a little more  
profitable  it has made no difference  a little less  
profitable  a lot less profitable  can't say .
129. PROFITABILITY: Compared with the past, is your enterprise  
now much more profitable  a little more profitable   
as profitable  less profitable  can't say .
130. CUSTOMER BASE: Compared with the past, do you now have many  
more clients  a few more clients  about the same number of  
clients  a few less clients  much fewer clients  ?
131. COMPETITION (1): From the point of view of your enterprise's  
present/future success, are there too many  not enough   
sufficient number of  enterprises like yours in this  
suburb?

132. COMPETITION (2): Are your clients starting to buy from big shops and firms rather than from you? Many of them  some of them  No .
133. COMPETITION (3): If so, how can this situation be rectified? [OPEN QUESTION]
134. COMPETITION (4): If so, why do clients buy elsewhere? The big shops & firms have lower prices  they sell at higher prices but have better quality  they sell at lower prices and have better quality  they sell at the same price and have the same quality  other reasons  [SPECIFY].
135. COMPETITION (5): Do the big firms use the same techniques as you?  different techniques with more expensive machinery?  don't know .
136. COMPETITION (6): Do you use the same materials as the big firms but pay more for them?  materials of lower quality but pay less for them  don't know .
137. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION (1): Do you belong to a professional association? Yes  No .
138. PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION (2): If so, which? [OPEN QUESTION].
139. RETURN TO WAGE-EMPLOYMENT? (1): Would you accept wage-employment now? Yes  No .
140. RETURN TO WAGE-EMPLOYMENT? (2): If so, at what minimum monthly wage? [OPEN QUESTION].
141. FURTHER SKILLS TRAINING (1): At the moment, do you consider that knowledge of some new technique(s) taught to you by a training institute would be profitable for your enterprise? Yes  No  don't know  not sure .
142. FURTHER SKILLS TRAINING (2): Would like to learn such advanced skills? Yes  No .
143. FURTHER SKILLS TRAINING (3): What sort of skills would be of interest to you? [OPEN QUESTION].
144. FURTHER SKILLS TRAINING (4): If such training were available, would you be prepared to learn only if you could work at the same time? even if you had to pay for training?  only if you were paid to learn?  under other conditions  [SPECIFY]?
145. KEY FACTORS FOR SMALL BUSINESSES: What factor do you consider most important to a small independent enterprise? Technical knowledge  credit for re-equipping the workshop  easier acquisition of licences and permits  management and accounting skills  other factors [SPECIFY].
146. NEW CLIENTS: If it were possible, would you prefer to have civil servants, large firms, the State, etc., as clients? Yes  No  not sure . If so, Why? [OPEN QUESTION].

147. BETTER WORKSHOP LOCATION (1): Would you prefer to have a workshop closer to the centre of town? Yes  No .
148. BETTER WORKSHOP LOCATION (2): If so, Why? [OPEN QUESTION].
149. KEY FACTORS TO IMPROVE YOUR BUSINESS (1): Would your situation be improved by any/some/all of the following changes:
- (a) no need of licences & permits? Yes  No .
  - (b) no need to pay market tax/patente? Yes  No .
  - (c) large firms, the State, schools, hospitals, etc., purchased your goods or services? Yes  No .
  - (d) If you had a new workshop here? Yes  No .
  - (e) If you had a new workshop close(r) to the town centre? Yes  No .
  - (f) cheap credit were made available to you? Yes  No .
  - (g) free training were made available to you? Yes  No .
150. KEY FACTORS TO IMPROVE YOUR BUSINESS (2): Which of the above seven possibilities appears to you to be most important? [SPECIFY]
151. KEY FACTORS TO IMPROVE YOUR BUSINESS (3): Which of these seven possibilities appears to you to be least important? [SPECIFY]
152. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES (1): Where do you expect to be in 10 years' time? [OPEN QUESTION].
153. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES (2): What occupation do you expect to have in 10 years' time? [OPEN QUESTION].
154. FUTURE PERSPECTIVES (3): How well do you expect to be living in 10 years' time? [OPEN QUESTION].

TABULATED DATA TO BE COLLECTED, IF POSSIBLE:

- A. Work history of the petty producer.
- B. Description, cost and date of acquisition of key equipment.
- C. Data on employees: wages, educational level, ethnic group, kinship relations with petty producer, years of service with enterprise, etc.
- D. Any additional observations.

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APPENDIX IV (2) CASUAL WORKER SURVEY, DAKAR, MAY-JULY, 19714

These interviews, of which 100 were conducted, took place outside factories in the Industrial Zone of the city, where men without regular employment congregate early in the morning, in the hope of being taken on for a morning, a day, or several days' work. I should like to express my thanks to Bandiougou Coulibaly (who himself had considerable experience of life as a casual worker) for his invaluable help as both interviewer and interpreter.

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Where did the interview take place?
2. Name of respondent.
3. Age.
4. Birthplace.
5. In which suburb do you reside?
6. For what length of time have you lived in Dakar?
7. Are you a permanent resident of the city?  in Dakar for a short stay?  other answers .
8. Do you live currently in your parents' home?  your own home?  with relatives?  with friends?  alone?  other answers .
9. Is the dwelling where you live a wooden shack?  a bricks-and-mortar house?  an 'HLM'-type house?  other answers .
10. How many persons are you responsible for feeding?
11. How many of them have incomes of their own? [SPECIFY WHO].
12. How much does each earn per month?
13. How much of their earnings do they contribute to the household expenses?
14. What was the highest level of education you attained? None?  Primary  Elementary  Middle School  Secondary  [SPECIFY]
15. What is your profession or skill?
16. How did you learn these skills? As an artisan's apprentice?  as an apprentice in an enterprise?  as a trainee in a professional institute?  as a wage-earner in an enterprise?  in the Army?  other answers  [SPECIFY].

17. Describe how you look for work (i.e. which factories? what times?  every day?  friends  family networks  contacts  other methods  [SPECIFY].
18. Approximately how many days per month do you usually manage to find work?
19. Do you receive payment: on the basis of the task performed?  hourly?  daily?  weekly?  fortnightly?  monthly? .
20. By whom are you paid? The cashier's office?  the foreman or supervisor?  the owner of the enterprise?  other answers .
21. Have you had any dealings in the past with the public Employment Services? Yes  No ; are you currently registered with them as seeking work? Yes  No .
22. Do you have any relations with the trades union? Yes  No .
23. Are you a member of l'Union Progressiste Sénégalaise? Yes  No .
24. What are your relations with your employers like? [OPEN QUESTION].
25. How well do you get on with the foremen and the other "regular" employees where you habitually work? Very well  Fairly well  OK  Not so well  Poorly .
26. How would you explain the current employment situation? [OPEN QUESTION].
27. What are your views on the recent increases in the cost of living? [OPEN QUESTION].
28. What do you consider to be the main problems facing casual workers like you? [OPEN QUESTION].
29. Do you have any other sources of income apart from your casual employment? (i.e. odd jobs; trading; farming; musicianship; fetish-making; officiating at religious festivals; etc.) [OPEN QUESTION: PLEASE SPECIFY THE OCCUPATION(S) AND HOW MUCH EARNED PER MONTH].
30. Please give as detailed an account as possible of your employment history. [RECORD BELOW THE KEY DETAILS OF THE INTERVIEWEE'S LAST 10 PERIODS OF CASUAL EMPLOYMENT]:

Dates starting with most recent employment	Employer; type of firm; work function and category	Wage-rate in CFA francs per period	Duration in days of this period of casual employment	How hired; how fired; reason for termination

APPENDIX V: MISCELLANEOUS TABLES

TABLE V.1. Petty commodity producers by ethnic group & occupation (%) with a comparison of Dakar and national level ethnic compositions.

ETHNIC GROUP	Nation	Dakar	OCCUPATION(%)				Sample
			Furniture makers	Tailors	Shoe-makers	Mechanics & metal-workers	
Wolof	36.3	43.0	64.1	56.3	75.7	64.5	65.2
Lébou	1.4	12.0	6.4	2.8	1.3	6.5	4.2
Serère	19.6	6.0	6.4	7.0	2.7	9.7	6.3
Toucouleur	13.9	11.0	6.4	8.4	4.0	3.2	5.6
Peul Futa	7.1	5.5	2.6	11.3	6.8	3.2	6.0
Bambara*	3.2	2.2	1.3	1.4	-	-	0.7
Soninké	2.1	3.0	1.3	1.4	6.8	-	2.5
Mandinka*	3.2	2.3	-	1.4	-	1.6	0.7
Diola	7.1	2.5	5.1	2.8	-	4.8	3.2
Others	5.9	12.5	6.4	7.2	2.7	6.5	5.6
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(\*) The figures for the general Dakar population (from NEDECO) grouped Bambara and Mandinka together; in this table they have been disaggregated (using data from République du Sénégal, 1969).

TABLE V.2 Petty commodity producers by religion and occupation (%)

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION	Furniture-makers	Tailors	Shoe-makers	Mechanics & metal-workers	Sample
Moslem ( <u>Mouride</u> )	37.2	68.9 *	29.6	37.1	45.3 *
Moslem ( <u>Tidjane</u> )	42.3	16.2	43.7	43.5	36.1
Moslem ( <u>Khadria</u> )	8.9	1.3	7.0	9.7	6.7
Moslem (unspecified)	8.9	10.8	16.9	8.1	11.2
Moslem (total)	97.3	97.2	97.2	98.4	97.5
Catholic	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.6	2.5
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(\*) If the additional sample of 25 Médina shoemakers is excluded, the proportion of Mourides falls to 59% (occupation) and 39.2% (sample).

TABLE V.3. Petty commodity producers: town- versus village-born (%).

OCCUPATION	TOWN-BORN	VILLAGE-BORN
Furniture-makers	78.2	21.8
Tailors	64.8	35.2
Shoe-makers	52.7	47.3
Mechanics/Metalworkers	72.6	27.4
SAMPLE	67.0	33.0

TABLE V.4. Regional origin of petty commodity producers (%)

OCCUPATION:	Furniture- makers	Tailors	Shoe- makers	Mechanics & metal- workers	Sample
REGION:					
Cap Vert	19.2	11.3	6.8	17.7	13.7
Thiès	25.6	16.9	21.6	17.7	20.7
Diourbel	24.4	22.5	45.9	32.2	31.2
Sine-Saloum	9.0	9.8	5.4	6.4	7.7
Fleuve	10.3	15.5	5.4	9.7	10.2
Sénégal Oriental	-	-	2.7	-	0.7
Casamance	6.4	5.6	-	8.1	4.9
non-Senegalese	5.1	18.4	12.2	8.2	10.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

TABLE V.5. Petty commodity producers: spatial relations between work-place and residence (%).

OCCUPATION:	Furniture- makers	Tailors	Shoe- makers	Mechanics & metal- workers	Sample
WORKPLACE vs RESIDENCE:					
Live/work same suburb	23.1	26.8	33.7	16.1	66.9
Live/work at residence	7.7	5.6	13.6	79.0	8.2
Live/work different suburbs	69.2	67.6	52.7	28,9	4.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

**TABLE V.6. Petty commodity producers' children: number, children of school-age, children at school.**

OCCUPATION:	Furniture-makers	Tailors	Shoe-makers	Mechanics & metal-workers	SAMPLE
Average No. of children	6.4	3.2	3.8	5.2	4.8
Average No. of school-age children	6.1	2.2	2.8	3.0	3.8
Average No. of children at school	3.4	1.8	2.6	3.0	2.5

**TABLE V.7. Age distribution of petty commodity producers (%).**

AGE RANGE (in years)	Furniture-makers	Tailors	Shoe-makers	Mechanics & metal-workers	SAMPLE
≤ 20	-	7.0	2.7	1.6	2.8
21-25	11.5	18.3	6.8	14.8	12.6
26-30	15.4	28.2	5.4	13.1	15.4
31-35	28.2	22.5	14.9	21.3	21.8
36-40	9.0	11.3	16.2	16.4	13.0
41-45	20.5	5.6	18.9	9.8	14.0
46-50	-	2.8	16.2	4.9	6.0
51-60	9.0	2.8	8.1	11.5	7.7
≥ 61	6.4	1.5	10.8	6.6	6.7
TOTALS	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

APPENDIX VI. TRANSITION MATRICES (WHOLE SAMPLE AND BY INDIVIDUAL OCCUPATIONS) USED IN CHAPTER 6.v.

KEY TO TRANSITION MATRICES VI.A. - VI.E.

E	POINT OF ENTRY INTO CAREER, FOLLOWED BY SOME/ALL OF THE FOLLOWING STEPS OR STAGES:
σ	Intermittent self-employment (as one of several distinct activities).
A	Military service (army).
AAf	Apprenticeship with small African enterprise.
AC	Apprenticeship with European or Lebanese capitalist firm.
Af	Intermittent/causal employment in African small enterprises.
AG	Peasant farming.
AM	Apprenticeship with Municipal enterprise (e.g. Electricity Co.)
I	Illness preventing regular work.
J	Journeymanship (low wage + food/accommodation, working for relative/former master.
K	Full-time trading activities.
S	Full-time self-employment as petty producer.
U	Open unemployment (subjectively assessed).
WAF	Wage-employment in African small enterprises.
WC	Wage-employment in capitalist industry or commerce.
wc	Intermittent/casual employment in capitalist industry or commerce.
WM	Wage-employment in municipal enterprises.
∅	FULL-TIME SELF-EMPLOYMENT AS PETTY PRODUCER (OSTENSIBLY THE 'ABSORBING' OR 'STEADY' STATE)
Σ	Column and line totals (measured in 'subjective' years).

Note: Periods spent in each stage of the working career were quantified on the basis of detailed employment histories collected as part of the questionnaire survey of 285 petty commodity producers.

**FIG. VI.A. AGGREGATE TRANSITION MATRIX FOR SAMPLE OF 285 PETTY COMMODITY PRODUCERS.**

	E	AAF	AM	AC	AG	WC	WAF	wc	waf	WM	U	A	I	J	K	σ	S	∅	Σ
E		232	13	35	3										1		1		285
AAF		1315		2	4	17	35	9	1	2	4	3		6		3	152		1553
AM			52			5	1	1			2	1					5		67
AC				199		22	1				1	2					14		238
AG		1			25			1	1								5		33
WC				1		487	2	4		1	8	2	3			10	51		569
WAF						14	152				1					1	28		196
wc		2	2			1	1	32	2				3	2			8		53
waf									7		1						4		12
WM						1	1			38							2		42
U				1		6		1			22						11		41
A		1				3		1	1	1		27					2		36
I													5				8		13
J		1												12			7		20
K		1													20		1		22
σ						4	1	1					1			56	7		70
S					1	9	2	3			2	2	1		1		2468	285	2774
∅	285																		285
Σ	285	1553	67	238	33	569	196	53	12	42	41	36	13	20	22	70	2774	285	6309

The numbers in each cell refer to distinct 'steps' in a respondents' working lives, each equal to approximately one year. The diagonal line indicates the number of times respondents did not change their form of employment e.g. there was a total of 22 occasions on which they considered themselves unemployed (U) in one year and remained so the next (U). Similarly, there were 35 occasions on which they made the transition from apprentice in a small African enterprise (AAF) to a wage-worker in the same type of enterprise (WAF).

**FIG. VI.B. TRANSITION MATRIX FOR SUBSAMPLE OF 78 FURNITURE-MAKERS.**

	E	AAF	AM	AC	AG	WC	WAF	wc	waf	WM	U	A	I	J	K	$\sigma$	S	$\emptyset$	$\Sigma$	
E		54	6	16	2															78
AAF		288			1	15	11	2	1	2	2	1					19			342
AM			37			2		1									3			43
AC				96		11	1					1					3			112
AG					19			1	1								1			22
WC						237	1	2		1	1					7	28			277
WAF						3	103				1	1				1	12			121
wc							1	14	2		1					1	8			24
waf									8								4			12
WM						1	1			14							1			17
U						2		1			19						2			24
A								1				8					2			11
I																				
J																				
K																				
$\sigma$						3	1	1								18	5			28
S						3	1	1								1	445	78		532
$\emptyset$	78																			78
$\Sigma$	78	342	43	112	22	277	121	24	12	17	24	11	0	0	0	28	532	78		1721

The numbers in each cell refer to distinct 'steps' in respondents' working lives, each equal to approximately one year. The diagonal line indicates the number of times respondents did not change their form of employment e.g. there was a total of 288 occasions on which they were apprentices in a small African enterprise (AAF) in one year and remained so the next year (AAF). Similarly, there were 15 occasions on which they made the transition from apprentice in a small African enterprise (AAF) to wageworker in a capitalist enterprise (WC).

**FIG. VI.C. TRANSITION MATRIX FOR SUBSAMPLE OF 71 TAILORS.**

	E	AAF	AM	AC	AG	WC	WAF	wc	waf	WM	U	A	I	J	K	σ	S	∅	Σ	
E		64	3	3	1															71
AAF		59			2	1	8				2	1		3		2	47			325
AM			9			1						1					1			12
AC				22							1						3			26
AG		1			0												2			3
WC						45					2						6			53
WAF							8				1						8			17
wc								0												
waf							8		0											
WM										0										
U				1		3					1						2			8
A		1				2						1								3
I							1						0				2			2
J														0			3			3
K															0					
σ																24	1	1		26
S						2					1		2				327	70		402
∅	71																		0	71
Σ	71	325	12	26	3	53	17	0	0	0	8	3	2	3	0	26	402	71		1022

The numbers in each cell refer to distinct 'steps' in respondents' working lives, each equal to approximately one year. The diagonal line indicates the number of times respondents did not change their form of employment e.g. there was a total of 8 occasions on which they were wageworkers in a small African enterprise (WAF) in one year and remained so the next year (WAF). Similarly, there were also 47 occasions on which they made the transition from apprentice in a small African enterprise (AAF) to self-employment as a petty producer (S).

FIG. VI.D. TRANSITION MATRIX FOR SUBSAMPLE OF 74 SHOE-MAKERS.

	E	AAF	AM	AC	AG	WC	WAF	wc	waf	WM	U	A	I	J	K	$\sigma$	S	$\emptyset$	$\Sigma$	
E		71	1	2																74
AAF		535		1	1	1	1	1						2			64			606
AM			3				1													4
AC				1		2											1			4
AG					6												2			8
WC						40					2						3			45
WAF							3										2			5
wc								12									1			13
waf																				
WM																				
U											1						3			4
A																				
I																				
J														9			3			12
K																				
$\sigma$																				
S					1	2					1			1			1203	74		1282
$\emptyset$	74																			74
$\Sigma$	74	606	4	4	8	45	5	13			4			12			1282	74		2131

The numbers in each cell refer to distinct 'steps' in respondents' working lives, each equal to approximately one year. The diagonal line indicates the number of times respondents did not change their form of employment e.g. there was a total of 535 years in which they were apprentices in an African enterprise (AAF) one year and remained so the next year (AAF). Similarly, there were only 3 occasions on which they made the transition from wageworker in a capitalist enterprise (WC) to self-employed petty producer (S).

**FIG. VI.E. TRANSITION MATRIX FOR SUBSAMPLE OF 62 MECHANICS & METALWORKERS.**

	E	AAF	AM	AC	AG	WC	WAF	wc	waf	WM	U	A	I	J	K	σ	S	∅	Σ
E		43	3	14											1		1		62
AAF		233		1		11	6					2		1		1	21		276
AM			3			2											1		6
AC				80		9											7		96
AG																			
WC				1		165	1	2			3	2	2			3	17		196
WAF						2	38										5		45
wc						1		8					1						10
waf																			
WM										24							1		25
U						1					1						2		4
A						2				1		18					1		22
I													5				4		9
J														3			1		4
K															20		1		21
σ						1							1			14	2		18
S						2											493	62	557
∅	62																		62
Σ	62	276	6	96		196	45	10		25	4	22	9	4	21	18	557	62	1413

The numbers in each cell refer to distinct 'steps' in respondents' working lives, each equal to approximately one year. The diagonal line indicates the number of times respondents did not change their form of employment e.g. there was a total of 24 occasions on which they were wageworkers in a municipal enterprise (WM) in one year and remained so the next year (WM). Similarly, there was 17 occasions on which they made the transition from wageworker in a capitalist enterprise (WC) to self-employed petty producer (S).

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